Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
CRA-D-1672-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
Anmolpreet Singh
Versus U.T. Chandigarh
1. The date when the judgment is reserved
2. The date when the judgment is pronounced
3. The date when the judgment is uploaded
4. Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced or whether the full pronounced
5. The delay, if any of the pronouncement of full
judgment, and reasons thereof
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI
Present : Mr. Mr. PKS Phoolka
For the appellant.
Mr. Manish Bansal, Public Prosecutor with Mr. Ankur Bali, Additional Public Prosecutor and Ms. Diksha Sharma, Advocate, For respondent
LAPITA BANERJI, J.
The appellant has challenged passed by Special Judge, NIA Court, Chandigarh application in FIR No. 25,54,59 of the Arms Act, 1959, 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRA-D-1672-
RESERVED ON: MAY 22, 2026
DATE OF DECISION Anmolpreet Singh
Versus U.T. Chandigarh
The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced or whether the full judgment is pronounced The delay, if any of the pronouncement of full
judgment, and reasons thereof HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Mr. Davinder Kumar, Advocate for Mr. PKS Phoolka, Advocate, For the appellant. Mr. Manish Bansal, Public Prosecutor with Mr. Ankur Bali, Additional Public Prosecutor and Ms. Diksha Sharma, Advocate, For respondent-U.T. Chandigarh LAPITA BANERJI, J. The appellant has challenged the order dated Special Judge, NIA Court, Chandigarh application in FIR No.29 of 26.02.2024 25,54,59 of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections 419, 471, 201, 120
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT -2024 (O&M) RESERVED ON: MAY 22, 2026 ATE OF DECISION: JULY 17, 2026
...Appellant
...Respondent
22.05.2026 The date when the judgment is pronounced 17.07.2026 The date when the judgment is uploaded 20.07.2026 Whether only operative part of the judgment is
judgment is Full The delay, if any of the pronouncement of full Not applicable HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Davinder Kumar, Advocate for Mr. Manish Bansal, Public Prosecutor with Mr. Ankur Bali, Additional Public Prosecutor and U.T. Chandigarh the order dated July 16, 2024, Special Judge, NIA Court, Chandigarh, whereby his bail registered under Section 419, 471, 201, 120-B of the SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
Indian Penal Code Sections 17, 18, 18 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the UAPA”), at Police Station 36, Chandigarh, added to the FIR on March 11, 2024.
2.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that although it has been alleged that the appellant was involved in unlawful activities under the UAPA, but except for Tiger, who had terrorist Goldy Brar’s gang and Chauhan @ Tiger incriminating material Chauhan @ Tiger Pindu have harboured the gang members of Goldy Brar and given them money on various occasi arrest of the appellant. T record to establish the involvement of appellant with any terrorist which could even suggest that the offence and much less an
3.
It is was that the appellant harboured Sunny @ Sachin @ Maddy Manchanda Umang and Kailash Chauhan gave them money on several occasions at the asking of designated terrorist harbouring any purported terrorist was three years upto life imprisonment 2024 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “ 17, 18, 18-B, 20 of The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the UAPA”), at Police Station 36, Chandigarh, has been dismissed. The provisions of UAPA were later added to the FIR on March 11, 2024.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that although it has been alleged that the appellant was involved in unlawful activities under the UAPA, but except for disclosure of one Kailash Chauhan had allegedly stated that the appellant was a member of terrorist Goldy Brar’s gang and had given shelter to @ Tiger and some of the co-accused incriminating material against him. It is only the statement of Kailash @ Tiger alleging that the appellant and one Parw Pindu have harboured the gang members of Goldy Brar and given them money on various occasions at the asking of Goldy Brar which led to the arrest of the appellant. There was also no legally admissible material on record to establish the involvement of appellant with any which could even suggest that the appellant offence and much less an offence under the UAPA. It is further argued that the case of was that the appellant harboured Sunny @ Sachin @ Maddy Manchanda and Kailash Chauhan @ Tiger at his flat in TDI City, Mohali and them money on several occasions at the asking of designated terrorist. Under Section 19 of the UAPA harbouring any purported terrorist was three years upto life imprisonment
einafter referred to as “the IPC”) and of The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the UAPA”), at Police Station Sector- The provisions of UAPA were later
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that although it has been alleged that the appellant was involved in unlawful activities disclosure of one Kailash Chauhan @ that the appellant was a member of shelter to the said Kailash accused, there was no other It is only the statement of Kailash appellant and one Parwinder Singh @ Pindu have harboured the gang members of Goldy Brar and given them ons at the asking of Goldy Brar which led to the ally admissible material on record to establish the involvement of appellant with any designated appellant has committed any offence under the UAPA. argued that the case of the prosecution, at best, was that the appellant harboured Sunny @ Sachin @ Maddy Manchanda, at his flat in TDI City, Mohali and them money on several occasions at the asking of Goldy Brar, a Section 19 of the UAPA, the punishment for harbouring any purported terrorist was three years upto life imprisonment SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
and the appellant is in custody for more than two years. evidence to show that the aforesaid people were harboured at the instance of Goldy Brar. appellant should be released on bail. 4. He has relied on the judgment of v. State of Maharashtra there was no allegation or the material to argue that the essential ingredients “constituting a terrorist act” as defined under Section 15 is present in this case. When such material is charged by invoking provisions of UAPA. 5. He has further placed reliance on the judgments of Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, Shoma Kanti Sen 2024 SCC OnLine SC 498 another, reported in Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1755 Maharashtra and another wherein it has been held that long custody by itself would entitle the accused being tried under UAPA to the grant of bail by invoking Arti 21 of the Constitution of India. 6. The Court had directed the State to file a comprehensive affidavit after filing of the supplementary challan, vide order dated January 15, 2026. 2024 and the appellant is in custody for more than two years. evidence to show that the aforesaid people were harboured at the instance of Goldy Brar.
Therefore, on the basis of prolonged custody alone, the appellant should be released on bail. He has relied on the judgment of v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1994)4 there was no allegation or the material to argue that the essential ingredients “constituting a terrorist act” as defined under Section 15 is present in this case. When such material is absent, the accused cannot be charged by invoking provisions of UAPA. He has further placed reliance on the judgments of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, reported in Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 498, Vernon v. The State of Maharashtra and , reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 885 Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh OnLine SC 1755 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra and another, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 wherein it has been held that long custody by itself would entitle the accused being tried under UAPA to the grant of bail by invoking Arti 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court had directed the State to file a comprehensive affidavit after filing of the supplementary challan, vide order dated January 15, 2026. Pursuant to the said direction, the State has filed a
and the appellant is in custody for more than two years.
There was no evidence to show that the aforesaid people were harboured at the instance Therefore, on the basis of prolonged custody alone, the He has relied on the judgment of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (1994)4 SCC 602 to submit that there was no allegation or the material to argue that the essential ingredients “constituting a terrorist act” as defined under Section 15 is absent, the accused cannot be He has further placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713, v. State of Maharashtra and another, reported in Vernon v. The State of Maharashtra and 885, Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693, wherein it has been held that long custody by itself would entitle the accused being tried under UAPA to the grant of bail by invoking Article The Court had directed the State to file a comprehensive affidavit after filing of the supplementary challan, vide order dated Pursuant to the said direction, the State has filed a SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
comprehensive affidavit of Dhiraj Kumar, Deputy Superintendent of Police (Crime), Chandigarh Police. 7.
Learned counsel for the State submits that appellant with his co- prosecution’s case is that were apprehended at around 11:45 pm on February 25, 2024 near Bus Stand, Sector- without helmets. Upon enquiry, they revealed their names as Sunny @ Sachin @ Maddy Manchanda and Umang. Upon search being conducted one pistol and a live cartridge was found from the right pocket of Sunny’s trouser trousers. All the cartridges bore the mark of “KF 7.65” on the No.29 was initially registered on February 26, 2024 under Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act.
8.
The Singh @ Pindu with the intention of harbouring the terrorists, had gone to Chandigarh Rail (members of Goldy Brar’s gang) to his flat in TDI City, Sector Nagar, Mohali, Umang to his friend’s @ Tiger along present appellant. @ Tiger, the present appellant February 28, 2024 from TDI City, Sector being identified by Sunny. 2024 comprehensive affidavit of Dhiraj Kumar, Deputy Superintendent of Police (Crime), Chandigarh Police.
Learned counsel for the State submits that appellant -accused is involved in anti prosecution’s case is that on the basis of secret information, two boys were apprehended at around 11:45 pm on February 25, 2024 near Bus 43, Chandigarh. The said boys were riding a white Activa without helmets. Upon enquiry, they revealed their names as Sunny @ n @ Maddy Manchanda and Umang. Upon search being conducted one pistol and a live cartridge was found from the right pocket of Sunny’s trousers and 03 live cartridges were recovered from Umang’s trousers. All the cartridges bore the mark of “KF 7.65” on the No.29 was initially registered on February 26, 2024 under Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act. The prosecution’s case is that Singh @ Pindu with the intention of harbouring the terrorists, had gone to Chandigarh Railway Station and brought back (members of Goldy Brar’s gang) to his flat in TDI City, Sector Nagar, Mohali, in his Verna car. Thereafter, he shifted said Sunny and Umang to his friend’s i.e the present appellant @ Tiger along with Sunny and Umang, was present appellant. Upon disclosure made by co @ Tiger, the present appellant-Anmolpreet Singh was arrested on February 28, 2024 from TDI City, Sector-111, SAS being identified by Sunny.
comprehensive affidavit of Dhiraj Kumar, Deputy Superintendent of
Learned counsel for the State submits that appellant along is involved in anti-national activities. The on the basis of secret information, two boys were apprehended at around 11:45 pm on February 25, 2024 near Bus 43, Chandigarh. The said boys were riding a white Activa without helmets. Upon enquiry, they revealed their names as Sunny @ n @ Maddy Manchanda and Umang. Upon search being conducted one pistol and a live cartridge was found from the right pocket of and 03 live cartridges were recovered from Umang’s trousers. All the cartridges bore the mark of “KF 7.65” on the back. FIR No.29 was initially registered on February 26, 2024 under Sections case is that the co-accused Parwinder Singh @ Pindu with the intention of harbouring the terrorists, had gone way Station and brought back Sunny and Umang (members of Goldy Brar’s gang) to his flat in TDI City, Sector-111, SAS in his Verna car. Thereafter, he shifted said Sunny and the present appellant’s flat. Kailash Chauhan with Sunny and Umang, was then given shelter by the Upon disclosure made by co-accused Kailash Chauhan Anmolpreet Singh was arrested on 111, SAS Nagar, Mohali after SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
9. T designated terrorist had done recce and Panchkula on February 12, 2024 with the motive of killing one gangster- Bhupinder @ Bhuppi Rana when he hearing. Co-accused Sunny used to communicate with terrorists like Goldy Brar and Vicky Chauhan through his ph present appellant has harboured members of Goldy Brar’s gang
10. The prosecution has of the appellant for the relevant period to bring home comprehensive members of a gang belonging to a that the appellant should not be enlarged on bail before the witnesses are fully examined
11. This Court has heard learned coun perused the material on record. 12. At the outset, it is appr the UAPA. Section 43(D) of the UAPA ready reference:
“43 Code. (1) any other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable case” as defined in that clause shall be construed accordingly.
(2) case involving an offence to the modification that in sub 2024 The prosecution further alleges that upon instructions from designated terrorist Goldy Brar, co-accused ce at the premises of District Courts and Panchkula on February 12, 2024 with the motive of killing one Bhupinder @ Bhuppi Rana when he accused Sunny used to communicate with terrorists like Goldy Brar and Vicky Chauhan through his ph present appellant has harboured members of Goldy Brar’s gang The prosecution has also relied upon the account statement of the appellant for the relevant period to bring home ve affidavit. Since there was a common intention to harbour members of a gang belonging to a designated terrorist the appellant should not be enlarged on bail before the witnesses are fully examined This Court has heard learned coun perused the material on record. At the outset, it is appropriate to refer to Section 43(D . Section 43(D) of the UAPA is reproduced hereinafter for ready reference:- 43 D. Modified application of certain Code.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable case” as defined in that clause shall be construed accordingly. (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification that in sub-section (2),
that upon instructions from a Sunny, Umang and Maya at the premises of District Courts at Mohali, Chandigarh and Panchkula on February 12, 2024 with the motive of killing one Bhupinder @ Bhuppi Rana when he would come for his court accused Sunny used to communicate with terrorists like Goldy Brar and Vicky Chauhan through his phone on Signal App and the present appellant has harboured members of Goldy Brar’s gang.
relied upon the account statement of the appellant for the relevant period to bring home his guilt in its Since there was a common intention to harbour designated terrorist, it is submitted the appellant should not be enlarged on bail before the witnesses are This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and opriate to refer to Section 43(D) of is reproduced hereinafter for D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable case” as defined in that clause shall be construed accordingly. Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a punishable under this Act subject section (2),— SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
(a)
“sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be construed as referenc days” respectively; and
(b) inserted, namely:
“Provided further that if it is not possible to complet investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said peri hundred and eighty days:
Provided also that if the police officer making the investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of any per the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the delay, if any, for requesting such police custody. (3) involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification that
(a)
(i) to “the State Government” shall be construed as reference to “the Central Government or the State Government.”; (ii) to “order of the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “order of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be”; and
(b) Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be”. (4) to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of having committed an offence punishable under this Act .
(5) person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or 2024 (a) the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and
“sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to “thirty days”, “ninety days” and “ninety days” respectively; and (b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted, namely:—
“Provided further that if it is not possible to complet investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days, extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty days: Provided also that if the police officer making the investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of any person in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the delay, if any, for requesting such police custody. (3) Section 268 of the Code shall apply involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification that— (a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof (i) to “the State Government” shall be construed as reference to “the Central Government or the State Government.”; (ii) to “order of the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “order of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be”; and (b) the reference in sub-section (2) thereof, to “the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be”.
(4) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of having committed an offence punishable under this Act (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or
the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and
“sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be construed as es to “thirty days”, “ninety days” and “ninety the proviso, the following provisos shall be
“Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said od of ninety days, extend the said period up to one Provided also that if the police officer making the investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of any son in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the delay, if any, for requesting such police custody.
Section 268 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the section (1) thereof— (i) to “the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the Central Government or the State (ii) to “order of the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “order of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be”; and section (2) thereof, to “the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the Central Government or the State Government, as the case Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of having committed an offence punishable under this Act Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that ther grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. (6) section (5) is in addition to the restrictio or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. (7) and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of a offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen and has entered the country unauthorisedly or illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing. 13. As per Section 43 an offence punishable under Chapter IV and VI of the UAPA shall, if in custody, be released on bail unless the public prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application made b relief and if the Court, on perusing the case diary or the report filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against such persons are proved.
Section 43 bail specified in Section 43 provided under the Cr.P.C or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. 14. It appears from the Dhiraj Kumar, DSP (Crime), Chandigarh Police, incriminating material has been found against 2024 on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that ther grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. (6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub section (5) is in addition to the restrictio or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of a offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen and has entered the country unauthorisedly or illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing. As per Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapter IV and VI of the UAPA shall, if in custody, be released on bail unless the public prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application made b relief and if the Court, on perusing the case diary or the report filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against such persons are proved.
Section 43-D(6) further stipulates that restrictions for grant of bail specified in Section 43-D(5) would be in addition to the restrictions provided under the Cr.P.C or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. It appears from the comprehensive affidavit Dhiraj Kumar, DSP (Crime), Chandigarh Police, incriminating material has been found against
on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub- section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (5) and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of an offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen and has entered the country unauthorisedly or illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing.” D(5) of the UAPA, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapter IV and VI of the UAPA shall, if in custody, be released on bail unless the public prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application made by him for such relief and if the Court, on perusing the case diary or the report filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against such persons are prima facie (6) further stipulates that restrictions for grant of D(5) would be in addition to the restrictions provided under the Cr.P.C or any other law for the time being in force on nsive affidavit affirmed by Shri Dhiraj Kumar, DSP (Crime), Chandigarh Police, that prima-facie no incriminating material has been found against the present appellant.
SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
Furthermore, no link evidence has also been established to connect the appellant to the commission of any crime, more so, to a crime/offence showing his involvement under UAPA. 15. The prosecution has not recovered any incriminating material like mobile show any link between the terrorist Goldy Brar and and also the co @Pindu. No link evidence deposited the money, at whose instructions it was withdrawn and to whom it was paid. In case of Parwinder Singh @ Pindu, is obtained to show after withdrawing the cash, Parwinder Singh @ Pindu paid the same to photographs the appellant was found together with Sunny and Umang, it cannot be held that the appellant had the intent of committing a terrorist act. Apart from disclosure statements of Sunny and Tiger, prima-faci by the prosecution. 16. From the comprehensive affidavit DSP (Crime), Chandigarh Police Kailash Chauhan @ Tiger and arrested on February 28, 2024 from TDI City, Sector Mohali. 17. Article 21 of the Constitution of India enshrines the fundamental right to protection of right to a speedy trial. It has been held by the Supreme Court in a catena 2024 Furthermore, no link evidence has also been established to connect the appellant to the commission of any crime, more so, to a crime/offence showing his involvement under UAPA. The prosecution has not recovered any incriminating material like mobile phone etc from the present appellant which will show any link between the terrorist Goldy Brar and and also the co-accused Sunny, Umang, Maya and o link evidence is brought on deposited the money, at whose instructions it was withdrawn and to whom it was paid. In case of Parwinder Singh @ Pindu, is obtained to show after withdrawing the cash, Parwinder Singh @ Pindu paid the same to co-accused Umang. Just because i photographs the appellant was found together with Sunny and Umang, it cannot be held that the appellant had the intent of committing a terrorist act. Apart from disclosure statements of Sunny and facie no evidence has been collected against the appellant by the prosecution. The appellant is in custody for more than two years.
From the comprehensive affidavit DSP (Crime), Chandigarh Police, it transpires Kailash Chauhan @ Tiger and identification by Sunny, the appellant was arrested on February 28, 2024 from TDI City, Sector Article 21 of the Constitution of India enshrines the fundamental right to protection of life and liberty which also includes the speedy trial. It has been held by the Supreme Court in a catena
Furthermore, no link evidence has also been established to connect the appellant to the commission of any crime, more so, to a crime/offence The prosecution has not recovered any incriminating phone etc from the present appellant which will show any link between the terrorist Goldy Brar and the present Appellant accused Sunny, Umang, Maya and Parwinder Singh is brought on record to show who had deposited the money, at whose instructions it was withdrawn and to whom it was paid. In case of Parwinder Singh @ Pindu, a CCTV footage is obtained to show after withdrawing the cash, Parwinder Singh @ ng. Just because in some photographs the appellant was found together with Sunny and Umang, it cannot be held that the appellant had the intent of committing a terrorist act. Apart from disclosure statements of Sunny and Kailash Chauhan @ no evidence has been collected against the appellant is in custody for more than two years. From the comprehensive affidavit of Shri Dhiraj Kumar, , it transpires that upon disclosure by identification by Sunny, the appellant was arrested on February 28, 2024 from TDI City, Sector-111, SAS Nagar, Article 21 of the Constitution of India enshrines the life and liberty which also includes the speedy trial. It has been held by the Supreme Court in a catena SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
of judgments that long custody by itself would entitle the accused under UAPA to the grant of bail by invoking Article 21 of the Constitutio India.
The Constitutional Court would like to prevent a situation where the lengthy and arduous process of trial becomes the punishment in itself. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Najeeb’s case be an essential factor while granting bail under UAPA. Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides right to speedy trial and long period of incarceration would be a good g an offence punishable under UAPA. It has also been held that the embargo under Section 43 the Court to give effect to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The relevant extract of the
“ restrictions like Section 43 oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Whereas at commencement of proc appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration alr exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43 sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of cons xxxxxxxxxxxx
19. xxxxxx Instead, Section 43 possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition to the well settled considerations like gravity of the offence, pos the witnesses or chance of the absconsion etc. 2024 of judgments that long custody by itself would entitle the accused under grant of bail by invoking Article 21 of the Constitutio India. The Constitutional Court would like to prevent a situation where the lengthy and arduous process of trial becomes the punishment in itself. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in (supra), wherein it has been held that long custody would be an essential factor while granting bail under UAPA. Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides right to speedy trial and long period of incarceration would be a good ground to grant bail to an unde an offence punishable under UAPA.
It has also been held that the embargo under Section 43-D of UAPA would not negate the powers of the Court to give effect to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is as follows
“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of UAPA per se does not oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration alr exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D (5) of UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial. xxxxxxxxxxxx
19. xxxxxx Instead, Section 43-D (5) of UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition to the well settled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by absconsion etc.”
of judgments that long custody by itself would entitle the accused under grant of bail by invoking Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Constitutional Court would like to prevent a situation where the lengthy and arduous process of trial becomes the punishment in itself. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.A. wherein it has been held that long custody would be an essential factor while granting bail under UAPA. Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides right to speedy trial and long period of round to grant bail to an under-trial for an offence punishable under UAPA.
It has also been held that the D of UAPA would not negate the powers of the Court to give effect to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The as follows: It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory D(5) of UAPA per se does not oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Whereas eedings, the Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of D (5) of UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of titutional right to speedy trial. D (5) of UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition to the well settled considerations like gravity of the sibility of tampering with evidence, influencing accused evading the trial by SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
18. The Supre that serious allegations against accused by itself cannot be a reason to deny bail to the accused. The relevant extract thereof is reproduced hereunder:-
“44. reference was made to the judgment of Swamigal v. State of Tamil Nadu which, citing two earlier decisions of this court in the cases of Singh v. State of (UT of Delhi) factor discussed. It was held that the nature and seriousness of the offences, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accu reasonable apprehension of witnesses being t the larger interest of the public or the State would be relevant factors for granting or rejecting bail.
the appellants’ case founded on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India with the aforesaid allegations and considering the fact that almost five years have lapsed since they were taken into custody, we are satisfied that the appellants Allegations against them no doubt are serious, but for that reason alone bail cannot be denied to them. with the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, we have referred to the materials avai this stage. These materials cannot justify continued detention of the appellants case under the other provisions of the 1860 Code and the 1967 Act
19. In the case of has held that generally pre is necessary to maintain purity in the course of trial and also to prevent an accused from being a fugitive from justice or to prevent further commission of an offence. possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the Court would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them 2024 The Supreme Court in the case of that serious allegations against accused by itself cannot be a reason to deny bail to the accused. The relevant extract thereof is reproduced
44. In the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali reference was made to the judgment of Swamigal v. State of Tamil Nadu which, citing two earlier decisions of this court in the cases of State v. Jagjit Singh (AIR 1962 SC 253) and Singh v. State of (UT of Delhi) factors for granting bail under normal circumstances were discussed. It was held that the nature and seriousness of the offences, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being t the larger interest of the public or the State would be relevant factors for granting or rejecting bail.
the appellants’ case founded on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India with the aforesaid allegations and considering the fact that almost five years have lapsed since they were taken into custody, we are satisfied that the appellants have made out a case for granting bail. Allegations against them no doubt are serious, but for that reason alone bail cannot be denied to them. with the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, we have referred to the materials avai this stage. These materials cannot justify continued detention of the appellants, pending final outcome of the case under the other provisions of the 1860 Code and the 1967 Act.” In the case of Shoma Kanti Sen (supra) has held that generally pre-conviction detention at the investigation stage is necessary to maintain purity in the course of trial and also to prevent an accused from being a fugitive from justice or to prevent further commission of an offence. Once it is apparent that a timely trial is not possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the Court would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them
me Court in the case of Vernon (supra) has held that serious allegations against accused by itself cannot be a reason to deny bail to the accused. The relevant extract thereof is reproduced Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) reference was made to the judgment of Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2005) 2 SCC 13) in which, citing two earlier decisions of this court in the cases (AIR 1962 SC 253) and Gurcharan Singh v. State of (UT of Delhi) [(1978) 1 SCC 118), the s for granting bail under normal circumstances were discussed.
It was held that the nature and seriousness of the offences, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the sed not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State would be relevant factors for granting or rejecting bail. Juxtaposing the appellants’ case founded on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India with the aforesaid allegations and considering the fact that almost five years have lapsed since they were taken into custody, we are satisfied that the have made out a case for granting bail. Allegations against them no doubt are serious, but for that reason alone bail cannot be denied to them. While dealing with the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, we have referred to the materials available against them at this stage. These materials cannot justify continued , pending final outcome of the case under the other provisions of the 1860 Code and the (supra), the Supreme Court conviction detention at the investigation stage is necessary to maintain purity in the course of trial and also to prevent an accused from being a fugitive from justice or to prevent further Once it is apparent that a timely trial is not possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the Court would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
on bail as any form of deprival of liberty must be proportionate to
facts of the case and also follow a just and fair procedure. A balance must be made between the prosecution’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously, the respondent’s rights guaranteed under relevant extract is reproduced hereinafter:
“xxx
37. SCC 713], a three Judge Bench of this Court (of which one of us Aniruddha Constitutional Court is not strictly bound by the prohibitory provisions of grant of bail in the 1967 Act and can exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to release an accused on bail who has been incarcerated for a on Article 21 of Constitution of India. This decision was sought to be distinguished by Mr. Nataraj on facts relying on
judgment of this Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2024 INSC 92]. In this judgment i held:
2024 on bail as any form of deprival of liberty must be proportionate to
facts of the case and also follow a just and fair procedure. A balance must be made between the prosecution’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously, the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution. relevant extract is reproduced hereinafter:
“xxx
37. In the case of K.A. Najeeb v. Union of India [(2021) 3 SCC 713], a three Judge Bench of this Court (of which one of us Aniruddha Bose, J was a party), has held that a Constitutional Court is not strictly bound by the prohibitory provisions of grant of bail in the 1967 Act and can exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to release an accused on bail who has been incarcerated for a long period of time, relying on Article 21 of Constitution of India. This decision was sought to be distinguished by Mr. Nataraj on facts relying on
judgment of this Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2024 INSC 92]. In this judgment i held:-
"32. The Appellant's counsel has relied upon the case of KA Najeeb (supra) to back its contention that the appellant has been in jail for last five years which is contrary to law laid down in the said case. While this argument may appear compelling at first glance, it lacks depth and substance. In KA Najeeb's case this court was confronted with a circumstance wherein except the respondent-accused, other co already undergone trial and were sentenced to imprisonment of not exceeding eight years therefore this court's decision to consider bail was grounded in the anticipation of the impending sentence that the respondent accused might face upon conviction and since the respondent-accused had already served portion of the maximum imprisonment i.e., more than five years, this court took it as a factor influencing its assessment to grant bail. Further, in KA Najeeb's case the trial of the respondent accused was severed from the other co-accused owing to his absconding and he was traced back in 2015 and was being separately tried thereafter and the NIA had filed a long list of witnesses that were left to be examined with reference to the said accused therefore this
on bail as any form of deprival of liberty must be proportionate to the
facts of the case and also follow a just and fair procedure. A balance must be made between the prosecution’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously, the III of the Constitution. The In the case of K.A. Najeeb v. Union of India [(2021) 3 SCC 713], a three Judge Bench of this Court (of which one Bose, J was a party), has held that a Constitutional Court is not strictly bound by the prohibitory provisions of grant of bail in the 1967 Act and can exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to release an accused on bail long period of time, relying on Article 21 of Constitution of India. This decision was sought to be distinguished by Mr. Nataraj on facts relying on
judgment of this Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2024 INSC 92]. In this judgment it has been
"32. The Appellant's counsel has relied upon the case of KA Najeeb (supra) to back its contention that the appellant has been in jail for last five years which is contrary to law laid down in the said case. While this r compelling at first glance, it lacks depth and substance. In KA Najeeb's case this court was confronted with a circumstance wherein accused, other co-accused had already undergone trial and were sentenced to eding eight years therefore this court's decision to consider bail was grounded in the anticipation of the impending sentence that the respondent accused might face upon conviction and accused had already served imprisonment i.e., more than five years, this court took it as a factor influencing its assessment to grant bail. Further, in KA Najeeb's case the trial of the respondent accused was severed accused owing to his absconding ed back in 2015 and was being separately tried thereafter and the NIA had filed a long list of witnesses that were left to be examined with reference to the said accused therefore this SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
38. bail is not a fundamental right. Secondly, to be entitled to be enlarged on bail, an accused charged with offences enumerate fulfill the conditions specified in Section 43D (5) thereof. We do not accept the first part of this submission. This Court has already accepted right of an accused under the said offences of the 1967 Act to be such right on Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This was in the case of Najeeb (supra), and in that judgment, long period of incarceration was held to be a valid ground to enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the bail provision of Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act. Pre detention is necessary to collect evidence (at the investigation stage), to maintain purity in the course of trial and also to prevent an accused from being fugitive from justice. Such commission of offence by the same accused.
Depending on gravity and seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed by an accused, detention before conclusion of trial at the investigation and post sanction of law broadly on these reasonings. But any form of deprival of liberty results in breach of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and must be justified on the ground of being reasonable, following a just and fair proce such deprival must be proportionate in the facts of a given case. These would be the overarching principles which the law Courts would have to apply while testing prosecution’s 2024 court was of the view of unlikelihood of completion of trial in near future. However, in the present case the trial is already under way and 22 witnesses including the protected witnesses have been examined. As already discussed, the material available on record indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of ter by members of banned terrorist organization involving exchange of large quantum of money through different channels which needs to be deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on bail there is every l that he will influence the key witnesses of the case which might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on the behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted.”
38. Relying on this judgment, Mr. Nataraj, submits that bail is not a fundamental right. Secondly, to be entitled to be enlarged on bail, an accused charged with offences enumerated in Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, must fulfill the conditions specified in Section 43D (5) thereof. We do not accept the first part of this submission. This Court has already accepted right of an accused under the said offences of the 1967 Act to be enlarged on bail founding such right on Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
This was in the case of Najeeb (supra), and in that judgment, long period of incarceration was held to be a valid ground to enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the bail provision of Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act. Pre detention is necessary to collect evidence (at the investigation stage), to maintain purity in the course of trial and also to prevent an accused from being fugitive from justice. Such detention is also necessary to prevent further commission of offence by the same accused. Depending on gravity and seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed by an accused, detention before conclusion of trial at the investigation and post- sanction of law broadly on these reasonings. But any form of deprival of liberty results in breach of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and must be justified on the ground of being reasonable, following a just and fair proce such deprival must be proportionate in the facts of a given case. These would be the overarching principles which the law Courts would have to apply while testing prosecution’s
court was of the view of unlikelihood of completion ture. However, in the present case the trial is already under way and 22 witnesses including the protected witnesses have been examined. As already discussed, the material available on record indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities backed by members of banned terrorist organization involving exchange of large quantum of money through different channels which needs to be deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of the case which might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail.
Hence, the aforesaid argument on the behalf of the appellant Relying on this judgment, Mr. Nataraj, submits that bail is not a fundamental right. Secondly, to be entitled to be enlarged on bail, an accused charged with offences d in Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, must fulfill the conditions specified in Section 43D (5) thereof. We do not accept the first part of this submission. This Court has already accepted right of an accused under the said enlarged on bail founding such right on Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This was in the case of Najeeb (supra), and in that judgment, long period of incarceration was held to be a valid ground to enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the bail-restricting provision of Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act. Pre-conviction detention is necessary to collect evidence (at the investigation stage), to maintain purity in the course of trial and also to prevent an accused from being fugitive from detention is also necessary to prevent further commission of offence by the same accused. Depending on gravity and seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed by an accused, detention before conclusion of -charge sheet stage has the sanction of law broadly on these reasonings. But any form of deprival of liberty results in breach of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and must be justified on the ground of being reasonable, following a just and fair procedure and such deprival must be proportionate in the facts of a given case. These would be the overarching principles which the law Courts would have to apply while testing prosecution’s SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
plea of pre charge she
39. which we have noted in the preceding paragraph, we accept it with a qualification. The reasoning in case constitutional court whic for retaining in custody an accused charged with bail restricting offences. He cited Singh was distinguished on facts and a judgment of the High Court rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant was upheld.
But this was a judgment in the given facts of that case and did not dislocate the axis of reasoning on constitutional ground enu prosecution, another order of a coordinate Bench passed on 18 this order, the petitioner's prayer for overturning a bail rejection order of the the 1967 Act was rejected by the coordinate Bench applying the ratio of considering in this judgment accepting the restrictive valid and applicable and then dealt with the individual allegations in terms of the proviso to Section 43 1967 Act. Thus, the prosecution's case, so far as the appellant is concerned, does not gain any premium from the reason
20. In the case of Supreme Court has observed that criminals are not born but made Howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India. Moreover, the purpose of bail is only to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial and bail is not to be withheld as a form of punishment. The relevant extract thereof is reprod
“13. again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya & Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in (1981) 3 SCC 671 and Abdul 2024 plea of pre-trial detention, both at investigation and post charge sheet stage.”
39. As regards second part of Mr Nataraj's argument which we have noted in the preceding paragraph, we accept it with a qualification. The reasoning in case would also have to be examined, if it is the constitutional court which is examining prosecution's plea for retaining in custody an accused charged with bail restricting offences. He cited Singh (supra) in which the judgment of was distinguished on facts and a judgment of the High Court rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant was upheld.
But this was a judgment in the given facts of that case and did not dislocate the axis of reasoning on constitutional ground enunciated in the case of Najeeb (supra) prosecution, another order of a coordinate Bench passed on 18-1-2024, in the case of Mazhar Khan this order, the petitioner's prayer for overturning a bail rejection order of the High Court under similar provisions of the 1967 Act was rejected by the coordinate Bench applying the ratio of the case of Watali (supra) considering the case of Vernon (supra) in this judgment accepting the restrictive valid and applicable and then dealt with the individual allegations in terms of the proviso to Section 43 1967 Act. Thus, the prosecution's case, so far as the appellant is concerned, does not gain any premium from the
reasoning forming the basis of Mazhar Khan (supra). In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Supreme Court has observed that criminals are not born but made Howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India. Moreover, the purpose of bail is only to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial and bail is not to be withheld as a form of punishment. The relevant extract hereof is reproduced hereunder:
“13. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya & Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in (1981) 3 SCC 671 and Abdul
trial detention, both at investigation and post- As regards second part of Mr Nataraj's argument which we have noted in the preceding paragraph, we accept it with a qualification. The reasoning in Najeeb (supra) would also have to be examined, if it is the h is examining prosecution's plea for retaining in custody an accused charged with bail- the case of Gurwinder (supra) in which the judgment of K.A. Najeeb (supra) was distinguished on facts and a judgment of the High Court rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant was upheld. But this was a judgment in the given facts of that case and did not dislocate the axis of reasoning on constitutional ground Najeeb (supra). On behalf of the prosecution, another order of a coordinate Bench passed on Mazhar Khan v. NIA was cited. In this order, the petitioner's prayer for overturning a bail- High Court under similar provisions of the 1967 Act was rejected by the coordinate Bench applying (supra) judgment and also (supra). We have proceeded in this judgment accepting the restrictive provisions to be valid and applicable and then dealt with the individual allegations in terms of the proviso to Section 43-D (5) of the 1967 Act. Thus, the prosecution's case, so far as the appellant is concerned, does not gain any premium from the Mazhar Khan (supra).’
[emphasis supplied]. Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that criminals are not born but made out. Howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a right to a speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India.
Moreover, the purpose of bail is only to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial and bail is not to be withheld as a form of punishment. The relevant extract The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya & Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in (1981) 3 SCC 671 and Abdul SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak reported in (1992) 1 SCC
225. In th trial, and further held that an accused, facing prolonged trial, has no option:
14. reported in 2023 INSC 311, this Court observed as under:
2024 Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak reported in (1992) 1 SCC
225. In the latter the Court reemphasized the right to speedy trial, and further held that an accused, facing prolonged trial, has no option:
“The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of the society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands speedy trial and yet he is not given one, may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.”
14. In Mohd Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in 2023 INSC 311, this Court observed as under:
“21.
Before parting, it would be imp laws which impose stringent conditions for grant of bail, may be necessary in public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wrecked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded and their living conditions, more often than not, appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry’s response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31st December 2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against total capacity of 4,25,069 lakhs in the country. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest 4,27,165 were undertrials. 22. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prison reported in 1993 Cri LJ 3242, as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity any autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes. 23. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning t crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak reported in (1992) 1 SCC e latter the Court reemphasized the right to speedy trial, and further held that an accused, facing prolonged
“The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of the society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable.
Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands speedy trial and yet he is not given one, may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of t of his right to speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy In Mohd Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in 2023 INSC 311, this Court observed as under:
“21. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for grant of bail, may be necessary in public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wrecked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded and conditions, more often than not, appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry’s response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31st December 2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against total capacity of 4,25,069 lakhs in the country. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest 4,27,165 were undertrials. 22. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State reported in 1993 Cri LJ 3242, as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, tatus, possessions, dignity any autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary perception changes. 23. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
18. Criminals are not born out but made. The hu potential in everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond redemption.
This humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifesta in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations
21. In the case of Javed Ansari liberty enshrined under Article overarching and sacrosanct. A Constitutional Court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to l constitutionalism and the rule of law, of which liberty is an intrinsic part. 2024 more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” (also see Donald Clemmer’s ‘The Prison Community’ published in 1940). Incarceration has further deleterious effects - where the accused b to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials – especially in cases, where special laws enact stringent provisions, are taken up and concluded speedily.” Xxxxxxx
18. Criminals are not born out but made. The hu potential in everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult.
Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifesta in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations.” In the case of Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ (supra), it has been held that right to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A Constitutional Court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused al under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to l constitutionalism and the rule of law, of which liberty is an intrinsic part. Page 15 of 24 more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” (also see Donald Clemmer’s ‘The Prison Community’ published in 1940). Incarceration has where the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that especially in cases, where special laws enact stringent provisions, are taken up and concluded
18. Criminals are not born out but made. The human potential in everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond redemption.
This humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a is committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ , it has been held that right to life and personal 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A Constitutional Court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused- al under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law, of which liberty is an intrinsic part.
SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
Furthermore, (supra) rendered by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court was binding on a Two Judge Bench li relevant extract hereunder:-
“31 has been placed by the respondent, a two Judge Bench of this Court distinguished that the appellant in custody for five years and that the trial 25 of the that case was severed from the other co had concluded whereupon they were sentenced to imprisonment of eight years; but in Gurwinder Singh, the trial was already underway and that twenty two witnesses including the protecte was in that context, the two Judge Bench of this Court in Gurwinder Singh observed that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. 32. to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provi in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a pe be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant ba be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence. In any view of the matter, K.A. Najeeb’s Bench is binding on a Bench of two Judges like us. Xxxxxx
33.
Continued incarceration of the appellant cannot be justified xxx
2024 Furthermore, it was held that the view taken in rendered by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court was binding on a Two Judge Bench like Sheikh Javed Iqbal’s relevant extract of Sheikh Javed Iqbal’s case (
31. In Gurwinder Singh’s case (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the respondent, a two Judge Bench of this Court distinguished K.A. Najeeb’s that the appellant in K.A. Najeeb’s custody for five years and that the trial 25 of the that case was severed from the other co had concluded whereupon they were sentenced to imprisonment of eight years; but in Gurwinder Singh, the trial was already underway and that twenty two witnesses including the protected witnesses have been examined. It was in that context, the two Judge Bench of this Court in Gurwinder Singh observed that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. 32. This Court has, time and again, to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provi in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant ba be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence.
In any view of the matter, K.A. Najeeb’s case (supra) being rendered by a three Judge Bench is binding on a Bench of two Judges like us. Xxxxxx
33. xxx Continued incarceration of the appellant cannot be justified xxx.”
the view taken in K.A. Najeeb’s case rendered by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court was binding Sheikh Javed Iqbal’s case (supra). The case (supra) is reproduced case (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the respondent, a two Judge Bench of K.A. Najeeb’s case (supra) holding K.A. Najeeb’s case (supra) was in custody for five years and that the trial 25 of the appellant in that case was severed from the other co-accused whose trial had concluded whereupon they were sentenced to imprisonment of eight years; but in Gurwinder Singh, the trial was already underway and that twenty two witnesses d witnesses have been examined. It was in that context, the two Judge Bench of this Court in Gurwinder Singh observed that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences cannot be used as a ground to This Court has, time and again, emphasized that right to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused- undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of nal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail.
But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence. In any view of the matter, case (supra) being rendered by a three Judge Bench is binding on a Bench of two Judges like us. Continued incarceration of the appellant cannot be justified SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
22. In SCC 574, the appellant was, 18-A and 20 of the UAPA. He was arrested on July 12, 2022 and a charge-sheet was filed on January 07, 2023. The relevant part of the charge-sheet reads as follows:
“xxx 17.1 distu Bihar by some suspected persons who had assembled in Phulwarisharif area. On 11.07.2022 at about 19:30 hrs, on secret information, a raid was carried out by the police officers of PS Phulwarisharif, Patna house/premises of Athar Parvej (A of documents “India 2047 Towards Rule of Islamic India, Internal Document: Not for Circulation”, Pamphlets
“Popular Front of India 20 and 30 copies in Urd ke liye Popular Front ke saath” and one copy of rent agreement on non Jalaluddin Khan (A Abdul Qayum Ansari. The recovered articles and a mobile phone having SIM card of accused Md. Jalaluddin (A anti Xxx”
23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that nothing in the charge committed unlawful activities as defined in UAPA. produced on record to show that the appellant advocated, abetted, advised or incited the commission of terrorist acts or preparatory activity Succinct reasoning under:
“xxx
30. not possible to record a conclusion that there are reasonable 2024 In Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India , the appellant was, inter-alia, charged A and 20 of the UAPA. He was arrested on July 12, 2022 and a sheet was filed on January 07, 2023.
The relevant part of the sheet reads as follows:
“xxx 17.1 Bihar Police had received information about a plan to disturb the proposed visit of Hon’ble Prime Minister to Bihar by some suspected persons who had assembled in Phulwarisharif area. On 11.07.2022 at about 19:30 hrs, on secret information, a raid was carried out by the police officers of PS Phulwarisharif, Patna house/premises of Athar Parvej (A of documents “India 2047 Towards Rule of Islamic India, Internal Document: Not for Circulation”, Pamphlets
“Popular Front of India 20-2-2021” and 30 copies in Urdu, 49 cloth flags, 02 magazines “Mulk ke liye Popular Front ke saath” and one copy of rent agreement on non-judicial stamp by Farhat Bano w/o Md. Jalaluddin Khan (A-2) with tenant Athar Parvej (A Abdul Qayum Ansari. The recovered articles and a mobile phone having SIM card of accused Md. Jalaluddin (A-2) were seized in the instant case. They were related to anti-India activities.” Xxx” The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that nothing in the charge-sheet showed that the appellant had taken part in or committed unlawful activities as defined in UAPA. produced on record to show that the appellant advocated, abetted, advised or incited the commission of terrorist acts or preparatory activity Succinct reasoning leading to the grant of bail is reproduced herein
“xxx
30. Therefore, on plain reading of the charge not possible to record a conclusion that there are reasonable
Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India reported in (2024) 10 , charged under Sections 13, 18, A and 20 of the UAPA. He was arrested on July 12, 2022 and a sheet was filed on January 07, 2023. The relevant part of the Bihar Police had received information about a plan to rb the proposed visit of Hon’ble Prime Minister to Bihar by some suspected persons who had assembled in Phulwarisharif area.
On 11.07.2022 at about 19:30 hrs, on secret information, a raid was carried out by the police officers of PS Phulwarisharif, Patna at the rented house/premises of Athar Parvej (A-1) and recovered 05 sets of documents “India 2047 Towards Rule of Islamic India, Internal Document: Not for Circulation”, Pamphlets 2021” – 25 copies in Hindi u, 49 cloth flags, 02 magazines “Mulk ke liye Popular Front ke saath” and one copy of rent judicial stamp by Farhat Bano w/o Md. 2) with tenant Athar Parvej (A-1) son of Abdul Qayum Ansari. The recovered articles and a Samsung mobile phone having SIM card of accused Md. Jalaluddin 2) were seized in the instant case. They were related to The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that nothing ellant had taken part in or committed unlawful activities as defined in UAPA. No material was produced on record to show that the appellant advocated, abetted, advised or incited the commission of terrorist acts or preparatory activity. leading to the grant of bail is reproduced herein Therefore, on plain reading of the charge-sheet, it is not possible to record a conclusion that there are reasonable SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
grounds for believing that the accusation against the appellant of commi is prima statement of witness Z as they are without conducting a mini impossible to record a prima reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the appellant of commission of offences under UAPA was prima brought on record. 31. no reason to reject the bail application filed by the appellant. 32. Before we part with the judgment, we must mention here that the Special Court and the High Court did not consider the material in the charge Perhaps t therefore, the appellant’s case could not be properly appreciated. When a case is made out for a grant of bail, the Courts should not have any hesitation in granting bail.
The allegations of the prosecution m duty of the Courts is to consider the case for grant of bail in accordance with the law. “Bail is the rule and jail is an exception” is a settled law. 33. stringent conditi statutes, the same rule holds good with only modification that the bail can be granted if the conditions in the statute are satisfied. The rule also means that once a case is made out for grant of bail, the Court c If the Courts start denying bail in deserving cases, it will be a violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 of our Constitution. xxx”
24. In the case of “ another” SLP (Criminal) No.3655 of 2024 30, 2024, the petitioner was charged under Sections 10, 13, 17, 38 (1) (2), 40, 22-A and 22 was in custody since May 06, 2020 and 40 out of 100 prosecution witnesses had been 2024 grounds for believing that the accusation against the appellant of commission of offences punishable under UAPA is prima-facie true. We have taken the charge statement of witness Z as they are without conducting a mini-trial. Looking at what we have held earlier, it is impossible to record a prima-facie finding t reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the appellant of commission of offences under UAPA was prima-facie true. No antecedents of the appellant have been brought on record. 31. The upshot of the above discussion is t no reason to reject the bail application filed by the appellant. 32. Before we part with the judgment, we must mention here that the Special Court and the High Court did not consider the material in the charge Perhaps the focus was more on the activities of PFI, and therefore, the appellant’s case could not be properly appreciated. When a case is made out for a grant of bail, the Courts should not have any hesitation in granting bail.
The allegations of the prosecution may be very serious. But, the duty of the Courts is to consider the case for grant of bail in accordance with the law. “Bail is the rule and jail is an exception” is a settled law. 33. Even in a case like the present case where there are stringent conditions for the grant of bail in the relevant statutes, the same rule holds good with only modification that the bail can be granted if the conditions in the statute are satisfied. The rule also means that once a case is made out for grant of bail, the Court cannot decline to grant bail. If the Courts start denying bail in deserving cases, it will be a violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 of our Constitution. xxx” . In the case of “Mukesh Salam v. State of Chhattisgarh and SLP (Criminal) No.3655 of 2024, vide an order dated August 30, 2024, the petitioner was charged under Sections 10, 13, 17, 38 (1) (2), A and 22-C of UAPA and directed to be released on bail as he was in custody since May 06, 2020 and 40 out of 100 prosecution witnesses had been examined. The Apex Court observed that continued
grounds for believing that the accusation against the ssion of offences punishable under UAPA facie true. We have taken the charge-sheet and the statement of witness Z as they are without conducting a trial. Looking at what we have held earlier, it is facie finding that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the appellant of commission of offences under UAPA was facie true. No antecedents of the appellant have been The upshot of the above discussion is that there was no reason to reject the bail application filed by the
32.
Before we part with the judgment, we must mention here that the Special Court and the High Court did not consider the material in the charge-sheet objectively. he focus was more on the activities of PFI, and therefore, the appellant’s case could not be properly appreciated. When a case is made out for a grant of bail, the Courts should not have any hesitation in granting bail. The ay be very serious. But, the duty of the Courts is to consider the case for grant of bail in accordance with the law. “Bail is the rule and jail is an Even in a case like the present case where there are ons for the grant of bail in the relevant statutes, the same rule holds good with only modification that the bail can be granted if the conditions in the statute are satisfied. The rule also means that once a case is made annot decline to grant bail. If the Courts start denying bail in deserving cases, it will be a violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 of our Mukesh Salam v. State of Chhattisgarh and , vide an order dated August 30, 2024, the petitioner was charged under Sections 10, 13, 17, 38 (1) (2), C of UAPA and directed to be released on bail as he was in custody since May 06, 2020 and 40 out of 100 prosecution examined. The Apex Court observed that continued SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
detention of the petitioner would not subserve the ends of justice as there was no likelihood of early conclusion of the trial.
However, along with the conditions that may be imposed by the Special Judge (NI following two conditions were imposed as the conditions for grant of bail: 6 (i) station once every week and
(ii) Judge on every date of the tr presence is dispensed with by the trial Court, and shall cooperate in the early conclusion of the trial.”
25. In a recent case in Chhattisgarh, reported in dated February 14, 2025, the Supreme Court set
order passed by the High Court, rejecting the bail of the appellant. As per the prosecution’s case, the appellant was travelling in a vehicle carrying articles which could be ordinarily rel search being conducted, it was alleged that the appellant was in conscious possession of the following articles:
“xxx
4. were recovered from the car alleged to be in co possession of the appellant herein:
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Xxx”
2024 detention of the petitioner would not subserve the ends of justice as there was no likelihood of early conclusion of the trial. However, along with the conditions that may be imposed by the Special Judge (NI following two conditions were imposed as the conditions for grant of 6 (i) The petitioner shall report to the nearest police station once every week and (ii) The petitioner shall remain present before the trial Judge on every date of the trial without fail, unless his presence is dispensed with by the trial Court, and shall cooperate in the early conclusion of the trial.” In a recent case in Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 dated February 14, 2025, the Supreme Court set
order passed by the High Court, rejecting the bail of the appellant. As per the prosecution’s case, the appellant was travelling in a vehicle carrying articles which could be ordinarily related to Naxalite activities. Upon search being conducted, it was alleged that the appellant was in conscious possession of the following articles:
“xxx
4. The search was undertaken and the following articles were recovered from the car alleged to be in co possession of the appellant herein: (i) 95 pair of shoes (ii) Green black printed cloth (iii) Two bundles of electric wire each of 100 (iv) LED lens and (v) Walki talki and other articles.
Xxx”
detention of the petitioner would not subserve the ends of justice as there was no likelihood of early conclusion of the trial. However, along with the conditions that may be imposed by the Special Judge (NIA Act) following two conditions were imposed as the conditions for grant of The petitioner shall report to the nearest police The petitioner shall remain present before the trial ial without fail, unless his presence is dispensed with by the trial Court, and shall cooperate in the early conclusion of the trial.” Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322, by a judgment dated February 14, 2025, the Supreme Court set-aside the impugned
order passed by the High Court, rejecting the bail of the appellant. As per the prosecution’s case, the appellant was travelling in a vehicle carrying ated to Naxalite activities. Upon search being conducted, it was alleged that the appellant was in conscious possession of the following articles: The search was undertaken and the following articles were recovered from the car alleged to be in conscious possession of the appellant herein:- Two bundles of electric wire each of 100 metere Walki talki and other articles. SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
26. In that case, the appellant was arrested on March 24, 2020. After filing of the charge 42 witnesses and intended to examine as many as 100 witnesses. It was observed that even after the passing of five years judicial custody, learned counsel appearing for the State had no idea regarding time that would be consumed to complete the recording of oral evidence. The Supreme Court recorded that in the aforesaid circumstances, it was left wi released on bail despite the seriousness of the crime alleged. Furthermore, it was of the view that the Public Prosecutor who was in charge of the trial, had to decide which of the witnesses were to be examined and who were to be dropped as no useful purpose would be served if several witnesses were examined for establishing the same fact. The relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced hereinafter:
“xxx
10. clear that howsoever serious a crime may be the accused has a fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Xxx
12. of trial. It is expected of the Public Prosecut exercise his discretion insofar as examination of the witness is concerned. Xxx
14. would also assume importance. The Special Judge should inquire with the Special Public Prosecutor why he in examine a particular witness if such witness is going to depose the very same thing that any other witness might have deposed earlier. We may sound as if laying some guidelines, but time has come to consider this issue of delay and bail in its tru 2024 In that case, the appellant was arrested on March 24, 2020. After filing of the charge-sheet, the prosecution was only able to examine 42 witnesses and intended to examine as many as 100 witnesses.
It was observed that even after the passing of five years judicial custody, learned counsel appearing for the State had no idea regarding time that would be consumed to complete the recording of oral evidence. The Supreme Court recorded that in the aforesaid circumstances, it was left with no other option but to get the appellant released on bail despite the seriousness of the crime alleged. Furthermore, it was of the view that the Public Prosecutor who was in charge of the trial, had to decide which of the witnesses were to be nd who were to be dropped as no useful purpose would be served if several witnesses were examined for establishing the same fact. The relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced hereinafter:
“xxx
10. However, many times we have made ourselves very clear that howsoever serious a crime may be the accused has a fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Xxx
12. The aforesaid results in indefinite delay in conclusion of trial. It is expected of the Public Prosecut exercise his discretion insofar as examination of the witness is concerned. Xxx
14. In this regard, the role of the Special Judge (NIA) would also assume importance. The Special Judge should inquire with the Special Public Prosecutor why he in examine a particular witness if such witness is going to depose the very same thing that any other witness might have deposed earlier. We may sound as if laying some guidelines, but time has come to consider this issue of delay and bail in its true and proper perspective. If an accused is
In that case, the appellant was arrested on March 24, 2020. sheet, the prosecution was only able to examine 42 witnesses and intended to examine as many as 100 witnesses.
It was observed that even after the passing of five years of the appellant being in judicial custody, learned counsel appearing for the State had no idea regarding time that would be consumed to complete the recording of oral evidence. The Supreme Court recorded that in the aforesaid th no other option but to get the appellant released on bail despite the seriousness of the crime alleged. Furthermore, it was of the view that the Public Prosecutor who was in- charge of the trial, had to decide which of the witnesses were to be nd who were to be dropped as no useful purpose would be served if several witnesses were examined for establishing the same fact. The relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced hereinafter: However, many times we have made ourselves very clear that howsoever serious a crime may be the accused has a fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in The aforesaid results in indefinite delay in conclusion of trial. It is expected of the Public Prosecutor to wisely exercise his discretion insofar as examination of the witness In this regard, the role of the Special Judge (NIA) would also assume importance. The Special Judge should inquire with the Special Public Prosecutor why he intends to examine a particular witness if such witness is going to depose the very same thing that any other witness might have deposed earlier. We may sound as if laying some guidelines, but time has come to consider this issue of delay e and proper perspective.
If an accused is SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
to get a final verdict after incarceration of six to seven years in jail as an undertrial prisoner, then, definitely, it could be said that his right to have a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution has on accused persons guilty financially compensated for what might be a lengthy period of pre accommodation, experienced damage to personal relationships while incarcerated, and spent a considerable amount of money on legal fees. If an accused person is found not guilty, they have likely endured many months of being stigmatized an and will have to rebuild their lives with their own resources. 15. extremely bad for the victims, for Indian society and for the credibility of our justice s the masters of their Courtrooms and the Criminal Procedure Code provides many tools for the Judges to use in order to ensure that cases proceed efficiently. Xxx”
27. In the present case, even if one assumes that the were indulging in to the commission of terrorist acts, relevant material connecting the accused to advocating, abetting, advising, inciting or conspiring to commit any terrorist act had to be brought on record to justify rejection of bail especially after a long period of incarceration. However, no worthwhile material has been brought on record by the prosecution, at this stage. 28. The definition of a “ relevant to be considered at this junctur hereinafter:
“15. Terrorist Act threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security [economic security] or sovereignty of India or with intent to 2024 to get a final verdict after incarceration of six to seven years in jail as an undertrial prisoner, then, definitely, it could be said that his right to have a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution has been infringed. The stress of long trials on accused persons- who remain innocent until proven guilty- can also be significant.
Accused persons are not financially compensated for what might be a lengthy period of pre-trial incarceration. They may also ha accommodation, experienced damage to personal relationships while incarcerated, and spent a considerable amount of money on legal fees. If an accused person is found not guilty, they have likely endured many months of being stigmatized and perhaps even ostracized in their community and will have to rebuild their lives with their own resources. 15. We would say that delays are bad for the accused and extremely bad for the victims, for Indian society and for the credibility of our justice system, which is valued. Judges are the masters of their Courtrooms and the Criminal Procedure Code provides many tools for the Judges to use in order to ensure that cases proceed efficiently. Xxx”
In the present case, even if one assumes that the were indulging in ‘terrorist acts’ or were participating in acts preparatory to the commission of terrorist acts, relevant material connecting the accused to advocating, abetting, advising, inciting or conspiring to commit any terrorist act had to be brought on record to justify rejection of bail especially after a long period of incarceration. However, no worthwhile material has been brought on record by the prosecution, at The definition of a “terrorist act relevant to be considered at this juncture and the same is reproduced
“15. Terrorist Act- (1) whoever does any act with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security [economic security] or sovereignty of India or with intent to
to get a final verdict after incarceration of six to seven years in jail as an undertrial prisoner, then, definitely, it could be said that his right to have a speedy trial under Article 21 of been infringed. The stress of long trials who remain innocent until proven can also be significant. Accused persons are not financially compensated for what might be a lengthy period trial incarceration. They may also have lost a job for accommodation, experienced damage to personal relationships while incarcerated, and spent a considerable amount of money on legal fees.
If an accused person is found not guilty, they have likely endured many months of being d perhaps even ostracized in their community and will have to rebuild their lives with their own resources. We would say that delays are bad for the accused and extremely bad for the victims, for Indian society and for the ystem, which is valued. Judges are the masters of their Courtrooms and the Criminal Procedure Code provides many tools for the Judges to use in order to ensure that cases proceed efficiently. In the present case, even if one assumes that the co-accused or were participating in acts preparatory to the commission of terrorist acts, relevant material connecting the accused to advocating, abetting, advising, inciting or conspiring to commit any terrorist act had to be brought on record to justify rejection of bail especially after a long period of incarceration.
However, no worthwhile material has been brought on record by the prosecution, at terrorist act” under Section 15 is e and the same is reproduced (1) whoever does any act with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security [economic security] or sovereignty of India or with intent to SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
strike terror or likely to str section of the people in India or in any foreign country,
(a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chem or by any other substances (whether biological radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause
(i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or
(ii) loss of, or
(iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country; or
[(iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of production or smuggling or counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other material; or]
(iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any ot Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies; or
(b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of a functionary; or
(c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the Government of India, any State Government or the Government of a foreign country or [an internati inter or abstain from doing any act; or], commits a terrorist act.
[(2) offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties
29. The IPC, Section 25 2024 strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country, (a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chem or by any other substances (whether biological radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause (i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or (ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or (iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country; or [(iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of production or smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other material; or] (iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any ot Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies; or (b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of a functionary; or (c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the Government of India, any State Government or the Government of a foreign country or [an internati inter-governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act; or], commits a terrorist act.
[(2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule.] The charge sheet under Sections 120 IPC, Section 25/54/59 of the Arms Act and Sections Page 22 of 24 ike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country,- (a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause - (i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or damage to, or destruction of, property; or (iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country; or [(iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other (iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their (b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public (c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the Government of India, any State Government or the Government of a foreign country or [an international or governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act; or], The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the specified in the Second Schedule.] 120-B, 201, 419, 471 of the of the Arms Act and Sections 17, 18, 18-B and 20 SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh CRA-D-1672-2024 of UAPA was filed prosecution witnes is also unable to give any reasonable estimate of the time that may be required
for completion of the trial. Therefore, the Court is left with no other option but to release the appellant on bail. 30. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the law laid down by the Supreme Court, two and a half considering only 01 out of allowed and the impugned order appellant is ordered to be released on regular bail subject to following conditions besides furnishing of requisite bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court/Duty Magistrate concerned: (i) He shall furnish bond of ₹10 lakh each;
(ii) He shall surrender his passport in the Trial Court, if he is holding the same and is still with
(iii) He shall appear before date
(iv) He shall appear before the Investigating Officer when summoned;
v) He shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the case or who is cited as witness;
vi) He shall not involve in any criminal activity and if during the pendency of trial, he is found involved in commission of any offence punishable under UAPA, the prosecuting agency would be free to appr this order and cancellation of his bail;
2024 of UAPA was filed on March 10, 2026 and only 01 witness out of prosecution witnesses has been examined till date. is also unable to give any reasonable estimate of the time that may be required for completion of the trial. Therefore, the Court is left with no other option but to release the appellant on bail.
In view of the aforesaid discussion and the law laid down by the Supreme Court, especially when the appellant is in custody for two and a half years and the end of the trial is not in sight and only 01 out of 56 witnesses has been examined, allowed and the impugned order dated July appellant is ordered to be released on regular bail subject to following conditions besides furnishing of requisite bail bonds to the satisfaction of al Court/Duty Magistrate concerned:- (i) He shall furnish bond of ₹10 lakh with two sureties of 10 lakh each; (ii) He shall surrender his passport in the Trial Court, if he is holding the same and is still with hi (iii) He shall appear before the Trial Court on each and every date, unless exempted by the Court; (iv) He shall appear before the Investigating Officer when summoned; v) He shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the case or who is cited as witness; vi) He shall not involve in any criminal activity and if during the pendency of trial, he is found involved in commission of any offence punishable under UAPA, the prosecuting agency would be free to approach this this order and cancellation of his bail;
and only 01 witness out of 56 ses has been examined till date. Learned State counsel is also unable to give any reasonable estimate of the time that may be required for completion of the trial. Therefore, the Court is left with no other option but to release the appellant on bail. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the law laid down by especially when the appellant is in custody for almost nd of the trial is not in sight and been examined, the appeal is July 16, 2024 is set aside.
The appellant is ordered to be released on regular bail subject to following conditions besides furnishing of requisite bail bonds to the satisfaction of
₹10 lakh with two sureties of (ii) He shall surrender his passport in the Trial Court, if he is him; Trial Court on each and every Court; (iv) He shall appear before the Investigating Officer, as and v) He shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case or who is cited as witness; vi) He shall not involve in any criminal activity and if during the pendency of trial, he is found involved in commission of any offence punishable under UAPA, the prosecuting oach this Court for recalling this order and cancellation of his bail; SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh
CRA-D-1672-2024
vii) He shall not sell, transfer or in any other manner create third party right over his immovable property;
viii) He shall furnish an undertaking to the effect that in case of shall not claim re
ix) At the time of release of the appellant, the concerned SHO shall be informed every alternate Monday till the conclusion of the trial. 31. In the event there is a breach of any of the abovementioned conditions, or of the conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court independently, it would be o the bail of the defaulting appellant without any further reference to this Court. Similarly, if the appellant seeks to threaten or otherwise influence any of the witnesses, whether directly or indirectly, then prosecution shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of bail of the concerned appellant by making appropriate application before the Trial Court.
(DEEPAK SIBAL)
JUDGE
JULY 17, 202 shalini
Whether speaking/reasoned: Whether reportable:
2024 vii) He shall not sell, transfer or in any other manner create third party right over his immovable property; viii) He shall furnish an undertaking to the effect that in case of his absence, Trial Court may proceed with shall not claim re-examination of any witness. ix) At the time of release of the appellant, the concerned SHO shall be informed. He shall appear before the SHO on every alternate Monday till the conclusion of the trial. In the event there is a breach of any of the abovementioned conditions, or of the conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court independently, it would be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of the bail of the defaulting appellant without any further reference to this Court. Similarly, if the appellant seeks to threaten or otherwise influence any of the witnesses, whether directly or indirectly, then prosecution shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of bail of the concerned appellant by making appropriate application before the Trial
(DEEPAK SIBAL)
(LAPITA BANERJI) JUDGE
2026 Whether speaking/reasoned:
Yes/No Whether reportable:
Yes/No
vii) He shall not sell, transfer or in any other manner create third party right over his immovable property; viii) He shall furnish an undertaking to the effect that in case absence, Trial Court may proceed with the trial and he examination of any witness. ix) At the time of release of the appellant, the concerned . He shall appear before the SHO on every alternate Monday till the conclusion of the trial. In the event there is a breach of any of the abovementioned conditions, or of the conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court pen to the prosecution to seek cancellation of the bail of the defaulting appellant without any further reference to this Court.
Similarly, if the appellant seeks to threaten or otherwise influence any of the witnesses, whether directly or indirectly, then also the prosecution shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of bail of the concerned appellant by making appropriate application before the Trial (LAPITA BANERJI)
JUDGE
SHALINI 2026.07.20 19:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court, Chandigarh