THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No.455 of 2024 Date of Decision: 21.04.2026 _______________________________________________________ Bhup Chand …….Petitioner Versus Kunju Devi & another … Respondents _______________________________________________________ Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the Petitioner : Mr. Loveneesh Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Sat Prakash, Advocate, for respondent No.1. Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for respondent No.2/ State. _______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral): Instant Criminal Revision petition filed under Section 438 read with Section 442 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays challenge to judgment dated 03.06.2024, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.02 of 2024(CIS Registration No.42 of 2024), affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.12.2023/ 23.01.2024, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi, 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal case No. 857 of 2015, titled Kunju Devi vs. Bhup Chand, whereby learned trial Court, while holding petitioner-accused (for short ‘accused’) guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act(for short ‘Act’), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.70,000/- to the respondent- complainant (for short ‘complainant’). 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as well as other documents adduced on record by the respective parties, are that respondent No.1-complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law, alleging therein that accused, with a view to discharge his lawful liability, issued cheque bearing No.949481, dated 07.12.2015, amounting to Rs. 50,000/- of Punjab National Bank, Branch Aut, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in favour of the complainant. However, fact remains that aforesaid cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned was returned to the complainant vide memo dated 02.04.2015 with the remarks “funds insufficient”. Immediately after receipt of return memo, complainant served the accused with legal notice dated 24.04.2015, calling upon him to make the payment good within stipulated time, but fact remains that neither afore legal 3 notice was replied nor payment was made, as a result thereof, complainant was compelled to institute proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law, which subsequently, on the basis of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, held the accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under S. 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per description given herein above. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by learned trial Court, present petitioner-accused preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, but same also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 03.06.2024. In the aforesaid background, petitioner-accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for his acquittal after quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by Courts below. 4. Vide order dated 08.08.2024, this Court suspended the substantive sentence imposed by Court below, subject to petitioner- accused depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal bonds in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. However, fact remains that aforesaid order never came to be complied with within 4 time. By way of indulgence, this Court extended the time and pursuant to which, petitioner deposited some amount and thereafter, he was repeatedly given time to deposit remaining sum of Rs. 28,000/-, but fact remains that till date, amount has not been deposited. More than ten opportunities came to be granted to the petitioner to either pay the money or contest the case, but in vain. Vide order dated 06.04.2026, on the vehement request of learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court adjourned the matter for today’s date, enabling petitioner to deposit the remaining amount, but fact remains that neither petitioner has come present nor he has deposited the amount. In the afore background, learned counsel representing the petitioner fairly states that this Court may proceed to decide the case at hand on its own merit. 5. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned judgments of conviction and order of sentence recorded by Courts below, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner-accused that both the Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court finds that both the courts below have meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and there is no scope left for interference. 5 6. Careful perusal of the pleadings as well as material adduced on record by the respective parties reveal that at no point of time, petitioner/accused disputed factum with regard to his having issued cheque as well as signatures thereupon. Accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., though denied the case of the complainant, but he failed to probablize aforesaid defence by leading cogent and convincing evidence. Careful perusal of pattern of cross-examination conducted upon complainant clearly reveals that accused attempted to set up a case that cheque in question was taken by the complainant from her son-in-law. Complainant specifically stated in her cross-examination that cheque bearing No.949483 (Ex.CW1/B) was not issued to her by the accused. 7. To the contrary, complainant successfully proved on record that cheque in question was issued towards discharge of lawful liability, but same was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds in the bank account of the accused. While examining herself as CW-1, complainant tendered evidence by way of affidavit Ex. CW1/A, reiterating therein the contents of the complaint. She successfully tendered in evidence original cheque Ex. CW1/B, return memo Ex. CW1/C, legal notice Ex.CW1/D and courier receipt Ex. CW1/E. Cross-examination conducted upon afore witness nowhere suggests that accused was able to extract anything contrary to what this 6 witness stated in her examination-in-chief. She deposed that Rajni Devi wife of late Sh. Hitesh Sharma is her daughter. She deposed that her son-in-law Hitesh Sharma had opened a shop at Kot in the name of M/s Aditya. While feigning ignorance that Hitesh Sharma and Bhup Chand were having cordial relationship with each other, she also feigned ignorance that her son-in-law had taken loan amounting to Rs. 24,00,000/- from Punjab National Bank, Branch Aut, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh. She specifically denied suggestion put to her that she had taken cheques from her son-in-law. She also denied that cheque bearing No.949483 was not issued to her by the accused. She categorically stated that accused had filled the cheque and same was not issued blank. 8. If the pattern of cross-examination conducted upon afore witness is perused, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the respondent/complainant that factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon never came to be disputed, rather same stands established, if it is so, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the Courts below, while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which speak about presumption in favour of the holder of the cheque that cheque was issued towards discharge of lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either can refer to 7 the documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or presumption can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any. However, in the instant case, no cogent and convincing evidence ever came to be led on record to probablize the defence otherwise attempted to be set up during the cross-examination. 9. Accused examined himself as DW-1 and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex.DW1/A, denying therein the contents of the complaint. In his cross-examination, he stated that he is posted as Peon in Revenue Department and getting salary of Rs. 50,000/- per month. He stated that Hitesh Sharma was known to him since childhood. He admitted that complainant Kunju Devi is mother-in-law of Hitesh Sharma and she has very good yearly income from apple orchards. While denying that he borrowed sum of Rs. 50,000/- from the complainant for his personal need, he attempted to set up a case that cheque in question was obtained by the complainant from her son-in-law Hitesh Sharma. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the 8 accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein:- “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the 9 same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy. 11. By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as “security” can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on 28.10.2021, has held as under: “16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque 10 as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow. 12. Needless to say, expression “security cheque” is not a statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a “security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138 of the Act in case of its dishonour. 13. Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section 138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Similarly, factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by the accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established on record. 14. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the 11 courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 15. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below, while passing impugned judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 16. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its 12 judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 17. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 18. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court within a period of 15 days to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Bail bonds of the petitioner are cancelled and discharged accordingly. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Sandeep Sharma), Judge April 21, 2026 (shankar)