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2024 DAILYLAW 2613 (BOM)

SAKHARAM SHRIKISAN SHINDE AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER

APPLN/4814/2024 · 2026-09-07

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Judgment text

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APPLN-4814-2024.odt IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4814 OF 2024 1. Sakharam S/o Shrikisan Shinde 2. Tukaram S/o Shrikisan Shinde ...Applicants Versus 1. The State of Maharashtra 2. Sanjay S/o Jagannath Shinde ...Respondents ... Mr. R. M. Deshmukh, Advocate for the Applicants Mrs. P. J. Bharad, APP for the Respondent No. 1– State Mr. Yogesh Neb, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2 (appointed) ... CORAM : R.M. JOSHI, J DATE : SEPTEMBER 07, 2026 P. C. : 1. By this application the applicants seeks quashment of the First Information Report bearing Crime No. 0492/2024 registered at Ghansawangi Police Station, District Jalna and the pending criminal proceedings bearing Special Case No. 45 of 2025, for the offences punishable under sections 324, 323, 506, 504, 201, 34 of Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) and under section 92(b), 92(e) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (for short ‘the Act’) 2. It is the case of the prosecution that the complainant, Sanjay Jagannath Shinde, who filed First Information Report bearing Crime No. 0492/2024 on 13.11.2024, is the owner of agricultural land situated at Gut 2026:BHC-AUG:41972-DB APPLN-4814-2024.odt No. 20, Nagobachi Wadi Shivar, Gunj Village, Taluka Ghansawangi, District Jalna. A civil dispute regarding the partition and division of the said ancestral property has been pending in court between the complainant and the applicants since the demise of the complainant's grandfather on 07.09.2023. On 08.09.2023, an argument ensued between the parties when the complainant requested the applicants not to swap or alter the land boundaries during the partition. On the date of the incident, the applicants allegedly verbally abused the complainant outside his house over the ongoing land dispute and issued death threats. Knowing that the complainant had a pre-existing disability and had undergone hip and waist surgery, the applicants deliberately assaulted complainant at the surgical site before relatives intervened to stop the attack. The complainant initially lodged a Non-Cognizable (NC) complaint and subsequently escalated the matter to the Disability Commissioners in Delhi and Pune, who forwarded the grievance to Ghansawangi Police Station District Jalna.. Consequently, the present FIR was registered against the applicants, and upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet came to be filed. 3. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false, malicious, and stem from a civil land dispute. He further submitted that there was an unexplained delay of more than one year in registering the FIR and contended that the applicants no APPLN-4814-2024.odt longer own any land in Gut No. 20, demonstrating the falsity of the complaint. He contended that Section 92(b) of the Act was falsely invoked as an afterthought, noting that the complainant was not born disabled. He submitted that continuing the criminal proceedings without evidence constitutes an abuse of the legal process. 4. Learned APP and learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 opposed the application. They submitted that the delay in filing the FIR was justified because of the complainant's situation, and that the disability certificate is a valid document issued by a competent authority. They argued that the FIR clearly made out a prima facie cognizable offence. They further submitted that issues about the land dispute and the truth of the medical certificate cannot be decided right now and must be proved during the trial. 5. Perusal of the documents on record and considering the submissions of the learned counsel for both sides, this Court finds that there is an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than one year in lodging the FIR, which shows serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations. Furthermore, there are fatal contradictions between the allegations made in the FIR and the material evidence on record. The medical certificates on record show injuries to the face of the complainant, whereas the allegations in the FIR and his supplementary statement indicate that he was hit on the hand with a stick. Page 3 of 7 APPLN-4814-2024.odt 6. At this stage, it would be relevant to take note of Section 92 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which reads thus: 92. Punishment for offences of atrocities. — Whoever,- (a) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a person with disability in any place within public view; (b) assaults or uses force to any person with disability with intent to dishonour him or outrage the modesty of a woman with disability; (c) having the actual charge or control over a person with disability voluntarily or knowingly denies food or fluids to him or her, (d) being in a position to dominate the will of a child or woman with disability and uses that position to exploit her sexually; (e) voluntarily injures, damages or interferes with the use of any limb or sense or any supporting device of a person with disability; (f) performs, conducts or directs any medical procedure to be performed on a woman with disability which leads to or is likely to lead to termination of pregnancy without her express consent except in cases where medical procedure for termination of pregnancy is done in severe cases of disability and with the opinion of a registered medical practitioner and also with the consent of the guardian of the woman with disability, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine. Insofar as the provisions of the said Act are concerned, the material on record demonstrates that the alleged altercation was purely the outcome of a pre-existing civil dispute regarding land partition, devoid of any specific intent to target the complainant on account of his disability. Section 92(b) mandates specific intent to dishonour a person with a disability, whereas APPLN-4814-2024.odt the disability certificate was obtained subsequent to the alleged incident. Similarly, Section 92(e) is not attracted due to the fatal contradiction between the complainant’s statement alleging a stick blow to his hand and the medical injury certificate showing injuries exclusively to the face, thereby failing to establish any deliberate injury targeted at a limb or surgical site. The essential ingredients to constitute offence under section 92 of the Act of 2016, are absent. Moreover the injury certificate is also doubtful showing the date of the examination of the injured on 08.10.2024, though the incident allegedly occurred on 08.09.2023. Consequently, the invocation of the Act appears to be a clear afterthought, intended to color a civil property dispute with a criminal hue. 7. This Court also finds that the alleged offences under the IPC are highly doubtful in the aforementioned circumstances. It would be relevant to take note of Sections 323 and 324 of the IPC, which read thus: 323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.— Whoever, except in the case provided for by section334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 324. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.— Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any APPLN-4814-2024.odt poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. In view of the above discussion, this Court observes that the nature of the injuries recorded does not indicate the use of any dangerous weapon, thereby failing to make out a prima facie case under Section 324 of the IPC. Consequently, continuing the criminal proceedings against the applicants on the basis of such FIR would amount to an abuse of the process of law, and no offence is made out under the provisions of the said Act. It is evident that the allegations under the said Act are doubtful and arise out of a pre-existing land dispute between the parties, indicating that the criminal proceedings were manufactured by the informant to target the applicants, falling within the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. As far as the use of the stick is concerned, needless to say, it depends upon the nature of the injury and the manner in which the assault was committed. In the absence of any such indication, it cannot be held that the stick is a dangerous weapon so as to attract the provisions of Section 324 of the IPC. This Court, therefore, finds substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that, at most, an offence under Section 323 could be made out. Page 6 of 7 APPLN-4814-2024.odt Since an offence under Section 323 is non-cognizable in nature, no criminal proceeding can be continued against the applicant on the basis of the First Information Report. 8. This Court finds substance in the contention of the learned advocate for the applicants that the possibility of the Medical Officer having issued a false medical certificate to accommodate the informant cannot be ruled out. Hence, the application is allowed in terms of prayer clauses ‘C’ & ‘C-1’. 9. Issue notice to the Medical Officer who issued the medical certificate dated 08.10.2023 (at page no. 102 of the petition) to explain the relevant facts of examination of injured. Although the application is allowed and disposed of on merits, the matter shall remain pending solely for taking necessary action against the Medical Officer. 10. Fees of the appointed Counsel is quantified at Rs. 10,000/- to be paid by the High Court Legal Services Sub-Committee, Aurangabad. (R. M. JOSHI, J.) Malani