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2025 DAILYLAW 1015 (CHH)

RAJENDRA NAIDU v. ARUN KUMAR NAIDU

CRMP/3/2023 · 2025-04-11

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 2025:CGHC:17004 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 3 of 2023 1 - Rajendra Naidu S/o Late Pasupaleti Vasudev Naidu, Aged About 54 Years, R/o - Byron Bazar Raipur, Police Station- City Kotwali, Tahsil and District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh, Mo. No. 8964000088 ... Petitioner versus 1 - Arun Kumar Naidu S/o- Late Jayakar Naidu, Aged About 44 Years, R/o- Anand Nagar, Near Balaji Temple, Telibandha Raipur, Police Station- Telibandha, Tahsil And District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - State of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate. For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Shashi Bhushan Tiwari, Advocate. For State/Respondent No.2 Mr. Gorelal Uikey, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 11-04-2025 1. The petitioner has filed the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. against the impugned order dated 01-12-2022 passed by learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, in Criminal Revision No. 328/2022, whereby the criminal revision filed by the petitioner is dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is an accused in Complaint Case No. 1315/2020, pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, arising out of the Complaint filed by the Respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, (in short “NI Act”). In the complaint case, the allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner and the respondents, under their mutual agreement to develop the residential plots over 10-12 Acres of the land of the petitioner, the respondent/complainant invested a huge amount in Digitally signed by MOHAMMAD AADIL KHAN 2 the project, which makes the complainant entitled for return of about Rs. 1,05,00,000/-. The petitioner/accused has given nine cheques in lieu of the amount to which he was entitled. When the respondent/complainant deposited the said nine cheques for clearance in his bank account, eight cheques out of nine cheques were dishonoured by the payee bank. The respondent/complainant, after due process of legal demand notice, prosecuted the criminal complaint case under Section 138 of the NI Act before the learned trial court. In the Criminal Complaint Case, the petitioner/accused appeared and he was released on bail. 3. On 20-05-2022, the respondent No.1/complainant filed an application under Section 143-A of the NI Act for interim compensation of 20% of the amount of the cheques. The said application was replied by the petitioner/accused, and after hearing the parties, the learned trial court allowed the application on 06-07-2022 and directed the petitioner/accused to pay 20% of the total amount of cheques as interim compensation to the respondent/complainant within 60 days from the date of the order. 4. The order dated 06-07-2022 passed by the learned trial court was challenged by the petitioner/accused before the learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, by filing a Criminal Revision No. 328/2022, which is decided on 01-12-2022 and the learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the criminal revision filed by the petitioner. The order dated 01-12-2022 is under challenge in the present petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner/accused would submit that the provisions of Section 143-A of the NI Act are not mandatory but discretionary, and before passing the order, the learned trial court ought to have considered the facts and circumstances of the case. The order cannot be passed mechanically. The learned trial court should also have considered the financial distress and paying capacity of the petitioner/accused, the defence taken by the accused, and the quantum of interim compensation, which are lacking in the present case. The reasons for granting interim compensation should also be recorded by the learned trial court but only on the ground that the provisions are there to grant 3 interim compensation, the application is allowed. Therefore, the impugned order is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and submits that after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down in the field, the learned trial court has rightly exercised its discretion and has passed the order granting interim compensation to the respondent/complainant. Before granting the interim compensation, the learned trial court has considered the facts of the case and the transaction between the parties. The order passed by the learned trial court has been affirmed in criminal revision, which also dealt with the matter in detail. Therefore, there are no merits in the petition, and the same is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition. 8. It is relevant here to quote the provisions of Section 143-A of the NI Act which is inserted w.e.f. 01-09-2018 which reads as under:- “Section 143A: Power to direct interim compensation—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (2 of 1974) the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant– (a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and (b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. (2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty per cent. of the amount of the cheque. (3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. (4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant. (5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section.” 4 9. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava Vs State of Jharkhand and another, (2024) 4 SCC 419, observed that the provision of Section 143-A of the N.I. Act is discretionary, and before passing the order, the subjective satisfaction has to be recorded by the concerned Court, and the relevant paragraphs are extracted here under for ready reference: “27. Subject to what is held earlier, the main conclusions can be summarized as follows: “27.1 The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143-A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word “may” used in the provision cannot be construed as “shall.” 27.2 While deciding the prayer made under Section 143-A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors. 27.3 The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143-A are as follows: 27.3.1 The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration. 27.3.2 A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case. 27.3.3 If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. 27.3.4 If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. While doing so, the Court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc. 27.3.5 There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive.” 10. From perusal of the order dated 06-07-2022 passed by the learned trial court, it appears that the learned trial court has considered the facts and circumstances 5 of the case and has observed in its order that the case is at the evidence stage, the name of the petitioner/accused is “P. Rajendra Naidu” whereas he has been made as an accused in the name of “Rajendra Naidu”, all the cheques are of prior to the year 2015 which was lying with the complainant, and the same are non-MICR cheques, and the financial capacity of the petitioner/accused are the matter of evidence. The petitioner/accused had not raised any objection regarding his name as mentioned in the cause title of the complaint memo on the first hearing when he appeared in the case. The cheque was dishonoured on the ground of insufficient balance and not on the ground of a non-MICR cheque. The provisions of Section 143-A of the NI Act are amended w.e.f. 01-09-2018 and gives the power to grant interim compensation to the complainant, which shall not exceed twenty per cent of the amount of the cheque. 11. From consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Ranjan Shrivastava case (supra), I do not find any material illegality or irregularity which warrants interference in the impugned order. As a fallout of the aforesaid consideration, the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is liable to be and hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil