021 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH FAO-4221-2024 (O&M) Date of Decision : 27.08.2026 Greater Mohali Area Development Authority & Anr ... Appellant(s) Versus M/s SMPL SE (JV) & Anr ... Respondent(s) CORAM : HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ALKA SARIN HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MONICA CHHIBBER SHARMA Present : Ms. Deepali Puri, Advocate with Mr. Arjun Dhaliwal, Advocate for the appellants. Mr. Rohan Markanda, Advocate and Ms. Aviral Setia, Advocate for respondent No.1. ALKA SARIN, J. (Oral) 1. The present appeal has been filed challenging the impugned judgment dated 29.02.2024 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, SAS Nagar (Mohali), whereby an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 filed by the appellants herein for setting aside the award dated 23.10.2019 was dismissed. 2. The present appeal has been filed alongwith an application (CM-13753-CII-2025) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for condonation of delay of 121 days in filing the present appeal. It has been averred in the application that the judgment was passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, SAS Nagar (Mohali) on 29.02.2024. The certified copy of the impugned judgment was applied on 01.03.2024 which was collected by the counsel on 13.03.2024 and the same was received by the applicant-appellants only on 04.04.2024. YOGESH SHARMA 2026.08.30 17:44 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Chandigarh FAO-4221-2024 (O&M) 2 Thereafter, the certified copy was misplaced in their office. It has further been averred in the application that the applicant-appellants sought opinion for challenging the impugned judgment and for seeking sanction for appointment of an Advocate, the file was sent to the Head Office and the said sanction was received on 11.06.2024. However, due to the summer break in the Court, the concerned counsel was not available. It has further been averred that the file of the case alongwith the sanction was marked to the counsel on 05.07.2024 and since the record was not complete, necessary steps were taken to do the needful. All the relevant documents were collected and the entire record was called from the previous counsel which was received by the applicant- appellants only on 14.08.2024. Accordingly, the present appeal was filed only on 28.08.2024. The limitation for filing the present appeal is 60 days which expired on 29.04.2024. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellants has vehemently contended that cogent reasons have been given for the delay caused in filing the present appeal. It has further been contended that the Court has the power to condone the delay. 4. Per contra the learned counsel for respondent No.1 has contended that there is a delay of 121 days in filing the appeal for which no cogent reason is forthcoming. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 6. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented by Executive Engineer Vs. M/s Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited [(2021) 6 SCC 460] has held as under : YOGESH SHARMA 2026.08.30 17:44 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Chandigarh FAO-4221-2024 (O&M) 3 “55. Nearer home, in Brahampal v. National Insurance Company, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1053, this Court specifically referred to the difference between a delay in filing commercial claims under the Arbitration Act or the Commercial Courts Act and claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as follows: “16. This Court has firstly held that purpose of conferment of such power must be examined for the determination of the scope of such discretion conferred upon the court. [refer to Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad, AIR 1963 SC 120; Shri Prakash Chand Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 2 SCC 806]. Our analysis of the purpose of the Act suggests that such discretionary power is conferred upon the Courts, to enforce the rights of the victims and their dependents. The legislature intended that Courts must have such power so as to ensure that substantive justice is not trumped by technicalities. (emphasis supplied) “22. Therefore, the aforesaid provision being a beneficial legislation, must be given liberal interpretation to serve its object. Keeping in view the substantive rights of the parties, undue emphasis should not be given to technicalities. In such cases delay in filing and refiling cannot be viewed strictly, as compared to commercial claims under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. In P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445, wherein this Court while interpreting Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, held that the right to object to an award itself is substantively bound with the limitation period prescribed therein and the same YOGESH SHARMA 2026.08.30 17:44 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Chandigarh FAO-4221-2024 (O&M) 4 cannot merely a procedural prescription. In effect the Court held that a complete petition, has to be filed within the time prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and ‘not thereafter’. The Court while coming to the aforesaid conclusion, reasoned as under: “36.1 First, the purpose of the Arbitration Act was to provide for a speedy dispute resolution process. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reveal that the legislative intent of enacting the Arbitration Act was to provide parties with an efficient alternative dispute resolution system which gives litigants an expedited resolution of disputes while reducing the burden on the courts. Article 34(3) reflects this intent when it defines the commencement and concluding period for challenging an award. This Court in Popular Construction case [Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470] highlighted the importance of the fixed periods under the Arbitration Act. We may also add that the finality is a fundamental principle enshrined under the Arbitration Act and a definitive time-limit for challenging an award is necessary for ensuring finality. If Section 17 were to be applied, an award can be challenged even after 120 days. This would defeat the Arbitration Act's objective of speedy resolution of disputes. The finality of award would also be in a limbo as a party can challenge an award even after the 120 day period.” (emphasis in original) YOGESH SHARMA 2026.08.30 17:44 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Chandigarh FAO-4221-2024 (O&M) 5 “23. Coming back to the Motor Vehicles Act, the legislative intent is to provide appropriate compensation for the victims and to protect their substantive rights, in pursuit of the same, the interpretation should not be as strict as commercial claims as elucidated above. 24. Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts with discretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same time it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was prevented from abiding by the same due to the existence of “sufficient cause”. Although there exists no strait jacket formula for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that, the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain from exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief. 25. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the opinion that the delay of 45 days has been properly explained by the appellants, which was on account of illness of the wife of Appellant No. 1. It was not appropriate on the part of the High Court to dismiss the appeal merely on the ground of delay of short duration, particularly in matters involving death in motor accident claims. Moreover, in the present case no mala fide can be imputable against the appellants for filing the appeal after the expiry of ninety days. YOGESH SHARMA 2026.08.30 17:44 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Chandigarh FAO-4221-2024 (O&M) 6 Therefore, we are of the opinion that the strict approach taken in the impugned order is hyper- technical and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.” (emphasis supplied) Thereafter the expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with in paras 56 to 58. It has further been held in paras 60 and 61 as under : “60. Also, it must be remembered that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the appellant to have delay condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 as follows: “It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by s. 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that YOGESH SHARMA 2026.08.30 17:44 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Chandigarh FAO-4221-2024 (O&M) 7 considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under s. 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of ss. 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of s. 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under s. 5 without reference to s. 14.” (page 771) 61. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches.” 7. In the absence of any cogent reasons having been given in the application for condonation of delay, this Court does not find any ground to condone the delay of 121 days in filing the present appeal. The explanation given in the application for condoning the delay is not acceptable. Accordingly, the application (CM-13753-CII-2025) for condoning the delay in filing the YOGESH SHARMA 2026.08.30 17:44 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Chandigarh FAO-4221-2024 (O&M) 8 present appeal is dismissed. Consequently, the present commercial appeal stands dismissed being barred by limitation. 8. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed off. ( ALKA SARIN ) JUDGE 27.08.2026 Yogesh Sharma ( MONICA CHHIBBER SHARMA ) JUDGE NOTE: Whether speaking/non-speaking: Speaking Whether reportable: YES/NO YOGESH SHARMA 2026.08.30 17:44 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Chandigarh