1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 457 of 2024 1 - Jitendra Shadangi S/o Late Shri Chakradhar Shadangi Aged About 47 Years R/o Near Sheetla Mandir, Koshtapara, Raigarh District Raigarh (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Pramod Singh S/o Late Laxman Singh Aged About 61 Years R/o Beladula, Raigarh Tah And District Raigarh (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rajendra Tripathi, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board 13/02/2026 1. Present is a acquittal appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 filed by the appellant/complainant against the impugned judgment dated 22.12.2022 passed by the learned Sessions Judge Raigarh, in Criminal Appeal No. 72/2022, whereby the learned appellate Court has allowed the appeal filed by the respondent/accused and acquitted him from the offence of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter called as NIA). 2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was the complainant before the learned trial Court. He prosecuted a complaint case under ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.03.28 14:00:30 +0530 2 Section 138 of the NIA Act against the respondent/accused with the allegation that the respondent/accused had given a cheque of his bank account of Bhartiya State Bank, Raigarh Branch bearing No. 272241 dated 05.06.2015 amounting to Rs. 5,50,000/-. When he deposited the said cheque in his bank account at Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank, Raigarh Branch, for its clearance on 09.06.2015, the same was dishonoured by the payee bank on 10.06.2015 on the ground of insufficient funds in the bank account of the accused. On 23.06.2015, he served a legal demand notice to the accused and demanded the amount of the cheque, but he refused to accept the notice and has not paid the amount of the cheque. Then, he filed the complaint case before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raigarh. The complaint case was registered on 13.07.2015, and a process was issued against the accused. The accused was produced before the learned trial court on 25.10.2018 pursuant to the permanent arrest warrant issued against him. He was released on bail on the same day, and details of the offence were explained. On 26.04.2022, evidence of the witnesses was recorded. The statement of the respondent/accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. has also been recorded, in which the respondent accused explained that he has not issued any cheque in favour of the complainant and there is no legally admissible dues against him, and he is entitled to acquittal. 3. After hearing the parties and appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the respondent/accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and sentenced him for S.I. for 03 months and compensation of Rs. 5,50,000/- in default of payment of compensation, one month additional S.I. 3 4. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court was challenged by the accused before the learned Sessions Judge, Raigarh, by filing his Criminal Appeal No. 72/2022, which was allowed by the learned appellate Court vide its judgment dated 22.12.2022, holding that the complaint has failed to prove that there exists a legally recoverable debt against the accused and to discharge his liability he issued the subject cheque in favour of the complainant. It is further observed by the learned appellate Court that although the accused has entered into a compromise with the complainant, however, the same cannot be considered that there exists a legally recoverable debt, and it is for the complainant to prove the same by producing cogent evidence. There is a lack of evidence of existing liability and accordingly acquitted the respondent/accused which is under challenge in the present acquittal appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the complainant has proved its case against the accused that the cheque given by him in discharge of his liability has been dishonoured by the payee bank. There is a statutory presumption in favour of the complainant that he is the holder of the said instrument in due course and it was issued in discharge of his liability. The accused has failed to prove that there was no liability. He would also submit that if there was no liability, how the cheque of the accused came into hand of the complainant. He further submits that, admitting his liability and debt, the accused entered into a compromise with the complainant. Subsequently, by the conduct of the accused, the said compromise could not be acted upon, yet the fact remains that the accused has admitted his liability. The complainant has duly proved by his evidence that the accused has 4 given the cheque in discharge of his liability and the learned trial Court has rightly convicted for the alleged offence but the well-reasoned judgment of the trial Court is upset by the learned appellate Court on surmises and conjectures that the complainant has failed to prove its case, therefore, the appeal may be allowed and the respondent may be convicted for the alleged offence under Section 138 of NIA by setting aside the judgment passed by learned appellate Court. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent supported the impugned judgment passed by the learned appellate Court and has submitted that in the complaint filed by the complainant, there is no averment as to the existence of any legally recoverable debt or transaction between the parties for which the cheque is said to have been issued in his favour. He would further submit that the complainant has admitted in his evidence that there is no deed of any transaction between them, and there is no averment in the complaint. Even the purpose for which the subject cheque was given has not been mentioned either in the complaint or in the evidence. The compromise was a coercion made upon the accused, and the complainant coerced him by threatening to send him in jail. There is lack of evidence about any transaction or recoverable dues against him, which is the pre-condition to constitute the offence under Section 138 of the NIA. The judgment passed by the learned appellate Court is based on proper appreciation of evidence and sound principles of law, which is not required to be interfered with, and the acquittal appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5 7. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court and gone through the impugned judgment of acquittal. 8. From perusal of the complaint filed by the complainant under Section 138 of NIA, it transpires that there is absolutely no averment with respect to the transaction between the parties or the legally recoverable debt against the accused for which the alleged cheque is said to have been issued in favour of the complainant. The complaint memo starts from “ अभियुक्त के ቛኋरा परिरावादी के रातयु स्टे टे ैሮके शाखा रायुगढ़ ेሰ ቝኌस्त अपने ैሮचत खात केेሰ!के 20124343879 के एके च के केेሰ!के 272241 ेሰ#्ቡ 5,50,000/- दिदीने!के 05.06.2015 ” के ्ቚदीने किकेयु गयु । 9. In the evidence of Jitendra Kumar Sadangi, PW-1, he admitted in Para- 9 that there is no document with respect to any transaction with the accused. He also admitted that he has not made any complaint to the police with respect to their transaction, and no proceeding is pending before any Court. He also admitted in Para-12 of his evidence that there is no averment in his complaint memo and the affidavit filed under Section 145 of the NIA that the accused has any dues or debt against him. He further admitted that the reason for giving the cheque had not been mentioned either in his complaint memo or the affidavit. 10. When there is no evidence of any transaction between the parties and there is no evidence of any legally recoverable debt against the accused, it cannot be presumed that the subject cheque was issued for discharge of any liability. It is for the complainant to prima facie aver in his complaint and to prove the legally recoverable debt so that 6 issuance of cheque for discharge of its liability can be legally presumed. Mere handing over the cheque to the complainant is not sufficient in absence of any debt or liability to hold guilty of the accused. 11. Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, give presumption that the cheque was issued for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, but there cannot be any presumption that there exists a legally recoverable debt. 12. In the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde, 2008 (4) SCC 54, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para 30: “30. The proviso appended to the said section provides for compliance with legal requirements before a complaint petition can be acted upon by a court of law. Section 139 of the Act merely raises a presumption in regard to the second aspect of the matter. Existence of legally recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under Section 139 of the Act. It merely raises a presumption in favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been issued for discharge of any debt or other liability.” 13. The learned trial Court has further considered that though an application signed by the parties have been produced in the case for compromise but it has not been acted upon further and the learned trial Court has considered the said compromise as a material piece of evidence while convicting the accused and draw a presumption in favour of the complainant that the respondent/accused has admitted 7 his liability/debt against him for which the subject cheque was issued. The compromise application does not have any evidentiary value unless it is acted upon by the parties, and it is only for compounding of the offence. The complainant cannot be absolved from his liability to prove the legally recoverable debt against the accused for which the cheque is said to have been issued to him. When he admitted in his evidence that there is no deed about the transaction between them, there is no averment about the transaction or liability of the accused in the complaint or evidence, it cannot be said that the complainant has proved his case that the subject cheque was issued for the discharge of his liability by the accused. 14. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case as well as the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat (Supra), the learned appellate Court acquitted the accused, in which this Court do not find any perversity or illegality. 15. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram" reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate 8 Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 16. In the case of “Jafarudheen and Others Vs. State of Kerala”, reported in 2022 (8) SCC 440, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in judgement at para 25, which reads as under :- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that ensures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 17. Further, in the case of “Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Shyam Bihari & Others”, 2023 (8) SCC 197, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 27 of its judgment that :- “27- It is trite law that in an appeal against acquittal, the power of appellate court to re appreciate evidence and come to its own conclusion is not circumscribed by any limitation. 9 But it is equally settled that the appellate court must not interfere with an order of acquittal merely because a contrary view is permissible, particularly, where the view taken by the trial court is a plausible view based on proper appreciation of evidence and is not vitiated by ignorance/misreading of relevant evidence on record.” 18. After considering the material available on record as well as the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court and being very much conscious of the existing legal position as held in case of Kistoora Ram (Supra) and Jafarudheen (Supra) and Shyam Bihari (Supra) that in an appeal against acquittal if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution and the trial court taking one view favoured the accused, reversion of the findings of acquittal by the appellate court taking the other possible view into consideration, is not permissible in law. I therefore, of the considered opinion that the judgment impugned, acquitting the accused/respondent, is just and proper and does not call for any interference. For the foregoing reasons, the acquittal appeal being devoid of merits the same is dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok