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2024 DAILYLAW 2458 (CAL)

Andaman and Nicobar Cooperative Workers Union v. Malabar Cooperative Coconut Farming Society Ograbraj

2024-11-18

Partha Sarathi Sen

body2024
JUDGMENT : PARTHA SARATHI SEN, J. 1. In this writ petition as filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the writ petitioner has prayed for issuance of writ of certiorari for quashing of the award dated 18.11.2021 as passed in I.D Case No. 2 of 2010 by the Learned Labour Court, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Port Blair. By the impugned award the said Labour Court while answering the reference as made by the appropriate Govt. found no illegality regarding termination / retrenchment of 19 workmen who were working under the respondent society. 2. For effective adjudication of the instant writ petition the facts leading to filing of the instant writ petition is required to be dealt with in a nut shell. 3. On 05.12.2007 the petitioner the workers’ union approached the Labour Commissioner, Andaman & Nicobar Islands for taking appropriate steps for regularizing the services of its members who according to the said union are the workers of the respondent society, grant of bonus and for implementing the minimum wages. In course of conciliation proceedings, 23 workers who according to the writ petitioner are the members of the said union were terminated from the service on and from 01.11.2008. Subsequently, 6 workers out of 25 workers have been reinstated but 19 workers’ termination order was not recalled. According to the writ petitioner union, such action on the part of the respondent society tantamounts to violation of Section 25-F, 25-G, 25-H, 25-N and the other provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act in short). 4. It is the matter of record that, since the labour dispute could not be resolved in conciliation proceeding, the appropriate Govt. within the meaning of the said Act made a reference to the Learned Labour Court under Section 10 (1) read with Section 12 (1) and 10 (2)(a) and the schedule of the reference is quoted below in verbatim:- “Whether the action on the part of Secretary, Malabar Cooperative Coconut Farming Society, Ograbraj by terminating the 19 workers (list of workers is enclosed as Annexure 1) from their services on different dates is legal and justified. If not, what relief the workmen are entitled to?” 5. The Learned Labour Court while answering the said reference passed the judgement dated 18.11.2021 which is under challenge in the instant writ petition. 6. In course of hearing Mr. If not, what relief the workmen are entitled to?” 5. The Learned Labour Court while answering the said reference passed the judgement dated 18.11.2021 which is under challenge in the instant writ petition. 6. In course of hearing Mr. Binnu Kumar, Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner draws attention of this Court to the judgement under challenge. It is contended that on comparative study of the schedule of reference and the issues as framed by the Learned Labour Court in the form of ‘Points for determination’ it would reveal that while passing the impugned judgement the said Labour Court has exceeded its jurisdiction for which writ of certiorari may be issued for quashing the same. It is further submitted that the said Labour Court is not supposed to act as a Civil Court and therefore, while answering a reference the said Court ought to have restrict itself within the ambit and the scope of reference and thus, the findings of the said Labour Court in relation to the points for determination is excessive. 7. Mr. Binnu Kumar, Learned Advocate in course of his argument put much emphasis upon the Section 12 (4) and (5) of the said Act. It is submitted further on behalf of the writ petitioner that though in answering the reference the said Labour Court has come to a finding that the 19 retrenched workmen were working directly under the respondent society but for the reason best known to the said Labour Court it has come to a faulty finding that before him no materials could be placed that the said retrenched workmen were in continuous service i.e for a period of 240 days within the meaning of Section 25 B of the said Act. It is further submitted that the condition precedent for retrenchment of workmen who were in continuous service as envisaged under Section 25- F were also not complied with. It is thus submitted that finding of the said Labour Court is perverse warranting interference by this Court by issuing writ of certiorari. 8. Mr. Binnu Kumar, Learned Advocate for the writ petitioner places his reliance upon the reported decision of the Hon’ble High Court that the case of Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others reported in 1963 0 Supreme (SC) 240: 1964 0 AIR (SC) 477: 1964 5 SCR 64 . 9. Per contra, Mr. 8. Mr. Binnu Kumar, Learned Advocate for the writ petitioner places his reliance upon the reported decision of the Hon’ble High Court that the case of Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others reported in 1963 0 Supreme (SC) 240: 1964 0 AIR (SC) 477: 1964 5 SCR 64 . 9. Per contra, Mr. D.C. Kabir, Learned Advocate for the Respondent Society submits before this Court that the writ petitioner has got no locus standi to file the instant writ petition in view of the fact that no materials have been placed before this Court that the retrenchment workmen are members of the writ petitioner union and in absence of any affidavit of competency the instant writ petition may not be entertained. It is thus submitted that on the said score the instant writ petition is not maintainable. 10. In his next fold of submission, it is submitted by Mr. Kabir, Learned Advocate for the respondent society that since the judgement which is under challenge before this Court is in the nature of a judgement passed by a Civil Court the instant writ petition cannot be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is however submitted that in respect of the impugned judgment the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked. 11. Mr. Kabir in course of his argument draws attention of this Court to Section 10 of the said Act. It is submitted that under section 10 (4) of the said Act a Labour Court while answering to a reference for adjudication is competent to decide the matter incidental thereto. (Emphasised supplied by me). It is further submitted that the said Labour Court is thus justified in making a finding that the retrenched workmen were not in continuous service and therefore the ‘conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen’ as envisaged under section 25-F of the said Act has got no manner of application as rightly observed by the said Labour Court. It is submitted further that none of the PWs before the Labour Court have been able to prove by any cogent evidence that they were in continuous service under the Respondent Society and therefore the labour Court is absolutely justified in coming to the conclusion that the writ petitioner is not successful to discharge its initial burden. It is further submitted that in Ext. It is further submitted that in Ext. B being the certified copy of attendance register from 6/2000 to 3/2002 the name of the retrenchment workmen are not transpiring as rightly noticed by the said Labour Court. 12. Mr. D.C. Kabir cited several judgements which are as follows:- (a). Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. Vs. Mohammed Rafi, AIR 2006 Supreme Court 3363: 2006 AIR SCW 4886; (b) Radhey Shyam Vs. Chhabi Nath, AIR 2015 Supreme Court 3269; (c) Writ Appeal Nos. 615 and 617 of 2021 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh: Amaravati dated 22.03.2022; (d) Mohd. Ali Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2018 Supreme Court 2194. 13. Before entering into the factual aspects of this case, this Court proposes to look into the law of the land relating to the principles governing issuance of writ of certiorari by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction. 14. In the reported decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Science Vs. Bikartan Das and Ors. reported in 2023 SCC online SC 996 the Hon’ble Apex Court expressed the following view:- “50. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 51. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 52. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 52. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not. 53.The essential features of a writ of certiorari, including a brief history, have been very exhaustively explained by B.K. Mukherjea, J. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 . The Court held that a writ in the nature of certiorari could be issued in 'all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner' so long as the broad and fundamental principles were kept in mind. Those principles were delineated as follows: “7. …In granting a writ of 'certiorari', the superior court does not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous, but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal ..... 8. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous, but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal ..... 8. … The supervision of the superior court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points, as has been expressed by Lord Summer in King v. Nat Bell Liquors Limited ([1922] 2 A.C. 128, 156). One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. 9. … Certiorari may lie and is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction." 54. Relying on T.C. Basappa (supra), the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), laid down the following propositions as well established: “(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous." 15. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law, this Court at the very outset proposes to deal with the issue of the maintainability of the instant writ petition in view of the fact that in course of his argument Mr. Kabir, Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent society raises the issue of maintainability of the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Kabir, Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent society raises the issue of maintainability of the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In considered view of this Court, since by filing the instant writ petition the writ petitioner has contended that the Labour Court while answering the reference exceeded his jurisdiction and / or illegally exercised its jurisdiction causing miscarriage of justice and error of law which is apparent on the face of record this Court has got no hesitation to hold that this Court has ample jurisdiction to entertain the instant writ petition for issuing the writ of certiorari. 16. In further considered view of this Court the judgement passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Appeal No. 617 of 2021 dated 22.03.2022 though deals with exercise of superintending power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India over the award passed by the Labour Court but since the issue of error of jurisdiction and / or excess of jurisdiction has been urged before this Court, this Court considers that the said judgement is of no help to the respondent society. At this stage, this Court proposes to look to some of the provisions of Industrial Dispute Act 1947 which are enumerated below:- “ S. 10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals - 1. ……..................................................... 1-A. Where the Central Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the dispute involves any question of national importance or is of such a nature that industrial establishments situated in more than one State are likely to be interested in, or affected by, such dispute and that the dispute should be adjudicated by a National Tribunal, then, the Central Government may, whether or not it is the appropriate Government in relation to that dispute, at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a National Tribunal for adjudication. 2. …….......................................................... 2. …….......................................................... 2-A. An order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section shall specify the period within which such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall submit its award on such dispute to the appropriate Government: Provided that where such industrial dispute is connected with an individual workman, no such period shall exceed three months: Provided further that where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed manner, whether jointly or separately, to the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for extension of such period or for any other reason, and the presiding officer of such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal considers it necessary or expedient to extend such period, he may for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit: Provided also that in computing any period specified in this sub-section, the period, if any, for which the proceedings before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal had been stayed by any injunction or order of a Civil Court shall be excluded: Provided also that no proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall lapse merely on the ground that any period specified under this sub-section had expired without such proceedings being completed. 3…….......................................................... 4. Where in an order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto. 5. …….......................................................... 6. …….......................................................... 7. ................................................................. 8. …….........................................................” “ 25- B Definition of continuous service- 1. …............................................................ 2. Where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer- (a) ……..................................................... (b) For a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than- (i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case. Explanation:- ........................................................... .” 17. Coming to the factual aspects of this case it appears to this Court that, while adjudicating the schedule of reference Learned Trial Court in the impugned judgement framed the ‘points for determination’ which according to Mr. Binnu Kumar, Learned Advocate for the writ petitioner is beyond the scope of the said Labour Court. However, on perusal of Section 10 (4) of the said Act it appears that it is the intention of the legislature that a Labour Court while answering to the point of adjudication shall have the power to adjudicate the matter incidental thereto. 18. On further perusal of the ‘points for determination’ as framed by the Learned Labour Court it appears to this Court that the ‘points for determination’ are very much relevant for the adjudication of the schedule of reference and therefore, this Court finds no perversity in the impugned judgement at the instance of the said Labour Court in framing the said ‘point for determination’ and answering its views by passing the impugned judgement as per the points for determination framed by it. 19. In course of his argument Mr. Binnu Kumar was also vocal with regard to the correctness of finding of the said Labour Court in as much as it is the case of the writ petitioner that the said Labour Court while assessing the evidence of the PWs did not at all consider the material evidence both oral and documentary as led by the said PWs. 20. It is settled principle of law that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India is not expected to act as an Appellate Court. The Writ Court is not supposed to reassess evidence led before the trial Court. The writ jurisdiction of a High Court more specifically a writ of certiorari can only be issued in the event it is found that there was error of jurisdiction and / or the finding is perverse or an error of law is apparent on the face of the record or principle of natural justice has been violated. 21. On perusal of the impugned judgement it does not appear to this Court that, the writ petitioner is successful in making out the case for invoking the writ jurisdiction of certiorari on any of the grounds mentioned supra. 22. 21. On perusal of the impugned judgement it does not appear to this Court that, the writ petitioner is successful in making out the case for invoking the writ jurisdiction of certiorari on any of the grounds mentioned supra. 22. The finding of the Learned Trial Court that the writ petitioner has failed to prove that 19 workmen had completed their 240 days prior to their retrenchment is purely a factual finding which this Court is not expected to interfere sitting in writ jurisdiction especially when the writ of certiorari has been sought to be invoked. 23. In the facts and circumstances, this Court thus finds no reason to interfere with the judgement which is impugned in this writ petition. 24. The writ petition is devoid of any merit and is hereby dismissed. 25. There shall be no order as to costs. 26. The certified copy of Ext. B in I.D Case No. 02 of 2010 as filed on behalf of the respondent society be returned to Mr. Kabir, Learned Advocate for the respondent after uploading of the judgement in the server. 27. Urgent Xerox certified copy of this judgement be supplied to the Learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties upon compliance of usual formalities.