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2024 DAILYLAW 2699 (CAL)

MD KAMIL KHAN AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR

CRR/3815/2024 · 2026-09-16

Shampa Dutt Paul

body2024

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE BEFORE: THE HON’BLE JUSTICE SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL) CRR 3815 of 2024 Md. Kamil Khan & Anr. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr. For the Petitioners :Mr. Fazlur Rahaman, Adv. Mr. Md. Babul Hussain, Adv. Ms. Dona Sanyal, Adv. Ms. Sadia Zarreen, Adv. Mr. Rahhil Rahaman. For the State : Mr. Kallol Mondal, Ld. P.P. Ms. Samira Grewal, Adv. Judgment reserved on : 25.08.2026 Judgment delivered on : 16.09.2026 SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J.:- 1. The revisional application has been preferred praying for quashing of the proceeding in G.R. Case no. 387 of 2023 arising out of Newtown Police Station Case no. 25 of 2023 dated 28.01.2023 under Sections 376/417/313/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, and the charge sheet number 110 of 2023 dated 30.04.2023 under Sections 417/376/506/34 of Indian Penal Code, pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate at Barasat. 2 2. The allegations as made in the petition of complaint dated 28.01.2023 are as follows:- “We were in a live in relation since 2020, and were living in Tarulia Mina villa from April 2022 till 30th November 2022. In between our relationship, I have been pregnant twice and I was forced to abortion. He promised to marry me in future in 2022, but whenever I asked him to marry me he always delayed it every time by saying we have caste difference so he needs more time to convince his father Md. Arif Khan. So I kept waiting, but finally again I got pregnant and on 29th November, I told him I'm pregnant again and this time I am serious about marriage, he then said let me go home and talk to my father about us, and left for home G J khan Road, early on 29th November, 2022, and from then his number is off. I waited but he did not contact me, I searched everywhere, asked every friend but no one knew, where was he, so lastly I contacted his father and his father wanted to meet me, but his father said Kamil ran from home with his mother's gold and father's cash and he don't want to search Kamil, and threatened me if I don't stop searching he will deal with me by disappearing me. In this pressure, stress and depression I had miscarriage. But very recently I came to know from Kamil's social media account that he is in Lucknow, Uttarpradesh, as it is their native village, his father hide him there, I tried to contact Kamil in social media, but after he got my text he blocked me, even my friends tried to contact he did the same. I have been badly misused in various other way by Kamil khan as I loved and trusted him. Md kamil khan - 7980127883, Md Arif Khan – 9748849159.” 3 3. The petitioner no. 1 Md. Kamil Khan is the principal accused and petitioner no. 2 Md. Arif Khan is the father of the petitioner no. 1. 4. In course of hearing the State has placed the case diary. It appears from the case diary that the de facto complainant/victim was aged about 31 years as seen from the doctor’s prescription at page 18 of the case diary. 5. On hearing of the learned Advocates for the parties and on perusal of the materials on record, it appears that the parties herein, both being major in age, were admittedly in a consensual relationship which included consensual physical relationship. The petitioner on being allegedly refused marriage by the accused has filed the written complaint in the present case. 6. The petitioner has filed the written notes and submits that the parties were in a long term physical relationship and no force was applied upon the de facto complainant and it is denied that there was any promise of marriage. The relationship appears to be consensual considering the age of the parties and the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. The petitioner has relied upon the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahesh Damu Khare Vs. State of Maharashtra (2024) 11 SCC 398, wherein the following observations were made:- “27.In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false 4 promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties. 28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.” 8. The petitioner has also relied upon the following Supreme Court Judgments:- i. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samadhan V. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 2025 SCC Online SC 2528, relied and reproduced Rajnish Singh V. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, “a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of IPC.” ii. State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) 335, and recently, Md. Wajid v. State of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 951, which held:- 5 “34. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before he Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 Procedure (CrPC) of the Code of Criminal or then extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged." iii. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Samadhan v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Supra), a case having similar facts 6 with the present case, has quashed the FIR under Section 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of IPC and rightly held that "the acts complained of in the present case occurred within the contours of a relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing short of an abuse of the court machinery." iv. State of Karnataka v. Munni Swamy the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:- "In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice." 9. The Supreme Court in Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3375, decided on November 20, 2024, held:- “17. In the present case, the issue that had to be addressed by the High Court was whether, assuming all the allegations in the FIR are correct as they stand, an offence punishable under Sections 376 and 506 IPC were made out. A bare 7 perusal of the FIR reveals that the appellant and the complainant first came in contact in the year 2017 and established a relationship thereafter. The parties met multiple times at various places during the years 2017 and 2019, including at parks and their respective houses. Although the complainant stated that the appellant had a forceful sexual relationship with her, neither did she stop meeting the appellant thereafter, nor did she file a criminal complaint during the said period. 18. It is inconceivable that the complainant would continue to meet the appellant or maintain a prolonged association or physical relationship with him in the absence of voluntary consent on her part. Moreover, it would have been improbable for the appellant to ascertain the complainant's residential address, as mentioned in the FIR unless such information had been voluntarily provided by the complainant herself. It is also revealed that, at one point, both parties had an intention to marry each other, though this plan ultimately did not materialize. The appellant and the complainant were in a consensual relationship. They are both educated adults. The complainant, after filing the FIR against the appellant, got married in the year 2020 to some other person. Similarly, the appellant was also married in the year 2019. Possibly the marriage of the appellant in the year 2019 has led the complainant to file the FIR against him as they were in a consensual relationship till then. 19. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376 (2)(n) IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under 8 Section 164 CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere breakup of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution. 22. Recently this Court in XXXX v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2024) 3 SCC 496 held that when the relationship between the parties was purely consensual and when the complainant was aware of the consequences of her actions, the ingredients of the offence of rape were not made out. Similarly, in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 arising out of identical facts, this Court has enumerated the following: “18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To 9 establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.”” 10. From the said materials, in the case diary, this Court finds that the de facto complainant was aware that the petitioner was not interested in marriage but still continued the relationship being a major aged about 31 years at the time of the incident. 11. Thus, as the relationship between the parties prima facie appears to be consensual, the ingredients required to constitute the offences alleged are prima facie not made out against the accused/ petitioners herein. 12. The allegation against the petitioner no. 2 is that he allegedly helped his son to hide from the de facto complainant. As such the ingredients required to constitute the offences as alleged against the petitioner no. 2 are also not present. 13. Criminal Revision being CRR 3815 of 2024 is thus allowed. 14. The proceedings in G.R. Case no. 387 of 2023 arising out of Newtown Police Station Case no. 25 of 2023 dated 28.01.2023 under Sections 376/417/313/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, along with the 10 charge sheet number 110 of 2023 dated 30.04.2023 under Sections 417/376/506/34 of Indian Penal Code, pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate at Barasat, are hereby quashed in respect of the petitioners namely Kamil Khan and Arif Khan. 15. All connected application, if any, stands disposed of. 16. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 17. Let a copy of the Judgment be sent to the learned trial Court for compliance. 18. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties, expeditiously after complying with all necessary legal formalities. [Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.]