2025:UHC:6408-DB HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL JUSTICE SHRI MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI AND JUSTICE SHRI SUBHASH UPADHYAY Writ Petition (S/B) No. 385 of 2020 22 July, 2025 Bhanu Pratap Singh --Petitioner Versus State of Uttarakhand --Respondents --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Presence:- Mr. Arvind Vashishta, Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Devanshi Joshi, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Puran Singh Bisht, Addl. C.S.C. for the State --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Court made the following: JUDGMENT: (per Hon’ble Justice Sri Manoj Kumar Tiwari) 1. By means of this writ petition, petitioner has challenged rejection of his candidature for appointment as Assistant Prosecuting Officer by Government of Uttarakhand. The reliefs sought are as follows:- “(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order la[;k 672@chl&6@2020&01 ¼08½ 2007 Vh- lh-&3 (Annexure No.13) dated 05.11.2020 passed by the respondent. (b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent to consider petitioner’s candidature for the post of Assistant Prosecuting Officer.” 2. Petitioner is a Law Graduate, who was appointed 1 2025:UHC:6408-DB on probation as Civil Judge (J.D.) in State of U.P. on the recommendation of Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission. While he was undergoing training in Judicial Training Research Institute (JTRI), Lucknow, an order was passed by Principal Secretary, Home Department, State of U.P. in September, 2014, whereby petitioner was discharged from service. In the said order, it was mentioned that it is a discharge simpliciter from service as petitioner failed to give satisfaction, as stipulated in Rule 24(4) of The Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001. 3. In reply to petitioner’s writ petition (WPSB No.1654 of 2014), challenging the aforesaid discharge order, counter affidavit was filed on behalf of Allahabad High Court. In paragraph nos.17 (i) and (ii) thereof, it was mentioned that sub-rule (5) of Rule 24 of The Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001 was referred to the Rule Committee and on the recommendation of the Rule Committee, the last sentence of sub-rule (5), which created a bar for reappointment in service, was removed. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 24 of the aforesaid Rules, before amendment made by Notification dated 04.09.2015, reads as under:- (5) A person, whose services are dispensed with under sub-rule (4) shall not be entitled to compensation and 2 2025:UHC:6408-DB shall also not be eligible for reappointment to the service.” 4. After referring to sub-rule (5) of Rule 24, both before and after amendment, following statement was made in para 17 (ii) of the counter affidavit:- “Hence, there is no bar against reappointment in the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service after discharge simplicitor and the petitioners are not debarred from seeking reappointment under the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service and apart from the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service, it was always open for the petitioners to apply to other government or private services and the discharge simpliciter in question is not at all a bar from employment in government/private services. A true copy of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service (Third Amendment) Rules, 2015 is annexed herewith as Annexure CA-2 to this affidavit. Therefore, it cannot be said that an order made under Rule 24(5) of the Rules, 2001 visits the petitioners with civil consequences, and therefore, there is no violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.” 5. After his discharge from service, petitioner responded to an advertisement dated 10.06.2016 issued by Uttarakhand Public Service Commission, inviting applications against 26 vacancies on the post of Assistant Prosecuting Officer. He participated in that selection and by virtue of his merit, he was recommended for appointment. Since appointment letters were issued to other recommended candidates and petitioner alone was left out, 3 2025:UHC:6408-DB therefore, he made a representation to Secretary, Home Department, Government of Uttarakhand, in which he stated that he is neither dismissed nor removed from service nor he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, therefore, denial of appointment to him, is without any reason or justification. He also drew attention to sub-rule (5) of Rule 24 of U.P. Judicial Service Rules, 2001, which after amendment, permits reappointment of a person, who is discharged from service under Rule 24(4) of the said Rules in U.P. Judicial Service. He further stated that he has not suppressed any information and he had also enclosed the discharge certificate with his application and also pointed out that as many as 15 Trainee Judicial Officers, including the petitioner, were discharged from service, out of which 02 were reappointed in Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service and 02 others were appointed as Assistant Prosecuting Officer in State of U.P. while some others were selected and appointed in Delhi Higher Judicial Service, which proves that petitioner’s discharge from service does not disqualify him from re-appointment under the State. 6. The Secretary, Home Department, passed an order on 05.12.2020, rejecting candidature of the petitioner for appointment as Assistant Prosecuting Officer, by relying upon Rule 11 of Uttarakhand Prosecuting 4 2025:UHC:6408-DB Officers Service Rules, 2015. Thus, feeling aggrieved petitioner has approached this Court. 7. In view of the facts as mentioned above, the following questions fall for consideration of this Court: (i) Whether discharge of a probationer for unsatisfactory work would have the effect of disqualifying him for future employment, and (ii) Whether the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Uttarakhand was justified in denying appointment to the petitioner by invoking Rule 11 of The Uttarakhand Prosecuting Officers Service Rules, 2015. 8. It is not in dispute that petitioner was discharged from service without holding any disciplinary inquiry. He was discharged by invoking provisions of The U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Termination Rules, 1975’). In the discharge order passed by the State Government, there is a reference to the Resolution passed by the Full Court of Allahabad High Court, which is extracted below:- “The aforesaid probationer Judicial Officers were recommended to be discharged simpliciter from services for having failed to give satisfaction, as stipulated in Rule 24(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001” 5 2025:UHC:6408-DB 9. The order passed by Government of Uttar Pradesh reveals that the Judicial Officers, who were discharged from service, were given one month’s pay in lieu of notice, in terms of first Proviso to Rule 3(2) as required under Rule 3 of The Termination Rules, 1975. Rule 1(3) and Rule 3 of the said Rules is extracted below”- “1(3) They shall apply to all persons holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh and who are under the rule-making control of Governor, but who do not hold a lien on permanent post under the Government of Uttar Pradesh. 3. Termination of service. – (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any existing rules or orders on the subject, the services of a Government servant in temporary service shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority, or by the appointing authority to the Government servant. (2) The period of notice shall be one month: Provided that the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith, and on such termination the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances, if any, for the period of the notice or as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services. Provided further that it shall be open to the appointing authority to relieve a Government servant without any notice or accept notice for a shorter period, without requiring the Government servant to pay any penalty in lieu of notice: Provided also that such notice given by the Government servant against whom a disciplinary proceeding is pending or contemplated shall be effective only if it is accepted by the 6 2025:UHC:6408-DB appointing authority, provided in the case of a contemplated disciplinary proceeding, the Government servant is informed of the non-acceptance of his notice before the expiry of that notice.” 10. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Allahabad High Court in petitioner’s writ petition, the stand taken was that his discharge from service will not disqualify him for seeking appointment in U.P. Judicial Service or in any other government or private service. This stand is in consonance with the law of the land which provides that discharge of a probationer for unsatisfactory work does not cast any stigma and do not come in the way of his reappointment. 11. In the celebrated judgment of Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1958 Supreme Court 36, a Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “One test for determining whether the termination of the service of a Government servant is by way of punishment is to ascertain whether the servant, but for such termination, had the right to hold the post. If he had a right to the post as in the three cases hereinbefore mentioned, the termination of his service will by itself be a punishment and he will be entitled to the protection of Art. 311. In other words and broadly 7 2025:UHC:6408-DB speaking, Art. 311 (2), will apply to those cases where the Government servant, had he been employed by a private employer, will be entitled to maintain an action for wrongful dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. To put it in another way, if the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or, under the rules, the right to terminate the employment at any time, then such termination in the manner provided by the contract or the rules is, prima facie and per se, not a punishment and does not attract the provisions of Art. 311.” (Emphasis Supplied) 12. In the case of Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab & Another and connected matter, reported in (1974) 2 SCC 831, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “62. The position of a probationer was considered by this Court in Purshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [1958] S C.R. 828 Das, C.J., speaking for the Court said that where a person is appointed to a permanent post in Government service on probation the termination of his service during or at the end of the period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the Government servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post any more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to do so. Such a termination does not operate as a forfeiture of any right of a servant to hold the post, for he has no such right. Obviously such a termination cannot be a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank by way of punishment. 8 2025:UHC:6408-DB There are, however, two important observations of Das, C.J., in Dhingra's case (supra). One is that if a right exists under a contract or service Rules to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant. The other is that if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and violates Article 311 of the constitution. The reasoning why motive is said to be irrelevant is that it inheres in the state of mind which is not discernible. On the other land, if termination is founded on misconduct it is objective and is manifest. 63. No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 64. Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any Rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved, in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in those cases the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer 9 2025:UHC:6408-DB is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311(2) he can claim protection. In Gopi Kishore Prasad v. Union of India A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 689 it was said that if the Government proceeded against the probationer in the direct way without casting any aspersion on his honesty or competence, his discharge would not have the effect of removal by way of punishment. Instead of taking the easy course the Government chose the more difficult one of starting proceedings against him and branding him as a dishonest and incompetent officer.” 13. In the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and another, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520, Hon’ble Supreme Court considered and discussed the entire law regarding discharge of a probationer. Paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of this judgment are relevant, which are extracted below:- “13. Another Constitution Bench of this Court in Benjamin (A.G.) and Union of India explained the decision of Parshotam Lal Dhingra. It followed the two tests mentioned in Dhingras case viz. (1) Whether the temporary Government servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) Whether he has been visited with evil consequences. 14. If “punishment” were restricted to “evil consequences”, the Court’s task in deciding the nature of an order of termination would have been easier. Courts would only have to scan the termination order to see whether it ex facie contains the stigma or refers to a document which stigmatises the officer, in which case the termination order would have to 10 2025:UHC:6408-DB be set aside on the ground that it is punitive. In these cases the “evil consequences” must be assessed in relation to the blemish on the employee’s reputation so as to render him unfit for service elsewhere and not in relation to the post temporarily occupied by him. This perhaps is the underlying rationale of several of the decisions on the issue. 15. In V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab (2000) 3 SCC 239 cited by the appellant, the Court construed the language of the order and found that it was ex-facie stigmatic. 16. In Krishnadevaraya Education Trust & Anr. v. L.A. Balakrishna (2001) 1 Scale 196 , the first letter of termination mentioned that the Committee appointed to go into the question of general performance of each staff had found that the employee, who had been appointed on probation, “was not upto the mark”. This was followed by a second order of termination which did not refer to the employee’s performance at all. The Court held that it was preferable that the order of termination did not mention that the employee’s performance was not satisfactory as then “the employer runs the risk of the allegation being made that the order itself casts a stigma.” (SCC p.320, para 5). Nevertheless, the Court held that the reasons stated in the first order did not mean that the termination may be by way of punishment because “the probationer is on test and if the services are found not to be satisfactory, the employer has, in terms of the letter of appointment, the right to terminate the services.”(SCC p.321, para 6) 17. Finally, this Court in H.F. Sangati V. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka and Others dealt with the question whether an order terminating the appointment of a probationer Munsif could be considered to be punitive. In that case during the period of probation, several adverse remarks had been made in the confidential records of the probationer. The Administrative Committee of the High Court considered these confidential records and came to the conclusion that the appellant was not fit to be confirmed in the post of a judicial 11 2025:UHC:6408-DB officer. They recommended to the High Court accordingly. The High Court accepted the recommendation at a Full Court meeting and referred the matter to the State Government. The State Government accepted the recommendation and discharged the probationer from service. The order of termination mentioned that the employee was “unsuitable to hold the post of Munsif”. The Court held that the order did not cast any stigma on the employee and was not punitive. 18. But the law does not rest there. In Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, the Courts were asked to look behind the form of the order to find out whether the termination was in substance punitive. So when a full-scale inquiry is held against a probationer or a temporary appointee and he is found guilty, an order terminating his services for this reason has been seen as punitive and bad. It is this search for the “substance” behind the “form” of the order of punishment which has lead to some apparently conflicting decisions.” 14. In the aforesaid judgment (Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI), after considering the judgments on the point, Hon’ble Supreme Court enunciated the law in para-29 of the judgment, which is also extracted below:- “29. Before considering the facts of the case before us one further, seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test needs to be cleared viz. what language in a termination order would amount to a stigma? Generally speaking when a probationer’s appointment is terminated it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer’s 12 2025:UHC:6408-DB appointment, is also not stigmatic. The decisions cited by the parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job.” (Emphasis Supplied) 15. In the case of Rajesh Kumar Srivastava vs. State of Jharkhand and others, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 447, Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that a probationer can be released from service for unsatisfactory work and such release would not amount to dismissal or removal from service. Para 9 and 10 of this judgment are extracted below:- “9. The records placed before us disclose that at the time when the impugned order was passed, the appellant was working as a Probationer Munsif. A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. There are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation. At that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the probationer (appellant) are generally under scrutiny and on the basis of his overall performance a decision is generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service. In the present case, in the course of adjudging such suitability it was found by the respondents that the performance of the appellant was not satisfactory and therefore he was not suitable for the job. 13 2025:UHC:6408-DB 10. The aforesaid decision to release him from service was taken by the respondents considering his overall performance, conduct and suitability for the job. While taking a decision in this regard neither any notice is required to be given to the appellant nor is he required to be given any opportunity of hearing. Strictly speaking, it is not a case of removal as sought to be made out by the appellant, but was a case of simple discharge from service. It is, therefore, only a termination simpliciter and not removal from service on the grounds of indiscipline or misconduct. While adjudging his performance, conduct and overall suitability, his performance record as also the report from the higher authorities were called for and they were looked into before any decision was taken as to whether the officer concerned should be continued in service or not.” (Emphasis Supplied) 16. Similar view was expressed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India and others vs. Palak Modi and another, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 607. Para 25 and 36 of the said judgment are extracted below:- “25. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his service can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post held by him. If the competent authority holds an inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then the action of the competent authority cannot be castigated as punitive. However, if the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate 14 2025:UHC:6408-DB decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice. 36. There is a marked distinction between the concepts of satisfactory completion of probation and successful passing of the training/test held during or at the end of the period of probation, which are sine qua non for confirmation of a probationer and the Bank’s right to punish a probationer for any defined misconduct, misbehaviour or misdemeanor. In a given case, the competent authority may, while deciding the issue of suitability of probationer to be confirmed, ignore the act(s) of misconduct and terminate his service without casting any aspersion or stigma which may adversely affect his future prospects but, if the misconduct/misdemeanor constitutes the basis of the final decision taken by the competent authority to dispense with the service of the probationer albeit by a non stigmatic order, the Court can lift the veil and declare that in the garb of termination simpliciter, the employer has punished the employee for an act of misconduct.” 17. In every service under the State or instrumentalities of State, appointment is made on probation in order to assess his suitability for the job. During the period of probation, an appointee is kept under watch. If the employer finds the performance of the probationer not up to the mark, then he can either extend the period of probation or discharge the probationer from service, which is also referred to as Termination Simpliciter. In the Rules governing conditions of service, the period of probation is mentioned and the extent to which it can be 15 2025:UHC:6408-DB extended is also provided. Merely because an appointee has completed the period of probation do not result in his acquiring permanent status. As per the law of the land, there cannot be automatic confirmation of a probationer in service and there has to be an express order confirming the probationer on the post he was appointed. 18. State of Uttar Pradesh has framed Rules in exercise of its rule making power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India known as The U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. The said Rules provide that a temporary government servant shall be liable to be terminated at any time by giving one month’s notice in writing or one month’s salary in lieu of such notice. A probationer does not hold lien on a post and, as such, his status remains that of a ‘temporary’ government servant. Although Rule 24(4) of U.P. Judicial Service Rules, 2001 provides for discharge of a probationer from service, however, the said provision falls short of providing a mechanism for terminating the services of a probationer or discharging him from service. The Termination Rules, 1975 applies to persons appointed to a civil post in connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh and who are under the rule-making control of Governor but do not hold a lien on any post. The said Rules 16 2025:UHC:6408-DB lay down the procedure of termination of a temporary government servant including a probationer. Thus, the Termination Rules, 1975 becomes part of conditions of service of a person appointed to service which is under rule-making control of the Governor, including the one who is appointed to U.P. Judicial Service. Thus, it can be safely inferred that the State Government reserved the right to terminate the employment of a probationer at any time under the Termination Rules, 1975 and in exercise of that right, petitioner was discharged from service. Therefore, his discharge will not amount to punishment and cannot be termed as punitive. 19. Allahabad High Court in its counter affidavit, filed before the Lucknow Bench, categorically stated that discharge of the petitioner shall not debar him from seeking reappointment in U.P. Judicial Service or any other State service. It is nobody’s case that disciplinary inquiry was initiated against the petitioner before discharging him from service and that his discharge was founded on a charge. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, petitioner’s discharge from U.P. Judicial Service will operate as disqualification for his future employment. 20. Rule 24(5) of U.P. Judicial Service Rules, 2001, as it existed before amendment in 2015 also do not disqualify 17 2025:UHC:6408-DB a discharged probationer for appointment in other services in State of Uttar Pradesh, it only operates as bar against appointment in U.P. Judicial Service. That bar has also been removed w.e.f. 04.09.2015 by an amendment. 21. Rule 11 of The Uttarakhand Prosecuting Officers Service Rules, 2015 is extracted below: “11. The character of a candidate for direct recruitment to post in the Service must be such as to render him suitable in all respects for employment in Government service. The appointing authority shall satisfy itself on this point. Note – Persons dismissed by Union Government or State Government or a Local Authority or by a Corporation or a Body owned or controlled by the Union Government or State Government shall be ineligible for appointment to any post in the service. Persons convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude shall also be ineligible.” 22. Careful perusal of Rule 11 with note appended thereto would reveal that the appointing authority can deny appointment, by direct recruitment, to a post in service if the character of a candidate is not found to be suitable for employment under the State. The note appended to Rule 11 clarifies that a person who is dismissed from service by Union Government, State Government, Local Authority, Corporation or a body under or controlled by Union/State 18 2025:UHC:6408-DB Government shall be ineligible for appointment. It further provides that person convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude shall also be ineligible. 23. Now coming back to the facts of the case in hand. Petitioner’s discharge from service does not reflect upon his character. In fact, the discharge order makes no comment on his conduct or character and the reason for discharge indicated in the order is that petitioner failed to give satisfaction as stipulated in Rule 24(4) of the U.P. Judicial Service Rules, 2001. No disciplinary inquiry was held against the petitioner before discharging him from service and he was discharged before completing training. Rule 24(4) of the aforesaid Rules provides that a member of Service, who is on probation, may be discharged from service, if he has not made sufficient use of his opportunities or has failed to give satisfaction. 24. Thus, there is no material available with the Secretary, Home, based on which such opinion can be formed that petitioner does not bear good character. 25. Government of U.P. has framed The U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975, which enables the Appointing Authority to terminate services of temporary government servant at any time by issuing one month’s notice or by paying salary in lieu of 19 2025:UHC:6408-DB such notice. Thus, the said Rules form part of conditions of service of every person appointed to a State service including judicial service. The Competent Authority exercised the power available under Rule 24(4) of the U.P. Judicial Service Rules, 2001 and discharged the petitioner from service by invoking the provision of The Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. Thus, it can be safely inferred that the discharge of petitioner from service was as per the service conditions applicable to him. His employer, in the counter affidavit, filed before the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court has mentioned that petitioner’s discharge was not by way of punishment and he was discharged as he failed to give satisfaction. Thus, it cannot be said that character of the petitioner is such which renders him unsuitable for employment in government service. In fact, petitioner stated in his representation made to the Competent Authority that other persons, who were discharged from service with him, were reappointed in U.P. Judicial Service, Delhi Higher Judicial Service and as Assistant Prosecuting Officer in State of U.P. Petitioner’s discharge from service under Rule 24(4) of the aforesaid Rules cannot be termed as dismissal or removal from service. Petitioner’s discharge was not by way of punishment but as per the conditions of 20 2025:UHC:6408-DB his service. Even otherwise also, it is not the case that petitioner was convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. Therefore, merely because petitioner was discharged from service will not render him unsuitable for appointment as Assistant Prosecuting Officer in State of Uttarakhand. 26. Thus, this Court has no hesitation in holding that denial of appointment to petitioner by the Secretary, Home, Uttarakhand is unsustainable in the eyes of law. Invocation of Rule 11 of Uttarakhand Prosecuting Officers Service Rules, 2015 for denying appointment to the petitioner is ex-facie illegal. 27. For the aforesaid reasons, impugned order dated 05.11.2020 passed by respondent is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside. Writ petition is allowed. Respondent is directed to act upon the recommendation made by Uttarakhand Public Service Commission by issuing necessary order, within four weeks from the date of production of certified copy of this order. (Subhash Upadhyay, J.) (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) 22.07.2025 22.07.2025 Rajni 21 RAJINI GUSAIN Digitally signed by RAJINI GUSAIN DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=97cfa6e4cbd49c07b876db484 48ac3701a9ae475a2547e4b7f1d9b1f17 d01342, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=8D039BC77BD1A2222B 4DF4FC80D4557562F95BEBA013F5306 16A158A0A878BD8, cn=RAJINI GUSAIN Date: 2025.08.07 17:41:31 +05'30'