112 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRA-D-1521-2024 Date of Decision: 16.07.2026 LAKHWINDER SINGH @ LAKHA ...Appellant Versus STATE OF PUNJAB …Respondent CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUKHVINDER KAUR Present : Mr. Amandeep Singh Manaise, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Mohit Kapoor, Sr. DAG., Punjab. VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, J. [ORAL] The present appeal has been filed against the order dated 21.10.2024 passed by the Sessions Court, Gurdaspur, whereby the application of the appellant for regular bail in case arising out of FIR No.103 dated 24.06.2023 registered under Sections 450, 307, 34 and 120-B IPC, Section 25 of the Arms Act and Sections 16, 17, 18,18-B and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, at Police Station City Batala, Police District Batala, District Gurdaspur, was dismissed. 2. The FIR in the present case was registered on the statement of one Aman Gupta son of Anil Gupta resident of Dera Baba Nanak Road, Sunder Nagar, Batala who submitted to the effect that his family runs an electronics shop under the name and style of Neelam TV Centre on Batala GURPREET KAUR 2026.07.17 12:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRA-D-1521-2024 -2- Road which was jointly owned and managed by his father Anil Gupta and his uncle Rajiv Mahajan. The complainant along with his cousin Manav Gupta @ Manu son of Rajiv Mahajan also worked at the shop. It was further stated that Rajiv Mahajan was serving as an Organization Minister of Shiv Sena Samajwadi, Punjab. The shop had employed one Gursewak Singh, a resident of Dholpur as a servant. The complainant further stated that when he and all the aforesaid person were present in the shop, two individuals entered the shop, one of whom was a turbaned Sikh and the other was a clean-shaven person, both having their faced muffled. It was alleged that the turbaned person inquired about the price of an LCD television and thereafter left the shop but returned after about two minutes. Immediately upon their return, both the assailants drew pistols and started firing indiscriminately. As a result thereof, his uncle Rajiv Mahajan sustained gunshot injuries on his abdomen, head and arm, his cousin Manav Gupta sustained gunshot injuries on the left side of his head and leg, while his father Anil Gupta sustained a gunshot injury on his abdomen. Consequently, on the basis of the aforesaid statement, the present FIR was registered. 3. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contends that as per the case of the prosecution, a secret information was received pursuant whereto the police initiated an investigation against co-accused Dalbir Singh as well as one Jashanpreet. It is the case of the prosecution that Dalbir Singh was the person who was driving the motorcycle used in commission of the offence while Jashanpreet was the pillion rider. It is submitted that co-accused Dalbir Singh was arrested on 11.07.2023 whereas Jashanpreet was apprehended in West Bengal on 04.07.2023 and brought to Punjab on GURPREET KAUR 2026.07.17 12:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRA-D-1521-2024 -3- transit remand and later arrested in the present case on 05.07.2023. A pistol of .32 bore along with two magazines and a live cartridges were recovered from Jashanpreet. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the investigation alleges that certain persons, namely Dev Singh, Inderjit Singh Bajwa and Ranjodh Singh were allegedly involved in raising and propagating the demand for Khalistan. It is contended that the appellant herein is alleged only to have collected money from one Rakesh Kumar and thereafter delivered the same to one Jagdeep Singh who in turn, further handed over the money to Sukhpal Singh, Sangita Kaur and Salita Kaur. The prosecution further alleges that Sukhpal Singh lastly handed over a sum of Rs.1,20,000/- to co-accused Dalbir Singh, out of which Rs.90,000/- was paid in cash while the remaining Rs. 30,000/- was transferred through a bank transfer. 5. It is contended that even though as per the case of the prosecution, one Rakesh Kumar allegedly handed over the aforesaid amount to the appellant herein at the instance of Dev Singh for further delivery to Jagdeep Singh, however, the said Rakesh Kumar is not an accused. The further transaction of money is inter-se between Jagdeep Singh, Sukhpal Singh, Sangita Kaur and Salita Kaur and even they have not been arrayed as accused in the present case. Rather they have been cited as prosecution witnesses. The appellant has no role in the later transaction. It is further contended that there is also nothing available on record to indicate that the appellant had any knowledge of the object or the purpose for which the aforesaid money was being transferred and thus, the allegation, at best, is GURPREET KAUR 2026.07.17 12:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRA-D-1521-2024 -4- only to the effect that he collected the amount from Rakesh Kumar for further delivering the same to Jagdeep Singh and was not in contact with the shooters or was privy to the larger conspiracy for which such money was supplied. 6. It is further contended that appellant-Lakhwinder Singh @ Lakha has been in custody since 25.07.2023 and has undergone custody of nearly three years. There are total 56 prosecution witnesses, out of which, 14 have been examined, while 12 have been given up, hence 30 witnesses are yet to be examined. It is submitted that the appellant was accused in three other cases, however, he has already been discharged in two of the said cases and acquitted in the third case and that there is no other case pending against the appellant. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-State contends that the appellant was a co-conspirator and active participant with Inderjit Singh Bajwa, who was one of the operatives along with Dev Singh and Ranjodh Singh and was fully aware of the nature and purpose of the entire financial transaction undertaken in the present case. However, learned counsel for the respondent-State is not in a position to refer to any prima-facie material on the basis of which such information and awareness could be attributed to the appellant herein. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the documents appended along with the appeal. 9. It is although not disputed that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 imposes a prohibition on grant of bail to a person qua whom a prima facie case is made out, in the opinion of the Court. GURPREET KAUR 2026.07.17 12:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRA-D-1521-2024 -5- However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency’ reported as ‘2026 INSC 503, has already held that the said prohibition cannot operate as an absolute bar against grant of bail to an accused. Once there is prolonged incarceration, the constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India come into play and Constitutional Courts are vested with the power to extend the concession of bail in such circumstances. The relevant extract thereof reads thus :- 27.4. In Najeeb, this Court clarified that Watali arose in a very specific factual context where the High Court had effectively conducted a mini-trial by reappreciating evidence and determining admissibility issues at the stage of bail and, therefore, this Court had to step in to cancel the bail granted by the High Court to the accused therein. The larger Bench in Najeeb, therefore, con- fined Watali to the impropriety of undertaking extensive evidentiary evaluation at the bail stage by the High Court. Importantly, Najeeb did not treat Watali as establishing a general rule of near-automatic denial of bail under the UAP Act. 27.5. This view was followed even more explicitly in Sk. Javed Iqbal, where this Court, speaking through one of us (Justice Bhuyan), observed as under: 33. ....This decision i.e. NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali has to be read and understood in the context in which it was rendered and not as a precedent to deny bail to an accused-undertrial suffering long incarceration with no end in sight of the criminal trial. 27.6. The position of law emerging from Najeeb and Sk. Javed Iqbal is therefore clear: Watali cannot be invoked to justify indefinite incarceration of the accused under the UAP Act. For the aforesaid reasons, the attempt in Gurwinder to read Watali as laying down a general rule of denial of bail notwithstanding the period of incarceration is difficult to reconcile with this Court's own subsequent clarification of what the ratio in Watali actually meant. 27.7. We also note that the Bench in Gurwinder formulated the so-called 'twin-prong test' governing grant of bail under the UAP GURPREET KAUR 2026.07.17 12:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRA-D-1521-2024 -6- Act. It held that the inquiry under Section 43-D(5) must proceed in two sequential stages: first, whether the accusation is prima facie true; and second, only if the first question is answered in favour of the accused, whether ordinary bail considerations, such as, flight risk, tampering with evidence, or influencing witnesses, justify release. If the first stage of this twin-prong test is satisfied against the accused, bail becomes absolutely impermissible. 27.8. With respect, this test flows neither from the text of Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act nor from Najeeb. In fact, on the contrary, it is in teeth of Najeeb which categorically stated that Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act provides no more than another possible ground, namely that the accusations against the accused are prima facie true, for the competent court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses, or the accused evading the trial by absconding etc. If this twin-prong test is accepted, the State need only satisfy a low prima facie threshold while the trial may continue for years with the result that pre-trial incarceration begins to acquire a post-trial punitive character and even then, no court could ever grant bail no matter the length of period of such incarceration because the case stood prima facie made out against the accused. A plain reading of Najeeb will show that it was trying to prevent precisely this possibility from arising when it cautioned that Section 43-D(5) must not become 'the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.' 27.9. Therefore, the caution of Najeeb is that continued incarceration cannot go unabated by a mere discharge by the State of the prima facie standard under Section 43-D(5). The judgment explicitly held that Section 43-D(5) will 'melt down' where prolonged incarceration and delayed trial produce a violation of Article 21. The constitutional inquiry in Najeeb therefore operated independent of, and notwithstanding, the statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) in the realm of constitutional principles. That being the case, the formulation of Gurwinder becomes difficult to follow. Once the three-Judge Bench in Najeeb recognised that constitutional courts retain the authority to intervene despite the existence of a prima facie case against the accused where prolonged incarceration and delayed trial would breach Article 21, the statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) could no longer be GURPREET KAUR 2026.07.17 12:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRA-D-1521-2024 -7- treated as the gateway through which the prayer of bail must first pass. 27.10. As a matter of law, nothing further need be said except that in any case, constitutional courts can always intervene to grant bail despite satisfaction of prima facie threshold under Section 43-D(5), and the section need not control the grant of bail if the accused person's liberty is infringed for a prolonged period of time. The power of the constitutional court to grant such a prayer cannot in our view be diminished by exercise of legislative power.” 10. At the outset, we have taken note of the period of custody already undergone by the appellant as well as his criminal antecedents. It also remains undisputed that Rakesh Kumar, from whom the appellant collected the money and Jagdeep Singh, to whom the appellant delivered the money, have not been arrayed as accused in the present case and to the contrary, both of them have been cited as prosecution witness. It is also not disputed that, as per the investigation conducted, the alleged consideration for carrying out the conspiracy was handed over to Dalbir Singh through one Sukhpal Singh, who has also not been impleaded as an accused, notwithstanding the role attributed to him. The intermediate amount handlers have been kept out while appellant is singularly being tried. 11. Besides, it is also noticed by us that the present case raises arguable issues with respect to the conscious knowledge and involvement of the appellant herein, in the commission of offence. No recovery except for a diary has been effected from the appellant. The diary allegedly contains entries of receipt of money from Rakesh Kumar and its delivery to Jagdeep Singh. The said diary would, at best, prima facie indicate that the appellant herein had acted as an intermediary and collected the money and further delivered it to Jagdeep Singh. However, such evidence would not lead to an outright GURPREET KAUR 2026.07.17 12:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRA-D-1521-2024 -8- assumption that he was also aware of the purpose for which such transfer or transportation of money had been undertaken. 12. In view of the above, we are thus of the opinion that the material presently referred to from record is yet to undisputedly demonstrate that the appellant shared the common intention or the criminal design with the principal accused and the essential ingredients for fastening criminal liability. The questions would require a detailed examination of the evidence at the stage of trial, which is likely to take a long time to conclude. 13. In the given circumstances and in light of the law laid down in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi (supra), the present appeal is allowed and the appellant is ordered to be released on bail on his furnishing requisite bail bond/surety bond to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court/Duty Magistrate, concerned. 14. It is made clear that the appellant shall not extend any threat and shall not influence any prosecution witnesses in any manner directly or indirectly. 15. The observation made hereinabove shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the case and the Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the material available on record. 16. All pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. [VINOD S. BHARDWAJ] JUDGE July 16, 2026 [SUKHVINDER KAUR] gurpreet JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Whether reportable: Yes/No GURPREET KAUR 2026.07.17 12:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document