IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No.376 of 2024 Date of Decision: 20.07.2026 _______________________________________________________ Garima Singh & Anr. …….Petitioners Versus State of H.P. & Anr. …..Respondents _______________________________________________________ Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes. For the petitioner: Mr. Anshul Bansal, Senior Advocate with Mr. Anshul Attri, Mr. Piyush Dhanotia & Mr. Ankit Chandel, Advocates. For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocates General with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for respondent No.1- State. Mr. Kuldeep Singh Chandel, Advocate, for respondent No.2. _______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral): By way of the instant petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners-accused (in short ‘accused’) for quashing and setting aside the FIR No.37 of 2023 dated 02.03.2023, registered under Sections 451, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Kangra, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, as well as consequent proceedings pending adjudication competent Court of law. 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2. Quint-essential facts, as emerge from the pleadings as well as other material adduced from the record by respective parties are that the FIR, sought to be quashed came to be instituted at the behest of respondent No.2, Ms. Heena Sharma, (hereinafter referred to as the "complainant"), who, at the relevant time, was a third-year Postgraduate Junior Resident in the Department of Surgery at Dr. RPGMC, Tanda. Complainant, named hereinabove, alleged that on 27.02.2023, she fell ill and as such, was admitted in the afore Hospital in Private Ward No.209. She alleged that on 27.02.2023 at about 12:30 p.m., accused No.1, Garima Singh, who was also pursuing the MBBS course at Tanda College, along with her mother, Ms. Shobha Singh Kanwar (accused No.2), unauthorizedly entered her room and clicked her photographs on mobile phone. She also alleged that above-named persons also pulled her hand. She alleged that accused named in FIR uploaded her photograph as well as video on internet. She alleged that since she had not suffered any injury, she did not wish to undergo medical examination. However, on account of unauthorized entry of the accused in the room of the complainant, appropriate action in accordance with law be taken against them. In the aforesaid background, FIR sought to be quashed came to be instituted against the accused, who happen to be daughter and mother. 3 3. Though after completion of investigation, Police has already presented challan in the competent Court of law, but before same could be taken to its logical end, accused have approached this Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR as well as consequent proceedings pending in the competent Court of law on the ground that no case much less under Sections 451, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the accused. 4. Mr. Anshul Bansal, learned Senior Counsel, duly assisted by Mr. Anshul Attri, learned counsel for the accused, vehemently argued that once accused, named in the FIR, after their having allegedly entered the private room of the complainant, not committed any illegal act, for which they could be imprisoned, there was no occasion, if any, for investigation agency to proceed against accused under Section 451 of IPC. Mr. Bansal further submitted that though accused came to be charged under Section 506 of IPC, but bare perusal of allegations contained in FIR nowhere suggest that threats, if any, were extended by the accused named in the FIR, rather, they, after having entered the private ward, allegedly clicked the photographs of the complainant and thereafter uploaded the same on Instagram. While referring to the reply filed by the respondent-State, Mr. Bansal submitted that Investigating Officer, after having conducted investigation, has categorically concluded that though simple photographs of the complainant were clicked, but those were 4 not uploaded on internet as is otherwise being alleged by the accused. Mr. Bansal further submitted that since no offence can be said to have been committed by the accused under Section 451 of IPC, charge of the accused under Section 506 of IPC is not tenable at all. 5. To the contrary, Sh. Kuldeep Singh, learned counsel representing the respondent, supported the impugned action of lodging FIR against the accused. He submitted that bare perusal of FIR clearly reveals that accused, firstly, unauthorizedly entered the private ward of the complainant, who at relevant time was taking rest in room allotted in her favour and thereafter unauthorizedly also clicked photographs of her and uploaded the same on internet. He further argued that accused by pulling arm of the complainant, also attempted to give injury, and as such, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the investigation agency by lodging FIR under Sections 451, 506 & 34 of IPC against the accused. He further submitted that otherwise also, present petition is not maintainable because allegations, which have been leveled in the FIR can only be proved by the investigation agency by leading cogent and convincing evidence and in case FIR sought to be quashed is quashed, it would amount to preempting the trial court from conducting proceedings to ascertain the correctness of allegations leveled in the FIR sought to be quashed, which is otherwise not permissible. 5 6. I have heard learned counsel of the parties and gone through the record carefully. 7. Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the submissions and counter-submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate upon the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings, while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC (now 528 of BNSS). 8. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699, held that High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC is entitled to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. 9. Subsequently, in case titled State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while elaborately discussing the scope and competence of High Court to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.PC laid down certain principles governing the jurisdiction of High Court to exercise its power. After passing of aforesaid judgment, issue with regard to exercise of power under 6 Section 482 Cr.PC, again came to be considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case bearing Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2017 (arising out of SLP (CrL.) No. 287 of 2017) titled Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., wherein it has been held that saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. court proceedings ought not be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, relying upon its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, reiterated that High Court has inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.PC., to quash the proceedings against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court concluded that while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.PC, Court exercising such power must be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the 7 prosecution/complainant. Besides above, the Hon’ble Apex Court further held that material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled as Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330, paras 29-30) 29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead 8 evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:- 30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 9 30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 11. It is quite apparent from the bare perusal of aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him/her due to private and personal grudge, High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC can proceed to quash the proceedings. 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case tilted Anand Kumar Mohatta and Anr. v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) Department of Home and Anr, AIR 2019 SC 210, has held that abuse 10 of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation and as such, the abuse of law or miscarriage of justice can be rectified by the court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC. The relevant paras of the judgment are as under: 16. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the provision invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482 Cr. P.C and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C reads as follows:- “482. Saving of inherent power of the High Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 17. There is nothing in the words of this Section which restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court ( G. Sagar Suri and Anr. V. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636 (para 7), Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (2013) 10 SCC 591 (para 20). Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced, and the allegations have materialized into a charge sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court.” 11 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr, (2019) 9 SCC 608, has elaborated the scope of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.PC, the relevant para whereof reads as under:- “7. Section 482 is an overriding section which saves the inherent powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Under Section 482 the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be exercised (i) to give effect to an order under the CrPC; (ii) to prevent the abuse of the process of the court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The powers of the court under Section 482 are wide and the court is vested with a significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to exercise them. The court should be guarded in the use of its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding as it denies the prosecution the opportunity to establish its case through investigation and evidence. These principles have been consistently followed and re-iterated by this Court. In Inder Mohan Goswami v State of Uttaranchal, this Court observed. “23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts’ powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to 12 injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.” 8. Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High Courts, any strict test as to when the court’s extraordinary powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court’s hands in the face of future injustices. This Court in State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal conducted a detailed study of the situations where the court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and laid down a list of illustrative examples of where quashing may be appropriate. It is not necessary to discuss all the examples, but a few bear relevance to the present case. The court in Bhajan Lal noted that quashing may be appropriate where, (2007) 12 SCC 1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 “102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2). …….… (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, the Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of the 13 facts alleged or enter into an appreciation of competing evidence presented. The limited question is whether on the face of the FIR, the allegations constitute a cognizable offence. As this Court noted in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine SC3100 (“Dhruvaram Sonar”): “13. It is clear that for quashing proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent powers.” 14. Aforesaid law, clearly stipulates that court can exercise power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to quash criminal proceedings, in cases, where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 15. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à- vis factual matrix of the case. 16. To ascertain the correctness of rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it would be apt to take note of Sections 451, 503 and 506:- “451. House-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with imprisonment.— 14 Whoever commits house-trespass in order to the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if the offence intended to be committed is theft, the term of the imprisonment may be extended to seven years. 503. Criminal intimidation.— Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. 506. 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.— Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprison-ment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.— And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. 17. Careful perusal of Section 451 of IPC reveals that whoever commits house-trespass in order to commit any offence 15 punishable with imprisonment shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine. The expression "house-trespass" has been defined under Section 442 of IPC to mean criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling, or any building used as a place of worship or as a place for the custody of property. Thus, Section 451 of IPC provides the punishment for a person, who commits house-trespass with the intent to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment. 18. Though Mr. Kuldeep Singh, learned counsel for the complainant and Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocate General for respondent-State, attempted to argue that act of the accused inasmuch as they unauthorizedly entered the private ward, wherein complainant was admitted, can be termed as house-trespass, but having perused material adduced on record, this Court is not persuaded to agree with aforesaid contention of learned counsel representing respondents. It is admitted case of parties that complainant at relevant time was teaching accused No.1. Since accused No.1 was unable to answer the query raised by the complainant during the medical examination of some admitted patient, allegedly complainant humiliated and harassed accused No.1, whereafter matter reached up to the level of Head of the Department. Head of the Department constituted an inquiry, wherein it transpired 16 that no act of humiliating and insulting accused No. 1 was committed by the complainant. However, in police inquiry, it transpired that accused No. 1 was insulted and humiliated by the complainant during the course of routine ward rounds in the hospital. It also emerges from the material adduced on record by the respective parties that on account of aforesaid dispute inter se accused No. 1 and the complainant, accused No. 1 was asked to bring her parents. Mr. Anshul Bansal, learned Senior Counsel for accused No. 1, vehemently argued that accused No.1, along with her mother i.e. accused No.2, after having reached Tanda and approached the Head of the Department, who directed them to meet the complainant, who at the relevant time was stated to be admitted in a private ward. Pursuant to afore direction, accused No. 1 along with her mother went to see the complainant in a private ward, where she was admitted, but while doing so, they allegedly clicked her photographs, which were allegedly subsequently uploaded on the internet. Though question, which needs to be determined in the case at hand, is that “Whether act of the accused inasmuch as visiting the private ward, wherein the complainant was admitted can be said to be house trespass in terms of provision contained under Section 451 or not?” 19. Bare perusal of aforesaid provision of law reveals that though definition of "house-trespass" under Section 442 of IPC contemplates that whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into 17 or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling, or any building used as a place of worship or for the custody of property, is said to commit "house-trespass", but to attract the provisions of Section 451 of IPC, it is not sufficient merely to establish the commission of house-trespass. The prosecution must further demonstrate that such house-trespass was committed with the intent to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment. Section 451 of IPC specifically provides that whoever commits house-trespass in order to commit any offence punishable with imprisonment shall be liable to punishment with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine. Admittedly, in the case hand, accused, after having entered private ward of the hospital, where the complainant was admitted, but there is nothing to suggest that after they entered, they caused or attempted to cause any harm to the complainant. Precise allegation, as came to be leveled against the accused, is that they unauthorizedly clicked the photographs of the complainant and thereafter, uploaded the same on internet. However, such allegation was not found to be correct by the investigating agency, who, in its inquiry, found that though simple photographs were clicked but same were not uploaded on internet, rather subsequent to filing of FIR, such photographs were also deleted. 18 20. Though at this stage, Mr. Kuldeep Singh, learned counsel representing the complainant, attempted to argue the act of pulling arm or throwing arm to other side can be said to be act of causing bodily injury to the complainant, which if found to be true, can invite action against the culprit under relevant provisions of law. However, this court, having taken note of fact that accused, after having entered the private ward, wherein the complainant was admitted, did not create any kind of ruckus, rather simply clicked the photographs of the complainant, is of the view that such an act cannot be said to constitute the offence of house-trespass punishable under Section 451 IPC. Similarly, this Court, having carefully perused material adduced on record as well as record made available to this court, nowhere finds that specific allegation, if any, with regard to extension of threats ever came to be leveled against the accused, rather they allegedly after having clicked simple photographs of the complainant, left the room and thereafter photographs were also not uploaded on the internet as has been concluded by the Police. 21. Section 506 of Indian Penal Code provides for punishment for alleged act of “criminal intimidation”, which otherwise defined in Section 503 of IPC. Bare reading of definition of “criminal intimidation” reveals that there must be an act of threatening another person with injury to his person, reputation, or property, or to the person, reputation, or property of anyone in whom the threatened 19 person is interested. Most importantly, the threat must be made with intent to cause alarm for the person threatened, or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act, which he is legally entitled to do. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Naresh Aneja Alias Naresh Kumar Aneja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2025) 2 Supreme Court Cases 604. Relevant paras of the afore judgment are extracted hereinbelow:- “25. Let us now examine the next charge for which the appellant stands accused. For an offence u/s 503 to be established, it must be shown that:- (1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested. (2) Such threat must be intentional; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Punishment for this offence is prescribed u/s 506 IPC, which is two years or with a fine or both, as applicable to this case. 26. Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132, as affirmed by a bench of three judges in Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2020) 8 SCC 20 811: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 914, records the principle of application of Section 506, IPC in the following terms: – (Manik Taneja case, SCC p.428, paras 11-12 “11.…A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do. 12. …It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant….” 27. A recent judgment of this court, Sharif Ahmed v. State of U.P15 held as under: - “48. An offence of criminal intimidation arises when the accused intendeds to cause alarm to the victim, though it does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not. The intention of the accused to cause alarm must be established by bringing evidence on record. The word ‘intimidate’ means to make timid or fearful, especially : to compel or deter by or as if by threats. The threat communicated or uttered by the person named in the chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered and communicated by the said person to threaten the victim for the purpose of influencing her mind. The word ‘threat’ refers to the 21 intent to inflict punishment, loss or pain on the other. Injury involves doing an illegal act.” This judgment also, with reference to Manik Taneja (supra), underscored the importance of material and evidence being placed on record to demonstrate intention. A mere statement without intention would not attract the offence. 28. What flows from the judgments referred is that for an offence of criminal intimidation to be prima facie established, the intention should be 2024 SCC OnLine SC 726 clearly visible, and the same is to be established by evidence on record. Granted that at this stage, evidence on record is not the standard to be applied since the trial is underway, but at least the results of the investigation and the material gathered thereunder, which is on record, should disclose somewhat of an offence. The FIR, interim investigation report and the chargesheet, reproduced above, do not disclose any offence having been committed by the appellant herein. 22. As per aforesaid exposition of law, to invoke Section 503 of IPC, prosecution is under a legal obligation to prove that the accused threatened a person with injury to his person, reputation, or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom such person is interested, and such threat was made with the intention of causing alarm to that person or of inducing him to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered while determining whether the words uttered by him amount to criminal intimidation. This necessarily implies that there must be an act of threatening another person with injury to his person, 22 reputation, or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom such person is interested. Further, such threat must have been made with the intention of causing alarm to the person threatened, or of inducing him to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit doing any act which he is legally entitled to do. For an offence of criminal intimidation to be established prima facie, intention should be clearly discernible from the material on record and the same is to be established by the evidence available on record. 23. Reliance is also placed upon judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Madhushree Datta vs. State of Karnataka and Another, along with Badrinarayana Jaganathan vs. State of Karnataka and Another, 2025 (3) Supreme Court Cases 612, decided on 24.01.2025, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated that mere act of insulting someone does not fulfill its requirement of Section 504 IPC, rather insult must be of such nature as to provoke the person insulted to breach the public peace or engage in criminal conduct. In afore judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the applicability of Sections 504, 506 and 507 of IPC. Relevant paras of the afore judgment are extracted hereinbelow:- “22. The next question for determination is, whether the mere assertion of “filthy language” allegedly used by the appellants in scolding the complainant, is sufficient to establish commission of offences under Sections 504 and 509IPC. 23. In the above context, it would be apt to consider the provisions contained in Section 504IPC. 23 24. A perusal of Section 504 IPC reveals that a mere act of insulting someone does not fulfil its requirements; the insult must be of such a nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public peace or engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on the available material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the public peace or the commission of any other offence. 26. In the instant case, the charge-sheet states that the appellants used “filthy language” while scolding the complainant; however, no such allegation is made against the appellants in the complaint. Furthermore, it is nowhere alleged that this act of using filthy language and insulting the complainant by the appellants, has provoked the complainant to commit breach of public peace or to commit any other offence. Therefore, from the materials on record, the ingredients of the offence under Section 504IPC, as explained in the abovesaid decision, are not satisfied. 27. For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section 509IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the meaning of the term “modesty”, to determine whether modesty has been insulted. While modesty is not explicitly defined in IPC, this Court has addressed the essence of a woman's modesty in the decision in Ramkripal v. State of M.P. [Ramkripal v. State of M.P., (2007) 11 SCC 265 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 674] Excerpts from the decision read as under : (SCC pp. 266-67, para 7) “7. … ‘12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined in IPC. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex.’ ” 24 (emphasis supplied) 28. Further, this Court while discussing the test for outraging the modesty of a woman under Section 509IPC in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , observed as under : (SCC p. 206, para 15) “15. In State of Punjab v. Major Singh [State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51 : AIR 1967 SC 63] a question arose whether a female child of seven- and-a-half months could be said to be possessed of “modesty” which could be outraged. In answering the above question Mudholkar, J., who along with Bachawat, J. spoke for the majority, held that when any act done to or in the presence of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of mankind that must fall within the mischief of Section 354IPC. Needless to say, the “common notions of mankind” referred to by the learned Judge have to be gauged by contemporary societal standards. The other learned Judge (Bachawat, J.) observed that the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex and from her very birth she possesses the modesty which is the attribute of her sex. From the above dictionary meaning of “modesty” and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major Singh case [State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51 : AIR 1967 SC 63] it appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged, is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman.” 29. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it will be essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the modesty of the complainant or, to put it 25 pithily, whether any act was intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a woman. 30. The term “filthy language”, when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509IPC. Had there been references to specific words used, contextual details, or any gestures—whether preceding, succeeding, or accompanying these words—that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants. 31. In considering the term “filthy language” objectively, in the overall conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the appellants' actions do not demonstrate the requisite intent or knowledge that would reasonably lead to the conclusion that their conduct could provoke such a severe emotional response as to constitute an insult to a woman's modesty. 32. Be that as it may, it goes without saying that each case must be assessed having regard to the specific facts and circumstances, not only of the case itself, but also of the individuals involved in the alleged incident. It is undisputed that the complainant and the appellants were positioned as an employee and senior officials, respectively. Moreover, it is evident from the case presented by both parties that a dispute existed between them with regard to the employment in question. 33. To reiterate, in the present case, the complaint does not indicate that the appellants used language towards the complainant that would warrant an offence under Section 509IPC. However, the charge-sheet alleges that the appellants scolded the complainant using “filthy language”. Notably, this allegation is also absent in the FIR. 26 34. In light of the employer-employee relationship between the appellants and the complainant; the existing dispute between them relating to the employment; the absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying gestures—whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words—the failure to mention the use of any “filthy language” in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in the charge-sheet : there are serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants. Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view that prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509IPC have not been disclosed. 35. This brings us to the offence under Section 506IPC, which the High Court has found to be prima facie disclosed against the appellants. Section 506IPC prescribes the punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation, while Section 503 defines the offence of criminal intimidation. 36. This Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506IPC in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132] , wherein it was observed as follows : (SCC p. 428, para 11) “11. … A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.” 37. In the present case, the complaint does not specifically attribute any threats or intimidation to the second accused. Therefore, ingredients of Section 506IPC, prima facie, are not made out against him. The argument that the first accused acted at the behest 27 of the second accused is untenable, as Section 34IPC, which imposes vicarious liability in criminal matters, has not been applied in this case. 38. However, the complainant has stated in her complaint that she was threatened by the first accused, as detailed below: “Then on 25-10-2013 at about 2.00 p.m. and 3.00 p.m. one Madhushiree Dutta (HR) asked me to forcefully resign or otherwise I will be sent out immediately. Further she abruptly asked me not to come for my work henceforth.” 39. Before an offence of criminal intimidation to be made out against the first accused, it must be established that she had the intention to cause alarm to the complainant. A review of the alleged threat reveals that the complainant is primarily alleging illegal termination, which constitutes a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation. It is also the appellants' case, which has not been disputed by the complainant, that the complainant has filed a reference before the Labour Court challenging her termination and seeking reinstatement along with back wages. Given these circumstances and the materials on record, the ingredients of Section 506IPC, prima facie, are not disclosed against the first accused too. 24. In afore case, Hon’ble Apex Court, while relying upon its earlier judgments, reiterated that before offence of criminal intimidation is made out against the perpetrator, it must be established that she/he intentionally caused alarm to the complainant. 25. In the instant case, there is nothing to suggest that there was intentional insult at the behest of the complainant with intent or knowledge to provoke disturbance of public peace or commission of any other offence. Similarly, the complaint, on the basis of which the FIR came to be registered, nowhere suggests that the accused 28 intended to cause alarm to the complainant. In the absence of such intention, the essential ingredients of the offence of criminal intimidation are not made out. 26. Having scanned the entire material adduced on record, vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that this Court, while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., may proceed to quash the FIR/challan submitted against the accused, because continuance thereof would be sheer abuse of process of law, since, for the reasons stated herein above, case of prosecution is bound to fail against the accused in all probabilities. Otherwise also, in case prayer made on behalf of the accused is not accepted, they would be subjected to unnecessary ordeal of facing protracted trial, which otherwise is bound to fail. 27. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made herein above and law taken into consideration, present petition is allowed. FIR No. 37 of 2023 dated 02.03.2023, registered under Sections 451, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Kangra, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, as well as consequent proceedings, are quashed and set aside qua the petitioner. The petitioner is discharged henceforth. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. (Sandeep Sharma), Judge July 20, 2026 (sunil)