JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, J. 1. As all these appeals arise out of the same judgment, they are being heard and disposed of by this common order. 2. The present appeals have been preferred under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment dated 14.12.2001 passed by the learned 2 nd Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, District - Durg (C.G.), in S.T. No. 144/1998, by which the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under with a direction to run both the sentences concurrently:- Appellant Name Conviction Sentence Santosh Kumar U/s 304 Part-II of IPC R.I. for 7 years and fine of Rs. 500/-. U/s 324/34 of IPC R.I. for 6 months and fine of Rs. 500/-. In default of payment of total fine amount of Rs. 1000/- additional imprisonment for 6 months. Billu alias Ramswaroop U/s 304 Part- II/34 of IPC R.I. for 7 years and fine of Rs. 500/-. U/s 324/34 of IPC R.I. for 6 months and fine of Rs. 500/-. In default of payment of total fine amount of Rs. 1000/- additional imprisonment for 6 months. Harakhlal U/s 304 Part- II/34 of IPC R.I. for 7 years and fine of Rs. 500/-. U/s 324/34 of IPC R.I. for 6 months and fine of Rs. 500/-. In default of payment of total fine amount of Rs. 1000/- additional imprisonment for 6 months. 3. As per the judgment of the trial court, the appellants were acquitted of the offences punishable under sections 294, 506 Part-II and 341 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . They were convicted for the offences punishable under Section 304 Part-II of the INDIAN PENAL CODE instead of Section 302 or 302/34 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE and under Section 324 or 324/34 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE instead of Section 307 or 307/34 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . 4. Brief facts of the case are that on the date of offence i.e. 09.11.1997, at about 01:45 pm, Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6) was coming to his house after completing his work and when he reached near Shyam Nagar Camp-2, Police Station- Chhawani, Bhilai, across the canal, the appellants Santosh and Billu alias Ramswaroop were armed with sticks and Appellant Ramsharan (appeal abated against him) was armed with a sword and Harkhlal was empty handed, they surrounded him, started pushing, abusing and threatened him for life. Appellant Santosh was about to be assaulted with a stick, at that time, Ravinder alias Raju's nephew Deepak alias Badku (deceased) came there from the house to save him. Appellant Santosh assaulted Deepak alias Badku on his head and leg. When Ramsharan tried to assaulte Deepak alias Badku by means of sword, Ravinder Singh alias Raju (PW-6) intervene him due to which Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6) sustained injuries on thumb of his left hand. All the four appellants together assaulted Deepak alias Badku and when he fell down, they ran away from the spot abusing him. Thereafter, Deepak alias Badku was taken to the hospital. On the same day, on the report of Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6), first information report has been lodged vide Ex.P-9 bearing Crime No. 905/1997 in the police station Chhawani. Medical examination was done. Deepak alias Badku died during treatment, and dead body Panchnama (Ex.P-15) was prepared. Doctor R.N. Pandey (PW-5) examined the dead body of Deepak alias Badku on 12.11.1997 and gave his report vide Ex.P-8 in which the cause of death was said to be hemorrhagic shock due to head injury. Spot map was prepared. Statements of witnesses were recorded. On the basis of the memorandum statement, a sword from Ram Sharan (appeal abated), a bamboo stick from the appellant Santosh and a stick from the appellant Billu alias Ram Swaroop were seized and sent for chemical examination to FSL. After due investigation, charge sheet was filed. 5. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses and exhibited 24 documents. However, the appellants-accused in support of their defence neither examined any witnesses nor exhibited any documents. Statements of the appellants were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which they were denied the circumstances against them and pleaded innocence and false implication in this case. The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellants for the aforesaid offences and sentenced them as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against which the present appeal has been preferred. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that on the basis of the report of the appellants regarding the same incident, a case under Section 307 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE was registered against the complainant. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that on the basis of the report of the appellants regarding the same incident, a case under Section 307 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE was registered against the complainant. The complainant had assaulted the appellants whereas the complainant has not been assaulted by the appellants. The seizure of weapons from the appellants is not supported by the independent witness. No weapon of offence has been seized from the appellant Harkhlal. Independent witness Usha Devi (PW-2) has turned hostile. The examined witnesses upon whom the trial court has relied upon to convict the appellant are the relatives of the deceased, including Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6) who is the maternal uncle of Deepak alias Badku and Jaswant Kaur (PW-3) is the sister and Snehlata (PW-7) is niece of Ravinder alias Raju. He has accepted the suggestion that on the basis of the report of the appellants, a case has been registered against Ravinder alias Raju for the offense under Section 307 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . All of them, being close relatives, are interested witnesses whose statements are not reliable. They have made false statements against the appellant Santosh whereas Jaswant Kaur (PW-3) and Snehlata (PW-7) had not witnessed the said incident. There is no clear evidence regarding assault by the appellants Harkhlal and Billu alias Ram Swaroop, yet the trial court has committed an error in finding them involved in the incident in furtherance of their common intention. The trial court's order of conviction and sentence in question is not sustainable as it is not based on proper appreciation of evidence. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be allowed and the appellants are entitled to be acquitted. 7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State, supporting the impugned judgment so far as the conviction is concerned and opposed the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. The first question for consideration as to whether the death of deceased Deepak @ Badku was homicidal in nature, has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the postmortem report Ex.P-8 proved by Dr. R.N. Pandey (PW-5). 10. 9. The first question for consideration as to whether the death of deceased Deepak @ Badku was homicidal in nature, has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the postmortem report Ex.P-8 proved by Dr. R.N. Pandey (PW-5). 10. In the said incident, the injured Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6) has stated that the death of his nephew Deepak alias Badku was due to head injury as a result of assault, which is supported by the statements of Jaswant Kaur (PW-3) and Snehlata (PW-7). The doctor R.N. Pandey (PW-5) examined the dead body of Deepak alias Badku on 12.11.1997 and give his report vide Ex.P-8, in which the following injuries were found:- (i) stitched wound having 12 black cotton stitches over head in right parietal area 5 ½ inch long. (ii) stitched wound having one cotton stitch over right parietal area of size ½ inch long. (iii) stitched wound having 3 cotton stitches in inter parietal area in center having 1 ½ inch length. (iv) contusion 2x2 inch left occipital parietal area. (v) contusion 1x1/2 inch left clavicle in middle point (vi) parietal frontal temporal mastoid bone right. (vii) fracture in parietal temporal occipital bone in inner skull right. (viii) fracture in left parietal & temporal bone. 11. The above evidence could not be rebutted. It is clear from the above evidence that the death of Deepak alias Badku was homicidal in nature. 12. Now, the question for consideration is whether Deepak alias Badku died due to being assaulted with a bamboo stick by the appellant Santosh? 13. Injured Ravinder @ Raju (PW-6) is an important witness who has also filed a report on the same day. Ravinder @ Raju has stated in his court statement that when he was returning home at about 1:45 pm, after working in the rolling mill four accused surrounded him near the canal and threatened him for life. Appellant Santosh armed with stick, Ramsharan armed with a sword, Billu alias Ramswaroop also armed with stick and Harkalal was also there along with them who started assault on him with hands and fists. After hearing the hue and cry, his nephew Deepak alias Badku came there and appellant Santosh tried to assault him then Deepak alias Raju intervened. Santosh assaulted with stick to Deepak alias Badku on his head 3-4 times due to which Deepak fell down. After hearing the hue and cry, his nephew Deepak alias Badku came there and appellant Santosh tried to assault him then Deepak alias Raju intervened. Santosh assaulted with stick to Deepak alias Badku on his head 3-4 times due to which Deepak fell down. When Ramsharan (appeal abated) tried to assault Deepak alias Badku with sword, he caught hold of the sword due to which he sustained injury on his hand. All four appellants assaulted him and Deepak due to which Deepak alias Badku fell down and then the appellants ran away abusing them. The incident was witnessed by her sister Jaswant Kaur (PW- 3), niece Snehlata (PW-7) and independent witness Ushadevi (PW-2). 14. Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6) has remained consistent in his statement during his cross-examination that the appellant Santosh had assaulted Deepak 3-4 times on his head with a bamboo stick. The above statement of Ravinder alias Raju is supported by the report Ex.P-9 written by Ravinder in the police station on the same day that Deepak was assaulted on his head with a stick by the appellant Santosh. Along with this, Jaswant Kaur (PW-3) and Snehlata (PW-7) have also supported the statement of Ravinder alias Raju in their court statement that Deepak was assaulted on his head with a bamboo stick by the appellant Santosh. The said evidence could not be rebutted. The report Ex.P-9, written immediately on the same day, confirmed the above fact that it was the appellant Santosh who had assaulted Deepak on his head with a bamboo stick and the bamboo sticks has also been seized from the appellant Santosh. The statements of these witnesses cannot be doubted merely on the basis that they are relatives of the deceased and the injured. Their presence on the spot seems natural. In such a situation, in the absence of rebuttal in the statement of the witnesses, the conclusion of the trial court is based on clear and reliable evidence that as a result of being assaulted with a bamboo stick by the appellant Santosh, Deepak received injuries on his head of serious and traumatic nature due to which he succumbed. Deepak was given multiple traumatic injuries on his head which resulted in fractures in his parietal, frontal parietal etc. which became the cause of his death. Deepak was given multiple traumatic injuries on his head which resulted in fractures in his parietal, frontal parietal etc. which became the cause of his death. The head is a delicate organ and assaulting it 2-3 times with a bamboo stick shows that the appellant Santosh was aware that he was giving such a traumatic blow to the head that it was likely to cause the death of the deceased. In this way, the conviction of the appellant Santosh under Section 304 Part-II of the INDIAN PENAL CODE for knowingly assaulting Deepak alias Badku and causing his death is found to be justified. 15. Now the question is whether the injury caused by the sharp weapon to complainant Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6) was the common intention of the appellant Santosh? 16. On 09.11.1997, Ravinder alias Raju was medically examined by doctor S.R. Churendra (PW-1) and gave his medical report vide Ex.P-2, as per the medical report of Ravinder @ Raju there is a 1 x ¼ cm & 1 x ¼ cm incised wound between the thumb and forefinger of his right hand which was normal in nature and could be caused by a hard & blunt object. The injured Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6) himself has stated in his statement that when Ramsharan (appeal abate) tried to assault Deepak with a sword, he had caught hold of the sword due to which he sustained injury on his hand. It is clear from this that the injury sustained by the sword on the hand of the complainant Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6) was not the injury caused by the appellant Santosh, which is said to have caused by Ramsharan by using the sword. Appeal against appellant Ramsharan has been abated due to his death during the pendency of this appeal. There is no clear evidence that there was a common intention of Santosh with Ramsharan in causing injury with the sword. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant Santosh under Section 324/34 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE for the injury alleged to have been caused by a sword to Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6) is not found appropriate and is not sustainable. 17. Now, the question for consideration is whether there was common intention of the appellants by causing assault upon Deepak @ Badku and Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6)? 18. 17. Now, the question for consideration is whether there was common intention of the appellants by causing assault upon Deepak @ Badku and Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6)? 18. It is notable that the stick has been seized at the instance of appellant Billu alias Ramswaroop whereas no seizure has been made at the instance of appellant Harkhlal. Complainant Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6), eye-witnesses Jaswant Kaur (PW-3) and Snehlata (PW-7) have also not stated that Harkhlal was armed with any weapon. These witnesses have not clearly stated that Billu alias Ramswaroop had assaulted Deepak on his head with a stick. In such a situation, it has to be seen whether the common intention of the appellants Billu alias Ramswaroop and Harkhlal along with the appellants Santosh and Ramsharan was formed or not? 19. The question would be whether Section 34 of the IPC is attracted in the facts of the present case to convict the appellants for offence under Sections 304 Part-II & 324 of the IPC. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 34 of the IPC which reads as follows : - “ 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention .—When a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.” 20. A focused glance of the aforesaid provision would show that the essence of Section 34 of the IPC is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result and such consensus can be developed at the spot also. Thus, Section 34 is intended to cover a situation wherein the accused persons have done something with common intention to constitute a criminal act. 21. In the matter of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor , [ AIR 1925 PC 1 ] it has been held as follows: - “….. Thus, Section 34 is intended to cover a situation wherein the accused persons have done something with common intention to constitute a criminal act. 21. In the matter of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor , [ AIR 1925 PC 1 ] it has been held as follows: - “….. Section 34 deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or diverse, by several persons; if all are done in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of them all, as if he had done them himself, for 'that act' and 'the act' in the latter part of the section must include the whole action covered by 'a criminal act' in the first part, because they refer to it.” 22. In the matter of Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor , [ AIR 1945 PC 118 ] , it has been held as under:- “... Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section does not say 'the common intentions of all', nor does it say 'an intention common to all'. Under the section the essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. To invoke the aid of Section 34 successfully, it must be shown that the criminal act complained against was done by one of the accused persons in the furtherance of the common intention of all; if this is shown, then liability for the crime may be imposed on any one of the persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone.” 23. Thereafter, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab , [ AIR 1963 SC 174 ] , while dealing with the scope of Section 34 of the IPC, held as under: - “13. ... Like Section 149, Section 34 also deals with cases of constructive liability. It provides that where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. The essential constituent of the vicarious criminal liability prescribed by Section 34 is the existence of common intention. It provides that where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. The essential constituent of the vicarious criminal liability prescribed by Section 34 is the existence of common intention. If the common intention in question animates the accused persons and if the said common intention leads to the commission of the criminal offence charged, each of the persons sharing the common intention is constructively liable for the criminal act done by one of them. Just as the combination of persons sharing the same common object is one of the features of an unlawful assembly, so the existence of a combination of persons sharing the same common intention is one of the features of Section 34.” 24. In the matter of Suresh v State of U.P. , [ (2001) 3 SCC 673 ] , Thomas, J, speaking for the Supreme Court has held two conditions precedent which are imperative for applying Section 34 of the IPC, which are as under: - “23. Thus to attract Section 34 IPC two postulates are indispensable: (1) The criminal act (consisting of a series of acts) should have been done, not by one person, but more than one person. (2) Doing of every such individual act cumulatively resulting in the commission of criminal offence should have been in furtherance of the common intention of all such persons.” 25. In the matter of Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar , [ (2003) 1 SCC 268 ] , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while relying upon the dictum laid down in Barendra Kumar Ghosh (supra) and Mohan Singh (supra), have held that the essence of Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the mind of persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result. It has been stated therein that such consensus can be developed on the spot, but in any case, such a consensus must be present in the commission of the crime itself. 26. It has been stated therein that such consensus can be developed on the spot, but in any case, such a consensus must be present in the commission of the crime itself. 26. In the matter of Nagaraja v. State of Karnataka , [ (2008) 17 SCC 277 ] , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that to impose vicarious liability under Section 34 of the IPC: (1) common intention, and (2) participation of accused in the commission of an offence must be proved, and further held that prosecution is bound to prove the factum of common intention amongst the accused persons. 27. In the matter of Virendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh , [ (2010) 8 SCC 407 ] , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that liability under Section 34 of the IPC can arise only when two conditions stand fulfilled i.e. firstly, mental element or intention to commit criminal act conjointly with another or others; and secondly, actual participation in one form or the other in commission of crime. Section 34 is intended to cover a case where a number of persons act together and on facts of case it is not possible for prosecution to prove as to which of the persons who acted together, actually committed the case. Under Section 34, it is the intention to commit the crime and accused can be convicted only if such intention has been shared by all accused. 28. In the matter of Syed Yousuf Hussain v. State of Andhra Pradesh , [ (2013) 4 SCC 517 ] , the Supreme Court has held that to get Section 34 of the IPC attracted, certain conditions precedent are to be satisfied. The act must have been done by more than one person and they must have shared a common intention either by omission or commission in effectuating the crime. It is always not necessary that every accused must do a separate act to be responsible for the ultimate criminal act. What is required is that an accused person must share the common intention to commit the act. 29. It is always not necessary that every accused must do a separate act to be responsible for the ultimate criminal act. What is required is that an accused person must share the common intention to commit the act. 29. Recently, in the matter of Vijendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , [ (2017) 11 SCC 129 ] , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have reiterated the principles of law for applicability and scope of Section 34 of the IPC and summarised the principles therein by holding as under: “28. The aforesaid authorities make it absolutely clear that each case has to rest on its own facts. Whether the crime is committed in furtherance of common intention or not, will depend upon the material brought on record and the appreciation thereof in proper perspective. Facts of two cases cannot be regarded as similar. Common intention can be gathered from the circumstances that are brought on record by the prosecution. Common intention can be conceived immediately or at the time of offence. Thus, the applicability of Section 34 IPC is a question of fact and is to be ascertained from the evidence brought on record. The common intention to bring about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons, with reference to the fact of the case and circumstances of the situation. Whether in a proved situation all the individuals concerned therein have developed only simultaneous and independent intentions or whether a simultaneous consensus of their minds to bring about a particular result can be said to have been developed and thereby intended by all of them, is a question that has to be determined on the facts. (See Kripal v. State of U.P. , [ AIR 1954 SC 706 ] .) In Bharwad Mepa Dana v. State of Bombay , [ AIR 1960 SC 289 ] it has been held that Section 34 IPC is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish the acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. The principle which the section embodies is participation in some action with the common intention of committing a crime; once such participation is established, Section 34 is at once attracted.” 30. The principle which the section embodies is participation in some action with the common intention of committing a crime; once such participation is established, Section 34 is at once attracted.” 30. Following the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court with regard to applicability and scope of Section 34 of the IPC in above stated judgments and keeping in mind those principles, if we review the facts and evidence in the case in hand, complainant Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6), Jaswant Kaur (PW-3) and Snehlata (PW-7) have stated the presense of appellants Billu alias Ram Swaroop and Harkhlal in the spot where the incident took place. They have stated that Billu alias Ramswaroop and Harkhlal had assaulted with hands and fists, but there is no such corroborative piece of evidence on record regarding the said assault by them. The injured/complainant Ravinder alias Raju (PW-6) himself has admitted in his cross- examination that in the report Ex.P-9 lodged by him, there is no mention of assault by the appellants Billu alias Ramswaroop and Harkhlal. There is no mention in his police statement that Harkhlal had assaulted him with his hands and fists. This fact has also come in the evidence that on the report of the appellants, a crime was registered against the complainant Ravindra alias Raju, but it has been said that he was acquitted. In paragraph 25 of the cross- examination by Ravinder alias Raju, it has been stated that mainly appellant Santosh had assaulted Deepak alias Badku due to which the deceased sustained grievous injuries. There is no clear evidence that appellant Ramswaroop had taken part in the fight with Deepak alias Badku. Thus, such an overt act of Billu alias Ramswaroop and Harkhlal is not visible, from which it can be assumed that appellant Santosh had assaulted Deepak alias Badku on his head with a bamboo stick and appellant Ramsharan had caused injury to Ravinder alias Raju with a sword in furtherance of their common intention. 31. Thus, on the basis of the analysis of the above evidence, in the opinion of this Court, there is no common intention of appellant Billu alias Ramswaru and Harkhlal with appellant Santosh or appellant Ramsharan (appeal abated). Therefore, the case against Billu alias Ramswaroop and Harkhlal under common intention has not been proved. 31. Thus, on the basis of the analysis of the above evidence, in the opinion of this Court, there is no common intention of appellant Billu alias Ramswaru and Harkhlal with appellant Santosh or appellant Ramsharan (appeal abated). Therefore, the case against Billu alias Ramswaroop and Harkhlal under common intention has not been proved. Their conviction and sentence under Section 304 Part-II/34 & Section 324/34 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is not sustainable 32. On the basis of evidence, an offence under Section 304 Part-II of the INDIAN PENAL CODE has been found proved against appellant Santosh, but the common intention of appellant Santosh along with appellant Ram Sharan to cause injury to Ravinder alias Raju with the sword is not found proved. Therefore, the conviction and sentence of appellant Santosh under Section 324/34 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is not sustainable. CRA No. 10/2002 33. Thus, the appeal of appellant Harakh Lal is allowed , the order of conviction and sentence for the offences punishable under Sections 304 Part-II/34 & 324/34 of INDIAN PENAL CODE is set aside and appellant Harakh Lal is acquitted of the said charges. CRA No. 33/2002 34. Appeal against appellant Ram Sharan has already abated due to his death during pendency of this appeal. The offence against appellant Billu alias Ramswaroop has not been found proved. Hence the appeal of appellant Billu @ Ramswaroop is allowed , the order of conviction and sentence for the offences punishable under Sections 304 Part-II/34 & 324/34 of INDIAN PENAL CODE is set aside and appellant Billu @ Ramswaroop is acquitted of the said charges. CRA No. 163/2002 35. The appeal of appellant Santosh is partly allowed , the order of conviction and sentence for the offence punishable under Sections 324/34 of INDIAN PENAL CODE is set aside and appellant Santosh is acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 324/34 of IPC. 36. While partly rejecting the appeal of appellant Santosh , his conviction under Section 304 Part-II of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is affirmed . 36. While partly rejecting the appeal of appellant Santosh , his conviction under Section 304 Part-II of the INDIAN PENAL CODE is affirmed . So far as the question of sentence is concerned, he has been punished with 07 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs 500/- and the learned counsel for the appellant prays for leniency on the question of sentence, stating that the incident took place about 26 years ago and has also submitted that since on the report of the appellant, a counter case was also initiated against the complainant, therefore, leniency should be exercised on the question of sentence. 37. It is noteworthy that the incident had taken place in the year 1997. At that time, the age of appellant Santosh was 18 years; since then, about 26 years have passed. In this situation, his sentence is reduced from 07 years to 05 years for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II of IPC. However, the fine amount remains intact. He remained in custody from 15.11.1997 to 22.01.1998 i.e. about 02 months and 07 days during the trial and thereafter remained in custody from the date of conviction and sentence i.e. 14.12.2001 till the date of suspension of his sentence. The custody period which he has already undergone shall be adjusted in his sentence period. 38. Accordingly, all three appeals are disposed of. The appellants are reported to be on bail. The bail bonds of appellants Billu alias Ramswaroop and Harakh Lal under Section 437A of the Cr.P.C. shall remain effective for another six months. 39. The surety & bail bonds of appellant Santosh is cancelled. Appellant Santosh is directed to surrender before the trial Court within one week from today, for serving out the remaining sentence . In case, the appellant fails to surrender , the trial Court shall take steps to secure the presence of accused for serving out the remaining sentence 40. Let a copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for information and necessary action, if any.