JUDGMENT : SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J. 1. The petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the respondent on December 7, 2009. 2. Clause XV of the same contained a Force Majeure provision. 3. The petitioner, during the COVID-19 period, faced hard times in running the hotel and resort for which the lease agreement was taken and accordingly sought a waiver in the lease rental payable to the respondent, by invoking the said Force Majeure clause. However, the respondent refuted the said claim, leading to the petitioner seeking to invoke the pre-arbitration conciliation clause in the agreement. 4. Clause XXI of the agreement pertains to dispute resolution. In Sub-Clause XXI.1, amicable resolution has been contemplated as a prior recourse before taking the route of arbitration. Clause XXI.2 provides for arbitration and Clause XXI.3 provides that the arbitration award will be binding on the parties. 5. According to the petitioner, the petitioner in terms of Clause XXI.1(b) sought a joint meeting between the parties by its letter dated August 12, 2021. By a communication dated August 26, 2021, the respondent fixed a meeting on August 28, 2021 at the time and venue mentioned therein. 6. What happened next is the subject matter of divergence between the parties. Whereas the petitioner contends that there was a meeting where the parties failed to reach a settlement, the respondent says that there was no such meeting at all. 7. Be that as it may, thereafter by a correspondence dated August 30, 2021, the respondent communicated that the matter was examined and reiterated its claim of the entire lease rental, refusing to grant any waiver as per the petitioner’s request. 8. In its affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent has disclosed the minutes of the 154th meeting of the Board of Directors of the respondent where the decision was taken to refute the claim of the petitioner, leading to the communication dated August 30, 2021. 9. The respondent has also disclosed in its opposition a further minutes of the 156th meeting of its Board dated November 22, 2021 where the same stand was reiterated. 10. Ultimately on January 5, 2022, the petitioner stated in writing that it was paying the dues as claimed by the respondent, however, mentioning that the same was without prejudice to its rights. 11. The same stand was reiterated by the petitioner subsequently as well. 12. 10. Ultimately on January 5, 2022, the petitioner stated in writing that it was paying the dues as claimed by the respondent, however, mentioning that the same was without prejudice to its rights. 11. The same stand was reiterated by the petitioner subsequently as well. 12. According to the petitioner, upon the parties failing to reach an amicable resolution in terms of Clause XXI.1, the petitioner invoked the Arbitration Clause i.e. XXI.2 by issuing a notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on December 28, 2023, therein nominating its arbitrator and asking the respondent to appoint the latter’s nominee. 13. It is relevant to mention here that Clause XXI.2 envisages that the Arbitration Tribunal shall consist of 3 arbitrators, one to be selected by each party and the 3rd arbitrator to be appointed by the two selected arbitrators. 14. Thereafter having received no response from the respondent, the petitioner has preferred the present application under Section 11 (6) of the 1996 Act seeking appointment of the nominee of the respondent by this Court. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner duly complied with all pre-arbitration formalities in terms of the arbitration agreement. In view of the respondent having categorically expressed its refusal of the claim of the petitioner even after the joint meeting, going to the extent of expressing displeasure at the petitioner seeking waiver repeatedly, there was no course of action open to the petitioner but to seek arbitration. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that in view of the payment being categorically made without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner and the petitioner having also clarified in its notice under Section 21 that the payment was being made under protest and without prejudice to its right and contention, there was no question of accord and satisfaction between the parties. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner cites Visa International Limited vs. Continental Resources (USA) limited reported at (2009) 2 SCC 55 where the Supreme Court had held, while dealing with the contention that the pre-condition for amicable settlement of the dispute had not been exhausted and therefore the application seeking appointment of arbitrator was premature, that from the correspondence exchanged between the parties it was clear that there was no scope for amicable settlement, for both the parties had taken rigid stand making allegations against each other. The Supreme Court observed further that the exchange of letters between the parties undoubtedly disclosed that attempts were made for an amicable settlement but without any result, leaving no scope but to invoke the arbitration clause. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relies on two judgments of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the matters of Shyam Sel and Power Ltd. vs. W.B. Minerals Development and Trading Corporation Ltd. reported at 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 11975 and Hi-Tech Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Tata Aig General Insurance Company Ltd. reported at 2014 SCC OnLine Cal 1732 where in view of refusal of one of the parties to appoint its nominee, the Court, under Section 11, appointed such nominee. 19. While refuting the arguments of the petitioner, learned counsel appearing for the respondent takes two-fold objections. 20. First, it is argued that the issue between the parties is a dead one, since the entire payment has been made by the petitioner. 21. Secondly, it is contended that the petitioner having failed to comply with the pre-arbitration procedure laid down in Clause XXI.1 of the agreement, the present application is premature and ought to be dismissed. In support of his contentions, learned counsel appearing for the respondent cites Iron and Steel Co Ltd. vs. Tiwari Road Lines reported at (2007) 5 SCC 703 . The Supreme Court held in the said judgment that the legislative scheme of Section 11 is very clear and if the parties have agreed on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator/arbitrators as contemplated by sub-Section (2) thereof, then the disputes between the parties have to be decided in accordance with the said procedure and recourse to the Chief Justice or his designate cannot be taken straightaway. The Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of full compliance with and primacy of the appointment procedure provided for in the agreement. 22. The Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of full compliance with and primacy of the appointment procedure provided for in the agreement. 22. Learned counsel next cites a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the matter of Sushil Kumar Bhardwaj vs. Union of India reported at 2009 SCC OnLine Del 4355 in support of the proposition that under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, the Chief Justice or his designate can be approached for appointment of an arbitrator only where a party has failed to act as required under the agreed procedure and/or where the person or institution has failed to perform any function entrusted to him/it under that procedure. Thus, it was held, under the 1996 Act, the parties do not have any choice of either attempting appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal themselves or at least take steps therefor or approaching the Court directly but are now, before approaching the court, required to first exhaust the agreed procedure or the procedure prescribed by law. Without the same being done, there would be no cause of action for approaching the designate of the Chief Justice. 23. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent also relies on Tulip Hotels Pvt. Ltd, Mumbai and another vs. Trade Wings Ltd, Mumbai and others reported at 2010 (1) Mh.L.J. 73 in support of the proposition that crystallization of referable disputes in conciliation is the first and unavoidable stepping stone. If that stage is not taken, no arbitrable disputes arise and recourse to Section 11 (6) is not open. 24. Thus, it is contended that in the present case, the petitioner failed to comply with the provisions of sub-clause (b) of Clause XXI.1 by failing to call a meeting of the Directors of the parties. In fact, even the first joint meeting between the parties had failed to take place and, as such, there is no option available to the petitioner to seek appointment of an arbitrator. 25. Two questions fall for consideration in the present case:- (i) Whether the dispute between the parties is still live for the Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. 25. Two questions fall for consideration in the present case:- (i) Whether the dispute between the parties is still live for the Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. (ii) Whether the petitioner failed to comply with the prior amicable resolution clause in the agreement between the parties, thereby precluding it from seeking to invoke the arbitration clause and, consequentially, to prefer the present application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. 26. Insofar as the first issue is concerned, it is clearly evident from all the relevant correspondence that the payment-in-question was made by the petitioner under compulsion, with the clear rider in writing that the same was being made without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the petitioner. 27. In the letter dated January 5, 2022, the petitioner communicated that it was making payment of the entire amount towards the interest and penalty amount as demanded, without prejudice to its rights and contentions, with the earnest hope that its request for waiving the interest and penalty would be favourably considered and the amount paid would be adjusted towards future lease rental/share of Gross Revenue of the resort. 28. Even in its notice under Section 21 dated December 28, 2023, it was reiterated that since the petitioner did not receive the waiver and since it did not want to be seen as a defaulter, it nonetheless paid the lease rent amount under protest without prejudice to its rights and contentions that the same was not payable on account of Force Majeure. 29. Hence, it is seen that the entire amount was paid by the petitioner without prejudice to its rights and contentions, at no point of time admitting the claim of the respondent. Thus, there arises no question of there being accord and satisfaction, since no settlement was arrived at between the parties at any point of time. In the absence of such consensus and/or any admission on the part of the petitioner, it cannot be said that the issue in question has become dead. Thus, the dispute between the parties is still very much in contention and is a live issue which is otherwise arbitrable. 30. Thus, the first issue is decided in favour of the petitioner. 31. The second issue requires consideration of the relevant law and the materials on record. Thus, the dispute between the parties is still very much in contention and is a live issue which is otherwise arbitrable. 30. Thus, the first issue is decided in favour of the petitioner. 31. The second issue requires consideration of the relevant law and the materials on record. The sequence of events in the present case turned out as follows:- 32. Upon the parties having a dispute as regards proposed waiver of lease rental payable by the petitioner during the Pandemic times, the petitioner wrote to the respondent on August 12, 2021 seeking a joint meeting in terms of Clause XXI.1 of the agreement. For a complete adjudication of the issue, the Dispute Resolution provisions, as find place in Clause XXI of the agreement, are set out below:- “ XXI. DISPUTE RESOLUTION XXI.1 Amicable Resolution a) Save where expressly stated to the contrary in this Agreement, any dispute, difference of controversy of whatever nature, howsoever arising under, out of or in relation to this Agreement including completion of the Project between the Parties and so notified in writing by either Party to the other (the “Dispute”) in the first instance shall be attempted to be resolved amicably in accordance with conciliation procedure set forth in Sub-clause (b) below. b) In the event of any Dispute between the Parties, either Party may call upon a joint meeting between the Parties in arriving at an amicable settlement thereof. Failing the meeting, either Party may require such Dispute to be referred to the Managing Director of the Lessor and the Managing Director of the Lessee, for the time being for amicable settlement. Upon such reference, the said two parties shall meet not later than 7 (seven) days of the date of such request to discuss and attempt to amicably resolve the Dispute, if such meeting does not take place within 15 (fifteen) days of such meeting between the said two parties, either Party may refer the Dispute to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Clause XXI.2. c) If the Dispute is not resolved as evidence by the signing of the written terms of settlement within 30 (thirty) working days from the date of aforesaid amicable settlement of such longer period as may be mutually agreed by the parties then the Provisions of Clause XXI.2 shall apply. c) If the Dispute is not resolved as evidence by the signing of the written terms of settlement within 30 (thirty) working days from the date of aforesaid amicable settlement of such longer period as may be mutually agreed by the parties then the Provisions of Clause XXI.2 shall apply. XXI.2 Arbitration a) Any Dispute which is not resolved amicably as provided in Clause XXI.1 shall be finally decided by reference to arbitration by an Arbitration Tribunal, appointed pursuant to Sub clause (b) below. Such arbitration shall be held in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. b) The Arbitration Tribunal shall consist of a three Arbitrators, of whom each Party shall select one, and the third arbitrator shall be appointed by the two arbitrators so selected, and in the event of disagreement between the two arbitrators, the appointment shall be made in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. c) The arbitrators shall issue a reasoned Award. d) The venue of such arbitration shall be Port Blair, India. XXI.3 Arbitration Awards to be binding a) The Lessee and the Lessor undertake to carry out any decision on Award of the arbitrator without delay. Awards relating to any Dispute shall be final and binding on the parties as from the date they are made. b) The Lessee and the Lessor agree that an Award may be enforced against the Lessee and/or the Lessor, as the case may be and their respective assets wherever situated. c) This Agreement and rights and obligations of the Parties shall remain in full force and effect pending the Award in any arbitration proceeding hereunder.” 33. Sub-Clause (a) of Clause XXI.1 in respect of Amicable Resolution provides that any dispute, difference of controversy of whatever nature, howsoever arising under, out of or in relation to the Agreement including completion of the Project between the Parties and so notified in writing by either Party to the other (the “Dispute”) in the first instance shall be attempted to be resolved amicably in accordance with the conciliation procedure set forth in Sub-clause (b) thereinbelow. 34. Sub-Clause (b) of Clause XXI.1 provides the contours of the modality of such resolution. 35. There are three phases envisaged in Sub-Clause (b). 36. In the first phase, either party may call a joint meeting between the parties for arriving at an amicable settlement. 37. 34. Sub-Clause (b) of Clause XXI.1 provides the contours of the modality of such resolution. 35. There are three phases envisaged in Sub-Clause (b). 36. In the first phase, either party may call a joint meeting between the parties for arriving at an amicable settlement. 37. The second phase kicks in only “failing the meeting”, when either party may require such dispute to be referred to the Managing Directors of the lessor and lessee for the time being for amicable settlement. Upon such reference, the said two parties shall meet not later than 7 (seven) days from the date of request to discuss and attempt to amicably resolve the dispute. 38. The third phase comes “if such meeting does not take place” within the said period or “the dispute is not amicably settled” within 15 days of the meeting, in which case the matter may be referred to arbitration under Clause XXI.2. 39. In the present case, there is no doubt that the petitioner invoked the first phase by writing to the respondent on August 12, 2021 seeking a joint meeting. The respondent also responded to the same by communicating in writing on August 26, 2021 fixing the meeting on August 28, 2021. Whether such meeting actually took place is disputed between the parties. In favour of the petitioner, it is found that nowhere in its subsequent communications the respondent referred to either the meeting being called, actually being held or not being held. All subsequent correspondence and minutes of meetings produced by the respondent are conspicuously silent on the meeting altogether. Hence, although there is no admission on the part of the respondent that the meeting took place, neither is there any contemporaneous communication from the respondent to deny that such meeting was held. Such complete silence, despite admittedly the respondent having fixed the date in writing for such meeting, is rather surprising and may be construed either way. 40. As against the petitioner, it also fails to produce any proof that the meeting actually took place. 41. Since the parties dispute the holding of the meeting on oath versus oath, this Court is not in a position to undertake a detailed enquiry within the limited scope of Section 11 of the 1996 Act in that regard. 40. As against the petitioner, it also fails to produce any proof that the meeting actually took place. 41. Since the parties dispute the holding of the meeting on oath versus oath, this Court is not in a position to undertake a detailed enquiry within the limited scope of Section 11 of the 1996 Act in that regard. As such, I proceed on the premise that the meeting did not take place, since there is no positive evidence in support of the same and the negative cannot be proved. 42. A careful scrutiny of the language of Sub-Clause (b) of Clause XXI.1 shows that the second stage of conciliation would set in if the meeting failed. The language used is “failing the meeting”. Conspicuously, as rightly argued by the petitioner, the said stage does not envisage failing of settlement, which would necessitate a meeting to be held as a pre-condition but refer to failure of the meeting itself, thus taking into account a situation where no meeting took place at all. Thus, even going by the stand of the respondent, failing the meeting, both parties were at liberty to refer the matter to the Managing Directors of the parties. 43. Let us now see the aforesaid provisions from a pragmatic view- point, by adverting to the actual facts which took place in the present case instead of theorizing on the legal connotation of the said Clause. 44. After the meeting was fixed on August 28, 2021, in fact immediately two days thereafter, on August 30, 2021, a communication was made by the respondent to the petitioner where it was stated that “the matter was examined”. However, the claim of waiver on the ground of Force Majeure made by the petitioner was refuted by the respondent in the said communication. Going a step further, the respondent “advised” the petitioner to make payment of annual lease rent along with interest and Gross Revenue share for the relevant year i.e. 2020-21 as per the agreement within 30 days therefrom, failing which “appropriate action may be initiated as per the term of the Agreement”. 45. In its affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent has disclosed the minutes of the 154th meeting of the Board of Directors of the respondent dated August 30, 2021 itself. 45. In its affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent has disclosed the minutes of the 154th meeting of the Board of Directors of the respondent dated August 30, 2021 itself. In the minutes, not only did the Board deliberate in detail as to the dispute but also recorded its displeasure with the behavior of the petitioner for repeatedly claiming waiver of rent referring to the relevant Clause of the lease agreement regarding waiver. According to the respondent as reflected in such minutes, it was not possible under the said Clause to grant waiver to the petitioner. 46. Not stopping there, the respondent has also annexed the minutes of the 156th meeting of its Board of Directors dated November 22, 2021 where the Board took into consideration the legal opinion obtained by it and reiterated its refusal to accede to the claim of the petitioner. It was observed therein that the petitioner is doing temporary misappropriation of Government fund, hence they should be directed to pay the dues within 30 days, failing which necessary action to be initiated to recover the dues after taking legal opinion from its advocate. 47. In fact, on December 6, 2021, the respondent requested the petitioner to make the payment of penalty and interest of the entire amount including the annual lease rental. 48. Again, in the 164th meeting of the Board of Directors of the respondents dated December 19, 2023, the Board discussed the matter in detail but did not find any ground to consider the relief other than extension of the agreement for a period of 297, days thereby refusing the plea of waiver of the petitioner. 49. It is noteworthy that in all the three meetings of the Board of Directors, all of which succeeded the joint meeting attempted by the petitioner, the consistent stand of the Board of Directors was to refute the stand of the petitioner. In fact, in the first such meeting, the Board went so far as to express its displeasure regarding the petitioner reiterating its claim of waiver. 50. Coming back to Clause XXI.1, sub-clause (b), the second stage failing the joint meeting was a reference to the Directors of the parties. In fact, in the first such meeting, the Board went so far as to express its displeasure regarding the petitioner reiterating its claim of waiver. 50. Coming back to Clause XXI.1, sub-clause (b), the second stage failing the joint meeting was a reference to the Directors of the parties. In its clear stand repeated in all communications and the minutes of the three Board meetings, the Board of Directors in no uncertain terms eschewed the probability of amicable settlement by reiterating their stand repeatedly even after the date of the first joint meeting which was fixed by the respondents on the request of the petitioner. 51. In view of the expression of displeasure by the Board on the repeated claims of the petitioner, the outcome of a further reference to the Directors themselves of the respondents would be futile exercise and a forgone conclusion. The meetings were held by the Board of Directors, obviously comprising the Directors of the respondent themselves and a further reference to them would mean precious nothing. 52. Thus, the insistence of the respondent on non-compliance of the second stage before the matter being referred to arbitration is a misnomer and an attempt to stall resolution of the dispute by arbitration. Any reference, if made to the Directors, would be futile and illusory in view of their declared stand and thus, such insistence by the respondent is unjustified. 53. It is well-settled that under the present scheme of the 1996 Act, the endeavour of Courts is to facilitate arbitration and to ensure that the dispute between the parties is resolved by arbitration at the earliest and all recent amendments to the statute have been intended to expedite arbitration. In the event the view sought to be projected by the respondent is accepted, the same would tantamount to stalling the arbitral process further and would be counter-productive to the scheme and spirit of the 1996 Act itself. 54. Seen in such context, in Iron & Steel (supra), relied on by the respondent, the Supreme Court laid down a general proposition that the parties should stick to the procedure for appointing arbitrator or arbitrators before invoking Section 11 of the 1996 Act. However, such general proposition cannot be a deterrent in reference to arbitration in the instant case in view of the factual premise as indicated above. However, such general proposition cannot be a deterrent in reference to arbitration in the instant case in view of the factual premise as indicated above. Here, it is not the case of either party that the procedure prescribed for arbitration is not being complied with, since the petitioner has already nominated one member of the Arbitral Tribunal and has sought the appointment of the respondent’s nominee, in consonance with clause XXI.2 of the agreement between the parties. 55. Thus, the general proposition laid down in Iron & Steel (supra) cannot be considered to be an impediment to this Court exercising its jurisdiction under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. 56. In fact, the ratio of Iron & Steel (supra) was considered in Visa International Limited, cited by the petitioner. In the said case, the Supreme Court observed that the parties had taken rigid stand, making allegations against each other and exchange of letter between the parties undoubtedly discloses that attempts were made for an amicable settlement but without any result, leaving no option but to invoke the arbitration clause. 57. Although the facts of Visa International were subtly different from the present case, as no three-tier step of prior resolution was contemplated therein, still, the premise of the ratio laid down therein holds good in the present case as well since all efforts were made to amicably settle the matter between the parties before invoking arbitration clause and further efforts to that end would be futile in view of the Directors of the respondent, to whom the matter was to be referred to in the next stage, had themselves considered the matter and expressed their stand on the issue. 58. The respondent has also cited a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court where it was inter alia observed that the arbitration is a creature of agreement and the agreement is supreme and cannot be given a go-bye by the parties, especially when it is found that in the interest of the parties and to avoid unnecessary arbitration in matters in which the higher authorities find a possibility of settlement, the clauses therein were introduced. 59. 59. Even if the ratio of the said judgment is adopted in the present case, here, in view of the rigid stand taken repeatedly by the Directors of the respondent, to whom the matter was to be referred to in the next stage, there could not be any possibility of settlement by the intervention of the “higher authorities”. Also, in the Delhi High Court judgment, there was no averment or pleading at all to the effect that the procedure prescribed in the agreement or the law had been followed, which led to the rejection of the application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act, which is not the case here. 60. The third judgment cited by the petitioner in the matter of Tulip Hotels Pvt Ltd (supra) rather supports the case of the petitioner. The learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court observed therein that the scheme of Clause 19 in the said agreement does not permit invocation of arbitration clause till conciliation is first sought. However, if it is avoided by one of the parties that does not mean that the other party is rendered a helpless spectator. The Court further held that dispute resolution is the aim of the Clause 19 and it cannot be frustrated by any unwilling party. The applicants therein having duly invoked the conciliation clause, because of negative response or no response from the respondent, they were held to be fully justified in calling upon them to appoint the arbitrator. Clause 19, it was held, did not clothe the respondents with right to frustrate the dispute redressal mechanism agreed to between the parties. The respondents therein themselves rendered holding of conciliation impossible and they could not be permitted to take advantage of their own mistake by urging that as conciliation did not take place physically, arbitration also could not take place. If in a given case recourse to conciliation becomes impossible, that does not mean that the arbitration agreement automatically falls to the ground. Attempting use of conciliation clause by the respondents to defeat arbitration arrangement itself is contrary to the spirit of the 1996 Act and also to the understanding between parties and cannot be countenanced, it was held. 61. If in a given case recourse to conciliation becomes impossible, that does not mean that the arbitration agreement automatically falls to the ground. Attempting use of conciliation clause by the respondents to defeat arbitration arrangement itself is contrary to the spirit of the 1996 Act and also to the understanding between parties and cannot be countenanced, it was held. 61. Thus, on a composite reading of all the judgments cited by the parties, there cannot be any iota of doubt that in view of the failure of the conciliation mechanism between the parties due to the resolute and obstinate stance of the respondent to ward off the claim of the petitioner consistently at all stages, further attempts at conciliation would be a futile exercise and a foregone conclusion, unnecessarily delaying the process of arbitration further, contrary to the scheme of the 1996 Act. 62. In such view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that both the objections taken by the respondent are bereft of merit and are hereby turned down. 63. Upon a perusal of the agreement between the parties, this court is satisfied that the said agreement contains an arbitration clause by way of Clause XXI.2 and its sub-clauses. It contemplates that the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, of whom each party shall select one and the third arbitrator shall be appointed by the two arbitrators so selected. 64. Also, the dispute as to waiver of lease rental falls squarely within the purview of “dispute” as defined in Clause XXI.1 (a), that is, any dispute, difference or controversy of whatever nature, howsoever arising under, out of or in relation to the agreement including completion of the project between the parties and so notified in writing by either of the parties. Hence, there cannot be any impediment in appointment of the nominee of the respondent since the respondent itself has not done so despite being so requested by the petitioner. 65. In view of the petitioner having already appointed its nominee, it remains for the Court under Section 11 of the 1996 Act to appoint the nominee of the respondent. Hence, there cannot be any impediment in appointment of the nominee of the respondent since the respondent itself has not done so despite being so requested by the petitioner. 65. In view of the petitioner having already appointed its nominee, it remains for the Court under Section 11 of the 1996 Act to appoint the nominee of the respondent. Accordingly, Justice Subrata Talukdar (Retired) is hereby appointed as a member of the Arbitral Tribunal in the capacity of the nominee of the respondent, subject to disclosure being furnished by the said proposed nominee in terms of Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 66. The two nominated Arbitrators shall select the third Arbitrator to complete the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal to decide the disputes between the parties. 67. It will be open to the Arbitrators to assess their remuneration in terms of the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 1996 and its Schedule. 68. It is made clear that the merits of the disputes between the parties have not been gone into by the Court. It will be open to the Arbitral Tribunal to decide all issues in accordance with law. 69. AP/2/2024 is accordingly disposed of. 70. Urgent certified server copies, if applied for, be issued to the parties upon compliance of due formalities.