1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 171 of 2024 1 - Ravi Kumar Makhija S/o Raj Kumar Makhija Aged About 42 Years Qwater No. D. 202/223, Sector (Wrongly Mentioned As Sexcater) 04, Saraswati School Ke Peeche Devendra Nagar Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.), (Owner) / (Non-Applicant) ... Applicant(s) versus 1 - Pushpa Buwal And Other W/o Late Hol Singh Bhuwal Aged About 58 Years Secater 03, Bhatti P.S. Police Lain Quater No. P.W.D. 128 Bhilai District Durg (C.G.), (Claimants) / (Applicants). 2 - Bhupendra Kumar Bhuwal S/o Late Hol Singh Bhuwal Aged About 36 Years Secater 03, Bhatti, P.S. Police Lain Qwater No. P.W.D. 128 Bhilai District Durg (C.G.). 3 - Kamal Bhuwal S/o Late Hol Singh Bhuwal Aged About 34 Years Secater 03, Bhatti, P.S. Police Lain Qwater No. P.W.D. 128, Bhilai, District Durg, (C.G.). 4 - Ramdulari Bhuwal S/o Late Ramratan Singh Bhuwal Aged About 85 Years Secater 03, Bhatti, P.S. Police Lain Qwater No. P.W.D. 128 Bhilai District Durg (C.G.). RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 5 - Nitesh Alias Niteshwar Satnami And Other S/o Ahsok Kumar Aged About 22 Years Bhandara, P.S. Deori Tahsil Marribangala, District Balod, (C.G.),...(Non-Applicants). 6 - C.G. Ato Keyar G.I. Road Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.). ... Respondent(s) For Applicant(s) : Mr. Sudhanshu Singh, Advocate. For Respondent(s) No. 1 to 3 : Ms. Sweksha Sharma, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Prasoon Agrawal, Advocate. For Respondent No. 6 : Mr. K. N. Meher, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Ishan Verma, Advocate. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 16/04/2026 1. By way of this revision, the applicant has prayed for following reliefs:- “i. That this Hon'ble High Court may kindly be pleased to allow the petition and set aside the impugned order dated 26/07/2024 in МАСТ по. 16/2024 passed by the learned First Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Balod, District Balod, Chhattisgarh. ii. That any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also be granted in favor of the petitioner safeguarding their interest.” 2. In the civil revision, the applicant, comprising owner, has called in 3 question the legality, propriety and correctness of the proceeding initiated and order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, District- Balod in relation to claim petition preferred under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘M.V. Act’). 3. The core issue involved in the case pertains to the maintainability of claim petition filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to condone such delay. 4. The facts, in brief, as obtaining in the case, is broadly similar and are therefore being noticed in a consolidated manner. In this civil revision, the claimants instituted applications under Section 166 of the M.V. Act seeking compensation on account of injuries sustained in motor accidents. However, the said claim petition were filed beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act. Upon such filing, the present applicant i.e., the owner, raised objection before the concerned Tribunal and preferred application seeking rejection of the claim petition on the ground that the same were barred by limitation and thus not maintainable. 5. The concerned Tribunal, however, declined to accept the objection raised by the applicant and proceeded to entertain the claim petition by condoning the delay in filing the same. While doing so, the Tribunal, in substance, invoked principles analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘Limitation Act’), and held that sufficient cause had been shown for condonation of delay. 4 6. Consequently, the application preferred by the present applicant under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC seeking rejection of the claim petition came to be dismissed, giving rise to the present civil revision. 7. The applicant has assailed the impugned order primarily on the ground that the learned Tribunal has acted with material irregularity and illegality in assuming jurisdiction not vested in them by law. It is contended that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, being a statutory forum constituted under the M.V. Act, is bound by the provisions of the said Act and cannot travel beyond the same. According to the applicant, there is no provision under the Act, particularly after the amendments brought into force, which empowers the Tribunal to condone delay in filing claim petition under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, and therefore, the invocation of principles akin to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is wholly misconceived and impermissible. 8. It is further contended that the claim petition, having been instituted beyond the statutorily prescribed period, could not have been entertained, and the failure on the part of the learned Tribunal to reject such petition at the threshold amounts to a jurisdictional error. It has also been urged that, in several instances, the delay has been condoned without affording adequate and effective opportunity of hearing to the present applicant, i.e., the Owner, thereby resulting in violation of the principles of natural justice. According to the applicant, the 5 impugned order thus suffer from non-application of mind, patent illegality and jurisdictional infirmity, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 9. It is further submitted that the issue relating to the scope, applicability and condonability of delay under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act has been engaging consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a batch of proceedings, wherein interim protection has also been granted. In the said proceedings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, inter alia, directed that claim petitions ought not to be dismissed at this stage solely on the ground of limitation, thereby indicating that the issue is yet to attain finality and is under active consideration before the Apex Court. 10. In this context, reference is made to the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited v. Ayiti Navaneetha and others (Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 8412–8413/2023 and connected matters), wherein, vide order dated 04.11.2025, it has been specifically observed that the Tribunals and the High Courts shall not dismiss claim petitions on the ground that such petitions are barred by limitation under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act. Taking note of the aforesaid interim directions, this Court had earlier directed the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunals to proceed with the claim cases, however, no final award shall be passed. 11. Further, in continuation thereof and in view of the subsequent 6 order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Dash v. Union of India and another (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 166/2024) vide order dated 19.03.2026, whereby the matter has been directed to be listed for further hearing, this Court is of the considered opinion that a balanced approach is required to be adopted. Accordingly, while the concerned Tribunal shall be at liberty to proceed with the adjudication of the claim petition in accordance with law, it is directed that no final order shall be passed until the issue is finally settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. It is further clarified that in the event any order is passed which operates in favour of the Insurance Companies or the vehicle owners, it shall be open to them to bring such development to the notice of the concerned Tribunal, and upon such intimation, the Tribunal shall be at liberty to pass appropriate orders, strictly in accordance with law and subject to the final outcome of the proceedings pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. In view of the factual matrix as delineated hereinabove, particularly the interim direction issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in relation to the issue of limitation under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court finds that the principal grievance raised by the applicant i.e. owner, seeking outright rejection of the claim petition on the ground of delay, cannot be countenanced at this stage. The direction of the Apex Court clearly mandate that such claim petition ought not to be dismissed solely on the ground 7 of limitation pending final adjudication of the issue. 14. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the rival submission and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the challenge laid by the applicant does not warrant interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction at this stage. The order passed by the learned Tribunal, in so far as they proceed to entertain the claim petition instead of rejecting them at the threshold, cannot be said to suffer from such jurisdictional error or material irregularity as would call for interference, particularly in light of the binding interim direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. At the same time, considering the contention of the applicant with regard to lack of jurisdiction and the alleged improper exercise of discretion in condoning delay, it is deemed appropriate to balance the competing interests of the parties. While the claimant cannot be non-suited at the threshold on technical grounds of limitation, the right and objection of the owner also deserve to be adequately safeguarded. 16. Accordingly, it is directed that the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal shall proceed with the adjudication of the claim petition in accordance with law. However, no final award shall be passed by the Tribunal until the issue relating to the applicability and condonation of delay under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act is conclusively decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is further observed that contention of the parties, including those relating to 8 limitation, jurisdiction, and the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, are kept open to be urged at the appropriate stage, and the Tribunal shall consider the same independently, uninfluenced by any prima facie observation made in the present proceeding. 17. Needless to say, in the event there is any subsequent development or authoritative pronouncement by the Hon’ble Supreme Court governing the field, it shall be open to either party to bring the same to the notice of the concerned Tribunal, which shall thereafter proceed to pass appropriate orders strictly in accordance with law and in consonance with such pronouncement. 18. In view of the aforesaid, the civil revision stand disposed of. Any interim order operating in this matter shall stand vacated forthwith, subject, however, to the direction issued hereinabove. 19. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat