IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) CRR 2852 of 2024 Ranjit Kumar Kundu @ Ranjit Kundu & Anr. Vs The State of West Bengal & Anr. For the Petitioners : Mr. Shibaji Kr. Das, Mr. R. N. Basu, Ms. Deblina De. For the State : Mr. Ramashis Mukherjee, Ms. Jayashree Patra. For the Opposite Party No.2 : Ms. Gopa Biswas, Mr. Mainak Ghosal. Judgment reserved on : 07.08.2026 Judgment delivered on : 31.08.2026 Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.: 1. The revisional application has been preferred praying for quashing of proceedings in Spl. Case No.1 of 2017, arising out of Ashoknagar Police Station Case No.998 Of 2016 dated 2nd November, 2016 which culminated in Charge Sheet No.258 of 2024 dated 21st May, 2024 under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 2 3(1) (r) of the Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 corresponding to G.R. No.3159 of 2016 presently pending before the Court of the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court at Barasat, District-North 24 Parganas being the Learned Judge, Special Court under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 2. The petitioners’ case is that the Opposite Party No.2 herein is the younger sister-in-law of the Petitioners herein being the wife of the younger brother of the Petitioner No.1 herein namely Biswajit Kundu. The Petitioners and the Opposite Party No.2 herein reside in separate premises as will be evident from the addresses given in the cause-title to this petition. 3. It is further stated that the husband of the Party No.2 herein namely Biswajit Kundu was all along a very homeless person. Since the relation between the Petitioners herein and the husband of the Opposite Party No.2 herein, the Opposite Party No.2 herein was all along very sweet. The Petitioner No.2 herein in the capacity of being the sister-in-law decided to help her brother-in-law and his family members including the Opposite Party No.2 herein. 4. Accordingly, the Petitioner No.2 herein by executing a Deed Of Gift being Deed No.354 for the year 2001 dated 9 February, 2001 which was duly registered before the Sub-Registrar, Guma, District-North 24 Parganas transferred 1.30 Cottahs of land in favour of the husband of the Opposite Party No.2 herein out of the total 33% Cottahs of land which she had received as a refugee, who had come 3 from East Pakistan presently Bangladesh and delineated in the Government Records as LOP No.92A vide a Deed Of Gift being executed in her favour by the Government of West Bengal in the year 1989. After execution of the Deed of Gift by the Petitioner No.2 herein, the husband of the Opposite Party No.2 herein and the Opposite Party No.2 herein started to reside over the said plot of land by constructing their residential house over the same. 5. Gradually by the passage of time the Petitioners herein were able to understand that both the husband of the Opposite Party No.2 herein and the Opposite Party No.2 herein are very greedy persons who were trying to grab the properties of the Petitioners herein by hook or by crook. The husband of the Opposite Party No.2 herein happens to be police personnel and by mis-utilizing his power and position he along with the Opposite Party No.2 herein were all along trying evict the Petitioners herein who are aged ailing persons from their lawful possession of their property without due process of law. 6. On 31st October, 2016, the Opposite Party No.2 herein and her husband once again attempted to block the common passage in between the two adjacent buildings by raising bamboo pillars and thereby block the egress and ingress of the Petitioners herein, but due to objection raised by the Petitioners herein they failed in their evil attempt. The Petitioners herein were threatened by the Opposite Party No.2 herein and her husband that unless they transfer the entire property in their name they would be subjected to such types of nuisances and disturbances regularly and they could also be killed by life or faced with 4 physical harm of all kinds. Such fact was duly reported by the Petitioner No.2 herein on 31st October, 2016 to the local Ashokenagar Police Station through a Written Complaint which was diarized as G.D. Entry No.1561 of 2016. 7. On 17th November, 2016, the Petitioner No.1 herein was brutally assaulted by the husband of the Opposite Party No.2 herein namely Biswajit Kundu with his ill-motive to grab the property by forcibly evicting the Petitioners herein. Due to such assault the Petitioner No.1 herein had to be medically treated since he had sustained grievous injuries as will be evident from his injury report issued on the self-same date by the authorities of the Ashokenagar General Hospital. Over such incident the Petitioner No.1 herein had lodged a Written Complaint to the Ashokenagar Police Station which was diarized as G.D. Entry No.801 of 2016 dated 17th November, 2016. Though the Petitioner No.1 herein was subjected to severe assault by the husband of the Opposite Party No.1 herein namely Biswajit Kundu, but owing to the fact that he was a member of the Police Force by mis-utilizing his power and position he had influenced the authorities of Ashokenagar Police Station and thus based on the Written Complaint lodged by the Petitioner No.1 herein Ashokenagar Police Station Case No. 1049 Of 2016 dated 17th November, 2016 under sections 341/323/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was registered by the police authorities of Ashokenagar Police Station as against Biswajit Kundu (husband of the de facto complainant herein) which is presently pending in the Court of the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, North 24 Parganas at Barasat. 5 8. In order to safeguard their lawfully owned and possessed property from the hands of Biswajit Kundu and the Opposite Party No.2 herein, the Petitioner No.2 herein thereafter lodged proceedings as against the said Biswajit Kundu under the provisions of Section 144(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 & Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the Court of the Learned Executive Magistrate at Barasat, District-North 24 Parganas being M.P. Case No.3496 Of 2016 & M.P. Case No.3499 Of 2016 and obtained orders in their favour. 9. 9. Thereafter they came to know that as a counter blast to the police complaint lodged by the Petitioner No.2 herein on 31 October, 2016 and with a view to forcibly oust the Petitioners herein from their lawfully owned and possessed property and thereby to grab the same and further in order to wreck her vengeance upon them and also harass them unnecessarily, by suppressing material facts, the Opposite Party No.2 herein on 2nd November, 2016 had lodged a Written Complaint addressed to the Officer-In-Charge, Ashokenagar Police Station and the same has been registered as Ashokenagar Police Station Case No.998 Of 2016 dated 2nd November, 2016 under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 3(ii) of the Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 corresponding to G.R. No.3159 Of 2016 as against the Petitioners herein which was pending before the Court of the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barasat, District-North 24 Parganas. The husband of the de facto complainant is not an accused in this case. 6 10. The allegations levelled in the Written Complaint by the Opposite Party No.2 herein inter-alia in brief are to the effect that:- “On 26th June, 1988 she got married to Biswajit Kundu according to Hindu Rites & Customs and she is Schedule Caste by birth. It is further alleged that since her marriage she and her family was tortured both physically and mentally by the accused persons who happens to be her elder brother-in-law and his elder sister-in-law and the Accused No.2 who is a brahmin by caste criticized and humiliated her and used filthy languages over the issue of her caste. The accused no.2 always told her that she could not achieve higher education and defamed her due to her caste.” 11. In the said investigation conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Headquarters), the same ended in a final report being Ashokenagar Police Station FR False No. 227 of 2017 dated 28th of March, 2017 under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 & Section 3(ii) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 12. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with Final Report being Ashokenagar Police Station FR False No.227 Of 2017 dated 28 March, 2017, the Opposite Party No.2 herein had filed a Petition For Further Investigation before the Learned Special Court below under the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Learned Court below vide Order No.34 dated 19th September, 2023 after a lapse of a period of more than six years was inter-alia pleased to allow and dispose of such petition and thereby directed for 7 re-investigation by a competent person other than previous 1.0. and the SDPO, Habra which is legally impermissible as it is a well settled proposition of law that re-investigation is not permitted. 13. The same investigation ended in a charge sheet in the proceedings of which quashing has been prayed for. 14. Parties have filed their respective affidavits wherein the opposite party no.2 in her affidavit-in-opposition has denied the case of the petitioners and has reiterated her case, as made out in the written complaint and also the proceedings before the Trial Court. 15. In reply, the same is denied. 16. The State along with the written notes has placed the case diary. 17. The petitioners herein in support of their case have relied upon the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:- (a) Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto – Vs. State of Bihar & Another reported in (2026) Live Law (SC) 62, 2026 SCC Online SC 799, Relevant Paragraphs – 11 to 20. (b) Shajan Skaria Vs. State of Kerala & Another reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2249, Relevant Paragraphs – 53 to 88. (c) State of Haryana & Others Vs. Bhajanlal & Others reported in (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335. 18. In respect of the offence alleged under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioners have relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Others – Versus- 8 State of Bihar & Others reported in (2022) 6 SCC 599, Relevant Paragraphs – 10 to 22. 19. In respect of the allegations under Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 it is stated that the ingredients required to constitute the said offence is not prima facie present in the materials on record including the case diary. 20. It is further argued by the petitioners that in order to constitute offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (i) this Section requires the accused to abuse a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe “by the caste name in public view” – noted that the intent behind the abuse must be found to be denigrating towards the caste resulting in a feeling of caste based humiliation. (ii) Merely saying a caste name or simple abuse does not automatically constitute an offence. 21. The petitioners have relied upon Clause 3(1), (3), (5) and (7) of Paragraph 102 of the Judgment in State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajanlal & Ors. (Supra) and have prayed that their case is entitled to be quashed. 22. Heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the materials on record including the copy of the gift deed which was executed in favour of the husband of the opposite party no.2/de facto complainant by the petitioner no.2 herein. The said deed has been executed on 9th February, 2001. The deed proves that part of the property which was allotted in favour of the petitioner no.2 was gifted to the husband of the opposite party no.2. It appears that this supports the 9 case of the petitioners that it is the land which was gifted by the petitioner no.2 on which the de facto complainant and her husband reside. 23. On perusal of the materials on record it appears that the parties reside separately and not in a joint family. There appears to be a family property dispute between the parties and case/counter-case lodged. The present case also appears to be prima facie a fall out of the bitter relationship, between the parties. The allegations in respect of the offence alleged under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code are general in nature. 24. Section 498A of IPC, lays down:- ―498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a)any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Ingredients of offence. -The essential ingredients of the offence under sec. 498A are as follows:- (1) A woman was married; 10 (2) She was subjected to cruelty; (3) Such cruelty consisted in - (i) any lawful conduct as was likely to drive such woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health whether mental or physical; (ii) harm to such woman with a view to coercing her to meet unlawful demand for property or valuable security or on account of failure of such woman or any of her relations to meet the lawful demand; (iii) the woman was subjected to such cruelty by her husband or any relation of her husband.” 25. In Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. vs State of Telangana & Anr., in Criminal Appeal No. ………… of 2024 (arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 16239 of 2024, decided on December 10, 2024, the Supreme Court held:- “15. An offence is punishable under Section 498A of the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a woman to cruelty, which may result in imprisonment for a term extending up to three years and a fine. The Explanation under Section 498A of the IPC defines “cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498A of the IPC to mean any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b). The first limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that “cruelty” means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman. Further, clause (b) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty would also include harassment of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 11 16. Further, Section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any person who engages in giving, taking, or abetting the exchange of dowry, shall face a punishment of imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a fine of not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the Dowry Act talks of penalty for demanding dowry. It states that any person demanding dowry directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardians of a bride or bridegroom shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees. 18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations. 25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband‟s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them. 12 28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them. 29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case. 30. In the above context, this Court in G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as follows: “12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the 13 young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.” 31. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realties into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by the husband‟s close relatives who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection. 32. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned FIR No.82 of 2022 filed by respondent No.2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and grudges against appellant No.1 and his family members i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal. Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not exercising the powers available to it under Section 482 CrPC and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court‟s process by continuing the criminal prosecution against the appellants.” 26. In Hitesh Verma vs The State of Uttarakhand & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 707 of 2020, on 05.11.2020, the Court held:- 14 “14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors.,(2008) 8 SCC 435. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under: “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” 15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of 15 witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.” 27. The Supreme Court in Ramawatar vs State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 2021 SC 5228, categorically held:- “16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its power to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer of quashing on the basis of compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objection of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a „special statue’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure.” 28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. in Criminal Appeal No…../2023 (arising out of SLP(CRL) No. 1249 of 2023) in Paragraph 18 held:- “18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliate him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any further to bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-sheet that the same makes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation or to 16 the caste to which the complainant belonged, except for the allegation/observation that caste-related abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If on calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars invocation of the court‟s jurisdiction under Section 438, Cr.P.C. and having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the charge- sheet(which is prepared based either on statements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it, prior to taking cognizance of the offence. Even for the limited test that has to be applied in a case of the present nature, the charge- sheet dated 21st January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence having been committed by the appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial.” 29. In Randheer Singh vs The State of U.P. & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 932 of 2021, on September 02, 2021, the Supreme Court held:- “23. Even though an FIR need not contain every detail, an offence has to be made out in the FIR itself. It is the case of the Private Respondents that Bela Rani has no title. Bela Rani executed a false Power of Attorney in 17 favour of Rajan Kumar (since deceased). Alternatively, the Power of Attorney, in itself, was a forged document. 33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings are being taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment against a purchaser. It is reiterated at the cost of repetition that the FIR does not disclose any offence so far as the Appellant is concerned. There is no whisper of how and in what manner, this Appellant is involved in any criminal offence and the charge sheet, the relevant part whereof has been extracted above, is absolutely vague. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra (supra) extracted above.” 30. Though the de facto complainant submits that he has been insulted due to his caste, there is no materials or statements to make out an offence against the opposite party as alleged, either in the FIR nor in the charge sheet. (Hitesh Verma vs The State of Uttarakhand & Anr. (Supra)) and (Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (Supra)). 31. The revisional application being CRR 2852 of 2024 is allowed. 32. The proceeding in Spl. Case No.1 of 2017, arising out of Ashoknagar Police Station Case No.998 Of 2016 dated 2nd November, 2016 which culminated in Charge Sheet No.258 of 2024 dated 21st May, 2024 under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 3(1) (r) 18 of the Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 corresponding to G.R. No.3159 of 2016 presently pending before the Court of the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court at Barasat, District-North 24 Parganas being the Learned Judge, Special Court under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is hereby quashed in respect of the petitioners namely Ranjit Kumar Kundu @ Ranjit Kundu and Dipa Kundu. 33. All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of. 34. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 35. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary compliance. 36. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities. (Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)