1 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR WP(C) 1338/2024 CM(3650/2024) CM(5281/2024) Reserved on: 21.04.2026 Pronounced on: 14 .05.2026 Uploaded on: 15 .05.2026 Whether the operative part or full Judgment is pronounced: Full 1. HAJIRA: AGE 56.YEARS WO MOHAMMAD RAFIQ DAR R/O MUGHAL MOHALLA, CHATTABAL, SRINAGAR. ……...Petitioner(s) Through: Mr. NisarAhamdBhat, Advocate Vs. 2. JAMMU & KASHMIR SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, SRINAGAR, THROUGH ITS CHAIRPERSON. 3. COMMISSIONER, SRINAGAR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, SRINAGAR. 4. JOINT COMMISSIONER (PLANNING), SRINAGAR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, SRINAGAR 5. ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, SRINAGAR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, SRINAGAR 6. WARD OFFICER, WARD NO. 25, SRINAGAR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, SRINAGAR. 7. FAYAZ AHMAD RANGREZ S/O ALI MOHAMMAD RANGREZ R/O BAGHI SUNDER PAYEEN, KAKA SARAI, KARAN NAGAR, SRINAGAR .……Respondent(s) Through: Mr. Bikramdeep Singh, Dy. AG Mr. M. M. Dar, Advocate 2 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE JUDGEMENT 14.05.2026 PRAYER: 1. The petitioner through the medium of instant petition has sought following reliefs: “i. By issuance of a ‘Writ of Certiorari’, or any other appropriate Writ, Order or direction, the impugned Order dated 28th of May, 2024, as well as the corrigendum issued thereto, by the Respondent No.1 be quashed/ set aside; ii. By issuance of a ‘Writ of Mandamus’, or any other appropriate Writ, Order or direction, the official Respondents, more particularly Respondent No.2, be directed to seal the building raised by the Respondent No.6 situate at Barthana, Qamarwari, Srinagar in violation of the sanction granted by the competent authority, as well as the Statute; iii. By issuance of a ‘Writ of Mandamus’, or any other appropriate Writ, Order or direction, the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 be directed to demolish the illegal construction raised by the Respondent No.6 on spot in violation of sanction granted by the competent authority; iv. By issuance of a ‘Writ of Certiorari’, or any other appropriate Writ, Order or direction, the impugned Order dated 26th of September, 2023 passed by the learned Tribunal be quashed; and v. Any other Writ, Order or direction which this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper, in the attending facts and 3 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 circumstances of the case, may also be passed in favour of the Petitioner and against the Respondents”. BRIEF FACTS: 1. Through the medium of the instant petition, the petitioner has called in question Order dated 28.05.2024 along with the corrigendum issued thereto by respondent No.1, whereby the revision petition preferred by respondent No.6 came to be allowed and Order dated 11.05.2023 issued by the Srinagar Municipal Corporation was quashed. By virtue of the impugned order, the Commissioner, Srinagar Municipal Corporation, was directed to regularize the additional floor raised by respondent No.6 under the “Deemed Permission” clause contained in the Jammu & Kashmir Municipal Corporation Act, 2000, subject to payment of regularization fee and compliance with the relevant laws and rules, besides issuance of completion certificate in favour of respondent No.6. 2. The record further reveals that respondent No.6 had initially obtained building permission vide Order No.677 of 2013 dated 12.12.2013 in respect of land situated at Barthana, Qamarwari, Srinagar. The permission was subsequently revalidated vide Order No.462 of 2019 dated 31.10.2019. In the meantime, a portion of the land had already been alienated by respondent No.6. The petitioner alleges that despite such alienation and despite discrepancies in the survey particulars and revenue records, the building permission came to be revalidated by the official respondents. 3. It emerges from the record that construction activities were thereafter commenced by respondent No.6 in the year 2021 and additional floors 4 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 were allegedly raised beyond the sanctioned building plan. An application filed by respondent No.6 seeking permission for additional construction came to be rejected by the competent authority vide communication dated 11.05.2023. Aggrieved thereof, respondent No.6 preferred a revision petition before the learned Tribunal. 4. During the pendency of the proceedings before the learned Tribunal, the petitioner filed an application seeking impleadment as party respondent in the revision petition. The said application, however, came to be dismissed by the learned Tribunal vide order dated 26.09.2023 on the ground that the petitioner was not a necessary party to the proceedings. 5. The learned Tribunal thereafter passed the impugned order dated 28.05.2024, whereby the revision petition preferred by respondent No.6 came to be allowed and directions were issued for regularization of the additional construction under the “Deemed Permission” clause contained in the Jammu & Kashmir Municipal Corporation Act, 2000, besides issuance of completion certificate in favour of respondent No.6. A corrigendum also came to be issued thereafter, which too has been called in question in the present petition. 6. Order dated 26.09.2023 passed by the learned Tribunal rejecting the petitioner’s application for impleadment has also been challenged in the present petition. The controversy raised in the petition primarily relates to the legality and validity of the impugned order dated 28.05.2024 and the corrigendum issued thereto. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 2. The petitioner submits that she is the owner in possession of a residential building along with the land appurtenant thereto situated at Barthana, Qamarwari, Srinagar, and that the said construction was raised 5 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 strictly in accordance with the permission granted by the competent authority and after maintaining the prescribed setbacks, to which no objection was ever raised by any neighbouring landowner. 3. It is further submitted that respondent No. 6 owns land measuring 02 Kanals and 238 sq. ft. under Survey No. 609/105 adjacent to the petitioner’s property and had obtained building permission vide Order No. 677 of 2013 dated 12.12.2013; however, the said permission was erroneously granted with reference to Survey No. 611/106 Min instead of Survey No. 609/105, contrary to the revenue records. 4. The petitioner submits that respondent No. 6 failed to act upon the said permission within the prescribed period and, in the meantime, sold 19 Marlas out of the aforesaid land, yet the official respondents revalidated the permission vide Order No. 462 of 2019 dated 31.10.2019 without verifying the existing ownership or revenue position. 5. It is further submitted that despite the reduction in landholding, the revalidated permission continued to permit construction of a ground plus three-storeyed building, although respondent No. 6 no longer fulfilled the minimum land requirement of 02 Kanals under the applicable Master Plan. 6. The petitioner further submits that in the year 2021, respondent No. 6 commenced construction in violation of the sanctioned plan and also encroached upon the petitioner’s land, compelling the petitioner, through her son, to submit a representation before the Deputy Commissioner, Srinagar. It is further submitted that upon enquiry, the Tehsildar concerned reportedly found that the permission granted in 2013 was inconsistent with the revenue records and that respondent No. 6 had already alienated the portion of land in respect whereof the permission had been issued, and further that the revalidation had been granted without proper verification of ownership and 6 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 revenue particulars. It is submitted that despite such findings, no corrective action was taken by the authorities and, on the contrary, respondent No. 6 continued unauthorized construction beyond the sanctioned limits, including raising additional floors without valid permission, which fact was also acknowledged before the grievance redressal forum. 7. The petitioner submits that respondent No. 6 thereafter proceeded to raise fourth and fifth floors despite having permission only up to three storeys and despite expiry of the building sanction, and that an application subsequently moved by respondent No. 6 seeking permission for additional construction came to be rejected by the competent authority vide communication dated 11.05.2023. Aggrieved thereof, respondent No. 6 preferred a revision petition before the Tribunal seeking grant of completion certificate and permission for additional construction, wherein the petitioner’s application for impleadment was rejected. 8. It is lastly submitted that during the pendency of the revision proceedings, respondent No. 6 continued with the unauthorized construction and the Tribunal, vide order dated 28.05.2024, allowed the revision petition, regularized the unauthorized additional construction including the extra floors, and thereafter issued a corrigendum granting deemed permission and directing issuance of completion certificate. 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has placed on record a copy of theorder dated 26.09.2023 passed by the learned Tribunal. A perusal whereof reveals that the applicant/petitioner herein had filed an application seeking impleadment as a party respondent in the case preferred by Fayaz Ahmad Rangrez against Srinagar Municipal Corporation. The Tribunal, after hearing the applicant in detail, passed a reasoned order dated 7 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 26.09.2023,whereby the said application came to be dismissed for the reason that the applicant is not a necessary party to the proceedings. 10. When a specific query was raised by this Court regarding the locus and maintainability of the writ petition, Mr. Nissar Ah. Bhat, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that through the medium of the instant petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the subsequent order dated 28.05.2024, the corrigendum issued by the learned Tribunal, as well as the earlier order dated 26.09.2023, whereby his application for impleadment had been dismissed. 11. It is the specific case of the petitioner that a complete statutory mechanism is provided under the Jammu and Kashmir Special Tribunal Act and the rules framed thereunder for adjudication of disputes. However, in the instant case, it is alleged that the learned Tribunal has adopted a novel procedure inasmuch as, after passing the final order, it issued a corrigendum bearing the same date as that of the main order and, in purported violation of law and prescribed procedure, granted additional relief which had been declined in the original order. 12. It has been vehemently argued by Mr. Nisar Ah. Bhat, learned Counsel that the aforesaid corrigendum clearly shows that the same has been issued much after passing of the main order though given same date as of the main order and has been issued by the Tribunal on its own as if the Tribunal was dealing with an administrative matter rather than a judicial matter. Mr. Nissar Ah. Bhat, learned counsel has further supplemented his argument by projecting that assuming though not admitting that there was an error in the order/judgment and some clarification was required then in that eventuality it was incumbent on part of the applicant to have filed an application and thereafter the Tribunal was under an obligation to have 8 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 proceeded in accordance with law. But in the instant case, the Tribunal has adopted a method which is unknown to law and without their being in such formal application on part of respondent No. 6 have issued the corrigendum which cannot sustain the test of law and is liable to be set aside along with the main impugned order. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: 13. Reply stands filed on behalf of respondent No. 6, the contesting respondent, wherein a preliminary objection has been raised to the effect that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any locus standi to maintain the instant petition before this Court, which is a sine qua non for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, particularly in view of the fact that the application filed by the petitioner seeking impleadment already stands dismissed by the learned Tribunal by way of a detailed order. 14. In addition, Mr. M. M. Dar, learned counsel, has vehemently argued that once the petitioner has gladly and voluntarily accepted the order passed by the learned Tribunal,he is a estopped under law to question the subsequent order passed by the learned Tribunal, which order came to be issued by way of an appeal preferred by his client i.e., respondent No. 6 herein.The petitioner has failed to establish any locus before this Court and, therefore, according to Mr. M. M. Dar, learned counsel, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed at the very threshold. 15. It has also been submitted that the petitioner has willingly and voluntarily accepted the order dated 26.09.2023 passed by the learned Tribunal, wherein a categorical finding was recorded that the petitioner lacks locus standi, and the said finding has attained finality. It is contended that, without challenging the aforesaid finding before the appropriate forum, the petitioner has filed the instant petition on false and frivolous grounds, 9 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 rendering the same not maintainable. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to first assail the said order, particularly the findings recorded with regard to locus standi. Once such findings have attained finality, it is not forthcoming from the record as to how and under what circumstances the present petition has been preferred. On this preliminary objection alone, the instant petition, deserves to be dismissed. 16. Lastly Mr. M. M. Dar, learned counsel, submits that the petitioner has challenged the subsequent order passed by the learned Tribunal in an appeal preferred by respondent No. 6, without seeking quashment/setting aside of the earlier order whereby his application for impleadment was dismissed. Although, the said order has also been called in question in the instant petition, but merely challenging the aforesaid order does not, by itself, confer any right upon the petitioner to maintain the instant petition. 17. The submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents, have been duly supplemented by Mr. Bikramdeep Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the official respondents. Learned Dy. AG submits that the controversy raised in the present writ petition stands squarely covered by the judgment dated 12.08.2025 passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 1499/2024 titled Noor Mohammad Dar vs. Srinagar Municipal Corporation and Ors., wherein the writ petition came to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner therein lacked the requisite locus standi to maintain the petition. It is further contended that the findings and observations recorded in the aforesaid judgment apply with full force to the facts and circumstances of the present case as well. 10 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 LEGAL ANALYSIS: 18. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the material available on record. 19. The principal issue that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the petitioner possesses the requisite locus standi to maintain the instant writ petition, particularly in view of the categorical findings returned by the learned Tribunal while rejecting her application for impleadment vide order dated 26.09.2023. 20. The record reveals that the petitioner had sought impleadment in the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 6 against the Srinagar Municipal Corporation. However, the said application came to be rejected by the learned Tribunal through a detailed and reasoned order dated 26.09.2023, wherein it was specifically held that the petitioner was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the proceedings. The Tribunal further observed that the controversy sought to be projected by the petitioner essentially pertained to questions of ownership and title, which lay beyond the jurisdictional competence of the Tribunal. This Court finds itself in agreement with the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal. 21. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate as to how the impugned orders infringe or prejudice any legally enforceable right vested in her. The writ petition merely contains a bald assertion that respondent No. 6, being her neighbour, could not have been permitted to raise construction of a guest house after having sold 90 marlas out of the total land measuring 2 kanals, particularly when the minimum land requirement for such construction is stated to be 2 kanals. 22. Except for the aforesaid assertion, no material has been placed on record to establish the manner in which any legal right of the petitioner 11 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 stands adversely affected by the permission granted in favour of respondent No. 6. Mere vague apprehensions or generalized allegations of prejudice, unsupported by any substantive foundation, are insufficient to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 23. Hon’ble Supreme Court inJasbhaiMotibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, reported as (1976) 1 SCC 671 has held as under: “This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus siandi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the application, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter.” 24. Furthermore, Hon’ble Supreme Court inRaviYashwantBhoir v. Collector, reported as (2012) 4 SCC 407 has held as under: “The complainant has to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and not a stat pro rationevoluntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons. Under the garb of being a necessary party, a person cannot be permitted to make a case as that of general public interest. A person having a remote interest cannot be permitted to become a party in the lis, as the person 12 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 who wants to become a party in a case, has to establish that he has a proprietary right which has been or is threatened to be violated, for the reason that a legal injury creates a remedial right in the injured person. A person cannot be heard as a party unless he answers the description of aggrieved party.” 25. In the absence of any demonstrable infringement of a legally protected right, the petitioner has failed to establish her locus standi to maintain the present petition, and this Court finds no ground to entertain the same. 26. So far as the challenge to the corrigendum issued by the learned Tribunal is concerned, this Court finds that the same does not introduce any substantive or material alteration in the original order. A comparison of the original order with the corrigendum clearly demonstrates that the operative directions substantially remain unchanged. 27. The original order had directed regularization of the construction through a speaking order and issuance of the completion certificate, subject to the condition that the construction was not violative of the relevant land laws. By way of the corrigendum, the Tribunal merely clarified that such regularization would be subject to payment of the requisite regularization fee and further observed that the construction was covered by the deemed permission clause under the Jammu and Kashmir Municipal Corporation Act, 2000. 28. Save for the aforesaid clarification, no new right has been created in favour of respondent No. 6, nor has any vested right of the petitioner been taken away. The procedural directions requiring respondent No. 6 to approach the Commissioner, SMC within the stipulated period, along with 13 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 the liberty reserved to the authorities in the event of default, continue to remain intact. 29. The corrigendum, therefore, is purely clarificatory in nature and does not effect any substantial modification in the operative portion of the original order so as to independently prejudice the petitioner or furnish a separate cause of action warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It is well settled that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable only at the instance of a person who demonstrates infringement of a legally enforceable right. Mere dissatisfaction or apprehension, however strongly perceived, does not confer locus to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioner has failed to establish any such infringement. 30.What further assumes significance is that the order dated 26.09.2023 rejecting the impleadment application admittedly remained unchallenged for a considerable period of nearly one and a half years. Having accepted the said order and the findings recorded therein for such a long period, the petitioner cannot now be permitted to indirectly assail the same by challenging the subsequent order passed by the learned Tribunal in the appeal preferred by respondent No. 6. 31. The petitioner has also failed to show as to how the present writ petition is maintainable despite the categorical adjudication already rendered by the learned Tribunal on the issue of locus standi. 32. Once the learned Tribunal, by a reasoned order dated 26.09.2023, conclusively held that the petitioner was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the proceedings and consequently declined impleadment, the said adjudication attained finality upon the petitioner having failed to assail the same before the appropriate forum within a reasonable time. The legal 14 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 consequence of such finality is that the finding on locus standi became binding inter se the parties and could not thereafter be reopened collaterally in subsequent proceedings. 33. It is trite that a judicial determination which has attained finality cannot be permitted to be circumvented by adopting an indirect device. Permitting such a course would render the doctrine of finality otiose and would strike at the very root of judicial discipline. If the petitioner was aggrieved of the rejection of her impleadment application, the proper course available in law was to challenge the said order independently and seek its reversal. Having consciously abstained from doing so, the petitioner cannot now be permitted to achieve the very same result by questioning the final order passed in proceedings to which she was already held not to be a necessary party. 34. The settled maxim that what cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The petitioner, having been non-suited on the issue of impleadment, cannot be allowed to indirectly resurrect the very right of audience which stood expressly declined by the learned Tribunal. To hold otherwise would amount to conferring upon the petitioner, through the backdoor, a status which stood judicially negatived by a subsisting and unchallenged order. 35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA & Others, reported as(2011) 6 SCC 508, has reiterated the settled principle that what cannot be done directly in law cannot be permitted to be achieved indirectly by adopting circuitous methods, by holding as under: “It is a settled proposition of law that whatever is prohibited by law to be done, cannot legally be affected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance on the principle of 15 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 "quandoaliquidprohibetur, prohibeturet omne per quod devenituradillud", which means "whenever a thing is prohibited, it is prohibited whether done directly or indirectly”. 36. Similarly, in State of Tamil Nadu and Others vs. K. ShyamSunder and Others, reported as (2011) AIR SC 3470, the Hon’bleSupreme Court again emphasized this doctrine and observed as under: “ It is a settled proposition of law that what cannot be done directly, is not permissible to be done obliquely, meaning thereby, whatever is prohibited by law to be done, cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance on the principle of quandoaliquidprohibetur, prohibeturet omne per quod devenituradillud. An authority cannot be permitted to evade a law by shift or contrivance.” 37. This Court is of the considered view that entertaining the present challenge, without the foundational order dated 26.09.2023 first being set aside, would amount to sitting in appeal over an order that has already attained conclusiveness. Such an exercise is clearly impermissible in law. A litigant who acquiesces his rights by not challenging the said order cannot subsequently be allowed to approbate and reprobate by accepting its adverse consequences at one stage and then seeking to reopen the very issue, when a later order does not suit her convenience. 38. The conduct of the petitioner, therefore, clearly reflects an attempt to bypass the legal consequences flowing from the rejection of impleadment. Such a collateral challenge cannot be countenanced in exercise of writ jurisdiction, particularly when the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is founded upon equity, good faith, and complete disclosure. The petitioner, having allowed the earlier order to attain finality, is estopped from 16 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 reagitating the same issue in the guise of challenging the subsequent orders passed by the learned Tribunal. 39. This Court cannot lose sight of the surrounding circumstances in which the present petition has been instituted. The tenor of the pleadings, the nature of allegations levelled against respondent No. 6, and the repeated attempts made by the petitioner to obstruct the proceedings despite having already been held to be neither a necessary nor a proper party, unmistakably suggest that the litigation is not founded upon protection of any legally enforceable right, but appears to be actuated by personal animosity against respondent No. 6. 40. The petitioner has persistently sought to challenge every stage of the proceedings concerning the construction raised by respondent No. 6, notwithstanding the categorical finding returned by the learned Tribunal that she lacked locus standi to participate in the matter. Even after suffering the said adjudication, which attained finality, the petitioner continued to reagitate the issue through collateral proceedings. Such conduct reflects an endeavour not to vindicate any legal right, but rather to keep the controversy alive with the apparent object of obstructing the culmination of proceedings which otherwise stand concluded in accordance with law. 41. It is well settled that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is an equitable and discretionary jurisdiction, which cannot be permitted to be invoked for settling personal scores or pursuing motivated litigation. Courts are duty bound to ensure that judicial process is not misused as an instrument of oppression or harassment. Litigation inspired by malice, rivalry, or oblique motives deserves to be discouraged at the very threshold, lest the sanctity of judicial proceedings be 17 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 diluted by permitting parties to abuse the process of law for collateral purposes. 42. The present case, viewed in its entirety, bears all the indicia of vexatious litigation. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate any subsisting legal injury, yet has sought to repeatedly question proceedings to which she was already held disentitled to participate. 43. This Court is of the considered opinion that permitting such litigation to proceed would amount to encouraging abuse of the judicial process and would unnecessarily burden the constitutional courts with disputes lacking any real legal foundation. The writ jurisdiction of this Court cannot be converted into a forum for pursuing personal grudges under the guise of legal proceedings. CONCLUSION 44. In view of the distinct nature of controversy involved in both the clubbed petitions, this Court deems it appropriate to de-tag WP(C) No. 2366/2022 and shall be heard separately. Although, the petitions had earlier been tagged together in terms of order dated 16.11.2024, but upon a closer examination of the pleadings and reliefs sought therein, it transpires that the issues arising in the two matters are distinct and require independent consideration. 45. The record reveals that WP(C) No.2366/2022 arises out of proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein, the petitioner has primarily assailed the order dated 20.09.2022 passed by the learned J&K Special Tribunal, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner came to be dismissed. The petitioner has further sought quashment of demolition notice bearing No. SMC/ENF/2021-27 dated 04.11.2019 and has also prayed for issuance of a writ of mandamus 18 | P a g e WP(C) 1338/2024 commanding the respondents to regularize the alleged minor deviations, if any, in the structure of the existing mixed-use commercial building. 46. The questions that arise for adjudication in WP(C) No. 2366/2022 are intrinsically connected with the validity of the order passed by the learned Tribunal, the legality of the demolition notice and the claim of the petitioner for regularization of deviations. However, the controversy involved in the instant petition is distinct and independent and, therefore, both petitions do not warrant a joint hearing. 47. Accordingly, WP(C) No. 2366/2022 shall be listed and considered separately in accordance with law. 48. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court finds no merit in the reliefs sought by the petitioner. The impugned order dated 26.09.2023 passed by the learned Tribunal, whereby the petitioner’s application for impleadment came to be rejected, as well as the order dated 28.05.2024 and the corrigendum issued thereto, do not suffer from any illegality, arbitrariness, perversity, or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 49. Accordingly, the writ petitions, along with all connected applications, are dismissed. (WASIMSADIQNARGAL) JUDGE SRINAGAR: 14.05.2026 “Mubashir”  Whether Judgment is Speaking: Yes  Whether Judgment is Reportable: Yes/No