CWP-22141 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT 107 KARAMBIR SINGH LABOUR COMMISSIONER, HARYANA AND ANR. CORAM: HON'BLE Present: KIRTI SINGH 1. of India has been filed praying for certiorari for setting aside order dated 12.12.2024 (Annexure P the Labour Commissioner, Haryana, whereby the application filed by respondent No.2 Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act'), seeking approval of the petitioner's dismissal from service, was allowed; and for consequential reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service. 2. with respondent No.2 Bellsonica Auto Component India Employees Union (Regd. No. 1983). The registration of the said Union came to be cancelled by the Unions, Haryana, vide order dated 23.09.2023, on the ground that it had 22141-2026 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP Date of Decision: 27.07.2026 KARAMBIR SINGH VS LABOUR COMMISSIONER, HARYANA AND ANR. CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Mr. Anil K. Sokal, Advocate for the petitioner. **** KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL) The present petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for setting aside order dated 12.12.2024 (Annexure P the Labour Commissioner, Haryana, whereby the application filed by respondent No.2-M/s Bellsonica Auto Component India Pvt. Ltd. under 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act'), seeking approval of the petitioner's dismissal from service, was allowed; and for consequential reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service. The facts, briefly stated, are that the petitioner was working with respondent No.2-Management and was the Legal Advisor of the Bellsonica Auto Component India Employees Union (Regd. No. 1983). The registration of the said Union came to be cancelled by the Unions, Haryana, vide order dated 23.09.2023, on the ground that it had -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-22141-2026 (O&M) Date of Decision: 27.07.2026 ... Petitioner LABOUR COMMISSIONER, HARYANA AND ANR. ... Respondents MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Mr. Anil K. Sokal, Advocate The present petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for setting aside order dated 12.12.2024 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Labour Commissioner, Haryana, whereby the application filed by M/s Bellsonica Auto Component India Pvt. Ltd. under 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act'), seeking approval of the petitioner's dismissal from service, was allowed; and for consequential reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service. The facts, briefly stated, are that the petitioner was working Management and was the Legal Advisor of the Bellsonica Auto Component India Employees Union (Regd. No. 1983). The registration of the said Union came to be cancelled by the Registrar, Trade Unions, Haryana, vide order dated 23.09.2023, on the ground that it had The present petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution issuance of a writ in the nature of 1) passed by the Labour Commissioner, Haryana, whereby the application filed by M/s Bellsonica Auto Component India Pvt. Ltd. under 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act'), seeking approval of the petitioner's dismissal from service, was allowed; and for consequential reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service. The facts, briefly stated, are that the petitioner was working Management and was the Legal Advisor of the Bellsonica Auto Component India Employees Union (Regd. No. 1983). The Registrar, Trade Unions, Haryana, vide order dated 23.09.2023, on the ground that it had SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.30 12:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-22141 enrolled workmen of a contractor as its ordinary members in violation of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 and its own rules. Notwithstanding the said cancellation, the peti declared a 'protected workman' by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Gurugram, vide order dated 25.09.2023 (Annexure P 01.06.2023 under Section 12(3) of the Act had also been arrived the Union and the Management, inter alia providing for reinstatement of certain suspended/terminated workmen and for amicable resolution of pending demand notices. On 01.12.2023, an incident is alleged to have occurred on the shop floor in which employees, is alleged to have assaulted and criminally intimidated two co workers; complaints in this regard were lodged with the police and the department on the same date, and CCTV footage of the incident was placed on record. A chargesheet dated 11.12.2023 was issued to the petitioner alleging severe misconduct. A domestic inquiry was thereafter held before Sh. Virender Singh, Advocate, appointed as Inquiry Officer vide letter dated 22.01.2024; the inquiry proceeded course of which four management witnesses were examined, and the petitioner participated as WW put to him in cross The Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 07.06.2024 holding all the charges proved. A show cause notice dated 08.07.2024 proposing dismissal was issued, to which the petitioner replied on 11.07.2024 denying the charges and alleging bias and victimis satisfactory, and the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 22141-2026 (O&M) enrolled workmen of a contractor as its ordinary members in violation of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 and its own rules. Notwithstanding the said cancellation, the petitioner, along with four other office declared a 'protected workman' by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Gurugram, vide order dated 25.09.2023 (Annexure P 01.06.2023 under Section 12(3) of the Act had also been arrived the Union and the Management, inter alia providing for reinstatement of certain suspended/terminated workmen and for amicable resolution of pending demand notices. On 01.12.2023, an incident is alleged to have occurred on the shop floor in which the petitioner, along with certain co employees, is alleged to have assaulted and criminally intimidated two co workers; complaints in this regard were lodged with the police and the department on the same date, and CCTV footage of the incident was placed on record. A chargesheet dated 11.12.2023 was issued to the petitioner alleging severe misconduct. A domestic inquiry was thereafter held before Sh. Virender Singh, Advocate, appointed as Inquiry Officer vide letter dated 22.01.2024; the inquiry proceeded from 30.01.2024 to 21.05.2024, in the course of which four management witnesses were examined, and the petitioner participated as WW-1 but did not specifically answer the questions put to him in cross-examination, relying instead on his written statement. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 07.06.2024 holding all the charges proved. A show cause notice dated 08.07.2024 proposing dismissal was issued, to which the petitioner replied on 11.07.2024 denying the charges and alleging bias and victimisation; the explanation was not found satisfactory, and the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated -2- enrolled workmen of a contractor as its ordinary members in violation of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 and its own rules. Notwithstanding the said tioner, along with four other office-bearers, was declared a 'protected workman' by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Gurugram, vide order dated 25.09.2023 (Annexure P-3). A settlement dated 01.06.2023 under Section 12(3) of the Act had also been arrived at between the Union and the Management, inter alia providing for reinstatement of certain suspended/terminated workmen and for amicable resolution of pending demand notices. On 01.12.2023, an incident is alleged to have the petitioner, along with certain co employees, is alleged to have assaulted and criminally intimidated two co workers; complaints in this regard were lodged with the police and the department on the same date, and CCTV footage of the incident was placed on record. A chargesheet dated 11.12.2023 was issued to the petitioner alleging severe misconduct. A domestic inquiry was thereafter held before Sh. Virender Singh, Advocate, appointed as Inquiry Officer vide letter dated from 30.01.2024 to 21.05.2024, in the course of which four management witnesses were examined, and the 1 but did not specifically answer the questions examination, relying instead on his written statement. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 07.06.2024 holding all the charges proved. A show cause notice dated 08.07.2024 proposing dismissal was issued, to which the petitioner replied on 11.07.2024 denying the ation; the explanation was not found satisfactory, and the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated enrolled workmen of a contractor as its ordinary members in violation of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 and its own rules. Notwithstanding the said bearers, was declared a 'protected workman' by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, 3). A settlement dated at between the Union and the Management, inter alia providing for reinstatement of certain suspended/terminated workmen and for amicable resolution of pending demand notices. On 01.12.2023, an incident is alleged to have the petitioner, along with certain co- employees, is alleged to have assaulted and criminally intimidated two co- workers; complaints in this regard were lodged with the police and the department on the same date, and CCTV footage of the incident was placed on record. A chargesheet dated 11.12.2023 was issued to the petitioner alleging severe misconduct. A domestic inquiry was thereafter held before Sh. Virender Singh, Advocate, appointed as Inquiry Officer vide letter dated from 30.01.2024 to 21.05.2024, in the course of which four management witnesses were examined, and the 1 but did not specifically answer the questions examination, relying instead on his written statement. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 07.06.2024 holding all the charges proved. A show cause notice dated 08.07.2024 proposing dismissal was issued, to which the petitioner replied on 11.07.2024 denying the ation; the explanation was not found satisfactory, and the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.30 12:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-22141 12.08.2024, on which date the Management also remitted, through NEFT, full and final dues of Rs. 3,28,417/ 47,312/-. On the same date, respondent No.2 filed the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act before the Labour Commissioner, Haryana, citing the pendency of the Union's general demand notice dated 01.04.2022 as the subsisting industrial dispute, th that demand notice stood deregistered a precautionary measure'. After considering the petitioner's reply dated 21.11.2024 and hearing arguments on 10.12.2024, the Labour Commissio the application and approved the dismissal, holding, inter alia, that the petitioner was not a protected workman on the date of dismissal since the Management's appeal against the grant of tha order dated 08.12.2023, that the domestic inquiry satisfied the guidelines in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen (SC), and that the proviso conditions under Section 33(2)(b) stood duly complied with. 3. the following grounds: firstly, that the mandatory requirements of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) and of the Model Standing Orders were not complied with; secondly, that the petitioner con workman at the relevant time, and the application ought to have been made under Section 33(3), and not Section 33(2)(b), of the Act; thirdly, that the Labour Commissioner failed to take cognizance of the tripartite settlement dated 01.06.2023 arrived at under Section 12(3) of the Act; fourthly, that the 22141-2026 (O&M) 12.08.2024, on which date the Management also remitted, through NEFT, full and final dues of Rs. 3,28,417/- and one month's gross wages of Rs. . On the same date, respondent No.2 filed the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act before the Labour Commissioner, Haryana, citing the pendency of the Union's general demand notice dated 01.04.2022 as the subsisting industrial dispute, though noting that demand notice stood deregistered-that the application was being filed 'as a precautionary measure'. After considering the petitioner's reply dated 21.11.2024 and hearing arguments on 10.12.2024, the Labour Commissioner, Haryana, vide the impugned order dated 12.12.2024, allowed the application and approved the dismissal, holding, inter alia, that the petitioner was not a protected workman on the date of dismissal since the Management's appeal against the grant of tha order dated 08.12.2023, that the domestic inquiry satisfied the guidelines in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen and that the proviso conditions under Section 33(2)(b) stood duly complied with. Learned counsel for the petitioner assails the impugned order on the following grounds: firstly, that the mandatory requirements of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) and of the Model Standing Orders were not complied with; secondly, that the petitioner con workman at the relevant time, and the application ought to have been made under Section 33(3), and not Section 33(2)(b), of the Act; thirdly, that the Labour Commissioner failed to take cognizance of the tripartite settlement 01.06.2023 arrived at under Section 12(3) of the Act; fourthly, that the -3- 12.08.2024, on which date the Management also remitted, through NEFT, and one month's gross wages of Rs. . On the same date, respondent No.2 filed the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act before the Labour Commissioner, Haryana, citing the pendency of the Union's general demand notice dated 01.04.2022 ough noting-since the Union raising that the application was being filed 'as a precautionary measure'. After considering the petitioner's reply dated 21.11.2024 and hearing arguments on 10.12.2024, the Labour ner, Haryana, vide the impugned order dated 12.12.2024, allowed the application and approved the dismissal, holding, inter alia, that the petitioner was not a protected workman on the date of dismissal since the Management's appeal against the grant of that status stood accepted vide order dated 08.12.2023, that the domestic inquiry satisfied the guidelines in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen, 2008-LLR-619 and that the proviso conditions under Section 33(2)(b) stood duly Learned counsel for the petitioner assails the impugned order on the following grounds: firstly, that the mandatory requirements of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) and of the Model Standing Orders were not complied with; secondly, that the petitioner continued to be a protected workman at the relevant time, and the application ought to have been made under Section 33(3), and not Section 33(2)(b), of the Act; thirdly, that the Labour Commissioner failed to take cognizance of the tripartite settlement 01.06.2023 arrived at under Section 12(3) of the Act; fourthly, that the 12.08.2024, on which date the Management also remitted, through NEFT, and one month's gross wages of Rs. . On the same date, respondent No.2 filed the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act before the Labour Commissioner, Haryana, citing the pendency of the Union's general demand notice dated 01.04.2022 since the Union raising that the application was being filed 'as a precautionary measure'. After considering the petitioner's reply dated 21.11.2024 and hearing arguments on 10.12.2024, the Labour ner, Haryana, vide the impugned order dated 12.12.2024, allowed the application and approved the dismissal, holding, inter alia, that the petitioner was not a protected workman on the date of dismissal since the t status stood accepted vide order dated 08.12.2023, that the domestic inquiry satisfied the guidelines in 619 and that the proviso conditions under Section 33(2)(b) stood duly Learned counsel for the petitioner assails the impugned order on the following grounds: firstly, that the mandatory requirements of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) and of the Model Standing Orders were not tinued to be a protected workman at the relevant time, and the application ought to have been made under Section 33(3), and not Section 33(2)(b), of the Act; thirdly, that the Labour Commissioner failed to take cognizance of the tripartite settlement 01.06.2023 arrived at under Section 12(3) of the Act; fourthly, that the SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.30 12:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-22141 impugned order was passed mechanically, without examining whether the dismissal amounted to victimisation or unfair labour practice; fifthly, that the domestic inquiry was vitiated b independent evidence, the alleged complainants were never examined as witnesses, and the petitioner's repeated requests for a co representative were declined; and lastly, that there was an unexplained delay between the inquiry report and the dismissal order, consistent with a pattern of similar dismissals of union office and that the punishment of dismissal is, in any event, disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. In suppo reliance upon Govind, [1962] Supp. (3) SCR 618; Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma, (2002) 2 SCC 244; Lalla Ram v. D.C.M. Chemica Rathor v. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 976. 3. relevant material on record. 4. order has been passed by the Competent Authority in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, proceedings whereunder are of a limited and summary nature, confined to examining whether a proper domestic enquiry has bee and whether the conditions of the proviso have been complied with; such approval does not amount to an adjudication upon the legality of the dismissal on merits. The Act provides a complete and 22141-2026 (O&M) impugned order was passed mechanically, without examining whether the dismissal amounted to victimisation or unfair labour practice; fifthly, that the domestic inquiry was vitiated by bias, in that it proceeded without independent evidence, the alleged complainants were never examined as witnesses, and the petitioner's repeated requests for a co representative were declined; and lastly, that there was an unexplained delay en the inquiry report and the dismissal order, consistent with a pattern of similar dismissals of union office-bearers by the Management since 2021, and that the punishment of dismissal is, in any event, disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. In support of these submissions, learned counsel places reliance upon Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v. Govind, [1962] Supp. (3) SCR 618; Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma, (2002) 2 SCC 244; Lalla Ram v. D.C.M. Chemical Works Ltd., (1978) 3 SCC 1; Rathor v. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 976. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the relevant material on record. Taking up the question of maintainability order has been passed by the Competent Authority in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, proceedings whereunder are of a limited and summary nature, confined to examining whether a proper domestic enquiry has been held, whether a prima facie case for dismissal is made out, and whether the conditions of the proviso have been complied with; such approval does not amount to an adjudication upon the legality of the dismissal on merits. The Act provides a complete and -4- impugned order was passed mechanically, without examining whether the dismissal amounted to victimisation or unfair labour practice; fifthly, that the y bias, in that it proceeded without independent evidence, the alleged complainants were never examined as witnesses, and the petitioner's repeated requests for a co-worker representative were declined; and lastly, that there was an unexplained delay en the inquiry report and the dismissal order, consistent with a pattern bearers by the Management since 2021, and that the punishment of dismissal is, in any event, disproportionate to the rt of these submissions, learned counsel places Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v. Govind, [1962] Supp. (3) SCR 618; Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma, (2002) 2 SCC 244; Lalla Ram v. l Works Ltd., (1978) 3 SCC 1; and Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 976. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the Taking up the question of maintainability first, the impugned order has been passed by the Competent Authority in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, proceedings whereunder are of a limited and summary nature, confined to examining whether a proper domestic n held, whether a prima facie case for dismissal is made out, and whether the conditions of the proviso have been complied with; such approval does not amount to an adjudication upon the legality of the dismissal on merits. The Act provides a complete and efficacious statutory impugned order was passed mechanically, without examining whether the dismissal amounted to victimisation or unfair labour practice; fifthly, that the y bias, in that it proceeded without independent evidence, the alleged complainants were never examined as worker representative were declined; and lastly, that there was an unexplained delay en the inquiry report and the dismissal order, consistent with a pattern bearers by the Management since 2021, and that the punishment of dismissal is, in any event, disproportionate to the rt of these submissions, learned counsel places Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v. Govind, [1962] Supp. (3) SCR 618; Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma, (2002) 2 SCC 244; Lalla Ram v. Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 976. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the first, the impugned order has been passed by the Competent Authority in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, proceedings whereunder are of a limited and summary nature, confined to examining whether a proper domestic n held, whether a prima facie case for dismissal is made out, and whether the conditions of the proviso have been complied with; such approval does not amount to an adjudication upon the legality of the efficacious statutory SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.30 12:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-22141 mechanism for redressal: by virtue of Section 2A, an individual dispute relating to dismissal is deemed to be an industrial dispute capable of adjudication by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, and where, as here, approval has been invoke Section 33 dispute is pending, as explained in Bank Ltd records some hesitation as to whether a subsisting industrial dispute existed at all to ground the application, since the Union whose general demand notice was cited as the pending dispute had already been deregistered, the Labour Comm merits only because it had, in fact, been filed. Whether an application under Section 33(2)(b) was maintainable in the first place in the absence of a subsisting industrial dispute is itself a mixed q Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, and not this Court in writ jurisdiction, is best placed to examine upon evidence. While the availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction unde Article 226 but only a self observes save where the writ is founded on enforcement of a fundamental right, violation of the principles of natural justice, or an order wholly without jurisdiction or under a Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1 none of these exceptions is attracted on the facts of the present case, and no other exceptional circumstance has been pleaded or demonstrated warra a deviation from the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies. 22141-2026 (O&M) mechanism for redressal: by virtue of Section 2A, an individual dispute relating to dismissal is deemed to be an industrial dispute capable of adjudication by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, and where, as here, approval has been granted under Section 33(2)(b), the workman is entitled to invoke Section 33-A before the very authority before which the underlying dispute is pending, as explained in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (supra). It may also be noticed that the i records some hesitation as to whether a subsisting industrial dispute existed at all to ground the application, since the Union whose general demand notice was cited as the pending dispute had already been deregistered, the Labour Commissioner having proceeded to examine the application on merits only because it had, in fact, been filed. Whether an application under Section 33(2)(b) was maintainable in the first place in the absence of a subsisting industrial dispute is itself a mixed q Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, and not this Court in writ jurisdiction, is best placed to examine upon evidence. While the availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction unde Article 226 but only a self-imposed restriction which this Court ordinarily observes save where the writ is founded on enforcement of a fundamental right, violation of the principles of natural justice, or an order wholly without jurisdiction or under a vires challenge, as explained in Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1 none of these exceptions is attracted on the facts of the present case, and no other exceptional circumstance has been pleaded or demonstrated warra a deviation from the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies. -5- mechanism for redressal: by virtue of Section 2A, an individual dispute relating to dismissal is deemed to be an industrial dispute capable of adjudication by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, and where, as here, granted under Section 33(2)(b), the workman is entitled to A before the very authority before which the underlying Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas . (supra). It may also be noticed that the impugned order itself records some hesitation as to whether a subsisting industrial dispute existed at all to ground the application, since the Union whose general demand notice was cited as the pending dispute had already been deregistered, the issioner having proceeded to examine the application on merits only because it had, in fact, been filed. Whether an application under Section 33(2)(b) was maintainable in the first place in the absence of a subsisting industrial dispute is itself a mixed question of fact and law that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, and not this Court in writ jurisdiction, is best placed to examine upon evidence. While the availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction unde imposed restriction which this Court ordinarily observes save where the writ is founded on enforcement of a fundamental right, violation of the principles of natural justice, or an order wholly vires challenge, as explained in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1 none of these exceptions is attracted on the facts of the present case, and no other exceptional circumstance has been pleaded or demonstrated warranting a deviation from the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies. mechanism for redressal: by virtue of Section 2A, an individual dispute relating to dismissal is deemed to be an industrial dispute capable of adjudication by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, and where, as here, granted under Section 33(2)(b), the workman is entitled to A before the very authority before which the underlying Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas mpugned order itself records some hesitation as to whether a subsisting industrial dispute existed at all to ground the application, since the Union whose general demand notice was cited as the pending dispute had already been deregistered, the issioner having proceeded to examine the application on merits only because it had, in fact, been filed. Whether an application under Section 33(2)(b) was maintainable in the first place in the absence of a uestion of fact and law that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, and not this Court in writ jurisdiction, is best placed to examine upon evidence. While the availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under imposed restriction which this Court ordinarily observes save where the writ is founded on enforcement of a fundamental right, violation of the principles of natural justice, or an order wholly Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1, none of these exceptions is attracted on the facts of the present case, and no nting SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.30 12:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-22141 5. without in any manner foreclosing the fuller examination that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal alone is competent to unde of the grounds urged appears, at this stage, to make out a case warranting interference. On the question of protected order records that the Management's appeal against the grant of that status stood accepted vide order dated 08.12.2023, so that the petitioner was not a protected workman on the date of dismissal, i.e., 12.08.2024, and the application was accordingly maintainable under Section 33(2)(b) rather than Section 33(3). On the conduct of the domes witnesses consistently testified to the incident of 01.12.2023, and the petitioner, though afforded opportunity, chose to rest on his written statement rather than specifically answer the questions put to him; the plea of bias, while founded partly on the fact that the alleged victims themselves were not examined and that a co has not been shown to have caused any concrete prejudice at this stage though this remains a matter the Labour Co weigh on the evidence. As regards the tripartite settlement dated 01.06.2023, it pertains, on the face of the record, to the reinstatement of other suspended/terminated workmen and to pending demand notices generally, and nothing has been shown connecting it to the specific charges of assault levelled against the petitioner personally. On compliance with the proviso to Section 33(2)(b), the NEFT records placed on file show that the dismissal, the payment of full and final dues and the filing of the approval application, were all effected on 12.08.2024, 22141-2026 (O&M) That apart, even on a prima facie view of the record, and without in any manner foreclosing the fuller examination that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal alone is competent to unde of the grounds urged appears, at this stage, to make out a case warranting interference. On the question of protected order records that the Management's appeal against the grant of that status epted vide order dated 08.12.2023, so that the petitioner was not a protected workman on the date of dismissal, i.e., 12.08.2024, and the application was accordingly maintainable under Section 33(2)(b) rather than Section 33(3). On the conduct of the domes witnesses consistently testified to the incident of 01.12.2023, and the petitioner, though afforded opportunity, chose to rest on his written statement rather than specifically answer the questions put to him; the plea while founded partly on the fact that the alleged victims themselves were not examined and that a co-worker representative was not permitted, has not been shown to have caused any concrete prejudice at this stage though this remains a matter the Labour Co weigh on the evidence. As regards the tripartite settlement dated 01.06.2023, it pertains, on the face of the record, to the reinstatement of other suspended/terminated workmen and to pending demand notices generally, ing has been shown connecting it to the specific charges of assault levelled against the petitioner personally. On compliance with the proviso to Section 33(2)(b), the NEFT records placed on file show that the dismissal, the payment of full and final dues together with one month's gross wages, and the filing of the approval application, were all effected on 12.08.2024, -6- That apart, even on a prima facie view of the record, and without in any manner foreclosing the fuller examination that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal alone is competent to undertake on evidence, none of the grounds urged appears, at this stage, to make out a case warranting interference. On the question of protected-workman status, the impugned order records that the Management's appeal against the grant of that status epted vide order dated 08.12.2023, so that the petitioner was not a protected workman on the date of dismissal, i.e., 12.08.2024, and the application was accordingly maintainable under Section 33(2)(b) rather than Section 33(3). On the conduct of the domestic inquiry, four management witnesses consistently testified to the incident of 01.12.2023, and the petitioner, though afforded opportunity, chose to rest on his written statement rather than specifically answer the questions put to him; the plea while founded partly on the fact that the alleged victims themselves worker representative was not permitted, has not been shown to have caused any concrete prejudice at this stage though this remains a matter the Labour Court would be better placed to weigh on the evidence. As regards the tripartite settlement dated 01.06.2023, it pertains, on the face of the record, to the reinstatement of other suspended/terminated workmen and to pending demand notices generally, ing has been shown connecting it to the specific charges of assault levelled against the petitioner personally. On compliance with the proviso to Section 33(2)(b), the NEFT records placed on file show that the dismissal, together with one month's gross wages, and the filing of the approval application, were all effected on 12.08.2024, That apart, even on a prima facie view of the record, and without in any manner foreclosing the fuller examination that the Labour rtake on evidence, none of the grounds urged appears, at this stage, to make out a case warranting workman status, the impugned order records that the Management's appeal against the grant of that status epted vide order dated 08.12.2023, so that the petitioner was not a protected workman on the date of dismissal, i.e., 12.08.2024, and the application was accordingly maintainable under Section 33(2)(b) rather than tic inquiry, four management witnesses consistently testified to the incident of 01.12.2023, and the petitioner, though afforded opportunity, chose to rest on his written statement rather than specifically answer the questions put to him; the plea while founded partly on the fact that the alleged victims themselves worker representative was not permitted, has not been shown to have caused any concrete prejudice at this stage- urt would be better placed to weigh on the evidence. As regards the tripartite settlement dated 01.06.2023, it pertains, on the face of the record, to the reinstatement of other suspended/terminated workmen and to pending demand notices generally, ing has been shown connecting it to the specific charges of assault levelled against the petitioner personally. On compliance with the proviso to Section 33(2)(b), the NEFT records placed on file show that the dismissal, together with one month's gross wages, and the filing of the approval application, were all effected on 12.08.2024, SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.30 12:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-22141 satisfying the requirement of simultaneity explained in Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 6. 2021 is a factual matter requiring appreciation of evidence and is not capable of being conclusively resolved on the face of the impugned order. As to proportionality, given the seriousness of the proved charges of physical assault and intimidation of co workers on the shop floor, the punishment of dismissal does not, prima facie, appear so shockingly disproportionate as to itself evidence mala fides, though this too remains open for assessment by the Labour Court under the princ (supra). 7. considering whether interference under Articles 226/227 is called for at this stage, and shall not preclude the petitioner from agitating any on merits, and on evidence, before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, which shall decide the same uninfluenced by anything said herein. 8. writ petition. The same is dism petitioner is at liberty to avail the appropriate statutory remedy available under Sections 2A and/or 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as may be advised. 9. opinion on the merits of the controversy, and all questions, factual and legal, are left open to be urged before the competent Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. 22141-2026 (O&M) satisfying the requirement of simultaneity explained in Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra). The claim of a broader pattern of r 2021 is a factual matter requiring appreciation of evidence and is not capable of being conclusively resolved on the face of the impugned order. As to proportionality, given the seriousness of the proved charges of physical ult and intimidation of co workers on the shop floor, the punishment of dismissal does not, prima facie, appear so shockingly disproportionate as to itself evidence mala fides, though this too remains open for assessment by the Labour Court under the principles explained in These observations are made only for the limited purpose of considering whether interference under Articles 226/227 is called for at this stage, and shall not preclude the petitioner from agitating any on merits, and on evidence, before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, which shall decide the same uninfluenced by anything said herein. Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present writ petition. The same is dismissed as not maintainable at this stage, the petitioner is at liberty to avail the appropriate statutory remedy available under Sections 2A and/or 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as may be advised. It is, however, clarified that this Court ha opinion on the merits of the controversy, and all questions, factual and legal, are left open to be urged before the competent Labour Court/Industrial -7- satisfying the requirement of simultaneity explained in Straw Board The claim of a broader pattern of retaliatory dismissals since 2021 is a factual matter requiring appreciation of evidence and is not capable of being conclusively resolved on the face of the impugned order. As to proportionality, given the seriousness of the proved charges of physical ult and intimidation of co workers on the shop floor, the punishment of dismissal does not, prima facie, appear so shockingly disproportionate as to itself evidence mala fides, though this too remains open for assessment by iples explained in Jitendra Singh Rathor These observations are made only for the limited purpose of considering whether interference under Articles 226/227 is called for at this stage, and shall not preclude the petitioner from agitating any of these issues on merits, and on evidence, before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, which shall decide the same uninfluenced by anything said herein. Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present issed as not maintainable at this stage, the petitioner is at liberty to avail the appropriate statutory remedy available under Sections 2A and/or 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as may It is, however, clarified that this Court has expressed no final opinion on the merits of the controversy, and all questions, factual and legal, are left open to be urged before the competent Labour Court/Industrial Straw Board etaliatory dismissals since 2021 is a factual matter requiring appreciation of evidence and is not capable of being conclusively resolved on the face of the impugned order. As to proportionality, given the seriousness of the proved charges of physical ult and intimidation of co workers on the shop floor, the punishment of dismissal does not, prima facie, appear so shockingly disproportionate as to itself evidence mala fides, though this too remains open for assessment by Jitendra Singh Rathor These observations are made only for the limited purpose of considering whether interference under Articles 226/227 is called for at this of these issues on merits, and on evidence, before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present issed as not maintainable at this stage, the petitioner is at liberty to avail the appropriate statutory remedy available under Sections 2A and/or 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as may s expressed no final opinion on the merits of the controversy, and all questions, factual and legal, are left open to be urged before the competent Labour Court/Industrial SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.30 12:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-22141 10. disposed of. 27.07.2026 SwarnjitS 22141-2026 (O&M) Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 27.07.2026 Whether speaking/reasoned Whether reportable -8- Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE : Yes/No : Yes/No Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.30 12:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document