JUDGMENT : SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred by the defendant-wife against a decree of divorce granted on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The respondent-husband preferred the suit on the ground that the appellant- wife was guilty of mental cruelty against the husband. It was alleged that in view of disputes between the parties, the matter went before a Panchayat in the year 2008 for resolution, after which the parties resumed their matrimonial life, but for a very short period. Admittedly, the appellant-wife has been living separately from her husband with her daughter for about 17 years at the time of the impugned judgement. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the respondent- husband admitted in his evidence that the parties are close relatives and have been acquainted with each other since childhood. Thus, it is not credible that the husband would be unaware of the appellant’s allegedly independent nature before marriage. 3. It is argued that the appellant, in her oral evidence, substantiated her case that she suffered from torture at her matrimonial home and there was no contrary suggestion in the cross-examination to belie such contentions of the appellant. Thus, the learned Trial Judge acted perversely in overlooking such evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of cruelty and desertion. 4. It is argued that due to the torture meted out to the appellant, she was compelled to leave her matrimonial residence. In the absence of any contrary evidence by the husband, the allegation of voluntary desertion was not proved. 5. Moreover, it is argued that the husband deprived the appellant and their daughter of a solvent life by paying meagre amount as alimony. 6. It is argued that the learned trial Judge failed to advert to the materials on record in arriving at the impugned conclusions. 7. Learned counsel cites the judgement of Kishore Samrite vs. State of UP and others reported at (2013) 2 SCC 398 in support of his contentions. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent controverts such arguments and contends that there was sufficient evidence on record to justify the impugned judgement. The appellant used to participate in the business affairs of her father and two buses were running in the name of the appellant. Despite several requests by the respondent, the appellant did not return to her matrimonial home. Learned counsel for the respondent controverts such arguments and contends that there was sufficient evidence on record to justify the impugned judgement. The appellant used to participate in the business affairs of her father and two buses were running in the name of the appellant. Despite several requests by the respondent, the appellant did not return to her matrimonial home. The appellant, it is argued, all along sought to lead a free life and told the respondent that she did not want any interference in her personal affairs. The respondent, it is contended, went under severe mental depression and consumed poison due to such behaviour of the appellant-wife, for which the respondent had to be taken to the G.B. Pant Hospital, Port Blair. Despite several attempts by the respondent, the appellant refused to resume her conjugal life. It is argued that apart from the wife/appellant, none else adduced evidence to corroborate her deposition. During her cross-examination, the appellant admitted that she had been residing separately from her husband since the last 17 years. 9. It is argued that the appellant-wife admittedly did not lodge any complaint against the respondent regarding the alleged torture upon her at any point of time, thus betraying the falsity of the allegations made against the respondent. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent cites Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh reported at (2007) 4 SCC 511 in support of the proposition that in case of a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. 11. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, we find that the appellant solely adduced evidence in support of her case and there is no corroboration of her deposition by any second witness. In cross-examination, counter suggestions were substantially made against the main allegations of the appellant in her examination-in-chief. 12. That apart, the records reveal that the respondent-husband’s deposition was corroborated by his brother-in-law, PW 2. 13. It is an admitted position that the parties have been residing separately for 17 years. In the teeth of the admission of the appellant that she had left her matrimonial home for at least 17 years, nothing comes forth by way of corroborative evidence to justify such desertion. 14. 13. It is an admitted position that the parties have been residing separately for 17 years. In the teeth of the admission of the appellant that she had left her matrimonial home for at least 17 years, nothing comes forth by way of corroborative evidence to justify such desertion. 14. Although it is alleged by the appellant that torture was inflicted upon her by her husband and his family, there is not a single piece of evidence to indicate that she ever lodged any complaint before any forum/authority in that regard. Moreover, the appellant/wife did not call any second witness to corroborate her contentions and relied on her own assertions. 15. From the records, we are unable to ascertain any evidence being adduced by the appellant/wife as to her animus revertandi. Thus, in the absence of any justification of leaving her matrimonial home, the learned trial judge was completely justified in arriving at the conclusion that the appellant had wilfully and deliberately deserted her husband. 16. The ratio laid down in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (supra) is applicable in the present case. The Supreme Court held therein that when there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction, though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever the matrimonial tie, the law in such cases does not serve the sanctity of the marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties, leading to mental cruelty. 17. In the present case, no useful purpose would be served in forcibly retaining the matrimonial bond between the parties, since the marriage has been severed for all practical purposes beyond repair. 18. Insofar as the allegations of the cruelty of the wife are concerned, the deposition of the husband is corroborated by the evidence of PW 2. There is no independent witness of the appellant to shake the veracity of the respondent’s evidence. 19. 18. Insofar as the allegations of the cruelty of the wife are concerned, the deposition of the husband is corroborated by the evidence of PW 2. There is no independent witness of the appellant to shake the veracity of the respondent’s evidence. 19. Insofar as the kinship of the parties and their having residing in the same neighbourhood is concerned, nothing of importance hinges on the same, since even if the parties were close relatives and lived near each other, such fact ipso facto does not demolish the evidence on record to indicate that after marriage she chose to live an independent life and having deserted her husband, never made any effort to return to her conjugal life with the respondent. 20. In Kishore Samrite (Supra), cited by the appellant, the Supreme Court observed that judicial discipline and propriety are the two significant facets of the administration of justice and every court is obliged to adhere to these principles to ensure discipline on the one hand and proper dispensation of justice on the other. Violation thereof may not always result in invalidation of the judicial action but normally it may cast a shadow of improper exercise of judicial discretion. 21. In the said case, however, the Supreme Court was considering a case of violation of principles of natural justice, the facts of which have nothing in common with the present case. As such, the reliance of the appellant on such judgement is misplaced, as here there arose no occasion of violation of natural justice, since both parties were given full hearing and all the material evidence was duly adverted to by the learned Trial Judge . 22. In the facts of the present case, the case of cruelty made out by the plaintiff-husband by corroborative evidence could not be shaken by rebuttal evidence. It is also evident that the appellant wilfully deserted the respondent, her husband, and never sought to return to the respondent. 23. The learned trial Judge, upon a thorough examination of the evidence, arrived at well-reasoned findings to support his conclusion that the appellant was guilty of cruelty as well as desertion and dissolved their marriage accordingly on such grounds. 24. 23. The learned trial Judge, upon a thorough examination of the evidence, arrived at well-reasoned findings to support his conclusion that the appellant was guilty of cruelty as well as desertion and dissolved their marriage accordingly on such grounds. 24. It is well-settled that while deciding a first appeal, it is not for the Appellate Court to substitute its own findings for those of the trial court unless the judgement of the learned Trial Judge is vitiated by perversity or an error of law or fact. 25. In the present case, we find that the judgement of the learned Trial Judge was well-reasoned and adverted to all relevant issues of fact and law. 26. Therefore, there arises no occasion to interfere with the same. 27. In any event, as observed above, the marriage between the parties has reached a cul de sac long back, arriving at a point of no return. No useful purpose would be served in forcibly making them stay together in a deadwood bond. 28. Thus, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgement and decree was perfectly justified on all counts and ought not to be interfered with. 29. Accordingly, FAT/2/2023 is dismissed on contest without any order as to costs, thereby affirming the judgement and decree dated October 27, 2022 whereby the matrimonial tie between the parties was dissolved by a decree of divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. 30. No order as to costs. 31. Department is directed to draw up a formal decree accordingly. I agree. - Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee , J.