JUDGMENT : SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J. 1. The present appeals have been preferred by the Andaman & Nicobar Administration against the common judgement and order dated January 11, 2023 passed in WPA No. 43 of 2019 (Smartspace Infrastructure Private Limited vs. Union of India), WPA No. 56 of 2019 (Jogeshwar Nath Arora vs. The Lieutenant Governor), WPA No. 45 of 2019 ( Girish Arora vs, Lieutenant Governor), WPA No. 6016 of 2020 (Smartspace Infrastructure Private Limited vs. Union of India and others), WPA No. 187 of 2021 (Smartspace Infrastructure Private Limited vs. Union of India and others) and WPA No. 6019 of 2020 (Smartspace Infrastructure Private Limited vs. Union of India and others). 2. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions, holding that the amended sub Clause (2) & (3) of Rule 4 (A) of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules, 1968 published vide Notification dated January 17, 2018 are struck down as ultra vires of Section 40 (2) of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands Land Revenue and Land Reforms Regulations, 1966 as well as of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Simultaneously, the Notification dated January 17, 2018 published by the Andaman & Nicobar Administration was also quashed and the Sub Divisional Officer (SDO) directed to dispose of the respective applications of the writ petitioners in accordance with Section 40 (2) of the 1966 Regulations and the relevant Rules framed thereunder within six weeks from that date. 3. The appellants contend that one of the premises of the impugned judgement and order was that there was no prior publication of the impugned Notification dated January 17, 2018 in terms of Section 210 (1) of the 1966 Regulation. It is argued that 2018 Notification had merely brought in minor alterations to the previous Notification dated July 26, 2017, in respect of the composition of the Land Use Committee (LUC). Since the 2017 Notification was preceded by prior publication, no further prior Notification was necessary for the 2018 amendment. It is argued that thus, lack of prior publication for the 2018 Notification was not fatal to the same. 4. In support of his contention, Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the appellants, cites Municipal Board Maunath Bhanjan vs. M/s Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. It is argued that thus, lack of prior publication for the 2018 Notification was not fatal to the same. 4. In support of his contention, Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the appellants, cites Municipal Board Maunath Bhanjan vs. M/s Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. reported in (1971) 1 SCC 875 where, while deciding on a challenge to a set of draft rules, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court has held that there was no previous publication of the draft rules for the levy of octroi and that only the rates of octroi were published, for which there was breach of the provisions of Sections 134(1)and 300 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 and Section 23 of the General Clauses Act. 5. It was observed that the draft rules were published as required by sub-Section (3) of Section 131 by the Officer in charge of the Board. Moreover it was found from the affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the Board that its Officer in charge wrote to the prescribed Authority on January 9, 1950, that the draft rules had been published in the "Sansar" on November 1, 1949, and may be sanctioned. An objection was also received from a particular Association, and the Commissioner directed that if the Board wanted to make any modification, it may again publish the modified proposals, which was done on February 14, 1950, but as only the rates had been reduced, and the rules had not been modified, it was not necessary to republish the draft rules. 6. The Supreme Court reiterated that the rules were forwarded to the Prescribed Authority on April 26, 1950, and were published in the State Gazette dated July 7, 1950. It was stated in the Notification that the rules were published under Section 300 of the Act, which required their previous publication, but there can be no doubt that it was a Notification under sub- Section (2) of Section 135 as it was issued after receipt of the Board's special resolution in pursuance of the sanction of the Prescribed Authority, and it was directed that the rules shall take effect from July 15, 1950. The Supreme Court held that it was therefore futile to contend that the rules were not made in accordance with the provisions of Sections 134(1) and 300 of the Act and Section 23 of the General Clauses Act which requires certain conditions to be observed in regard to the making of rules after previous publication. 7. Thus, in the said matter that the Supreme Court was of the opinion that by the impugned Notification, only the rates were changed, and as there was previous publication of the substantive draft rules, no further ‘previous’ publication was necessary. In the present case, by similar logic, it is argued that since the 2017 Notification was preceded by prior publication and the 2018 Notification merely brought in certain cosmetic changes, no further prior publication was necessary. 8. It is next argued by the appellants that the amendment proposed by the 2018 Notification intends to control conversion and restrict commercial and private exploitation of revenue land which is scarce in the Islands. It is submitted that due to scarcity of revenue property in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, as most of the Islands are covered by forests, in order to maintain ecological balance and administer properly the limited land resources available in the Islands, the impugned amendments were brought in by the 2018 Notification. Thus, the Notification was in furtherance of the 1966 Regulation and not in derogation thereof. In support of such contention, learned counsel cites several Sections of the 1966 Regulation, including Section 38, 98, 103, 104, 160, 162, 204 and 209, to contend that the scheme of the Regulation is to provide ecological balance and to restrict commercial and private use as well as diversion of agricultural land for other purposes. 9. Hence, it is submitted that the 2018 amendment was well within the rule-making power of the Administration under Section 210 of the 1966 Regulation. 10. It is next argued that by the 2018 amendment, only higher degree of scrutiny by the superior officers, who were a part of the LUC , was provided. 11. It is argued that in terms of the previously prevalent Notification dated May 04, 2011, the concept of LUC had already been brought in. 10. It is next argued that by the 2018 amendment, only higher degree of scrutiny by the superior officers, who were a part of the LUC , was provided. 11. It is argued that in terms of the previously prevalent Notification dated May 04, 2011, the concept of LUC had already been brought in. In the Notification of 2011, it was recorded that Master Plan had not been implemented in the Islands and it was necessary therefore to guard against unplanned development in Port Blair and other towns. The ecological and environmental issues were to be given due importance. Accordingly, it was provided in the 2011 Notification that once the Master Plan is notified, the Sub Divisional Officer (SDO) shall in deciding the applications of diversion in exercise of the powers under Section 40(2) of the 1966 Regulation, be guided by the approved land use prescribed in the Master Plan notified under the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Town and Country Planning Regulation, 1984. 12. For the areas for which land use pattern had not been prescribed by the Master Plan, the SDO was to be guided/advised by the LUC for plot sizes of more than 500 sq. mtrs of land. It is argued that, as such, the said Notification of 2011 provided for the SDO to be guided and advised by the LUC. It is argued that the SDO had no other option but to abide by the advice given by the LUC, since the latter was comprised of officers who were superior to the SDO in hierarchy. Hence, the purported advisory jurisdiction of the LUC was only on paper and the decision of his superior officers who constituted the LUC was virtually binding on the SDO. 13. It is pointed out that a challenge to the vires of the 2011 Notification was turned down in a previous writ petition by a learned Single Judge of this Court and had been upheld in appeal. Even a subsequent challenge preferred against the 2017 Notification met with the dismissal. Hence, it is argued that since the same principle which underlies the 2018 Notification was in contention in the challenges to the 2011 and the 2017 Notifications and was turned down by this Court, the issue has attained finality and cannot be re-agitated by the respondents/writ petitioners. 14. Hence, it is argued that since the same principle which underlies the 2018 Notification was in contention in the challenges to the 2011 and the 2017 Notifications and was turned down by this Court, the issue has attained finality and cannot be re-agitated by the respondents/writ petitioners. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on M.C.Mehta vs. Kamal Nath reported at (1997) 1 SCC 388 where the Supreme Court observed that the forest lands had been given on a lease to a hotel by the State Government although they were situated on the bank of the river Beas. It was recognised that the notion that the public has a right to expect certain lands and natural areas to retain their natural characteristic is finding its way into the law of the land. The need to protect the environment and ecology was sanctioned by the Supreme Court in the said judgment, which, it is argued, is in consonance with the 2018 Notification and the 1966 Regulation itself. 15. On the allegation as to the discrimination, which was one of the other grounds on which the impugned order was passed by the learned Single Judge, the Administration/appellants argues that all the cases cited by the respondents/writ petitioners pertain to lands which were owned in the first place by public authorities. Thus, the policy decision of the Administration behind converting the land for certain exigent purposes could not be cited as being on equal footing as private entities. It is argued that the Administration has the leeway and control to decide the use of revenue land in manners which are deemed fit by the Administration. Thus, private operators cannot claim equal treatment, as they do not stand on equal footing with land belonging to public authorities, over which the Administration has direct control. 16. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents/writ petitioners Mr. Sarkar controverts such arguments and contends that in the absence of any prior publication as envisaged to be mandatory by Section 210 of the 1966 Regulation, the 2018 Regulation stands vitiated. 17. It is argued that the writ petitioners have not challenged the 2017 Notification since the 2018 Notification itself provides that it is in supersession of the previous Notifications including the 2017 Notification. Thus, as on the date of challenge, there was no existence of 2017 Notification. 18. 17. It is argued that the writ petitioners have not challenged the 2017 Notification since the 2018 Notification itself provides that it is in supersession of the previous Notifications including the 2017 Notification. Thus, as on the date of challenge, there was no existence of 2017 Notification. 18. It is argued that the challenge to the 2011 Notification was on an entirely different footing, being on the premise of Section 210 of 1966 Regulation whereas the present challenge is on the basis of Section 40(2) of the 1966 Regulation. Moreover, the 2011 Notification merely confers advisory jurisdiction on the LUC, retaining the power with the SDO under Section 40 of the 1966 Regulation to permit the diversion of land. However, in case of plots of land above 500 sq. mtrs. in area, the impugned Notification of 2018 divests the SDO of such power and vests it in the LUC. Such divesting is directly contrary to the scheme of the 1966 Regulation, which provides a mechanism for such power to be exercised by the SDO under certain parameters. In the present set up, the entire hierarchy is altered by an Executive action beyond the rule-making power conferred by Section 210 read with Section 40(2) of the 1966 Regulation. Thus, the 2018 Regulation transgresses the 1966 Regulation, which is the parent statute, and was thus rightly declared to be ultra vires by the learned Single Judge. 19. It is argued that the decision taken in J.N. Choudhary’s case in respect of the 2011 Notification is not equivalent to a challenge to the 2018 Notification in view of the two challenges standing on entirely differently footing, as discussed above. 20. Insofar as the order of the learned Single Judge turning down the challenge to the 2017 Regulation is concerned, it is pointed out that an appeal was preferred against the same and the appellate court, although holding that the challenge to the 2011 Notification had attained finality, left it open for the 2017 and 2018 Notifications to be assailed. Thus, there is no bar to the present challenge. 21. It is reiterated that prior publication is mandatory under Section 210 and the same could not have been bye-passed by the Administration. Insofar as discrimination is concerned, it is argued by Mr. Thus, there is no bar to the present challenge. 21. It is reiterated that prior publication is mandatory under Section 210 and the same could not have been bye-passed by the Administration. Insofar as discrimination is concerned, it is argued by Mr. Sarkar, learned senior counsel for some of the respondents, that whereas other big hoteliers are being given similar benefits of conversion, the locals and private entities are being deprived of the same. 22. It is further contended that his clients, some of the writ petitioners, had applied for diversion of land as long back as in the year 2010 and a report was given by the Tahsildar in the year 2012. Thus, the entire process was complete and only the grant of permission to divert remained. By virtue of the impugned Notification, retrospective effect has been given, thereby taking away the accrued rights in favour of the said writ petitioners under the new amended provisions. Thus, there has been patent discrimination between private entities and public authorities insofar as grant of permission is concerned. 23. It is pointed out that the LUC took its last decision in the year 2012 when it had expressed its unwillingness to deal with individual cases and had clearly given out that it will not provide any case-to-case advice but would stipulate general guidelines. It is argued that thereafter no meeting of the LUC was convened. Thus, it is evident that the senior officers who comprised the LUC do not have sufficient time at their disposal, being saddled with other business, even to issue any advice in respect of grant of permission for conversion of land as per the 2011 Regulation. Hence, it cannot be accepted that they would be undertaking the exercise on case to case basis under the 2018 amendment if sole authority is vested on the LUC. Thus, the impugned Notification of 2018 is intended to stall the process of conversion and not to facilitate the purpose of the 1966 Regulation. 24. It is further submitted that the LUC has not taken a single decision between the year 2018, when the impugned Notification came into force, and 2024 i.e. till recently. 25. It is further submitted that the purpose of Section 40 of the 1966 Regulation is land revenue assessment and not to restrict any conversion or restore ecological balance. 24. It is further submitted that the LUC has not taken a single decision between the year 2018, when the impugned Notification came into force, and 2024 i.e. till recently. 25. It is further submitted that the purpose of Section 40 of the 1966 Regulation is land revenue assessment and not to restrict any conversion or restore ecological balance. Under Sub-Section (3) and (6) of Section 40, land can be diverted even without permission, in which case a premium has to be paid by the person converting the land. Thus, nothing in Section 40 prevents conversion of land, falsifying the basis of the argument of the Administration that the purpose of the 2018 amendment was to take forward the ecological balance contemplated in Section 40. 26. Ms. Nag, learned counsel appearing for the other writ petitioners/respondents argues that there is distinction between grant of land, which is for a limited period, first for a period of 30 years and thereafter for a further period of 30 years at the most, and licence, which vests the licencee with ownership rights. 27. Under Section 40 of the 1966 Regulation, power has been conferred on the SDO, which has sanction under Section 151(1)(b) of the Regulation. The latter provision stipulates penalty for conversion, thereby lending teeth to Section 40. Thus, a complete set-up has been provided, which has been sought to be obliterated by the 2018 amendment by divesting the SDO of such authority and conferring the same on the LUC, which is alien to the 1966 Regulation. 28. The impugned Notification, thus, supplants and not supplements the 1966 Regulation. 29. In respect of discrimination, it is argued that conversion has been allowed in the garb of licence being given to PPPs (Public Private Partnerships), thereby facilitating the interest of big businesses, depriving local, small businesses and Islanders. 30. It is argued that Rule 4A of the 1968 Rules, which has been amended by the impugned Notification of 2018, in Sub-Rule (2) provides only for grant and in Sub-Rule (3) provides that the ground given for exercise of such power by the SDO. Since the parameters of grant of permission have been provided, there is no need for further scrutiny by superior officers. 31. Since the parameters of grant of permission have been provided, there is no need for further scrutiny by superior officers. 31. Section 210(2)(ii) provides the rule-making power and indicates that the same is regarding assessment of land revenue and not restricting conversion for ecological balance, which is borne out by Regulation 40 as well. 32. Thus, the respondents controvert the arguments of the appellants and pray that the appeals be dismissed. 33. In order to effectively adjudicate the appeals, the following issues fall for consideration : - (i) Whether absence of prior publication vitiates the impugned Notification of 2018; (ii) Whether the issue has attained finality by previous orders passed in different writ petitions and appeals; (iii) Whether the amendment sought to be brought to Rule 4A of the 1968 Rule by the 2018 Notification furthers the scheme of the 1966 Regulation or stultifies the same; (iv) Whether there was any discrimination in the action of the appellant authorities. 34. While adjudicating the above issues, we are to keep in mind that the scope of interference is limited in intra-court appeals, and unless there is a patent perversity or palpable legal or jurisdictional error, normally there is no interference by the Division Bench of the same High Court. 35. With such perspective in the backdrop, we proceed to decide the above issues as follows: Issue (i) - Whether absence of prior publication vitiates the impugned Notification of 2018 36. In Municipal Board vs. Maunath Bhanjan (supra), the Supreme Court was considering a case where draft rules had already been published previously, and only the rates of certain duties were altered. Thus, the substantive body of the Rules had already been previously published. By the Notification impugned therein, certain rates were merely altered upon taking into consideration the objections to the previously published draft rules. 37. As opposed to the said case, here the 2018 Notification itself provides that it is in supersession of previous Notifications, in particular the Notification of 2017. 38. Thus, the prior publication of the 2017 Notification loses meaning, since the Notification itself has been subsumed by the impugned Notification of 2018. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that the prior publication of the 2017 Notification, which was obliterated by the 2018 Notification, can be construed to suffice as prior publication of the impugned Notification dated January 17, 2018. 39. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that the prior publication of the 2017 Notification, which was obliterated by the 2018 Notification, can be construed to suffice as prior publication of the impugned Notification dated January 17, 2018. 39. Thus, the 2018 Notification is bad on such count, being vitiated in the absence of prior publication of the same. This issue is, thus, decided against the appellants. Issue (ii) - Whether the issue has attained finality by previous orders passed in different writ petitions and appeals 40. While considering this question, the previous orders passed by this Court are required to be looked into in appropriate context. By an order dated April 11, 2013 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP No. 573 of 2012 (J. N. Choudhary vs. Lieutenant Governor and others), the Court was considering a challenge to the 2011 Notification. Upon a detailed consideration of the said Notification, it was observed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench sitting in appeal over the same that since the parameters that the SDO had to follow prior to the impugned amendment in considering an application for conversion of land use had, by the various sections under sub-Rule (3) of Rule 4A of the said Rules, already been prescribed, it cannot be contended that merely because the parameters have been altered, the exercise of the authority in such regard is beyond the power conferred under Regulation 210 of the said Regulation. The substitution of the original parameters by a similar set of guidelines as recognized by the Master Plan, it was observed, not only avoids duplication but leads to an element of synergy between the land rules and town and country planning provisions. Accordingly, the challenge to the Notification dated April 19, 2011 was turned down. The substitution of the original parameters by a similar set of guidelines as recognized by the Master Plan, it was observed, not only avoids duplication but leads to an element of synergy between the land rules and town and country planning provisions. Accordingly, the challenge to the Notification dated April 19, 2011 was turned down. The above observations came from the Division Bench which heard the challenge against the order of the learned Single Judge and affirmed the findings of the learned Single Judge that with the passage of time the need to develop a township had failed, which prompted the preparation of a Master Plan and promulgation of the 1994 Regulation for planned development of the Islands and it was only desirable that such exercise should be done in the manner prescribed in the amended Rules; otherwise there would be a possibility of arbitrariness and lack of consistency which would impede a sustainable and planned growth in the Islands. 41. Thus, a scrutiny of the findings of the Division Bench and the learned Single Judge indicates that the alteration of the parameters of the exercise by the SDO was the plinth of the decision. However, it is fruitful to keep in mind that the power of the SDO conferred by Section 40 of the 1966 Regulation have not been divested by the 2011 Notification but it merely provided further parameters for exercise of the same. Thus, it cannot be said, by any stretch of imagination, that the present issue was decided in the said challenge. 42. By a subsequent order dated September 20, 2018 passed in the matter of one of the present petitioners and another person, a learned Single Judge turned down a challenge to the 2017 Notification on the ground that the Court cannot revisit the issue since the same was substantially covered in the case of J. N. Choudhary ( supra ). 43. The appellants place much reliance on the said judgment of the learned Single Judge. 44. 43. The appellants place much reliance on the said judgment of the learned Single Judge. 44. However, the respondents/writ petitioners have rightly relied on the judgment dated February 8, 2019 passed by a Division Bench sitting in appeal over the self-same judgment of the learned Single Judge where, although the challenge to the 2011 Rule was said to have attained finality, the Division Bench observed that the writ petition may survive in respect of Notifications dated July 26, 2017 and August 01, 2017 and kept it open for the petitioner to challenge the legality and validity of the said Notifications. 45. Moreover, it was also observed that the Notification dated May 4, 2011 was to be read in a such manner that although in the third paragraph of the Notification the word ‘shall’ has been used but it is not mandatory but only ‘advisory’ which shall be clear from the words following the word ‘shall’, namely ‘guided and/or advised’. 46. Hence, two things are elicited from the said judgment of the Division Bench – first, that the challenge to the 2017 Notification was left open and secondly, it was clarified that the 2011 Notification merely conferred advisory capacity on the LUC as opposed to converting the LUC to the sole repository of the power to grant or refuse permission for diversion. 47. Hence, not only was the issue of veracity of the 2017 Notification kept open, it was also reiterated that the premise of the turning down of the challenge to the 2011 Notification was that it conferred advisory jurisdiction to the LUC which was not mandatory for the SDO to follow. 48. As such, it is evident that the challenge to the 2017 Notification was never closed by the said judgments. 49. In such scenario, the 2018 Notification subsumes and supersedes the 2017 Notification. Hence, the appellants have entirely misdirected themselves in arguing that the issue is a closed chapter, having attained finality by the previous orders of this Court. 50. Accordingly, this issue is also decided against the appellants. Issue (iii) - Whether the amendment sought to be brought to Rule 4A of the 1968 Rule by the 2018 Notification furthers the scheme of the 1966 Regulation or stultifies the same 51. While considering this issue, a careful scrutiny of Section 40 of the 1966 Regulation is necessary. The said Section is set out below: “40. Issue (iii) - Whether the amendment sought to be brought to Rule 4A of the 1968 Rule by the 2018 Notification furthers the scheme of the 1966 Regulation or stultifies the same 51. While considering this issue, a careful scrutiny of Section 40 of the 1966 Regulation is necessary. The said Section is set out below: “40. (1) The assessment of land revenue on any land shall be made, or shall be deemed to have been made, as the case may be, with reference to the use of land- (a) for the purpose of agriculture; (b) as sites for dwelling houses; (c) for industrial or commercial purposes; (d) for any other purpose. (2) No land assessed for use for any one purpose shall be diverted to any other purpose without the previous permission of the Sub Divisional Officer. (3) Where land assessed for use for any one purpose is diverted to any other purpose, the land revenue payable upon such land shall, notwithstanding that the term for which the assessment may save been fixed has not expired, be liable to be altered and assessed in accordance with the purpose to which it had been diverted. (4) Where any land held free from the payment of land revenue on condition of being used for any purpose is diverted to any other purpose it shall become liable to the payment of land revenue and shall be assessed in accordance with the purpose to which it has been diverted. (5) The assessment made under sub-Section (3) or sub-Section (4) shall be in accordance with the rule made under this Regulation. (6) Where any land used for any purpose is diverted to any other purpose, and land revenue is assessed thereon under the provisions of this Section, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall also have power to impose a premium on the diversion in accordance with the rules made under this Regulation. Provided that no premium shall be imposed for the diversion of any land for charitable purposes”. 52. Sub-Section (2) of Section 40 provides that no land assessed for use for any one purpose shall be diverted to any other purpose without the previous permission of the Sub Divisional Officer, thereby conferring authority exclusively on the SDO to grant or refuse such permission. 52. Sub-Section (2) of Section 40 provides that no land assessed for use for any one purpose shall be diverted to any other purpose without the previous permission of the Sub Divisional Officer, thereby conferring authority exclusively on the SDO to grant or refuse such permission. Section 151 (1) (b) of the 1966 Regulation provides that a tenant shall be liable to be ejected from his holding by an order of the Sub Divisional Officer, inter alia, on the ground that he has used such land for any purpose other than that for which it was given, thereby providing penal sanction behind the power conferred on the SDO under Section 40(2). 53. Hence, it is seen that the authority exercisable by the SDO under Section 40 (2) is absolutely vested in the SDO, calling for the serious repercussion of eviction in the event no such permission is obtained. 54. Rule 4A of the 1968 Rules, which has been sought to be amended by the impugned Notification of 2018, provides that the SDO shall cause an enquiry to be made if a tenant holding land applies for permission to divert the land or part of the land in its holding for any other purposes in Form-A. 55. Sub-Rule (3), in its Sub-clauses, provides the specific grounds on which such application may be rejected. Clauses (a) to (g) thus lay down the entire gamut of grounds for rejection of such application, by necessary implication conferring power on the SDO to grant such permission otherwise. 56. Hence, the 1966 Regulation, read with the Rules framed under the same in 1968, provides a complete ecosystem for deciding such issues by the SDO and also provides in detail the parameters on which such decision of the SDO shall be based. Thus, the argument of the appellants that further scrutiny by higher officials is required is entirely redundant and contrary to the scheme of the 1966 Regulation itself. 57. It is relevant to note that under Sub-Section (3) of Section 40, where land assessed for use for any one purpose is diverted to any other purpose, the land revenue payable upon such land shall, notwithstanding that the term for which the assessment may have been fixed has not expired, be liable to be altered and assessed in accordance with the purpose for which it had been diverted. Such assessment is also provided in Sub-Section (4), both of which sub-Sections would be governed by Sub-Section (5). Under Sub-Section (6) of Section 40, where any land used for any purpose is diverted to any other purpose, over and above the land revenue assessed under the provisions of the Section, an additional power is conferred on the Sub Divisional Officer to impose a premium on the diversion in accordance with the Rules made under the Regulation. 58. However, the impugned Notification of 2018 upsets the entire apple- cart envisaged by the Legislature by divesting the SDO of the authority to grant permission for diversion of land, conferred specifically under Section 40 of the 1966 Regulation. 59. As per the previous position, brought into effect by the Notification dated May 04, 2011, the SDO was merely guided/advised by the LUC, that too, in respect of plot sizes of more than 500 sq. mtrs. of land. By virtue of the impugned Notification dated January 17, 2018, however, the SDO has been relegated to a pawn in the hands of the LUC since under the said amendment, the SDO can only cause an enquiry and, unless he rejects the application for reasons to be recorded in writing, may divert the land up to 500 square mtrs. or forward the application along with the enquiry report and his own recommendation to the LUC. 60. However, in all cases above 500 sq. mtrs., the decision has to be taken “with the approval” of the LUC to be constituted by the Administrator. The power retained by the SDO thus is restricted to land up to 500 sq. mtrs., which is only a miniscule portion of the land in respect of which diversion is sought in the Islands, shifting the power entirely to the LUC for approval of diversion of lands above 500 sq. mtrs., which comprises the lion’s share of the revenue land regarding which diversion is sought. 61. Even in respect of less than 500 sq. mtrs., the SDO has to forward the application along with the enquiry report and his recommendation to the LUC. 62. Thus, what was previously a mere guidance/advise to be provided by the LUC has been converted into an “approval” by the LUC, which is to be mandatorily taken by the SDO, thereby divesting the SDO completely of the authority and power to decide on permission regarding diversion of land. 62. Thus, what was previously a mere guidance/advise to be provided by the LUC has been converted into an “approval” by the LUC, which is to be mandatorily taken by the SDO, thereby divesting the SDO completely of the authority and power to decide on permission regarding diversion of land. 63. Such encroachment on the authority of the SDO is contradictory to the scheme and provisions of the 1966 Regulation. 64. Section 210 of the said Regulation grants rule-making power on the Administration. Under Sub-Section (1) of 210, the Chief Commissioner may, after previous publication, make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Regulation. Sub-Section (2)(ii) contemplates that such rules may provide for the manner of assessment of land revenue under Section 40. 65. Thus, vis-à-vis Section 40, the limited scope of the rule-making power of the Administration is only with regard to the manner of assessment of land revenue and not to grant permission for diversion. 66. That apart, even under Sub-Section (1) of Section 210, the rule- making power is for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Regulation and not to stultify the same. 67. The intended amendment sought to be brought about by the 2018 Notification does not facilitate but frustrates the scheme of Section 40 of the 1966 Regulation. Moreover, the same is grossly beyond the purview of Section 210 (2) (ii), which restricts such power to land assessment and not to grant permission regarding diversion. Thus, said amendment is patently de hors the power conferred by the parent statute i.e. the 1966 Regulation and is thus ultra vires Section 40 as well as Section 210 of the 1966 Regulation. 68. On the other aspect of the matter, taking a pragmatic approach, conferring power to superior officers who are otherwise tasked with several statutory and administrative engagements does not further the scheme of the 1966 Regulation in any manner. The Legislature having reposed faith on the SDO, it is not for the Executive to transgress its rule-making power and divest power from the SDO, contrary to the legislative scheme, on the flimsy pretext that the LUC would be comprised of wiser heads, where the Legislature itself, in its wisdom, has chosen to confer such power on the SDO. 69. The Legislature having reposed faith on the SDO, it is not for the Executive to transgress its rule-making power and divest power from the SDO, contrary to the legislative scheme, on the flimsy pretext that the LUC would be comprised of wiser heads, where the Legislature itself, in its wisdom, has chosen to confer such power on the SDO. 69. Moreover, previous experience, as rightly pointed out by the petitioners/respondents, shows that only one meeting was held in 2012 under the regime of the 2011 Regulation. Thus, even when only advisory power was conferred on the LUC, is shirked its duty by abstaining from deciding issues on a case-to-case basis and framed general broad guidelines which are vague in nature. 70. More importantly, from 2018 till date, after the amendment was brought about by the impugned Notification, not a single meeting has been held by the LUC, thus creating a stalemate in the domain of applications for diversion of land. Hence, experience shows that the 2018 amendment, vesting the entire authority on the LUC by denuding the SDO of the same, would not further the provisions of the 1966 Regulation but would effectively clog the decision-making process and choke the implementation of the Regulation instead of furthering it. 71. The impugned Notification of 2018 shifts the power-center by divesting the statutory authority i.e. the SDO, which is counterproductive to the legislative intent borne out by the 1966 Regulation. 72. The argument that the 2017 amendment has not been challenged is neither here nor there, since the 2018 amendment supersedes the same and the 2017 amendment is no longer in existence. 73. Thus, this issue is decided against the appellants as well. Issue (iv) - Whether there was any discrimination in the action of the appellant authorities 74. On the question of discrimination, it is noticed from the materials on record that the Administration has adopted an oblique method to achieve indirectly what it could not do directly. Several instances have been cited by the respondents/writ petitioner where, in the garb of Public Private Partnerships, valuable revenue-earning agricultural land and plantation land has been handed over to large operators in the fields, thereby disproportionately favouring big business under the pretext of Public Private Partnerships. 75. Several instances have been cited by the respondents/writ petitioner where, in the garb of Public Private Partnerships, valuable revenue-earning agricultural land and plantation land has been handed over to large operators in the fields, thereby disproportionately favouring big business under the pretext of Public Private Partnerships. 75. It has been the common refrain of the appellants in all the matters that the purpose of the 2018 amendment is to further the cause of ecological balance and to properly administer scarce revenue earning land on the Islands. However, the action of the appellants speaks otherwise. Instead of striking an ecological balance, huge chunks of agricultural and plantation lands are being handed over in the name of PPP projects to big businesses, thereby bye-passing the statutory route of seeking diversion under Section 40. 76. Thus, the evident purpose of conferring exclusive power of grant of permission to diver lands on the LUC, comprised of superior officers who are members of the Administration, is clearly to bye-pass the neutrality of the SDO, in the process depriving common citizens, Islanders and small and private businesses from the benefit of having diversion of their lands to properly utilize their properties. 77. The appellants have argued that in the cases where diversion has been allowed in favour of PPPs, the lands belonged to public authorities in the first place and thus stand on a different footing than private lands. However, the said argument does not hold water since such line of discrimination is not valid. In fact, the private individuals are on a better footing inasmuch they are seeking diversion of their own property, over which they have full right, title and interest, as opposed to the land belonging to the public authorities, which is thus public property which is being squandered in favour of the big businesses by converting those indiscriminately by the Administration. If such action on the part of the Administration is not discrimination, this Court fails to understand what is. 78. Moreover, even if conversion is allowed in respect of property belonging to the public authorities, the logic of protecting ecological balance on the premise of M.C. Metha’s case, advanced by the appellant authorities themselves, is defeated. 79. If such action on the part of the Administration is not discrimination, this Court fails to understand what is. 78. Moreover, even if conversion is allowed in respect of property belonging to the public authorities, the logic of protecting ecological balance on the premise of M.C. Metha’s case, advanced by the appellant authorities themselves, is defeated. 79. Hence, the modus operandi of the appellant authorities is palpably discriminatory against private individuals, Islanders and small business and is rather lopsided in favour of big businesses, which cannot be countenanced under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the basic factual premise underlying the 2018 amendment, which divests the SDO’s statutory authority by executive action in favour of the LUC, comprised of members of the Administration, is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 80. In such view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge was perfectly justified in holding the impugned amendment to Rule 4A by virtue of the Notification of 2018 to be ultra vires of Section 40 of the 1966 Regulation as well as the Article 14 of the Constitution of the India. 81. We also find the latter portion of the impugned judgment reasonable, insofar as the SDO has been directed to dispose of the respective applications of the writ petitioners in accordance with Section 40(2) of the 1966 Regulation and the relevant Rules framed thereunder. 82. As such, all the issues are decided against the appellants. Hence, we find no merits in the appeals. 83. Accordingly, MAT/27/2023, MAT/29/2023, MAT/30/2023, MAT/31/2023, MAT/32/2023 and MAT/33/2023 are dismissed on contest, thereby affirming the impugned composite judgment of the learned Single Judge passed in WPA No. 43 of 2019, WPA No. 56 of 2019, WPA No. 45 of 2019, WPA No. 6016 of 2020, WPA No. 187 of 2021 and WPA No. 6019 of 2020. 84. Since the matter was sub judice in this Court so long, the time granted by the learned Single Judge to the SDO to dispose of the respective applications of the writ petitioners is extended for a further period of six weeks from date. 85. CAN/2/2023 in MAT/27/2023, CAN/2/2023 in MAT/29/2023, CAN/2/2023 in MAT/30/2023, CAN/2/2023 in MAT/31/2023, CAN/2/2023 in MAT/32/2023 and CAN/2/2023 in MAT/33/2023 are also disposed of accordingly in the light of the above observations. 86. No order as to costs. 87. 85. CAN/2/2023 in MAT/27/2023, CAN/2/2023 in MAT/29/2023, CAN/2/2023 in MAT/30/2023, CAN/2/2023 in MAT/31/2023, CAN/2/2023 in MAT/32/2023 and CAN/2/2023 in MAT/33/2023 are also disposed of accordingly in the light of the above observations. 86. No order as to costs. 87. Urgent certified server copies, if applied for, be issued to the parties upon compliance of due formalities. I agree. - Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee , J.