14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 338 OF 2020 WITH INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1407 OF 2024 IN CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 338 OF 2020 1. Baban Bapu Kharat 2. Sachin Baban Kharat 3. Mrs. Tanuja Sunil Bhosale 4. Mrs. Vanita Rajendra Kasbe 5. Mrs. Dinika Rajendra Kasbe …Applicants (Orig. Respondent Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8) Vs. 1. State of Maharashtra 2. Mrs. Smita Manoj Kharat …Respondents (Orig. Applicants) Mr. Raviraj S. Gamare a/w. Mr. Manoj Gaikwad, Shubhangi Chorge, for the Applicants. Mr. Savita M. Yadav, APP for the Respondent No.1-State. Mr. Vishal Vinayak Rankhambe a/w. Aparna Rankhambe, Chaitanya Bagul and Afsar Ansari, for the Respondent No.2. CORAM: MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J. DATE : 8th SEPTEMBER, 2026 P. C.: 1. Heard Mr. Gamare, learned counsel appearing for the Applicants, Mr. Rankhambe, learned counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 2 and Ms. Yadav, learned APP for the State. 2. It is the submission of Mr. Gamare, learned counsel appearing for the Applicants that the Applicants are original 8th September, 2026 14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt Respondent Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8 in the DV proceedings and except general allegations, there are no allegations against the Applicants. It is stated that the Applicant Nos.2, 4 and 6 are father-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law, respectively, and Applicant Nos. 4 and 5, i.e., Original Respondent Nos. 7 and 8 are not even the relatives. It is submitted that except general allegations, there are no allegations whatsoever against these Applicants, and therefore, the DV proceedings be quashed as far as the Applicants, i.e., original Respondent Nos. 2, 4 and 6 to 8 are concerned. 3. On the other hand, it is the contention of Respondent No. 2 that the challenge in this application is to the order dated 29th November 2019 passed in the Application under Section 25 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”) and this application filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”) is not maintainable, as there is a remedy of appeal provided under Section 29 of the DV Act. It is further submitted that in the complaint, specific role has been assigned to these Applicants, and therefore, no interference in the impugned order is warranted. Page 2 of 12 8th September, 2026 14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt 4. As far as the contention that appeal is provided against order dated 29th November 2019 passed under Section 25 of the DV Act, it is the submission of leaned counsel appearing for the Applicants that the prayer made in this application filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is two fold. The said order dated 29th November 2019 is also challenged and quashing of the proceedings has also been sought. Thus, there is no alternate remedy of Appeal under Section 25 of the DV Act as far as prayer of quashing is concerned. 5. Before considering the rival submissions, it is necessary to observe the parameters for exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the complaints which are well settled in the case of State of Haryana and Others Vs. Bhajan Lal and Others 1, as also, in the subsequent judgments. The parameters which are provided by the Supreme Court in Bhajanlal & Ors. (Supra) reads as under :- “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated 1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 8th September, 2026 14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the 8th September, 2026 14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Page 5 of 12 8th September, 2026 14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (Emphasis added) 6. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, where the allegations in the complaint and other materials do not disclose a cognizable offence, where the uncontroverted allegations made in the complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not 8th September, 2026 14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused, where the allegations made in the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and that criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 7. Thus, it is necessary to examine the complaint which is filed by the Respondent No. 2 under the provisions of the DV Act on the touchstone of the parameters of Bhajanlal & Ors. (supra). 8. Perusal of the complaint shows that it has been filed against the husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in- law, and Respondent Nos. 7 and 8, i.e., present Applicant Nos. 4 and 5, who are not at all related with Respondent No.2. The complaint is about 16 pages consisting of 41 paragraphs. As far as the allegations against the original Respondent Nos. 7 and 8, i.e., 8th September, 2026 14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt the present Applicant Nos. 4 and 5 are found in paragraph No. 28, which reads as under :- "२८. अर्जदा र हि चे असे म् णण आ की, बा ळ अहिचे महि न्या चे झा ल्या नं तर र्ज बादा र नं . ३, ५, ६, व ७ अर्जदा र या च्या र त्या घर* आले तसेचे अर्जदा र या च्या बार,बार भां ण कीरुनं आम् ले बा ळ ले दाव ले दा खव याचे आ असे बा,ले0नं फक्त बा ळ ले घव0नं चे र त से गा याबा झा ले तसेचे चे र त से नं तर बा ळ ले घव0नं परत अर्जदा र या च्या र त्या घर* आण0नं से,ले.” 9. The above allegation as contained in paragraph No. 28 is only against original Respondent No. 7. In the entire complaint, there is no allegation whatsoever against the original Respondent No.8. Thus, the only allegation against Respondent No. 7 is that she took the child along with Respondent Nos. 3, 5 and 6 for the purpose of taking the child to the temple and within a period of four hours, the child was brought to the house of the Applicants. 10. As noted earlier, as far as Respondent No. 8 is concerned, except mentioning her name in the cause-title in the DV proceedings, there is no allegation whatsoever against the original Respondent No. 8. As far as original Respondent No. 7 is concerned, apart from the allegation contained in paragraph No. 8th September, 2026 14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt 28 of the complaint, there is no other allegation whatsoever against her. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, can it be said that any relief under the provisions of the DV Act could be granted against original Respondent Nos. 7 and 8, i.e., the present Applicant Nos. 4 and 5. Thus, applying the parameters of Bhajanlal & Ors. (supra), it is clear that no useful purpose will be served by keeping the said DV proceedings pending against original Respondent Nos. 7 and 8, i.e., the present Applicant Nos. 4 and 5. 11. Perusal of the entire complaint shows that the main allegations are against original Respondent No.1, i.e., husband and the original Respondent No.3, i.e., mother-in-law. Prima facie, the allegations made against them are serious allegations. However, as far as the Applicant No. 1, i.e. original Respondent No.2-father-in- law, Applicant No. 2, i.e., original Respondent No.4-brother-in-law and Applicant No.3, i.e., original Respondent No. 6-sister-in-law, the allegations are only found in paragraph No. 30, which are general in nature against original Respondent Nos. 1 to 5. No specific allegations are made against original Respondent no.2 and Respondent No. 4. Except said allegation, there is no other 8th September, 2026 14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt allegation pointed out to me against Respondent Nos. 2 and 4. As far as the allegation against Respondent No. 6 is concerned, there is some reference in Paragraph 15. The only allegation against Respondent No. 6 is that although the mother of the Applicant made request to Respondent No. 6, she has rejected the same. In any case, even if entire complaint is read as it is and examined on the touchstone of parameters which are set out in the case of Bhajanlal & Ors. (supra), it is clear that no useful purpose will be served by keeping these DV proceedings pending against the present Applicants, i.e., Original Respondent Nos. 2, 4 and 6 to 8. As far as Respondent No.2 is concerned, he is a senior citizen of 72 years. 12. Thus, in the facts and circumstances, a case is made out for quashing of said D.V. complaint bearing Case No.121/DV/2018 pending before the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 62nd Court at Dadar (now J.M.F.C. at Sewri) only qua present Applicants, i.e., original Respondent Nso. 2, 4 and 6 to 8. Resultantly, the same is quashed and set aside only against the present Applicants, i.e., original Respondent No.2-Baban Babu Kharant, Respondent No.4, Sachin Baban Kharat, Respondent No. 8th September, 2026 14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt 6-Tanuja Sunil Bhosale, Respondent No.7- Vanita Rajendra Kasbe and Respondent No. 8- Dinika Rajendra Kasbe. 13. Criminal Application No. 338 of 2020 is disposed of in above terms. . 14. However, it is required to be noted that the said DV complaint is of the year 2018 and the same is pending for about last eights years. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances, the learned JMFC is requested to dispose of the said DV complaint as against original Respondent No.1-Manoj Baban Kharat, original Respondent No. 3-Dakshabai Baban Kharat and original Respondent No. 5-Kavita Sachin Kharat, on or before 31st December 2027. 15. It is clarified that the observations made in this order are only for the purpose of consideration of quashing of the complaint as against the present Applicants, and therefore, learned JMFC is requested to dispose of the trial uninfluenced by the observations made in this order as against other Respondents in the said D.V. complaint. Page 11 of 12 8th September, 2026 14 IA-1407-2024.DOC skt 16. As the Criminal Application No. 338 of 2020 is disposed of, nothing survives in Interim Application No. 1407 of 2024, and the same is also disposed of. 17. It is further clarified that the observations made in this order are only with respect to the DV proceedings and other proceedings pending between the parties are to be disposed of on the merits of those proceedings. [MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.] 8th September, 2026