JUDGMENT : Apurba Sinha Ray, J. 1. The parents of the petitioner allegedly executed two separate Wills in favour of her brother in respect of properties at Salt Lake and also at Kalyani along with movables. Two separate probate proceedings were initiated in the year 2007 by the executor/brother of the petitioner, and after being registed by the petitioner the said proceedings have become contentious, and are now pending as testamentary suits. Other sister raises no objection to the prayer of the executor/ beneficiary of the said Wills. 2. According to the petitioner, the executor being a resident of USA is not taking proper care in maintaining the valuable immovable properties at Salt Lake City, Kolkata and Kalyani. As a result of which the property at Salt Lake City, Kolkata has become dilapidated. The property at Kalyani has been intruded by outsiders and has been encroached upon. Photographs of two properties have been placed with the records. 3. It is also alleged by the petitioner that she came to know from reliable sources that the executor is also trying to sell off both the immovable properties, and if he is able to do so, the petitioner will suffer irreparable loss and injury since she has caveatable interest and she has every chance to succeed in the testamentary suits. 4. Accordingly, the petitioner have made two separate prayers by filing two petitions in both the Testamentary Suits being nos.7/2007 (re: Will of Usha Mukherjee, deceased) and 8/2007 (re: Will of Tarapada Mukherjee, deceased) for injunction restraining the executor from alienating immovable properties etc, and appointment of Administrator pendente lite and the numbers of such petitions are GA 2 of 2024 and GA 3 of 2024 respectively in both the suits. 4.1. Mr. Mitra, learned Senior Advocate, has submitted that the anxiety of the petitioner cannot be said to be mere apprehension since the brokers were enquiring her by sending letters whether the properties at both the locations as stated above are going to be sold very soon. Further, in order to show that the property at Salt Lake City, Kolkata has become dilapidated and the property at Kalyani has been encroached upon, several photos have been placed before the Court. Further, in order to show that the property at Salt Lake City, Kolkata has become dilapidated and the property at Kalyani has been encroached upon, several photos have been placed before the Court. The petitioner has been able to show that her contention has merits, and, therefore, the court should allow both the prayers of the petitioner and if allowed, the executor would not suffer any injury in true sense. 5. The learned Counsel, Mr. Ray Choudhury for the executor has vehemently opposed both the prayers of the petitioner by contending that the petitions have been filed only to harass the executor who although resides in USA used to come to Kolkata and take effective steps for maintaining the properties at Salt Lake City, Kolkata and Kalyani. The photographs have no legal basis and further the letters allegedly written by the brokers are false, fabricated. A cursory glance over the same would show that the petitioner is relying on a letter which was written in 2004, prior to initiation of probate proceedings. Moreover, both the letters were written allegedly by the different brokers more or less in same words and language. A broker who carries on business at Kolkata, in all probability has little scope to negotiate with the property at Kalyani. 6. Therefore, the said letters have been manufactured and cannot be relied upon. The petitioner has not been able to show that she has any prima facie case in obtaining the relief of injunction. Only when she is able to cross the first huddle, that is, showing of prima facie case, she will be required to show other grounds i.e. balance of convenience and inconvenience is in her favour and there is a chance of causing irreparable loss and injury to her. In this case, the petitioner is not even able to show that there is a prima facie case in her favour. In support of his contention he relies upon judicial decisions reported at (2006) 1 SCC 540 (Transmission Corpn. Of A.P. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd.); (2010) 1 SCC 689 (Kashi Math Samsthan & Anr. Vs. Shrimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy & Anr.); 2024 SCC OnLine SC 42 (Asma Lateef & Anr. Vs. Shabbir Ahmad & Ors.) 7. In support of his contention he relies upon judicial decisions reported at (2006) 1 SCC 540 (Transmission Corpn. Of A.P. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd.); (2010) 1 SCC 689 (Kashi Math Samsthan & Anr. Vs. Shrimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy & Anr.); 2024 SCC OnLine SC 42 (Asma Lateef & Anr. Vs. Shabbir Ahmad & Ors.) 7. It is also contended that the petitioner wants an order of injunction, and therefore, she could easily move to Civil Court since the probate court is not equipped under law to deal with such prayer of injunction. Section 269(2) of Indian Succession Act, 1925 has clearly prohibited exercise of such power by the Testamentary Court in respect of Hindu and several other communities. Therefore, the petition for injunction is not at all maintainable. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel has relied on 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3583 (Fauzia Sultana Vs. State & Anr.), [ 2011(4) Mh.L.J 50 ] (Ramchandra Ganpatrao Hande alias Handege Vs. Vithalrao Hande & Ors.). 8. The learned counsel has also submitted that when the statute specifically prohibits the exercise of power of granting interim order in respect of certain communities and has laid down specific provisions on the relevant subject it would be improper for the Court to issue an order of injunction on the ground that it has inherent jurisdiction to pass such order. In this regard, he cites judicial decisions reported at ( 2013)11 SCC 296 (Ram Prakash Agarwal & Anr. Vs. Gopi Krishan (Dead through Lrs.) & Ors.), 2020 (2) CLJ (CAL) 379 (Kiran Bala Sahu & Ors. Vs. Suprama Maiti & Ors.). 9. However, Mr. Ray Choudhury has pointed out several defects in the petitions. According to him, the applications are not in proper form. Deletion of a prayer after stamp punching is a serious irregularity. Prayers in the master summons are not supported by affidavit and it is filed like a notice of motion. There is no prayer for ad-interim injunction. The petitioner declared that the averment stating that she came to know from reliable sources that the executor is trying to sell off the immovable properties, is true to her knowledge, but, according to the executor, this type of affidavit has been deprecated. In this regard, the learned counsel draws our attention to the judicial decision reported at AIR 1977 Cal 125 (Sri Gouri Sankar Mukherjee Vs. In this regard, the learned counsel draws our attention to the judicial decision reported at AIR 1977 Cal 125 (Sri Gouri Sankar Mukherjee Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.) 10. Mr. Mitra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that no affidavit-in-opposition has been filed either against IA GA 2 of 2024 or against IA GA 3 of 2024 in both the suits, and therefore, allegations made by the petitioner in her application have not been controverted and accordingly such uncontroverted allegation shall be deemed to have been admitted by the executor. The learned counsel has drawn the attention of this court to the provisions of Section 269(2) and Section 247 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. He has further submitted that the judicial decision reported in 2011 (4) MHLJ 50 Ramchandra Ganpatrao Hande (supra) is not applicable since the said case law does not consider provisions of Section 247 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. It is further contended on behalf of the petitioner that nobody is challenging the title to the properties but the petitioner is seeking protection of the property. The learned counsel has also submitted that the case law reported in AIR 1951 Cal 561 (Atula Bala Dasi & Ors. Vs. Nirupama Devi & Anr.) considers both the provisions laid down in Section 269 and Section 247 of the Act, 1925. The case law of Sri Gouri Sankar Mukherjee (supra) is not applicable to factual matrix of this case. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has distinguished the case laws of Kiran Bala Sahu & Ors. (supra) and Ram Prakash Agarwal & Anr. (supra) by contending that inherent power can be exercised for securing the ends of justice, and to overcome the failure of justice the petitioner has been able to show the prima facie case by producing the relevant photographs showing that a property at Salt Lake has become dilapidated and further the property at Kalyani has been encroached upon. Therefore, the case laws of Kiran Bala Sahu & Ors. (supra) and Ram Prakash Agarwal & Anr. (supra) are not applicable in the present case. By citing (2017) 4 CHN 114 (In the Goods of Abha Rani Sinha @ Abha Sinha (Deceased) is also not applicable. The learned counsel has further contended that Hon’ble Justice Basak’s judgment did not lay down any law. 12. Mr. (supra) and Ram Prakash Agarwal & Anr. (supra) are not applicable in the present case. By citing (2017) 4 CHN 114 (In the Goods of Abha Rani Sinha @ Abha Sinha (Deceased) is also not applicable. The learned counsel has further contended that Hon’ble Justice Basak’s judgment did not lay down any law. 12. Mr. Ray Choudhury on the other hand has contended that Ramchandra Ganpatrao Hande alias Handege (supra) deals with both the provisions of Sections 247 and 269 of Act, 1925. The paragraphs 10, 13 and 14 of the said case law, in fact, supports the case of the executor. The case of Atula Bala Dasi & Ors. (supra) deals with Letters of Administration and not the probate of a Will. Mr. Roy Choudhury has also attacked the prayer of administrator pendente lite on the grounds that though the executor appointed by the testator/testatrix is still alive but without praying for removal of the said executor the petitioner has prayed for appointment of administrator pendente lite in this case. In this regard, the learned counsel draws our attention to the provisions laid down in Section 301 of Act, 1925. He has also referred to an unreported decision of Madras High Court wherein the Hon’ble Court has been pleased to observe that the appointment of an administrator pendente lite is one amongst the harshest remedy which cannot be granted merely on saying that the income from the property is being drained off. The learned counsel has also drawn our attention to the case of Jogendra Lal Chowdhury Vs. Atindra Lal Chowdhury & Ors decided on 17.06.1909, 1911 (13) CLJ 34 , to impress upon the court that when prayer of administrator pendente lite can be allowed. As the petitioner has failed to prove prima facie case, the court shall not look into the petition. The case law of Atula Bala Dasi & Ors. (supra) is not applicable since according to the learned counsel the powers of the testamentary court does not include power for granting any ad-interim relief, and further powers of appointment of administrator pendente lite is governed under Section 247 of Act, 1925. The learned counsel has also submitted that the petition for appointment of administrator pendente lite does not make any prima facie case in favour of the petitioner. The learned counsel has also submitted that the petition for appointment of administrator pendente lite does not make any prima facie case in favour of the petitioner. The learned counsel has referred to the judicial decision reported at (2010) 1 SCC 689 Kashi Math Samsthan & Anr. (supra). 13. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mitra has submitted that though the executor submitted that there is no tax due in respect of properties, no documents have been filed. The languages of the letter written by brokers may be similar since brokers use more or less same languages. There is no submission that the photographs do not belong to the relevant property. As the requirement arises, the prayer for interim order was made. There was no need for last 16/17 years to protect the estate. The court should do something to protect the interest of the petitioner since she is more than 80 years old. The petitioner is admittedly the sister of executor and she is entitled to get her dues if the court finds that there is no Will. The prima facie case is in favor of the petitioner, otherwise she would not have been allowed to contest the testamentary suit. If the probate proceedings are dismissed and properties are sold the petitioner would be in great difficulty. On the other hand, if the interim injunction is granted, the executor would not suffer any prejudice. The unreported decision of Madras High Court does not lay down any law. It is not binding upon this court. The factual matrix in Fauzia Sultana (supra) is different from this case Jogendra Lal Chowdhury’s case (supra) was decided prior to giving into effect of Indian Succession Act, 1925. As the prima facie case has been made out in respect of the interim orders, the prayers of the petitioner in GA 2 of 2024 and GA 3 of 2024 in both the suits should be allowed for ends of justice. Court’s View:- 14. It is true that the executor did not file any affidavit-in-opposition controverting the allegations in petitions for injunction as well as for appointment of administrator pendente lite. Initially, when the said petitions were taken up for consideration the executor did not indicate that he wished to file affidavit-in-opposition against those petitions. However, after hearing the said petitions for a considerable time, the executor wished to submit affidavits-in-opposition. Initially, when the said petitions were taken up for consideration the executor did not indicate that he wished to file affidavit-in-opposition against those petitions. However, after hearing the said petitions for a considerable time, the executor wished to submit affidavits-in-opposition. However, as the hearing of the petitions progressed to a great extent, the prayer for submission of affidavit-in-opposition at the fag end of the hearing was objected to by the petitioner. Since the hearing reached to its fag end the court considered that if the prayer of the executor were allowed then it would drag the hearing of the said petitions for a further considerable period. 15. Be that as it may, the moot point which has been raised by the learned counsels is that whether, in view of Section 269 (2) of Act, 1925, any interim order can be passed in respect of the estate of a testator who was from communities like Hindu, Muhammedan, Budhist, Sikh, Jain or an exempted person etc. For the purpose of proper understanding, the provisions of Section 269 are quoted herein below:- “269. When and how District Judge to interfere for protection of property.— (1) Until probate is granted of the Will of a deceased person, or an administrator of his estate is constituted, the District Judge, within whose jurisdiction any part of the property of the deceased person is situate, is authorized and required to interfere for the protection of such property at the instance of any person claiming to be interested therein, and in all other cases where the Judge considers that the property incurs any risk of loss or damage; and for that purpose, if he thinks fit, to appoint an officer to take and keep possession of the property. (2) This section shall not apply when the deceased is a Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person, nor shall it apply to any part of the property of an Indian Christian who has died intestate.” 16. From sub-section (2) of Section 269 it appears that protective order under sub-section (1) cannot be passed in respect of an estate which belongs to a deceased who was a Hindu/ Muhammedan/ Buddhist/ Sikh/ Jain etc. There are several judicial decisions dealing with above Section 269 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. From sub-section (2) of Section 269 it appears that protective order under sub-section (1) cannot be passed in respect of an estate which belongs to a deceased who was a Hindu/ Muhammedan/ Buddhist/ Sikh/ Jain etc. There are several judicial decisions dealing with above Section 269 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. In para 4 of the judicial decision reported in Atula Bala Dasi case (supra) it has been held that the powers of the probate court for the protection of the property which is the subject matter of a testamentary disposition are regulated by specific provisions containing in Indian Succession Act, 1925. Section 247 of the Act authorizes the probate court to appoint administrator pendente lite till an executor or an administrator is appointed in the usual course. The administrator has to act under the immediate control and direction of the probate court. It is further held therein that Section 269 of the Succession Act, 1925 makes further provision as to how the probate court can interfere with other proceedings for the protection of the property pending the grant of probate or letters of administration. It is specifically held in para 4 of the said decision that the said “section, however, does not apply if the testator is a Hindu and in the present case, the parties being Hindus it is not necessary to consider the implications” of the provisions laid down in Section 269 of the Succession Act, 1925. 17. However, in the said case, it has been mentioned that “even where the exercise of the powers given to the probate court under Section 247 of the Succession Act cannot obviate the difficulties or protect the properties, the powers of that court are wide enough to issue temporary orders restraining other persons from interfering with the properties which are the subject matter of testamentary disposition.” It is further opined if no question of title is involved in the proceedings, the court of probate is not thereby wholly incompetent to grant a temporary injunction even in extreme cases. Such order of injunction is to be issued only in aid of and in furtherance of the purpose for which the grant is made by a probate court. It is, therefore, open to the probate court not only to appoint an administrator pendente lite but also to issue an order of injunction temporary in character, pending the appointment of administrator pendente lite. It is, therefore, open to the probate court not only to appoint an administrator pendente lite but also to issue an order of injunction temporary in character, pending the appointment of administrator pendente lite. If such powers are exercised in probate cases by a probate court, there is no reasonable chance of any property being dissipated pending the actual grant of a probate or the appointment of administrator. 18. However, after considering the above case law it appears to me that Section 269 of Act, 1925 has two limbs. By the first limb , i.e., section 269(1), the testamentary court has been authorized to pass protective order at the instance of any person claiming to be interested therein provided there appears to be a risk of loss or damage in connection with the estate. By the second limb i.e. section 269(2), the testamentary court has been specifically prohibited to issue such protective order in respect of estates which belong to the testator who hailed from certain communities like Hindu, Muhammedan, Budhist and Sikh etc. The judgment of Atula Bala Dasi & Ors . (supra) has also shown that this prohibition has been taken note of by the Hon’ble High Court and it has been mentioned in para 4 therein that “Section 269 of Succession Act makes further provision as to how the probate court can interfere in other proceedings for protection of the property pending the grant of probate or letters of administration. This section, however, does not apply if the testator is a Hindu and in the present case the parties being Hindus, it is not necessary on this occasion to consider the implications of this provisions”. This section, however, does not apply if the testator is a Hindu and in the present case the parties being Hindus, it is not necessary on this occasion to consider the implications of this provisions”. This goes to show that the Hon’ble Court in that decision did not discuss the implications of Section 269(2) of the Act 1925 since, according to the Hon’ble Court, it is an established principle of law that Section 269(2) of Act, 1925 has prohibited the testamentary court to pass any protective order under Section 269(1) of the Act, 1925 where the estate belongs to person of certain communities mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 269 of Act, 1925, and therefore, paragraph 7 of the said judgment deals with only section 269(1) of the Act, 1925 and not section 269(2) of the said Act, since by paragraph 4 the Hon’ble Court has clearly stated that section 269 (2) of the Act, 1925 was not considered in the said decision. Therefore, whatever observation has been made in paragraph 7 of the said decision it relates only to section 269(1) of Indian Succession Act i.e . the cases where the testamentary court can pass protective orders. The said paragraph 7 of the said decision does not deal with Section 269(2) of the Act, 1925. 19. Needless to mention that several legislations were amended, abrogated since independence, but, astonishingly Section 269(2) of the Act, 1925 still remains in its original place. The legislature in its wisdom keeps the provision intact. In several case laws it has been categorically stated that section 269(1) is not applicable in respect of certain communities or persons mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 269 of the said Act. In Ramchandra Ganpatrao Hande alias Handege (supra) it has been clearly held:- “……The Legislature in sub-section (1) of section 269 made a specific provision to the effect that until probate of the Will of a deceased person is granted or an administrator of his estate is constituted, the District Judge (i) is authorized and required to interfere for the protection of such property at the instance of any person claiming to be interested therein; and (ii) in all other cases where the Judge considers that the property incurs any risk of loss or damage to do so. For that purpose, the District Judge is empowered to appoint an officer to take and keep possession of the property. While recognizing and conferring such a power expressly on the District Judge, the Legislature nonetheless mandated in sub- section (2) that this section shall not apply when the deceased is a Hindu, Mohammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person, nor shall it apply to any part of the property of an Indian Christian, who has died intestate. When section 268 emphasizes that "save as hereinafter otherwise provided", the proceedings before the District Judge shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 so far as the circumstances of the case permit, it is not open to the District Judge to exercise a power contrary to the legislative intent and mandate of section 269. Until probate of the Will is granted of, a deceased person or an administrator is constituted, the statute has recognized the power of the District Judge for the protection of the property (at the behest of a person claiming to be interested) and in all other cases (where the Judge considers that the property incurs a risk of loss or damage). But, just as this power is specifically conferred upon the District Judge, sub- section (2) precludes the exercise of the power when the deceased belongs to one of the categories specified in sub-section (2). If the provisions of sections 266 and 268 were broad enough to bring within their purview, powers of the nature specified in sub- section (1) of section 269, there was no necessity to incorporate a provision in the nature of sub-section (1) of section 269. As a rule of interpretation, the Court will not ascribe or attribute the use of a surplusage to the Legislature. But, even if an alternate construction is possible - one that recognizes that sub- section (1) of section 269 only makes implicit a power which is exercisable under sections 266 and 268 - the effect of sub-section (2) is to preclude the exercise of that power in the case of one of the excepted categories. But, even if an alternate construction is possible - one that recognizes that sub- section (1) of section 269 only makes implicit a power which is exercisable under sections 266 and 268 - the effect of sub-section (2) is to preclude the exercise of that power in the case of one of the excepted categories. It would not be permissible, in the face of the specific provision of sub-section (2) of section 269 to read into the provisions of sections 266 and 268 a general power to grant interlocutory relief even prior to the grant of probate in respect of the property which is alleged to form part of the estate of the deceased. This construction is fortified by the principle that the testamentary Court in proceedings for probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the Will of the deceased is genuine and that it has been made voluntarily. The probate Court is not concerned with questions relating to the property itself. Though an assiduous attempt was made on behalf of the Appellant to rely upon the provisions of the Act, to which a reference has been made earlier, the Court in this case is essentially concerned with the powers of the testamentary Court when it exercises its jurisdiction in a petition for the grant of probate. In view of the express provision which is contained in section 269(2), there can be no recourse to the exercise of the inherent powers of the Civil Court. This, however, would not preclude recourse a civil suit for obtaining relief necessary for the protection of the property.” 20. In Fauzia Sultana case (supra) the Hon’ble High Court at Delhi has been pleased to observe as hereunder:- “53. In fact, I find that the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court clearly held that the effect of Sub-Section (2) of Section 269 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is to preclude exercise of power in case of one of the excepted categories. In fact, I find that the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court clearly held that the effect of Sub-Section (2) of Section 269 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is to preclude exercise of power in case of one of the excepted categories. It went on to hold that it would not be permissible, in the face of the specific provision of sub- section (2) of Section 269, to read into the provisions of Sections 266 and 268 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, a general power to grant interlocutory relief even prior to the grant of probate in respect of the property which is alleged to form part of the estate of the deceased. In the case in hand, the deceased being a Muhammadan, the bar under Section 269(2) Shall come into play.” 21. The judicial decisions reported in Ram Prakash Agarwal & Anr. (supra) has also laid down that the inherent powers of the court cannot be exercised in contravention and/or in conflict with or upon ignoring express and specific provisions of law. Therefore, needless to mention that no inherent power of the court can be exercised when there is specific provision to that effect. In this regard the case of Kiran Bala Sahu & Ors. (supra) is appropriate since the Hon’ble Court has been mentioned in paragraph 8 of the said decision as follows:- “8. So far as the exercise of inherent power of the Court is concerned, a subsequent Division Bench of this Court reported in MANU/WB/0108/1959: AIR 1959 Cal 389 (Tulsiram Bhagwandas Vs. Sitaram Srigopal) has clearly held that if there is a specific provision available in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for entertaining an application and passing the orders therein, the inherent power available to Court under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 should not be used. Since Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 are the specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 following the ratio laid down in Tulsiram (supra) I am also not willing to exercise the inherent powers in the facts of the instant case. The remedy if any to the petitioner to injunct the respondents lies in filing a suit before a competent Court and seek injunction therein. I am, therefore, not inclined to exercise the inherent power of this Court in granting the injunction as prayed for.” 22. The remedy if any to the petitioner to injunct the respondents lies in filing a suit before a competent Court and seek injunction therein. I am, therefore, not inclined to exercise the inherent power of this Court in granting the injunction as prayed for.” 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 42 Asma Lateef & Anr. (supra) has been pleased to observe that when point of maintainability of the proceeding is raised, it is a duty cast upon the court to record at least a prima facie satisfaction that the suit is maintainable or that it is not barred by law. Whether the instant petition for interim injunction etc. is maintainable or not, this court must, in view of section 269(2) of the Act, 1925, specify its decision on its maintainability. The principle regarding such prima facie satisfaction has been mentioned in paragraph 41 of the said decision which may be quoted as hereunder:- “41. Although not directly arising in the present case, we also wish to observe that the question of jurisdiction would assume importance even at the stage a court considers the question of grant of interim relief. Where interim relief is claimed in a suit before a civil court and the party to be affected by grant of such relief, or any other party to the suit, raises a point of maintainability thereof or that it is barred by law and also contends on that basis that interim relief should not to be granted, grant of relief in whatever form, if at all, ought to be preceded by formation and recording of at least a prima facie satisfaction that the Suit is maintainable or that it is not barred by law. Such a satisfaction resting on appreciation of the averments in the plaint, the application for interim relief and the written objection thereto, as well as the relevant law that is cited in support of the objection, would be a part of the court's reasoning of a prima facie case having been set up for interim relief, that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant and non-grant would cause irreparable harm and prejudice. It would be inappropriate for a court to abstain from recording its prima facie satisfaction on the question of maintainability, yet, proceed to grant protection pro tem on the assumption that the question of maintainability has to be decided as a preliminary issue under Rule 2 of Order XIV, CPC. That could amount to an improper exercise of power. If the court is of the opinion at the stage of hearing the application for interim relief that the suit is barred by law or is otherwise not maintainable, it cannot dismiss it without framing a preliminary issue after the written statement is filed but can most certainly assign such opinion for refusing interim relief. However, if an extraordinary situation arises where it could take time to decide the point of maintainability of the suit and non-grant of protection pro tem pending such decision could lead to irreversible consequences, the court may proceed to make an appropriate order in the manner indicated above justifying the course of action it adopts. In other words, such an order may be passed, if at all required, to avoid irreparable harm or injury or undue hardship to the party claiming the relief and/or to ensure that the proceedings are not rendered infructuous by reason of non-interference by the court.” 23. Therefore, as all the decisions referred to above show that interim protection order cannot be granted in respect of the estate which belongs to a Hindu/ Mohamedan/ Sikh/ Jain etc. as mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 269 of the Act, 1925, I hold that the instant petition for injunction is not maintainable since the testator was a Hindu and parties to the proceedings are also Hindu. In view of the settled principles of law, it would not be wrong to mention that Atula Bala Dasi & Ors. (supra) has also accepted such view in paragraph 4 of the said decision. Accordingly, the prayer for ad-interim injunction as mentioned in GA 2 of 2024 in both the testamentary suits being nos. TS. 7 of 2023 and TS 8 of 2023 are accordingly dismissed but no order as to costs. 24. So far as regards the prayer for appointment of administrator pendente lite, I would like to add some more things since it appears that in the said petition there is no prayer for removal of the executor who is still alive. TS. 7 of 2023 and TS 8 of 2023 are accordingly dismissed but no order as to costs. 24. So far as regards the prayer for appointment of administrator pendente lite, I would like to add some more things since it appears that in the said petition there is no prayer for removal of the executor who is still alive. Without removing the executor it would not be prudent for any court to appoint any other administrator pendente lite. The prayer of the petitioner is appeared to be in violation of principles as espoused in section 301 of the Act, 1925. 25. As it has been rightly mentioned in the unreported decision of the Madurai Bench of Hon’ble Madras High Court in connection with CRP (MD) 1052 of 2021 and CMP (MD) 6130 of 2021 that appointment of an administrator pendente lite is one among the harshest remedy, the same cannot be allowed unless there are sufficient evidences on the record. It is true that the petitioner has annexed photographs of salt lake property as well as properties at Kalyani but the same cannot be said to be the best piece of evidence to prove the allegations as made out by the petitioner. As the prayer of the petition being no. GA 3 of 2024 in both the suits is appeared to be not inconformity with section 301 of the Act, 1925 and further as there is no sufficient and convincing piece of evidence, I do not think that the prayer for appointment of administrator pendente lite without removing the named executor can be allowed at this stage. 26. Accordingly, GA 3 of 2024 in connection with T.S. 7 of 2023 and GA 3 of 2024 in T.S. 8 of 2023 are dismissed but without any order as to costs. 27. Liberty to mention before appropriate bench. 28. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this Judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.