1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 948 of 2024 Order reserved on 17/04/2026 Order delivered on 15/06/2026 Awadh Kishore S/o Late Devki Mistry Aged About 54 Years R/o Q No. B- 200 , Basant Vihar Colony Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus Harjeet Singh S/o Lt. Guru Bachan Singh Aged About 66 Years R/o L-10 Vinoba Nagar Bilaspur (C.G.) ---Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Soumya Rai, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Vijay K. Deshmukh, Advocate Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge C.A.V. Order 1. Present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the judgment and decree dated 04.05.2022, passed by learned 7th Civil Judge Class-II, Bilaspur, in civil suit No. B/02/2022, whereby a decree for recovery of Rs. 1,44,000/- along with 0.50% monthly interest till its realization has been passed against the defendant on the basis of compromise between the parties. VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.06.15 20:07:21 +0530 2 2. Brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner was defendant before the learned trial Court. The respondent/plaintiff has filed a civil suit on 21.12.2021 for recovery of Rs. 1,44,000/- against the petitioner/ defendant with the pleading that the defendant borrowed an amount of Rs. 1,45,000/- from the plaintiff on 05.04.2015. It was agreed between the parties that the defendant shall pay the interest @ 1% per month on the amount of loan and the said amount of loan was to be repaid within three months. At the time of borrowing the amount, the defendant also executed a hand note/acknowledgment on 05.04.2015. The defendant repaid an amount of Rs. 500/- on 02.04.2018, Rs. 300/- on 01.04.2021, Rs. 200/- on 20.11.2021, but failed to repay the remaining amount of Rs. 1,44,000/-. The defendant was served with a legal demand notice dated 01.05.2021 through registered AD post and when the defendant neither repaid the borrowed amount nor replied the notice, the civil suit has been filed by the plaintiff for recovery of the remaining borrowed amount of Rs. 1,44,000/- along with the interest. 3. The suit was filed on 21.12.2021 and on 23.12.2021 summons was ordered to be issued to the defendant and the case was fixed for 04.02.2022. Due to COVID-19 pandemic the proceeding of the case was adjourned for 17.03.2022, however in the meantime on 02.03.2022 an application for urgent hearing along with the settlement deed was filed by both the parties for the reason that both the parties are willing to settle their dispute and the case may be placed before the Lok Adalat. On 02.03.2022, the defendant made his appearance in the case through his counsel and thereafter the case was fixed on 10.03.2022 for filing of the certain documents with 3 respect to proper identity of the defendant. Thereafter on 10.03.2022, the case was ordered to be placed before the Lok Adalat which was to be held on 12.03.2022. On that day before the National Lok Adalat, bench No. 21, District Court, Bilaspur a settlement deed was submitted by the parties, however for want of no objection certificate from the department where the defendant is employed, the case was adjourned for 12.04.2022. Another urgent hearing application was filed on 23.03.2022 for placing of the case before the mediator for mediation between the parties and the case was referred for mediation to the Mediation Centre, District Court, Bilaspur. On 29.03.2022, a mediation report was submitted by the Mediation Centre and ultimately the case was taken up for hearing on 04.05.2022 and on that day on the basis of the said compromise and mediation report, the judgment and decree has been passed by the learned trial Court for recovery of Rs. 1,44,000/- along with the interest @ 0.50 % per month from the date of judgment till its realization, against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff. It was also the condition of the decree that the said amount of Rs. 1,44,000/- shall be paid by the defendant in the monthly installment of Rs. 5000/- from his salary by its attachment. The said judgment and decree dated 04.05.2022 is under challenge in the present writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is illegal, arbitrary and perverse. The learned trial Court should have considered that the suit of the plaintiff itself was not maintainable for want of the document of money lending license of the plaintiff as 4 required under Section 11-H read with Section 3(1)(a) and (b) and Section 7 of the Chhattisgarh Money Lenders Act, 1934. Before passing the decree or considering the compromise, the learned trial Court should have satisfied itself for due compliance of the mandatory provision of Money Lenders Act, 1934. He would also submit that the signature of the defendant was obtained by the plaintiff under coercion and the compromise was not on the free will of the defendant. The plaintiff is a well known influential person who involved in money lending business and extorting money from the employees and putting them in fear of losing their employment. The genuineness of the compromise ought to have been examined by the learned trial Court, yet the decree has been passed, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside. 5. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the respondent opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that the petitioner/defendant is an employee of South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Bilaspur and not a layman. He borrowed an amount of Rs. 1,45,000/- from the respondent on 05.04.2015 and executed a hand note/acknowledgment for the same. When he has not repaid the amount, the respondent has filed the suit for recovery of the remaining borrowed amount. The petitioner duly represented through his counsel before the learned trial Court and after knowing fully well his position, he entered into compromise on 12.03.2022 for repayment of Rs. 1,44,000/- in the monthly installment of Rs. 5000/- which was to be attached from his salary. On 12.03.2022, before the learned National Lok Adalat, the matter could not be finalized for want of no objection service from the 5 concerned department, where the petitioner was employed, thereafter the matter was referred for mediation and the mediation report was also submitted on 29.03.2022, in which also the petitioner was agreed to repay the amount of Rs. 1,44,000/- in the monthly installment of Rs. 5000/- which was to be attached from his salary. On the basis of the said mediation report, the judgment and decree has been passed on 04.05.2022. The said compromise dated 12.03.2022 and mediation report submitted on 29.03.2022 and the judgment and decree dated 04.05.2022 have not been challenged by the petitioner for about 2 ½ years and it has only been challenged in the present writ petition which is filed on 16.10.2024. The petitioner was an educated person and employee of South Eastern Coalfields Limited. Knowing fully well the executed hand note/acknowledgment of the borrowed amount, he was represented in the suit through his counsel and he duly executed Vakalatnama in favour of his counsel, thereafter a compromise deed was also executed on 02.03.2022, 10.03.2022, 23.03.2022 and 26.03.2022 and thereafter he also appeared before the Mediation Centre and in his presence the mediation report was prepared with respect to settlement between the parties and he also signed the mediation report. Since the date from his appearance before the learned trial Court till the passing of the decree, the petitioner was having ample opportunity to deny the compromise, yet he willingly entered into compromise on his own free will and after such a long time, he challenged the said compromise decree, which is not bona fide. At this stage the maintainability of the suit cannot be objected, when the defendant have entered into compromise in the suit. He would also submit that 6 Section 11-H of the Money Lenders Act, 1934, it provided that the plaintiff should have hold a valid registration certificate, which the plaintiff has in his possession. Filing of the certificate along with the plaint was not necessary and it can be filed at the subsequent stage also, therefore, the ground raised by the petitioner in the present writ petition is misconceived and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and perused the documents annexed with the writ petition. 7. The main ground of challenge in the present writ petition by the petitioner is that the plaintiff/respondent has not filed the registration certificate of his being the money lender under the Chhattisgarh Money Lenders Act, 1934, the plaint itself was not maintainable as provided under Section 11-H of the Act of 1934 and therefore, the compromise between the parties, if any cannot be considered for passing of the decree. When the objection raised by the petitioner in view of Section 11-H of the Act of 1934, it would be necessary to notice here the said provision, which reads as under:- “11-H. Suit not to proceed without registration certificate, etc. - No suit for the recovery of a loan advanced by a money-lender shall proceed in a civil court until the court is satisfied that he holds a valid registration certificate or that he is not required to have a registration certificate by reason of the fact that he does not carry on the business of money-lending in any of the district of Chhattisgarh. 7 8. From perusal of Section 11-H of the Act of 1934 provided only for holding a valid registration certificate, however, there is no restriction for maintaining a civil suit without filing the same along with the plaint. The requirement is only that the plaintiff should have hold the valid registration certificate under the Chhattisgarh Money Lenders Act, 1934. Section 11-H provided that, no suit for recovery of a loan shall proceed until the court is satisfied that the plaintiff hold a valid registration certificate of money lending in the area. It is nowhere provided that he should annexed the copy of the certificate along with the plaint. From perusal of the order sheet dated 21.12.2021 and 23.12.2021 (Annexure P/2) after satisfying the proper presentation of the suit, the civil suit was ordered to be registered and summons was issued to the defendant. Further, from perusal of the copy of the plaint annexed at page No. 21 and his affidavit annexed at page No. 24, he clearly disclosed that the plaintiff is a registered money lender, which could not be rebutted by the defendant. 9. When the defendant appeared in the case on 02.03.2022 through his counsel and entered into compromise before National Lok Adalat, before Mediation Centre and signed the documents without raising any objection at that time, it can be hold that he was well within the knowledge of entire proceeding and consent of repayment of borrowed amount in installments. It is not a case where on a singular instance his signature has been obtained and which was placed before the court for compromise, but on various instances he appeared before the National Lok Adalat, Mediation Centre and has signed various documents of compromise to settle the dispute. He was having ample opportunity to deny the settlement, if he actually 8 not willing to settle the dispute. After about 2 ½ years of entering into settlement the challenge of the compromise decree on the ground that maintainability of the suit cannot be said to be bona fide or the compromise suffered from coercion upon the defendant. 10. Another important aspect which cannot be ignored is that the compromise decree was passed on 04.05.2022, whereas the present writ petition has been instituted only on 16.10.2024 after a lapse of more than 2 ½ years. The petitioner has neither pleaded nor demonstrated any sufficient cause explaining the enormous delay in approaching this Court. During this entire period, no steps appear to have been taken for questioning the compromise deed or the decree passed by the learned trial Court based on the compromise between the parties. A party who consciously enters into a compromise and thereafter remains silent for several years cannot be permitted to invoke the extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as a matter of course. The unexplained delay and laches on the part of the petitioner itself constitutes an additional ground for declining interference with the impugned decree. 11. The learned trial Court has passed the decree considering the compromise between the parties and mediation report submitted on 29.03.2022 and the said compromise decree cannot be upset on the ground of maintainability of the suit, particularly when the grounds raised by the petitioner regarding maintainability of the suit is misconceived as the filing of the registration certificate under the Money Lenders Act, 1934 is not necessary along with the plaint, but 9 what is necessary to have the registration certificate with the petitioner. 12. It is also pertinent to notice that the impugned award has been passed on the basis of a compromise voluntarily entered into between the parties. The petitioner not only signed the compromise deed but the compromise was also arrived at the Mediation Centre and mediation report was submitted before the learned trial Court acknowledging the settlement. Once a party has consented to the terms of settlement and a compromise decree has been passed on such consent, the same cannot ordinarily be assailed by invoking supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution merely on grounds which were available prior to the compromise. A compromise decree stands on a different footing and can be questioned only on limited grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation or coercion of a serious nature, duly pleaded and established. Except making bald allegations, the petitioner has placed no material on record to substantiate the plea of coercion. Therefore, the challenge to the compromise decree itself is not maintainable in the facts of the present case. 13. The challenge raised by the petitioner to the compromise decree is also liable to be rejected in view of the settled principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court governing the field. In Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the effect of Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, held in paragraph 17 that: 10 “17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus: (i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC. (ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43. (iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A. (iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23. Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of 11 a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made.” 14. In the present case, the petitioner voluntarily entered into the compromise before the National Lok Adalat as well as Mediation Centre and the learned trial Court passed the decree on the basis of such compromise. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be permitted to assail the compromise decree in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 15. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid consideration, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court based on the compromise between the parties. 16. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved