R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 1755 of 2024 ========================================================== SOMABHAI HIRABHAI BAGADA Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. ========================================================== Appearance: MRS REKHA H KAPADIA(2246) for the Appellant(s) No. 1 MR RATHIN P RAVAL(5013) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2,3,4,5,6 MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1 ========================================================== CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK Date : 13/08/2026 ORAL ORDER 1. The appellant- original complainant-victim has preferred this appeal under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 now Section 419 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sahnita (hereinafter be referred to as the “BNSS”) against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 14.06.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (Atrocity) and 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Amreli (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial Court”) in Special (Atrocity) Case No.26 of 2016 whereby the Trial Court has acquitted the respondents accused from the charges under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 352, 504 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter be referred to as the “IPC”) r/w Section 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(5)(a) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, (hereinafter be referred to as the “Atrocities Act”) r/w the provision of Section 135 of G.P. Act. 2. The brief facts leading to present appeal are that the R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 complainant, Somabhai Hirabhai Bagada, lodged the FIR stating that his agricultural land is situated within the limits of Village Nilvada, on the Taivadar road. Adjoining the complainant’s land, the land of original accused No.5, respondent No.5 herein, is situated, wherein work relating to a Windmill (Pavan Chakki) was being carried out. In connection with the said work, the accused had damaged the boundary of the complainant’s field and constructed a road through his land. When the complainant questioned the accused about the same, original accused Nos.1 to 4 and other persons, in furtherance of their common object and pursuant to a conspiracy, came towards the complainant armed with deadly weapons. Original accused No.1 was armed with a stick, original accused No.2 was armed with an iron pipe, original accused No.3 was armed with a knife, and original accused No.4 was armed with a stick. All the accused abused the complainant and insulted him by referring to his caste. Accused No.2, Gabharubhai, assaulted the complainant with an iron pipe and inflicted an injury on his head with an intention to cause his death. Accused No.5 facilitated the escape of the other accused in his Bolero vehicle. 2.1 Accordingly, the complainant-appellant herein lodged an FIR being C.R. No.45 of 2016 with Babara Talluka Police Station for the above mentioned offences. Thereafter, the accused were arrested pursuant to the registration of the FIR and, after completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, and the R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 case was registered accordingly. As the offences were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the learned Sessions Court, Amreli, in accordance with law. Upon committal, the case was registered as Special Atrocity Case No.26 of 2016 before the Trial Court Amreli. 2.2 Thereafter, charge was framed at Exh.8, and the pleas of the accused were recorded at Exhs.9 to 13. The accused denied the allegations levelled against them, pleaded not guilty, and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, the trial proceeded further. During the course of the trial. 2.3 The prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses and produced 16 documentary evidences in support of its case against the accused which read as under:- Oral Evidence Sr. No. Exh. No. Name of Witness Witness Details 1 28 Somabhai Hirabhai Bagda Complainant 2 34 Govindbhai Becharbhai Parmar Panch of the place of incident 3 37 Raghubhai Nathabhai Ratadiya Panch of arrest of Accused 4 39 Bharatbhai Dhanjibhai Pilukiya Panch of arrest of Accused 5 41 Jaydipbhai Mulubhai Vala Panch of arrest of Accused 6 45 Chhaganbhai Valjibhai Baraiya Panch of arrest of Accused 7 47 Deepakbhai Mohanbhai Parmar Panch of seizure of Muddamal 8 50 Mukeshbhai Thakorbhai Makwana Panch of seizure of Muddamal 9 51 Vishalbhai Ramjibhai Baraiya Panch of arrest of Accused 10 53 Karansingh Bhavsingh Witness R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 Chauhan 11 56 Kamleshbhai Surmanji Kotwal Witness 12 65 Nileshbhai Somabhai Bagda Witness 13 68 Kanjibhai Laljibhai Bagda Witness 14 73 Pareshbhai Waghjibhai Bagda Witness 15 77 Bavkubhai Dadubhai Khachar Witness 16 83 Gordhanbhai Talshibhai Parmar Witness 17 86 Govindbhai Badhabhai Khimsuriya Witness 18 94 Bhagwanbhai Gagubhai Bharwad Investigating Officer (I.O.) 19 99 Ashokbhai Govindbhai Gohil The officer who has registered the complaint. Documentary Evidence. Sr. No. Exh. No. Description of Document 1 29 Complaint 2 35 Panchnama of scene of offence 3 38 Panch of arrest of Accused 4 42 Panch of arrest of Accused 5 46 Panch of arrest of Accused 6 48 Panchnama of seizure of Muddamal 7 54 Notification of Arms Prohibition 8 57 True copy of register page regarding issuance of Caste Certificate 9 58 True copy of Caste Certificate 10 59 True copy of supporting documents for issuance of Caste Certificate 11 84 Proof of residence of accused No. 5 issued by Sukhpur Gram Panchayat 12 87 Certificate from Nilvada Gram Panchayat regarding the caste of Accused No. 4. 13 88 Certificate from Nilvada Gram Panchayat regarding the caste of Accused No. 1. 14 89 Certificate from Nilvada Gram Panchayat regarding the caste of Accused No. 2. R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 15 90 Certificate from Nilvada Gram Panchayat regarding the caste of Accused No. 3. 16 95 Depute Order 2.4 After hearing both the sides and after evaluation the evidence placed on record, the trial Court has acquitted the accused of the charges levelled against them vide judgment and order dated 14.06.2024 passed in Special (Atrocity) Case No.26 of 2016. 2.5 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of Trial Court acquitting the present respondents accused, the original claimant has preferred present appeal. 3. Heard Ms.Rekha Kapadia, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Dave, learned counsel for Mr. Rathin Raval, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 6 and Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned APP for the respondent No.1-State. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant, referring to the depositions of the witnesses and upon perusal of the impugned judgment, contended before the Court that the Trial Court had committed serious errors of law and facts in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of the respondents. She further contended that, although the prosecution had produced both oral and documentary evidence, as referred to in the impugned judgment, the Trial Court had discarded the evidence of the prosecution witnesses on the basis of minor discrepancies and contradictions. The impugned judgment and order was, R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 therefore, bad in law and deserved to be quashed and set aside, and the appeal deserved to be allowed. 4.1 The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Trial Court had failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution and had thereby committed a serious error in law. She submitted that the Trial Court had erroneously disbelieved the prosecution case and acquitted the respondents of the charges levelled against them. 4.2 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court is contrary to the evidence on record, provisions of law and settled legal principles. The Trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused despite the prosecution having led sufficient oral and documentary evidence to establish the charges under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 352, 504 and 506(2) of the IPC, Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(5-A) of the Atrocities Act and Section 135 of the G.P. Act beyond reasonable doubt. 4.3 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the complainant, examined at Exh.28, fully supported the FIR and specifically deposed regarding the overt acts of the accused, the weapons carried by them, the assault, caste-related abuses and threats. The panch witnesses and other prosecution witnesses, including the witnesses to the panchnamas, notification, caste certificate, Investigating Officer and PSO, also supported the prosecution case. Page 6 of 22 R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 4.4 The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the complainant had identified the weapons recovered from the accused and that the panchnama of the scene of offence established that the boundary and fencing of the complainant's field had been damaged and a road had been made through the field. The oral and documentary evidence, when considered cumulatively, clearly established the prosecution case. 4.5 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Trial Court erred in discarding the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and in giving undue importance to minor contradictions and omissions which did not go to the root of the case. Even the evidence of hostile witnesses, to the extent it supported the prosecution, ought to have been considered. The Trial Court also failed to properly appreciate the evidence of the Investigating Officer and PSO. 4.6 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of Section 149 of the IPC, once the common object of the unlawful assembly is established, it is not necessary to prove an individual overt act against each accused. The Trial Court therefore committed an error in appreciating the individual roles of the accused in isolation. 4.7 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal suffers from misappreciation of evidence and settled principles of law, resulting in miscarriage of justice, and deserves to be quashed R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 and set aside. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Dave, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges levelled against the respondents. He submitted that, upon perusal of the deposition of PW-1, i.e. the complainant himself, it was evident that, during his cross- examination, he had admitted that he had not sustained any injury and had not been referred to any doctor. He further submitted that, in paragraphs 10 to 16 of his deposition, the complainant had substantially contradicted and undermined his own case. Therefore, in view of the complainant’s own deposition, the prosecution had failed to prove the alleged offences against the respondents. 5.1 So far as the independent witnesses were concerned, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that they had not supported the prosecution case. With regard to the offences under the provisions of the Atrocities Act, he submitted that the Trial Court had rightly disbelieved the prosecution case, as no independent witness had supported the allegations regarding the use of filthy or caste-based words with an intention to insult the complainant on account of his caste. 5.2 Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that, as per the prosecution case, at about 10:00 a.m., the complainant was informed by one Sukhabai Channabhai Rathod that the erection of the windmill had commenced and that the boundary wall of his agricultural field had been R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 damaged. However, although said information was allegedly conveyed to the complainant over the telephone no details regarding the telephonic conversation were produced nor was Sukhabai Channabhai Rathod examined as a prosecution witness. The complainant had also referred to one Kanubhai Kalubhai, who was not an accused in the present case. Further, in paragraph 11 of his deposition, the complainant admitted that the persons whom he had seen present near his agricultural field and at the western boundary wall were not the present accused. Thus, in the absence of any clinching or cogent evidence led by the prosecution, the Trial Court had rightly appreciated the evidence of the complainant and acquitted the respondents. Therefore, no interference was warranted in the present appeal preferred by the original complainant. 5.3 Learned advocate appearing for the respondents-accused submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is just, legal, and proper and does not call for any interference by this Court. It was submitted that the Trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record and has recorded findings based on proper appreciation of facts and settled principles of law. 5.4 Learned advocate for the respondents accused has further submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Learned advocate for the respondents accused has submitted that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt as mere R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 examination of witnesses and production of documentary evidences do not establish the guilt of the accused unless the evidence is reliable and inspires confidence. 5.5 Learned advocate for the respondents accused has submitted that the prosecution has failed to point out any perversity, illegality or misreading of evidence in the impugned judgment of the Trial Court and the appeal is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have perused the relevant documents and material placed on record. I have also gone through the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court as well as the record and proceedings. 7. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order, as well as the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for both sides, the issues that arises for consideration before this Court are as under:- Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal? Whether the Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, has committed any error of law or fact? Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal suffers from any illegality or perversity? 8. Now, in light of the aforesaid facts and the issues framed by this Court for the purpose of determination, let us first examine the facts of the present case. The complainant, Somabhai Hirabhai Bagada, alleged that the accused R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 damaged the boundary of his agricultural land at Village Nilvada and constructed a road for windmill-related work on adjoining land. When he objected, accused Nos.1 to 4 allegedly approached him armed with weapons, abused and caste-insulted him, and accused No.2 assaulted him on the head with an iron pipe with an intention to cause death. Accused No.5 allegedly facilitated their escape in a Bolero vehicle. Accordingly, FIR C.R. No.45 of 2016 was registered at Babara Police Station. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed and the case was committed to the Sessions Court, Amreli, where it was registered as Special (Atrocity) Case No.26 of 2016. The prosecution examined 19 witnesses and produced 16 documentary evidences. However, by judgment dated 14.06.2024, the Trial Court acquitted all the accused. Aggrieved by the acquittal, the original complainant has preferred the present appeal. 9. Upon perusal of the evidence produced by the appellant, including the depositions of the prosecution witnesses on record, and upon closely examining the same, I am of the opinion that the Trial Court has rightly recorded its findings and reasons in paragraphs 30 to 36 of the impugned judgment and order. 10. So far as the offences under the Atrocities Act are concerned, the Trial Court, after referring to and relying upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court, examined the evidence in detail from paragraph 37 onwards and, ultimately, recorded its findings and reasons in paragraphs 38 to 41. The Trial Court rightly held that, in the R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 absence of any cogent and reliable evidence produced by the prosecution, the prosecution case could not be believed. After considering the applicable legal principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in various decisions, the Trial Court rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 11. Upon perusal of the deposition of PW-1, the complainant, it is evident that his testimony suffers from material contradictions and does not support the prosecution case. Even during his cross-examination, he had admitted that he had not sustained any injury and had not been referred to any doctor. Further, the panch witnesses did not support the case of the prosecution. Having carefully evaluated the entire evidence on record, I am of the opinion that the Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence and has committed no error in passing the impugned judgment and order. Therefore, no interference is warranted, and the appeal deserves to be dismissed at the admission stage. 12. Further, it is required to be noted herein that at about 10:00 a.m., the complainant was informed by one Sukhabai Channabhai Rathod that the erection of the windmill had commenced and that the boundary wall of his agricultural field had been damaged. The said details conveyed to the complainant over the telephone, no details regarding the telephonic conversation were produced nor was Sukhabai Channabhai Rathod examined as a prosecution witness. Even the complainant had also referred to one Kanubhai Kalubhai, who was not an accused in the present case and in paragraph 11 of his deposition, the complainant admitted that the R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 persons whom he had seen present near his agricultural field and at the western boundary wall were not the present accused. Therefore, in the absence of any clinching or cogent evidence led by the prosecution, the Trial Court had rightly appreciated the evidence of the complainant and acquitted the respondents. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the Trial Court has not committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 13. Now, So far as basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of Atrocity Act is concerned, it is relevant to refer the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shajan Skaria Versus State Of Kerala reported in 2024-AIR(SC)-0-4557 more particularly head notes (d) to (h) which reads as under:- “(d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1) (r), 3(1)(u) - decline to grant anticipatory bail - when can it be said that a prima facie case is made out in a given FIR/complaint - held, 'prima facie' is a Latin term that translates to "at first sight" or "based on first impression" - expression "where no prima facie materials exist warranting arrest in a complaint or FIR" should be understood as "when based on first impression, no offence is made out as shown in FIR or complaint" - this means that when necessary ingredients to constitute offence under the Act, 1989 are not made out upon reading of complaint, no case can be said to exist prima facie. (e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1) (r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Constitution of India - Art. 226 - rejection of application for anticipatory bail - legal bar - duty of Court - in present case, an accused may argue that although allegations levelled in FIR or complaint do disclose commission of an offence under the Act, 1989, yet FIR or complaint being palpably false on account of political or private vendetta, Court should consider plea for grant of anticipatory bail despite specific bar of S. 18 of the Act, 1989 - however, if accused puts forward case of malicious prosecution on account of political or private vendetta then the same can be considered only by High Court in exercise of its inherent powers u/S. 482 of CrPC or in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution - however, powers Page 13 of 22 R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 u/S. 438 of CrPC cannot be exercised once contents of complaint/FIR disclose a prima facie case - thus, if all ingredients necessary for constituting offence are borne out from complaint, then remedy of anticipatory bail becomes unavailable to accused - duty to determine prima facie existence of case is cast upon courts with a view to ensure that no unnecessary humiliation is caused to the accused - Courts should not shy away from conducting a preliminary inquiry to determine if narration of facts in complaint/FIR in fact discloses essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under the Act, 1989 - it is expected of courts to apply their judicial mind to determine whether allegations levelled in complaint, on a plain reading, satisfy ingredients constituting alleged offence application of judicial mind should be independent and without being influenced by the provisions figuring inLicenced to : Shri.Ashish Modi (Judicial Academy) complaint/FIR - words "having committed an offence under this Act" denote that it is only when accusation in complaint clearly points towards commission of an offence under the Act, 1989 that bar of S. 18 would apply - minimum threshold for determining whether an offence under the Act has been committed or not is to ascertain whether all ingredients which are necessary to constitute offence are prima facie disclosed in complaint or not - accusation which does not disclose necessary ingredients of offence on a prima facie reading cannot be said to be sufficient to bring into operation bar envisaged by S. 18 of the Act, 1989 - in cases like the one in hand, Courts should have the discretion to look into materials based upon which complaint has been registered, in addition to verifying the averments made in the complaint - if on a prima facie reading of materials referred to in complaint and complaint itself, ingredients necessary for constituting offence are not made out, then bar of S. 18 would not be applicable - hence, it would be open to Courts to consider plea for grant pre-arrest bail on its own merits. (f) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u) - whether averments in FIR/complaint in question disclose commission of any offence u/S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 held, no - in present case appellant is alleged to have published a video on YouTube, containing a slew of reckless statements in the form of allegations levelled against complainant - there is nothing in transcript of uploaded video to indicate even prime facie that those allegations were made by appellant only on account of fact that complainant belongs to a SC - from nature of allegations made by appellant, it appears that he is at inimical terms with complainant - his intention may be to malign or defame him but not on ground or for reason that complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste - offence u/S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not established merely on fact that complainant is a member of a SC or ST, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member for reason that he belongs to such community - S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where reason for intentional insult or R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 intimidation is that person who is subjected to it belongs to a SC or ST - object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the reason of their caste status. (g) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r) - expression "intent to humiliate" - words "with intent to humiliate" as they appear in text of S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to caste identity of person who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation - not every intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation - it is only in those cases where intentional insult or intimidation takes place either due to prevailing practice of untouchability or to reinforce historically entrenched ideas like superiority of the "upper castes" over the "lower castes/untouchables", notions of purity and pollution, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or intimidation of type envisaged by the Act, 1989 - mere fact that person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a SC or ST would not attract offence u/S. 3(1)(r) unless it was intention of accused to subject concerned person to caste-based humiliation - humiliation is not so much a physical injury but is in the nature of a psychological injury that leaves a permanent scar on the heart - distinction between systemic and regimented humiliation - resistance is internal to humiliation - thus, those who are humiliated also inherently possess capacity to protest against it - however, those who protest also run risk of inciting opposition from those who want to push traditionally humiliated groups to margins - this apprehension of opposition and push back from dominant against marginalised is also evident from Statements of Objects of the Act, 1989 - thus, term humiliation as it appears in S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members. (h) Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 - S. 7(1)(d) - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - grant of anticipatory bail - legal bar - it is clear from a plain reading of provision of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act that any insult against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the ground of "untouchability" was punishable with imprisonment for a maximum term of six months under the Civil Rights Act - Civil Rights Act was not adequately sufficient to tackle caste-based offences and the practice of "untouchability", leading to enactment of the Act, 1989 introducing more stringent provisions for combating such practices - S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 should, thus, be seen in the context of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act - thus, words "with an intent to humiliate a member of a SC or ST" become R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 inseparable from underlying idea of "untouchability" which is sought to be remedied and punished by the Act, 1989 - having regard to reprehensible conduct and nature of derogatory statements made, appellant, at best could be said to have prima facie committed offence of defamation punishable u/S. 500 of IPC - if that be so, it is always open for complainant to prosecute appellant accordingly - however, complainant could not have invoked provisions of the Act, 1989 only on premise that he is member of SC, more so, when a prima facie conjoint reading of transcript of video and complaint fails to disclose that actions of appellant were impelled by caste identity of complainant. 14. In the decision in the case of Sohanvir @ Sohanvir Dhama Versus State Of U.P. reported in 2025 (4) Crimes 375 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “9. In order to examine this contention, it is necessary to refer to Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which reads as under: 3. Punishments for offences of atrocities. (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view; 10. The expression any place within public view has been interpreted by this Court in numerous decisions, most recently in Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Others, 2025 0 INSC 132. Relying on Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710 this Court reaffirmed that: 11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place within public view, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view. 11. A perusal of the Application filed by the complainant under Section 156(3) of the CrPC reveals that the alleged casteist abuses were stated to have been used by the Appellants inside the premises of the complainant. This circumstance, on its face, does not satisfy the statutory requirement that the abuses were made in any place within public view, which is an essential component of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. The house of the complainant cannot be considered to be within public view. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent no. 2 has not R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 been able to show that the complaint or the statement recorded under Section 200 CrPC contained any specific averment that the caste based abuses were hurled at a place within public view. 13. In our considered view, the High Court erred in concluding that the incident occurred in public view. A careful reading of the complaint makes it evident that the alleged castebased abuses were uttered inside the premises, in the presence of the Appellants and Respondent No. 2. Therefore, the essential requirement of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not satisfied. 14. Upon consideration of the submissions and scrutiny of the material placed on record, we find merit in the contention raised on behalf of the Appellants insofar as the applicability of the SC/ST Act is concerned. On the allegations as they stand, a prima facie case under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not made out against the Appellants. 15. It is beyond dispute that the appellate powers are to be invoked with due caution, and only in exceptional circumstances. It is equally well established that the Court cannot delve into the truthfulness or credibility of the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint. The Appellate Court has to examine the contents of the complaint as they stand. In the facts of the present case, the High Court ought to have exercised its appellate powers to quash the summoning order with respect to offences under the provisions of the SC/ST Act. 16. In view of the foregoing discussion and having found that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act are not prima facie satisfied, we deem it appropriate to interfere to that limited extent. Accordingly, the proceedings initiated against the Appellants under the Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act are hereby quashed. However, the trial insofar as it pertains to the remaining offences under the IPC shall proceed in accordance with law.” 15. Even in the decision in case of Karuppudayar Versus State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent Of Police, Lalgudi Trichy reported in 2025 (0) AIR(SC) 705, Gunjan @ Girija Kumari Versus State (Nct Of Delhi) reported in 2026 (0) AIJEL-SC 76984 and Talari Naresh Versus State Of Telangana reported in 2026 (0) AIR(SC) 2499, the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken a similar view. In the decision of this Court in the case of State Of Gujarat R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 Versus Laxmanji Sadaji Thakor reported in 2025 (0) GUJHC 36421 also similar view has been taken by this Court. 16. In view of the above, the Court has rightly observed that unless the basic ingredients required to attract the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are proved and established by the prosecution, the accused cannot be held liable under the said provision. In the absence of the fulfilment of such basic ingredients, the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order in favour of the present respondents. 17. In that circumstance the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment in order in favour of the present respondents and there was no any infirmity found in the impugned judgment in order. 18. Further, on perusal of the record of the appeal, it transpires that the respondent-accused has established his innocence before the Trial Court and that, after due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and other material placed on record, the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The findings recorded by the Trial Court are just, proper and in accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court. 19. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Page 18 of 22 R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 20. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 out whether the accused are connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 21. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, more particularly paragraph Nos. 42 and 43, which was subsequently re- affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the Trial Court. 22. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:- “20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: “42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review, R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.” 23. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026 present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record. 24. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against them. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 25. In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith. (HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J) SURESH SOLANKI Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge. Digitally signed by: SURESHKUMAR MOTIBHAI SOLANKI(HC00208), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 18/08/2026 11:58:34