CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 1 of 16 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 231 Date of decision: 20.07.2026 1. CWP-20292-2024 (O&M) Mukesh Kumar (deceased) now through his Legal Representatives ...Petitioner(s) Vs. State of Haryana and others ...Respondent(s) AND 2. CWP-17460-2024 (O&M) Amit Kumar ...Petitioner(s) Vs. State of Haryana and others ....Respondent(s) CORAM: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE NIDHI GUPTA Present:- Mr. Rakesh Nagpal, Advocate for the petitioner(s). Mr. Ravi Partap Singh, D.A.G., Haryana. Mr. Saket Bhandari, Advocate for respondents No.2 to 4. *** NIDHI GUPTA, J. CWP-20292-2024: Present Civil Writ Petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner for the issuance of appropriate writ particularly in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 13.12.2019 (Annexure P-13); whereby services of the petitioner have been dispensed with without holding any regular departmental DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 2 of 16 inquiry; and for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. CWP-17460-2024: Present Civil Writ Petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner for the issuance of appropriate writ particularly in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 13.12.2019 (Annexure P-16); whereby services of the petitioner have been dispensed with without holding any regular departmental inquiry; and for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. 2. Both the above said Writ Petitions are being disposed of by this common order as the facts and issues, and respondents involved in both the cases are identical/similar. For the sake of convenience, facts are being drawn from CWP-20292-2024 titled as Mukesh Kumar (deceased) now through (deceased) now through his Legal Representatives vs. State of Haryana and others. 3. It is inter alia submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner-Mukesh Kumar was appointed as Mali-cum-Chowkidar on contractual basis vide Office Order dated 29.01.2002 (Annexure P-3). Extensions were granted to the petitioner from time to time vide various orders (Annexures P-4 to P-9). After 17 years of service, a Show Cause Notice dated 09.12.2019 (Annexure P-11) was issued to the petitioner to show cause within 3 days of receipt of the order as to why appropriate action be not taken against him. Learned counsel submits that the said DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 3 of 16 period was not at all sufficient for the petitioner to properly reply to the Show Cause Notice. Accordingly, vide request letter dated nil (Annexure P- 12), petitioner had sought time from the respondents to supply him Hindi version of the Notice dated 09.12.2019 (Annexure P-11). However, without granting time to the petitioner, in a totally arbitrary and inequitable manner, the impugned order dated 13.12.2019 (Annexure P-13) has been passed; whereby services of the petitioner have been terminated. 4. It is submitted that thereafter, the petitioner alongwith Amit Kumar (petitioner in connected CWP-17460-2024) had filed Representation/Appeal dated 19.12.2019 (Annexure P-17), against the impugned action. But to know avail. 5. Subsequently, order dated 09.05.2024 (Annexure P-20) came to be passed in CWP-2283-2020 titled as Sanjeev Kumar vs. State of Haryana and others, and other connected matters, by this Court disposing of a bunch of Writ Petitions holding that “When there are allegations of misconduct which are stigmatic in nature, then charge-sheet had to be served and departmental enquiry had to be conducted.” Accordingly, termination orders in the said Writ Petitions were set aside by the Coordinate Bench vide order dated 09.05.2024 (Annexure P-20). On 31.05.2024, petitioner had submitted another Representation (Annexure P- 21) seeking withdrawal of the order dated 13.12.2019, however no action was taken by the respondents. 6. Learned counsel submits that the impugned order of termination is unsustainable in view of the fact that principles of natural DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 4 of 16 justice has been flagrantly violated. It is submitted that misconduct has been dealt with in Rule 5 of the Haryana Civil Services (Government Employee’s Conduct) Rules, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules, 2016’) which had not been considered and/or adhered by the respondents while passing impugned order. Thus, the action of the respondents is totally arbitrary, illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, Show Cause Notice has been given only to show cause as to why appropriate action may not be taken without mentioning the proposed punishment; whereas punishment of dismissal has been awarded without holding any departmental enquiry. It is submitted that as per the aforesaid Rules, 2016, at least minimum period of 15 days is required to be given to file reply. Hence, action of the respondents also hit by provision of Article 311 of Constitution of India as the services of the petitioner have been terminated without holding any enquiry. 7. In support, besides the judgment passed in Sanjeev Kumar’s case (supra), learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in CWP-33915-2019 titled as Karam Singh vs. Managing Director, National Health Mission and others, Law Finder Doc Id # 1944409; wherein it is held that Show Cause Notice is required to be given even for contractual employees, and enquiry is required to be conducted. The relevant para of the said judgment reads as under: - “5. Undoubtedly, the petitioner is a contractual employee and in terms of the contract, his services could have been DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 5 of 16 terminated without conducting any inquiry. However, the termination was on account of misconduct as is evident from the order dated 25.10.2019 (Annexure P-22) and in a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Union Territory of Chandigarh and others v. Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench and others 2011 (1) SCT 777, it has been held that where the question is of misconduct, regular inquiry has to be conducted even if the employee is a contractual employee. No judgment to the contrary has been cited and thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside on this short ground alone.” 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly prays that the present Writ Petition be allowed; and the impugned order dated 13.12.2019 (Annexure P-13) be quashed. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for respondents No. 2 to 4 have opposed submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. It is firstly informed that petitioner in CWP-20292-2024, namely, Mukesh Kumar has expired. 10. It is further submitted that it is the admitted fact on record that both the petitioners were appointed on contractual basis. Learned counsel refers to the last extension dated 28.03.2019 (Annexure P-8) issued to the petitioner and submits that it is clearly mentioned therein that appointment of the petitioner is on temporary basis and is liable to be terminated without notice. It is contended that therefore, no right accrues to the petitioner. DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 6 of 16 11. It is further submitted that reliance of the petitioner upon the judgment of Sanjeev Kumar’s case (supra) (Annexure P-20), is misconceived as the said judgment was passed in case of regular employees. In respect of judgment passed in Karam Singh’s case (supra), (Annexure P-19), it is submitted that the reliance of the petitioner on the said judgment is misconceived as it is contrary to the prevailing position in law in this regard. Learned counsel refers to a Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court in case of Ravinder Kaushik vs. Union of India (Delhi) (DB) : Law Finder Doc Id # 984606; wherein it has been held that “As the petitioner therein was not a regular employee of the respondents, there was no need to initiate any disciplinary proceedings against him by holding a full-fledged enquiry before passing the termination order.” 12. It is further pointed out that case of the petitioner is barred by delay and laches as order of termination was passed on 13.12.2019; whereas present Writ Petition was filed only in July 2024 i.e. after a delay of approximately 4 years and 7 months. It is accordingly prayed that present Writ Petition be dismissed. 13. No other argument is raised on behalf of the parties. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the case file in great detail. I find no merit in the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. 14. Factual matrix of the case has already been noted herein above. It is not disputed that appointment of the petitioner was on contractual basis. As per the last order of extension contract dated DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 7 of 16 28.03.2019 (Annexure P-8), it is clearly mentioned therein in clause (vii) that: “Your appointment shall be purely temporary and you will be liable to be terminated even during the period of contract if your work and conduct is not found satisfactory during the said period at any time without notice and without assigning any reason.” Therefore, no right accrues to the petitioner. 15. The main thrust of the argument on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioner is reliance upon judgment in case of Karam Singh (supra); wherein it has been held that “where the question is of misconduct, regular inquiry has to be conducted even if the employee is a contractual employee.” However, as clarified in the said judgment in the next line itself, it has further been stated that “No judgment to the contrary has been cited and thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside on this short ground alone.” Clearly, therefore, the said ruling was made in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case; and was therefore a judgment in personam and could not operate as a judgment in rem. Practice of parties of relying upon random observations made in judgments rendered in particular facts and circumstances of a case has been castigated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In State of Rajasthan v. Ganeshi Lal, (SC) : Law Finder Doc Id # 135714, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: - “B. Constitution of India, 1950 - Precedents - The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament - Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 8 of 16 fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.” The relevant paras of the said judgment reads as under: - “11. Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates - (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See : State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors., (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 647) and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors., (1996(6) SCC 44). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem, (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 9 of 16 particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. 12. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge."” 16. Even otherwise, the question of law, as to whether even in case of contractual employees departmental proceedings are required to be conducted prior to termination, has been answered against the DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 10 of 16 petitioner. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondents have relied upon Division Bench judgment of the Delhi Court passed in Ravinder Kaushik vs. Union of India and another; Law Finder Doc Id # 984606; wherein while placing reliance upon another Division Bench judgment passed in Neena Shad vs. MCD & Ors reported as (2010) 175 DLT 240 and judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union Public Service Commission vs. Girish Javanti lai Vaghela (2006) 2 SCC 482, it has been held as under: - “13. In Syndicate Bank v. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association and Anr. reported as (2000) 5 SCC 65, the Supreme Court had examined the case of an employee whose services had been terminated without holding any inquiry. After sending a notice to him to show cause for his continued absence, which notice was returned with the report that the employee had refused to receive the same, the bank had terminated the services of the employee, who had been on unauthorised leave for more than 90 days. Upholding the order of the bank terminating the services of the employee and setting aside the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court, the Supreme Court opined that the principles of natural justice were complied with by the Bank in the said case and observed as follows:- "16. Now what are the requirements of principles of natural justice, which are required to be observed? These are: (1) a workman should know the nature of the complaint or accusation; (2) an opportunity to state his case; and (3) the management should act in good faith which means that the action of the management should be fair, reasonable and just. All these three criteria have been fully met in the present case. DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 11 of 16 Principles of natural justice are inbuilt in clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement. When evidence was led before the Tribunal, the Bank produced the registered covers, which had been received back with the endorsement "refused" and the addressee "not found during delivery time". Dayananda said that he never refused to receive the notice. In these circumstances the Tribunal thought it necessary to hold that notice was not served on Dayananda as the Bank did not examine the postman. The notice was sent on the correct address of Dayananda and it was received back with the postal endorsement "refused". A clear presumption arose in favour of the Bank and against Dayananda. Yet the Tribunal held that no notice was given to Dayananda as the postman was not produced by the Bank. This appears to us to be rather an incongruous finding by the Tribunal. Unfortunately, the High Court did not go into this question at all. Considering the conduct of Dayananda all this period and after three years of his having voluntarily retired from the Bank in terms of clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement his statement that he did not receive the notice was a sheer lie. His whole edifice was built on falsehood and yet the Tribunal was there to give him relief on the platter though at the same time criticised his conduct during his employment with the Bank." XXX XXX XXX 19. This undue reliance on the principles of natural justice by the Tribunal and even by the High Court has certainly led to a miscarriage of justice as far as the Bank is concerned. The conduct of Dayananda as an employee of the Bank has been astounding. It was not a case where the Tribunal should have given any relief to Dayananda and yet the Bank was directed to reinstate him with continuity of service and mercifully the latter DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 12 of 16 part of the relief the High Court struck down. There was no occasion for the Tribunal to direct that Dayananda be reinstated in service or for the High Court not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to set aside the award. (emphasis added) 14. In the context of contractual employees, reference may be made to the observations of a Division Bench of this court in Neena Shad v. MCD & Ors. reported as (2010) 175 DLT 240, wherein the court had considered whether the protection available to a government servant under Article 311 of the Constitution of India would be available to a contractual employee. We deem it appropriate to reproduce paragraph 68 of the aforesaid decision which reads as under: - "68. Sometimes due to rush of work or other exigencies of service the government makes contractual appointments. Such appointments are made in respect of non-sanctioned posts and de-hors the recruitment rules. A person appointed on contractual basis does not enjoy the protection of Article 311(2) for the simple reason he is not member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State. (See the decision of Supreme Court reported as Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Javanti Lai Vaghela, (2006) 2 SCC 482."” 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to dispute the above said position in law. As such, the sole argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is without merit. DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 13 of 16 18. It is also not disputed that judgment passed by this Court in Sanjeev Kumar (supra) (Annexure P-20) has been passed in case of regular appointees. Therefore, petitioner can derive no benefit from the said case. 19. Even otherwise, claim of the petitioner is liable to be rejected being highly belated. In respect of termination order dated 13.12.2019; present Writ Petition has been filed only in July 2024 i.e. after a delay of approximately 4 years and 7 months. Clearly, the claim of the petitioner is not maintainable at this belated stage. The said issue of delay stands settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (SC) : Law Finder Doc Id # 627984, holding as under: - “A. Constitution of India, Article 14 - Equality - Extending the benefit of judgments to similar situated persons (fence sitters) - Normal rule is that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently - This rule is subject to well recognised exceptions in the form of latches and delay as well as acquiescence - Same would be valid ground to dismiss claim - Exception is inapplicable in cases where judgment pronounced by Court is judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. B. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 16 and 226 - Appointment - Cancellation of appointment - Challenged - Delay and latches - Acquiescence - Cancellation challenged after nine years when some of similarly situated aggrieved persons got relief from Court - Unexplained delay and latches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years - Totally DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 14 of 16 unjust to give appointment after a period of 27 years - Order of High Court allowing claim of appellant set aside.” The relevant para of the said judgment reads as under:- “23. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under: (1) Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. (2) However, this principle is subject to well recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 15 of 16 (3) However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.” 20. The aforesaid judgment has been followed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Sudhir Bala v. State of Punjab, (Punjab And Haryana): Law Finder Doc Id # 2678248, decided on 11.12.2024; wherein it is held that “Delay and laches in filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can disentitle a petitioner to relief, especially when there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in asserting one's rights.” 21. It is not disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner that although order of termination was passed on 13.12.2019 yet Writ Petition DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and 17460 of 2024 (O&M) 16 of 16 has been filed only on 20.07.2024. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that there was delay in filing the Writ Petition because of Covid. However, Covid was over in July 2022; and as such, there is no explanation for the extraordinary delay. Case of the petitioner is therefore, hit by delay and laches as well. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to controvert or dispute the above said factual and legal position. Accordingly, both the Writ Petitions stand dismissed. 23. Pending application(s) if any also stand(s) disposed of. 20.07.2026 (NIDHI GUPTA) Divyanshi JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Whether reportable: Yes/No DIVYANSHI 2026.07.21 17:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document