GOVERNING BODY OF ISPAT COLLEGE, ROURKELA v. STATE OF ODISHA
WA/788/2025 · 2026-02-03
Chittaranjan Dash, Dixit K S
Writ Petition (Civil)body2025
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Judgment text
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W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025
Governing Body of Ispat College, Rourkela
…. Appellant -versus- State of Odisha & Others …. Respondents Advocates Appeared in this case
For Appellant - Mr. S. K. Das, Advocate
For Respondents - Mr. S. K. Jee, AGA
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CORAM :
MR. JUSTICE DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of Hearing & Judgment: 03.02.2026 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Chittaranjan Dash, J.
1. This intra-court appeal is filed by the Appellant i.e. Governing Body of Ispat College, Rourkela, assailing the judgment dated 19.07.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 19898 of 2011, whereby the writ petition filed by Respondent No.3 was allowed and the action of the College management in disengaging him was interfered with, coupled with a direction
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 2 which, according to the appellant, virtually amounts to treating the respondent No.3 as a regular appointee. The present appeal also takes exception to the consequential dismissal of the review petition, being RVWPET No. 198 of 2024, by order dated 19.03.2025 These intra-court appeals, being W.A. No. 788 of 2025 and the connected W.A. No. 791 of 2025, are filed by the Appellant– Governing Body of Ispat College, Rourkela. W.A. No. 788 of 2025 assails the judgment dated 19.07.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 19898 of 2011, whereby the writ petition filed by Respondent No.3 was allowed and the action of the College management in disengaging him was interfered with, coupled with directions which, according to the Appellant, have the effect of treating Respondent No.3 as a regular appointee. W.A. No. 791 of 2025, arising out of the same lis, calls in question the order dated 19.03.2025 passed in RVWPET No. 198 of 2024, whereby the review petition preferred by the Appellant against the aforesaid judgment was dismissed. Both the appeals, involving common questions of fact and law, are being heard and disposed of by this common
judgment. 2. The factual backdrop, shorn of unnecessary details, reveals that Respondent No.3 was initially engaged as a part-time Lecturer in Physics in Ispat College, Rourkela, by order dated 12.11.1994 for
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 3 a fixed academic term. Such engagement was purely temporary and continued on similar terms by a subsequent order dated 31.08.1995, pursuant to which Respondent No.3 submitted his joining report on 07.09.1995. Upon completion of the academic session 1995-96 and reduction of workload, the services of Respondent No.3, along with other part-time lecturers, were disengaged by order dated 10.02.1996, an order which was not assailed by him at the relevant point of time. Subsequently, when a substantive post of Lecturer in Physics became available, the Governing Body issued an advertisement on
21.04.1997. Respondent No.3 participated in the selection process held on 27.06.1997 but was not selected, as another candidate secured higher merit and was appointed on regular basis. Aggrieved, Respondent No.3 initiated litigation by filing OJC No. 9966 of 1997, wherein interim protection was granted to keep one post vacant. Ultimately, the said writ petition was disposed of on 12.05.2005 with a direction to the Director, Higher Education, Odisha, to consider the representation of Respondent No.3 in the light of earlier decisions concerning similarly placed part-time lecturers. In compliance with the aforesaid direction, the Director, Higher Education, passed an order dated 19.06.2006 directing reinstatement of Respondent No.3 as a Lecturer in Physics “without
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 4 prejudice to the claim of others.” This order itself became the subject matter of further litigation between the parties. While the Governing Body challenged the said direction in W.P.(C) No. 9601 of 2006, Respondent No.3 sought its implementation by filing W.P.(C) No. 11663 of 2008. Both writ petitions were disposed of by a common judgment dated 01.07.2009, wherein this Court upheld the Director’s order and directed its implementation, while clarifying that such reinstatement would not prejudice the services of the regularly appointed Lecturer. During the course of review proceedings arising therefrom, the Director was directed to submit a factual report regarding workload and sanctioned strength. The report indicated that there was no sanctioned vacant post available to accommodate Respondent No.3 on regular basis, though he could be engaged as a part-time lecturer.
In the light of such report, the review petition was dismissed on 11.01.2011. Thereafter, to give effect to the Director’s order dated 19.06.2006, the Governing Body issued an engagement order dated 11.03.2011 appointing Respondent No.3 as a part-time Lecturer in Physics on fixed remuneration for a limited term. Respondent No.3 eventually joined pursuant to this order on
11.04.2011. With the closure of the academic session 2010-11 and reduction of workload, the engagement of Respondent No.3 came
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 5 to an end, and this was communicated to him by office order dated 21.04.2011, followed by a corrigendum dated
23.04.2011. Challenging only this order of disengagement, Respondent No.3 approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 19898 of 2011, without assailing the engagement order dated 11.03.2011 or seeking any explicit relief for regularisation. The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 19.07.2024, allowed the writ petition, quashed the disengagement order and issued directions which, according to the appellant, effectively treated the part-time engagement of Respondent No.3 as a regular appointment. The appellant-Governing Body sought review of the said judgment by filing RVWPET No. 198 of 2024, which, however, came to be dismissed on 19.03.2025. It is in these circumstances, being aggrieved by both the original judgment in the writ petition and the dismissal of the review petition, that the appellant has invoked the intra-court appellate jurisdiction of this Court by filing the present writ appeal. 3. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the learned Single Judge committed a manifest error in law and on
facts in treating the engagement of Respondent No.3, which was admittedly part-time and purely contractual in nature, as a regular appointment, despite there being no sanctioned post available in
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 6 the college. He contends that the entire service history of Respondent No.3, beginning from 1994 till his last engagement in 2011, demonstrates that he was never appointed on a substantive basis and that every disengagement was strictly in terms of the conditions of appointment and academic requirement. He further submits that the writ petition itself was not maintainable in view of the statutory remedy available under Section 10-A of the Odisha Education Act, 1969 since the impugned order related to disengagement from an aided educational institution. According to
learned counsel, this jurisdictional issue goes to the root of the matter and ought to have been considered by the learned Single Judge even in the absence of a counter affidavit. It is also urged that Respondent No.3 deliberately suppressed the engagement order dated 11.03.2011 and never challenged the same, having accepted it by submitting his joining report on 11.04.2011. Having complied to the terms of engagement, Respondent No.3 was estopped from questioning the consequential disengagement effected upon closure of the academic session. Mr. Das further submits that the directions issued in the impugned judgment travel far beyond the relief sought in the writ petition, inasmuch as Respondent No.3 never prayed for regularisation or permanent absorption. He contends that the Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, could not have
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 7 directed appointment or altered the nature of employment, particularly when the Director, Higher Education had categorically reported non-availability of any sanctioned post. Lastly, learned counsel argues that the dismissal of the review petition overlooks glaring errors apparent on the face of the record, including misreading of the Director’s order and the statutory scheme governing appointments in aided colleges. On these premises, he submits that the impugned judgment and the consequential order in review are unsustainable and call for interference by this Court.
4. Before proceeding to test the sustainability of the impugned
judgment, it is necessary to examine the factual and legal landscape as it emerges from the record of W.P.(C) No. 19898 of 2011 and the preceding rounds of litigation. The learned Single Judge has not approached the issue as a simpliciter service dispute but has carefully traced the manner in which Respondent No.3 was subjected to prolonged uncertainty of service despite repeated administrative and judicial interventions in his favour. 5. The materials placed on record clearly establish that Respondent No.3’s engagement was not episodic or casual, but extended over a considerable length of time, during which he discharged teaching functions integral to the academic functioning of the institution. The Single Judge has specifically noted that the
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 8 Director, Higher Education, acting pursuant to earlier orders of this Court, had already found fault with the discontinuance of Respondent No.3 and had directed his reinstatement. That direction was upheld by this Court in subsequent writ proceedings and thereby attained finality. What followed thereafter was not a genuine implementation of the said directions, but a series of actions by the management which preserved the form of compliance while defeating its substance, by repeatedly relegating Respondent No.3 to a precarious and uncertain status. 6. The order dated 11.03.2011, though tailored as an engagement of a part-time Lecturer, must be read in the context of the binding directions which preceded it. The learned Single Judge has rightly observed that the management could not have reduced compliance with judicial and administrative orders to a ritualistic exercise, particularly when Respondent No.3 had already been litigating for over a decade to secure continuity of service. The abrupt disengagement immediately thereafter was thus rightly held to be arbitrary and reflective of a colourable exercise of power. 7. It is in this backdrop that reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaggo vs. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 assumes relevance. The said decision does not merely address the legality of temporary employment in the
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 9 abstract but condemns the systemic misuse of temporary and contractual arrangements by public institutions to evade long-term obligations towards workers whose services are essential and continuous. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while analysing the broader implications of such practices, observed as under:
“22.
The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations. ………
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long- term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 10 • Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are often labelled as
“temporary” or “contractual,” even when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks. • Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service. • Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises.
They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant. • Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment. • Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 11 undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.”
8. The emphasis laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is unmistakable: when government and public sector institutions repeatedly engage individuals for work that is recurring, essential, and central to their functioning, yet continue to cloak such engagement under the garb of temporariness, the resulting insecurity and exploitation cannot be countenanced in law. Compliance that perpetuates uncertainty is no compliance at all. 9. The present case squarely falls within that analytical framework. Respondent No.3 was subjected to misclassification of his role, arbitrary disengagement despite repeated orders, denial of progression, and a sustained pattern of uncertainty that was neither incidental nor inevitable, but institutionally induced. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, correctly lifted the veil of nomenclature and examined the substance of the relationship between the parties, consistent with the principles repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court. 10. This Court is also conscious that government and aided educational institutions are expected to act as model employers. Persistent engagement of teaching staff on temporary arrangements, despite demonstrated and continuing necessity, not
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 12 only undermines the standards but also erodes public confidence.
The learned Single Judge’s intervention, viewed in this light, was aimed at arresting a cycle of avoidable litigation and restoring fairness and stability in public employment. 11. As a result, the view undertaken by the learned Single Judge is firmly anchored in the factual record, the prior binding orders of this Court, and the settled position of law. The impugned judgment reflects a balanced, humane, and legally sound exercise of writ jurisdiction, and this Court finds no reason to take a different view. Conversely, the institution being a mighty employer constantly making endeavour to thwart all the effort of the Respondent No.3 to get his legitimate right is amenable to an exemplary cost. Accordingly, while dismissing the Appeal, the Appellant institution is directed to pay cost of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) to the Respondent No. 3 The direction passed by the learned Single Judge shall be implemented within a period of four weeks. Failure to implement the order within the period stipulated shall not only be viewed seriously but may entail order for contempt in its next journey. 12. In view of the foregoing analysis and having found no infirmity in the judgment dated 19.07.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No. 19898 of 2011, it necessarily follows that the order dated 19.03.2025
W.A. No.788 of 2025 & W.A. No.791 of 2025 p. 13 passed in RVWPET No. 198 of 2024, which declined to review the said judgment, does not warrant independent interference. The grounds urged in W.A. No. 791 of 2025 being co-extensive with those advanced in W.A. No. 788 of 2025 and having been duly considered hereinabove, the connected appeal is also liable to be
disposed of in terms of the present judgment. Both the Writ Appeals are hence dismissed with cost as above.
(Chittaranjan Dash)
Judge
(Dixit Krishna Shripad)
Judge
A.K.Pradhan/Bijay/Sarbani Designation: Senior Stenographer