JUDGMENT : SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J. 1. The present challenge has been preferred by the petitioners in all the four writ petitions against a common order passed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment and order dated March 15, 2024, dismissed all the writ petitions on the ground that the petitioners had been abusing the process of law, choosing the forum suppressing facts and had been litigating the matter even after the question of regularization had attained finality. Thus, the learned Single Judge did not enter into the merits of the case of each of the petitioners as to whether they were entitled otherwise to regularization of their appointments. 2. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, it transpires that certain facts, which form the backdrop of the case, are required to be gone into for the purpose of complete adjudication of the appeals. 3. At the outset, it may be noted that the case of Shri P. Vaikunta Rao, the appellant in the MAT/14/2024, is distinguishable on one factual aspect from that of the others. Before entering into such particular facts in the case of P. Vaikunta Rao, the common factual matrix applicable to all the appellants is taken up for consideration. 4. The appellants were a part of a total number of 136 Daily Rated Mazdoors (DRMs), who had filed a labour case, giving rise to Industrial Disputes (ID) Case No.3 of 2002, in which an award was passed on July 13, 2005. The said award primarily revolves around the rights of the applicants therein to daily wages at the rate of 1/30 th of the pay at the minimum of relevant pay scale plus dearness allowances. 5. In the award, appropriate directions were passed in that regard. 6. However, insofar as the rights of the appellants to regularization of their service are concerned, the same was categorically left open to be decided by the authorities, with the observations that the authorities shall consider the same subject to the availability of vacant posts in the department and subject to their fulfilling the process of recruitment in accordance with the extant provisions of the Recruitment Rules and the general administrative instructions. 7. Thus, up to that stage, it is clear that the question of regularization was kept open. 7. Thus, up to that stage, it is clear that the question of regularization was kept open. The Divisional Forest Officer (DFO), Baratang filed a writ petition bearing WP No.176 of 2005 against the said award, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on March 13, 2006, against which MAT No. 16 of 2006 was preferred. The Division Bench dismissed the said appeal, against which a further appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court where it was held that in view of the subsequent order of the Government with regard to entitlement of pay of the respondents therein (the employees), the Supreme Court did not find any live issue for adjudication in the appeal and accordingly disposed of the civil appeal as infructuous. 8. Thereafter, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, by an order dated May 21, 2015, appointed 122 DRMs out of the total 136 on ad hoc basis. The present appellants did not find place in the said 122 DRMs. 9. Since merely ad hoc appointments were given to the said 122 workmen, the said workmen, through their Union, filed a writ petition bearing WP No.290 of 2019 which was disposed of by an order dated December 18, 2019 by the concerned Single Judge by directing the respondent authorities to complete the process of regularization of the 122 DRMs who were represented by the Union. 10. An appeal was unsuccessfully preferred against the said order, which was challenged in Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also dismissed the Special Leave Petition, thereby lending finality to the said decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court. 11. Coming back to the present case, the learned Single Judge in the impugned order observed that the petitioners (appellants herein) “through workers’ union” could not succeed in the matter of regularization. Such presumption was formed since out of the 136 DRMs, only 122 were directed to be regularised. 12. Thus, learned Single Judge proceeded on the premise that the interests of the present appellants were also represented by the Union. 13. The learned Single Judge observed further that the appointment of the 122 DRMs were made by the office order dated May 21, 2015 in respect of those who met the criteria laid down in DoPT’s Office Memorandum on ad hoc basis. 13. The learned Single Judge observed further that the appointment of the 122 DRMs were made by the office order dated May 21, 2015 in respect of those who met the criteria laid down in DoPT’s Office Memorandum on ad hoc basis. As an automatic corollary thereof, the learned Single Judge observed that the present appellants were not eligible as they did not meet the criteria laid down in the Office Memorandum. 14. However, the said finding is perverse and based on conjecture as since there is nothing on record to indicate that the case of the appellants were specifically turned down insofar as their right to regularization is concerned. 15. Rather, by its award dated July 13, 2015 in ID Case No.3 of 2002, the Industrial Tribunal at Port Blair had kept the question of regularization open, of course, subject to the availability of vacant posts and subject to fulfilment of the process of recruitment in accordance with the extant provisions of the Recruitment Rules and the general administrative instructions. Such award was affirmed up to the Supreme Court and thus attained finality, leaving the question of regularization of the appellants and the other 122 DRMs open. 16. Thus, there was no occasion to observe that the appellants were found not eligible for regularization at any point of time. 17. The learned Trial Judge proceeded on a fundamental misconception in observing that the attainment of finality of the judgment dated December 18, 2019 in WP No. 290 of 2019 operated against the present appellants. It is extremely important to note that in the ordering portion of the said judgment dated December 18, 2019, which was affirmed up to the highest court of the country, the learned Single Judge categorically observed that it is the 122 DRMs who were represented by their Union. Thus, the very cause of action of the said writ petition had arisen on the ad hoc appointment of the 122 DRMs (not including the present appellants) without regularization. Even as per the ordering portion of the judgment, it is clear that the Union of workmen represented only the cause of the 122 DRMs to the limited extent that they had not been regularised but they had given merely ad hoc appointment. 18. Even as per the ordering portion of the judgment, it is clear that the Union of workmen represented only the cause of the 122 DRMs to the limited extent that they had not been regularised but they had given merely ad hoc appointment. 18. At no point of time where the present appellants represented by their Union and even the cause of action of the said writ petition was on a different footing altogether than the present case, being restricted to the right of the 122 DRMs, who had been given ad hoc appointment, to full regularization. 19. The distinguishing feature of the present appellants is that they were never given regularization, despite standing on a similar footing as the 122 DRMs who ultimately succeeded up to the Supreme Court, nor was such regularization specifically refused at any point of time. 20. Hence, the very premise of the judgment impugned herein, that the present appellants’ right to regularization attained finality against them, was erroneous, since the finality lent to the judgment was only in respect of limited cause of action of the 122 DRMs who were represented by their Union to the extent that they were given ad hoc appointment without regularization. In fact, it was recorded in the judgment in WP No. 290 of 2019 that the Union of employees was representing only the said 122 DRMs. 21. Hence, the present appellants’ cause was neither represented nor waived by their Union at any point of time. 22. The other line of reasoning of the learned Single Judge was that despite the judgment and order dated December 18, 2019 in WP No.290 of 2019 having attained finality, the petitioners/appellants were pursuing parallel remedy by OA No. 144/AN/2011, OA No. 200/AN/2011 and OA No.201/AN/2011. 23. However, insofar as the other appellants apart from P. Vaikunta Rao, the appellant in MAT/14/2024 are concerned, they were not parties to any of the said applications. OA No.144/AN/2011 was filed by the Union, OA No.200/AN/2011 by P. Vaikunta Rao and OA No.201/AN/2011 by one Robert Lakra. 24. Thus, the fundamental premise of such observation in the order impugned herein was contrary to the facts of the case, as the rest of the appellants had not preferred such applications, nor were their interests represented by their Union. 25. Thus, in any event, the orders passed therein did not bind the other appellants than P. Vaikunta Rao. 24. Thus, the fundamental premise of such observation in the order impugned herein was contrary to the facts of the case, as the rest of the appellants had not preferred such applications, nor were their interests represented by their Union. 25. Thus, in any event, the orders passed therein did not bind the other appellants than P. Vaikunta Rao. 26. Even insofar as P. Vaikunta Rao is concerned, we are to ascertain whether the dismissal of the three Original Applications by the Central Administrative Tribunal could have precluded him from preferring the present appeal, that is, MAT/14/2024. 27. A perusal of the order passed on the said three applications shows that the applicants including P. Vaikunta Rao had sought for regularization of their service in view of the continuous service rendered by them. The Tribunal, while considering such prayer, observed that there was a previous order passed in OA No.110/AN/1998 to quash an order dated July 24,1997 not to fill up posts lying vacant and for consideration of the case of the applicants including P. Vaikunta Rao for appointment to the post of regular mazdoor. The Tribunal, in its judgment dated July 04, 2000, noted that no ban order had been brought to its notice and the list of the members of Baratang Forest Workers Union was not furnished. However, the Tribunal directed the respondent authorities to pass an appropriate order for regular appointment of P. Vaikunta Rao and the other applicants. Pursuant thereto, it was recorded, the authorities had passed an order dated September 04, 2000 that the said workmen’s claims cannot not be considered as per their position in the seniority list and the number of existing vacancies but, in the same breath, it was admitted by the authorities that their cases would be considered when their turn comes and according to the eligibility criteria as per the provisions of Recruitment Rules, etc., in line with the award dated July 13, 2005 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Port Blair in ID Case No.3 of 2002. 28. 28. Against the common decision of the Tribunal in OA No.146/AN/2009 and OA No.208/AN/2009, which were filed by the DRMs working in the Baratang Forest Department being aggrieved by an order dated February 25, 2008 keeping the selection process in abeyance, the Tribunal referred to the award in ID Case No.3 of 2002 and the Special Leave Petition pending in such connection and dismissed the Original Application in the light of the judgment in the case of State of Karnataka and others vs. Uma Devi reported at (2006) 4 SCC 1 . 29. WPCT/14/1997 was preferred against the said order of the Tribunal, in which this Court noted that the persons concerned participated in the selection process initiated by the respondent authorities and were aggrieved by the authorities’ action in keeping the selection process in abeyance. In such limited context, it was noted that in the Special Leave Petition ultimately preferred from the award in the ID Case, the sole issue was whether the mazdoors were entitled to pay at the rate of 1/30th of the pay at the minimum of relevant pay scale plus dearness allowances as per the DoPT O.M. dated June 07, 1988. The writ petition was allowed by quashing the order of the Tribunal and the notice dated February 25, 2008 keeping the recruitment process in abeyance. 30. The Tribunal went on to observe that 1/30 th of the pay at the minimum of relevant pay scale was being paid. It was further recorded that the Tribunal, in OA/179/AN/ 2010, had amongst others considered the question as to whether : (a) the 1993 Scheme for conferment of temporary status in regularization was a one-time scheme; and (b) is it enforceable after the decision of the Apex Court in Uma Devi (supra). 31. Thus, the limited context of the said adjudication was whether the 1993 Scheme was one-time scheme and whether it was enforceable after Uma Devi’s case. The Tribunal expressed no opinion in OA No. 179/AN/2010 on the question as to whether the 1993 scheme could be enforced after the judgment in Uma Devi (supra). 32. WPCT No. 563 of 2012 was preferred against the said order of the Tribunal and it was contended before the learned Single Judge of this Court that the Administration was under an obligation to frame a scheme for employment on permanent basis by way of regularization. 32. WPCT No. 563 of 2012 was preferred against the said order of the Tribunal and it was contended before the learned Single Judge of this Court that the Administration was under an obligation to frame a scheme for employment on permanent basis by way of regularization. This Court noted that the 1993 Scheme was a one-time scheme and that the petitioners therein were not entitled to call upon the respondents to frame a special scheme for their employment in the department concerned for a permanent basis by way of regularization since the petitioners, despite getting sufficient opportunity to participate in the recruitment process for permanent employment in the Administration, chose not to participate in the said process. In such limited context, it was held by the learned Single Judge that it was not a fit case where the decision in State of Karnataka and others vs. M.L. Kesari and others reported in AIR 2010 SC 2587 could benefit the petitioners therein. Thus, the said decision was not followed by the learned Single Judge, who refused to pass a direction on the Administration to frame a scheme for petitioners’ employment in the department concerned on a permanent basis by way of regularization. 33. Hence, it is evident from the above observations that the limited context in which this Court refused the prayer of the writ petitioners was that the 1993 Scheme was a one-time scheme and the petitioners having not participated in the selection process therein, could not seek a direction on the Administration to frame a scheme for their employment by way of regularization. 34. However, the sub-text of the right of regularization of the petitioners therein was never turned down. In fact, it could not be, since such right of regularization had been previously finalized in favour of the petitioners by the award passed in ID case No. 3 of 2002 where it was kept open for the Administration to consider the said prayer subject to availability of vacant posts and fulfilling the process of recruitment in accordance with extant provisions of the Recruitment Rules and the general administrative instructions. 35. Following the said judgement of this Court, the Tribunal dismissed the Original Applications, including OA No.200/AN/2011 filed by P.Vaikunta Rao. 36. 35. Following the said judgement of this Court, the Tribunal dismissed the Original Applications, including OA No.200/AN/2011 filed by P.Vaikunta Rao. 36. The limited operation of the said dismissal was restricted, thus, to the issue that P. Vaikunta Rao and the other applicants had no rights to seek mandamus on the authorities to frame a new scheme on the premise that the 1993 Scheme was a one-time scheme and they had not participated in the selection process in respect of the same. 37. However, as observed above, the right to regularization of the said applicants including P. Vaikunta Rao was never turned down or taken away but had rather attained finality previously. 38. Returning to the present impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge proceeded on the premise that the present appellants were pursuing parallel remedy by the three Original Applications. However, the dismissal of the said three OAs bearing OA No.144/AN/2011, OA No.200/AN/2011 and O.A.No.201/AN/2011, as observed above, did not close their rights of regularization. Hence, the expression “attained finality” could be restricted only with regard to the 1993 scheme and the right to pray for direction on the authorities to frame a new scheme. 39. At present, however, by subsequent developments, there is an existing scheme whereunder 122 out of the 136 concerned DRMs have been regularized. Thus, the ratio of the judgement of the Tribunal dismissing the said three OAs is not a deterrent in regularization being granted to the present appellants including P. Vaikunta Rao. 40. Hence, the sole premise of the impugned judgment in the present case, that the issue had been decided finally against the appellants and they had abused the process of law by choosing the forum suppressing the facts and litigating even after the question of regularization had attained finality, is perverse, being contrary to the materials of the case. 41. At this juncture, learned counsel for the respondents raises an objection as to maintainability of the writ petitions from which the present appeals arise, on the ground that equally efficacious alternative remedy was available before the Tribunal. 42. A careful scrutiny of the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge reveals that such point of maintainability was never raised before the learned Single Judge by the respondents. As such, it would be unfair on the petitioners/appellants to be saddled with such objection at this belated juncture. 42. A careful scrutiny of the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge reveals that such point of maintainability was never raised before the learned Single Judge by the respondents. As such, it would be unfair on the petitioners/appellants to be saddled with such objection at this belated juncture. Moreover, it is well-settled that availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar provided, of course, the tests of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution are met. 43. However, some laxity may be shown in favour of the respondents- authorities in this regard since there was no opportunity for the respondents to prefer any appeal as the impugned judgement of the learned Single Judge, in any event, went in favour of the respondents. As such, we are of the opinion that the question of maintainability ought to be kept open for being adjudicated by the learned Single Judge on remand. 44. It is to be noted here that the judgments cited by the respondents on the merits of the case have not been adverted to consciously, since neither this Court nor the learned Single Judge while passing the impugned judgment have entered into the merits of the case. Insofar as L. Chandrakumar vs. Union of India and others , reported at (1997) 3 SCC 261 is concerned, since the question of maintainability of the writ petition is being left open to be decided by the learned Single Judge on remand, we desist from expressing any opinion on the same. 45. However, we are convinced in view of the discussions above that the impugned judgment and order dated March 15, 2024 passed in WPA/94/2020, WPA/95/2020, WPA/96/2020 and WPA/97/2020 are bad in law on the grounds as discussed above and are required to be set aside. 46. Accordingly, MAT/14/2024, MAT/15/2024, MAT/16/2024 and MAT/15/2024 are allowed on contest, thereby setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated March 15, 2024 passed in WPA/94/2020, WPA/95/2020, WPA/96/2020 and WPA/97/2020 and remanding the matter to the learned Single Judge having determination with a request to the learned Single Judge to re-adjudicate the matter on the merits of the case subject, of course, to the decision on the maintainability of the writ petitions. 47. 47. It is left open for the respondents to raise the objection as to maintainability of the writ petitions in view of the availability of purportedly equally efficacious alternative remedy before the Tribunal. If raised at the outset after remand, the learned Single Judge shall decide such issue first before proceeding to entertain the writ petitions on merits. 48. However, in view of the impugned judgment and order being set aside, it is made clear that the merits of the respective cases of the petitioners, as to whether they are otherwise eligible for their services being regularized, have not been entered into and are left open for being adjudicated by the learned Single Judge and/or any other appropriate forum having jurisdiction, without being influenced in any manner by the observations made against the appellants in the impugned judgement and order. 49. No order as to costs. 50. Urgent certified server copies, if applied for, be issued to the parties upon compliance of due formalities. I agree. - Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee , J.