1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 103 of 2024 1 - Smt. Indira Shrivastava D/o Shri Ashutosh Shrivastava Aged About 62 Years Advocate, R/o Kilapara, Wrad No. 21, Rajnandgaon (C.G.) ... Applicant versus 1 - Pramod Shrivastava S/o Late Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava Aged About 65 Years R/o Indira Gandhi, Ward No. 20, Naharpara, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur. ... Respondent (Cause Title is taken from CIS System) For Applicant : Mr. Karunendra Narayan Singh, Advocate holding brief on behalf of Mr. B. P. Sharma, Advocate For Respondent : Ms. Aditi Diwan, Advocate Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 10/04/2026 1. The present revision under Section 392 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 is being filed by the applicant being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the legality, propriety and Digitally signed by SHAYNA KADRI 2 correctness of the order dated 09.05.2024 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Raipur in Civil M.J.C. No. 88/2017 in the matter of Pramod Shrivastava vs. Smt. Indira Shrivastava, whereby the learned appellate Court has allowed the appeal in a manner contrary to law and settled principles. 2. The facts relevant for disposal of this revision are the present dispute relates to property bearing House No. 20/298/3 situated at Indira Gandhi Ward No. 20, Naharpara, Raipur (C.G.), which is recorded in the municipal records in the name of Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava S/o Mathura Prasad Shrivastava. An application for transfer of the said property was submitted by Pramod Shrivastava, which came to be allowed on the basis of certain documents. Aggrieved by such transfer, an appeal was preferred before the Appellate Committee of the Municipal Corporation. The Appellate Committee, after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties, allowed the appeal vide order dated 11.04.2016. Subsequently, the respondent herein challenged the said order by preferring an appeal under Section 149 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act before the Court below. In continuation, a review petition was also preferred before the Municipal Council, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 10.08.2017. The controversy before the Court below was not examined on merits, as the learned Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent primarily on the ground that the appeal before 3 the Appellate Committee was not filed within the prescribed period of 30 days and was thus barred by limitation. As a result, the petitioner was deprived of adjudication of the dispute on merits. According to the applicant, the Appellate Committee had entertained the matter, heard both parties at length, and decided the case on merits, which indicates that the delay, if any, stood impliedly condoned. It is further contended that no objection regarding limitation was raised by the respondent at the relevant stage, and therefore, such objection is deemed to have been waived or acquiesced. The applicant asserts that the learned Court below failed to consider these material aspects and adopted a hyper-technical approach by setting aside the order of the Appellate Committee solely on the ground of limitation. It is contended that such an approach has resulted in denial of substantial justice, particularly when the dispute involves adjudication of rights over property. In these circumstances, the applicant has approached this Court seeking setting aside of the impugned order and for remand of the matter to the competent authority for fresh adjudication on merits, with liberty to address any technical issues, including filing of an application for condonation of delay, if required. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the impugned order passed by the learned Court below is perverse, contrary to law and not sustainable, inasmuch as the same has resulted in 4 grave miscarriage of justice. It is contended that the learned Court below has failed to appreciate that before the Appellate Committee, no objection whatsoever was raised with regard to limitation or condonation of delay. Such non-objection clearly amounts to waiver, abandonment and acquiescence on the part of the respondent. In such circumstances, the petitioner ought not to have been non-suited on a mere technical ground of limitation. Learned counsel further submits that it is a settled principle of law that technicalities should not come in the way of rendering substantial justice, and that disputes ought to be adjudicated on merits rather than being dismissed on hyper-technical grounds. It is argued that the learned Court below has completely ignored the fundamental principles governing the law of limitation, particularly with regard to waiver, acquiescence and abandonment, and has thus erred in dismissing the matter on the ground of limitation alone. Learned counsel submits that the issue of limitation stood impliedly considered and condoned by the authorities below, as the matter was entertained and adjudicated on merits. Such adjudication necessarily presupposes condonation of delay, even if not expressly recorded. It is further contended that once the matter has been decided on merits, it was incumbent upon the learned Court below to recognize the implied condonation of delay, instead of subsequently holding the appeal to be barred by limitation. Learned counsel submits that in the present case, 5 denial of justice has occurred solely on a technical ground, without affording the petitioner an opportunity to cure the defect. The learned Court below ought to have either permitted the petitioner to file an application for condonation of delay or adopted a pragmatic approach in the interest of justice. It is also submitted that even otherwise, instead of dismissing the matter, the petitioner may be permitted to file an application for condonation of delay before the Court/authority below, and the matter may be remanded for fresh adjudication on merits in accordance with law. Learned counsel contends that the approach adopted by the learned Court below is overly technical and contrary to settled legal principles, rendering the impugned order unsustainable. It is further submitted that the impugned order suffers from illegality and material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction, as the learned Court below has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in a proper and judicious manner. Lastly, learned counsel submits that if the impugned order is not set aside, the applicant shall suffer substantial and irreparable loss, which cannot be compensated in any manner, and therefore interference by this Court is warranted in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the applicant and submits that the appeal under the relevant provisions of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act is 6 required to be filed within the prescribed period of limitation i.e. 30 days from the date of communication of the order. It is contended that in the present case, the appeal was admittedly not filed within the prescribed period and thus the same was clearly barred by limitation. It is further submitted that no application for condonation of delay was filed by the petitioner before the competent authority, and in absence of such an application showing sufficient cause, the appeal could not have been entertained. It is also contended that the plea of implied condonation of delay, as raised by the petitioner, is not tenable in law, inasmuch as condonation of delay must be specifically sought and granted on sufficient cause being shown. Learned counsel submits that merely because the matter was heard on merits would not amount to condonation of delay in absence of any formal application. It is further argued that the learned Court below has rightly appreciated the provisions of limitation and has correctly held the appeal to be barred by time. In support of his submissions, learned counsel submits that the law of limitation is mandatory in nature and must be strictly complied with, and that a time-barred appeal cannot be entertained in a routine manner. Learned counsel thus submits that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or perversity warranting interference under revisional jurisdiction and the present revision deserves to be dismissed. 7 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record with due consideration. 6. From a perusal of the record, it is evident that the dispute in the present case relates to the property bearing House No. 20/298/3 situated at Indira Gandhi Ward No. 20, Naharpara, Raipur (C.G.), recorded in the name of Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava. The application for transfer of the said property filed by Pramod Shrivastava was allowed, against which an appeal was preferred before the Appellate Committee of the Municipal Corporation. The Appellate Committee, after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties, allowed the appeal vide order dated 11.04.2016. Subsequently, the respondent herein preferred an appeal before the Court below under the provisions of the Act, wherein the learned Court below, by the impugned order dated 09.05.2024, has interfered with the order passed by the Appellate Committee primarily on the ground that the appeal before the Committee was not filed within the prescribed period of limitation. 7. It is not in dispute that the matter was heard by the Appellate Committee on merits and was decided after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. From the material available on record, it also appears that no specific objection with regard to limitation was raised at the relevant stage before the Appellate Committee, and the matter proceeded on merits. 8 8. A perusal of the relevant provisions of the Act makes it clear that the competent authority is empowered to condone the delay in filing the appeal upon sufficient cause being shown. Even otherwise, from the conduct of the proceedings, it appears that the appeal was entertained and adjudicated on merits, which prima facie indicates that the issue of limitation may have been considered, though not expressly recorded. 9. It is a settled principle of law that procedural technicalities should not be allowed to defeat substantial justice. Where the matter has been adjudicated on merits and parties have been heard, a hyper- technical approach in setting aside such adjudication solely on the ground of limitation, particularly in absence of objection at the appropriate stage, may not be justified. In the present case, the learned Court below has adopted a strictly technical view by holding the appeal to be barred by limitation, without considering the aspect of waiver/acquiescence and the fact that the matter had already been adjudicated on merits by the competent authority. 10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the ends of justice would be met if the matter is remanded to the Appellate Committee for fresh adjudication on merits, after affording opportunity to the parties and permitting the petitioner to cure the defect, if any, with regard to limitation. 9 11. Accordingly, the petitioner is granted liberty to file an appropriate application seeking condonation of delay by assigning sufficient reasons. Upon such application being filed, the Appellate Committee shall consider the same in accordance with law. The Appellate Committee is further directed to issue notice to all concerned parties and thereafter decide the matter afresh on merits, in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observations made herein. 12. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order dated 09.05.2024 passed by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Raipur, as well as the order dated 11.04.2016 passed by the Appellate Committee, are hereby set aside. 13. The revision stands disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Shayna Judge