JUDGMENT : SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J. 1. In the present Public Interest Litigations, the petitioners have challenged the vires of Section 28 of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Excise Regulation, 2012 as well as a Notification published thereunder dated April 26, 2022 bearing No.49/2022/F.No./1-55/Excise/2016. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners argue that Section 28 of the 2012 Regulation corresponds verbatim with Section 31A of the previous Regulation of 1876. Section 31A, however, was struck down by holding the same to be ultra vires by the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Harinarayan Arora vs. Union of India reported at (1995) 1 ILR (Cal) 67. 3. It is argued that as such, Section 28, in the absence of any alteration from the language of the Section 31A of 1876 Regulation, ought also to be struck down by the same logic. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners next argue that Section 91 of 2012 Regulation confers power on the Administration to make Rules. Sub-Section (1)(k) thereof confers such powers regarding the manner of collection of duties of excise under sub-section (J), the terms and conditions for collection of fee for issue of licence or permit under sub-section (2) and the manner of assessment of the import, export and transport duties under sub-section (3) of Section 28. It is argued that, thus, in the absence of any Rules having been framed under Section 28 read with Section 91 of the 2012 Notification, the Administration cannot give effect to Section 28 merely by issuing a Notification. As such, the impugned Notification dated April 26, 2022 is also vitiated and ought to be struck down. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners next argue that by virtue of Section 96 of the 2012 Regulation, the legislative mandate of framing Rules for giving effect to the provisions 2012 Regulations has been recognised. Since Section 96 contemplates a transitory scheme, it is evident that unless the Administration frames Rules under the 2012 Regulations, the provisions of the Regulation cannot be given effect to. 6. That apart, since the previous Rules were framed under Section 31A of the 1876 Regulation, which was struck down by this court, the said Rules are also vitiated, being without any valid source. 6. That apart, since the previous Rules were framed under Section 31A of the 1876 Regulation, which was struck down by this court, the said Rules are also vitiated, being without any valid source. Hence, the endeavour of the Administration to continue with the previous Rules instead of framing new Rules under the 2012 Regulation is itself suspect and it cannot be construed that the previous Rules would suffice to give effect to the provisions of 2012 Regulations, in the absence of new Rules under the said Regulation. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners rely on the various paragraphs of the Division Bench judgment in Harinarayan Arora (supra) in support of their contentions. 8. Learned counsel also cite the judgment of the Supreme Court in a challenge preferred against the said order of the Division Bench, reported at AIR 1999 SC 696 where the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Division Bench. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents/Administration argues that it will be evident from the Division Bench judgment, which was affirmed up to the Supreme Court, that the grounds on which Section 31A was declared ultra vires was the lack of any Notification under the said Section and absence of any assessment procedure or machinery. 10. Learned counsel takes the Court through the comparative provisions of the 1876 and 2012 Regulations and argues that such lacuna has been removed in the 2012 Regulations by introducing a complete machinery for assessment. 11. The impugned Notification, it is argued, provides a scientific calculation of excise duties by providing corresponding slabs for such assessment. As such, nothing further was required to be done to rectify the lacunae in the previous statute. 12. In view of such rectification, there is no impediment in law to give effect to Section 28, read with the Notification framed under the 2012 Regulations. 13. It is argued that the specific factors and logic of imposing particular rates of excise duty falls within the Legislative domain and the basis of such rates is a matter of policy decision of the Administration. It is submitted that the Administration has formulated such policy decisions which are already in place. 14. It is next argued by the Administration that the framing of Rules under the 2012 Regulation is not mandatory. Section 91 merely confers power on the Administration to frame such Rules. It is submitted that the Administration has formulated such policy decisions which are already in place. 14. It is next argued by the Administration that the framing of Rules under the 2012 Regulation is not mandatory. Section 91 merely confers power on the Administration to frame such Rules. As such, there is no compulsion on the Administration to frame Rules and the 2012 Regulations, read with the impugned Notification, are self-sufficient for being implemented. 15. Moreover, it is argued that the petitioners cannot seek a mandamus to be issued against the Administration directing it to frame Rules. 16. Learned counsel for the Administration also contends that the previous Rules can very well operate within the current frame-work of law as brought about by 2012 Regulation. Section 96, it is contended, does not include a mandate on the Administration to frame Rules within any specific period. 17. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that a perusal of the Division Bench judgment relied on by the parties in the matter of Harinarayan Arora (supra) in proper perspective is essential for a complete adjudication of the present lis. 18. It is seen from paragraph 11 of the said judgment that learned counsel for the writ petitioners therein had submitted that the respondent authorities could not make any levy and collect excise duty on the strength of Section 31A of the Regulation unless a Notification as mentioned in the said Section is issued fixing the rates of excise duty within the ceiling limit prescribed in the Schedule appended thereto. It was contended that Section 31A is an enabling provision which empowers the authority concerned to levy excise duty by a separate Notification and unless such Notification is issued, the authorities cannot collect any excise duty. 19. In paragraph 12 of its judgment, the Division Bench observed that no Notification as required under section 31A had so far been issued and on a plain reading of the said section, it appeared that until and unless a Notification was issued prescribing the rates at which the excise duty was to be realised, no excise duty could be levied or collected. The rates appended to the Schedule of the section, it was held, were only the ceiling limits of tax that can be levied in respect of items mentioned therein. The rates appended to the Schedule of the section, it was held, were only the ceiling limits of tax that can be levied in respect of items mentioned therein. The Schedule circumscribed the authority of the Executive to fix the rates of tax on individual items, and in no case levying or realizing at the maximum rate without issuing any Notification fixing the rates was contemplated by the Legislature, i.e. the President of India, it was observed. 20. It was also submitted by the petitioners therein that Section 31A does not prescribe any assessment procedure nor machinery nor does it contain any provision for appeal against such assessment. The Division Bench observed that it appeared that neither any assessment procedure was laid down nor the provisions contained any provision for appeal in case of dissatisfaction as to the assessment made and there was no assessment machinery prescribed in the Regulation and accordingly, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court mentioned therein, Section 31A Regulation was to be treated as ultra vires. 21. In the light of the above, Section 31A of the 1984 Regulation was declared to be ultra vires to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 22. In its judgment affirming the said decision of the Division Bench, the Supreme Court observed that subsequent to insertion of Section 31A, no notification had been issued by the Administrator in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Gazette, specifying the levy of special duty. It was further recorded by the Division Bench that since issuance of notification issued by the Administration is a pre-condition for making any levy under the said provision and the said pre-condition had not been satisfied, counsel for the Administration did not pursue the argument that the levy in question can be held to be a valid levy as special duty contemplated under the impugned provision. 23. Thus, the basis of holding Section 31A to be ultra vires was two-fold:- (i) The section did not provide any assessment procedure and machinery, and (ii) That there was no provision for appeal against assessment orders. 24. It is important to mention herein that the 1876 Regulation did not otherwise contain any provision regarding assessment of machinery or procedure whatsoever and/or any provision for appeal against the assessment orders. 24. It is important to mention herein that the 1876 Regulation did not otherwise contain any provision regarding assessment of machinery or procedure whatsoever and/or any provision for appeal against the assessment orders. It was only Section 31A, which was inserted by the 1984 amendment, whereby an isolated provision regarding such assessment was introduced. 25. Thus, the Division Bench as well as the Supreme Court were fully justified in striking down Section 31A on such ground. 26. The other ground of such striking down was, as held by the Division Bench clearly, that no notification had been issued in terms of Section 31A fixing the rates of excise duty. 27. Let us now consider whether the said maladies have since been removed by the present legislation. Section 27 under Chapter IV of the 2012 Regulation deals with Excise Revenue and provides for four heads of Excise Revenue. Sub-section (a) envisages “duty”. 28. Section 28 of the same is set out herein below: “28. Excise Duty – (1) There shall be levied and collected in the manner provided by the Regulation and the rules thereunder and such rates, not exceeding the rates set forth in the Schedule , as the Administrator may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify, a duty of excise or a countervailing duty or a special duty, as the case may be, on all liquor of the descriptions specified in the Schedule, being liquor manufactured or produced in, or brought into, the territory and such duty shall be payable by the person manufacturing or producing or importing such liquor. Provided that no such duty shall be levied on toddy when used for the manufacture of jaggery, vinegar, yeast, neera or when drunk as such. Explanation.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that in any notification issued under the section, it shall not be necessary to specify separately the rate of countervailing duty or special duty and, Unless otherwise provided in such notification expressly, any rate specified in such notification as the rate of excise duty in respect of any description of liquor shall be deemed to be also the rate of countervailing duty or s special duty, as the case may be, in respect of such description of liquor. (2) There shall be levied and collected fee for issue of licence or permit subject of such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. (2) There shall be levied and collected fee for issue of licence or permit subject of such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. (3) There shall be levied and collected the import, export or transport duties assessed in such manner as may be prescribed. 29. Section 29 of the 2012 Regulation provides for recovery of duty and levies on the property of defaulters and broadly provides the modalities of recovery of excise duty and other fees, taxes and fines payable to the Administration under the 2012 Regulation from persons liable to pay the same or from their sureties or agents as if they were arrears of land revenue. The said Section provides in detail the methodology of recovery of excise duty, including the procedure for show cause, incorporating, thus, the principle of audi alteram partem. 30. Such provisions of notice and show cause clearly imply that Section 29 provides a self-sufficient mechanism in itself for the recovery of the assessment dues. Section 30, on the other hand, envisages interest payable for failure to pay excise revenue and Section 31 confers the power to reduce or waive interest in certain cases on the Excise Commissioner. 31. Section 2, sub-sections (19) and (20) respectively enumerate the definitions of Excise Commissioner and Excise Officers. 32. Chapter II contemplates Establishment and Control. Sections 3 to 11 under the said Chapter provide for the appointment of Excise Commissioner, the powers and functions of the said authority as well as provisions regarding the excise administration as a whole and ancillary powers. Thus, read together, chapters II and IV constitute a complete code in themselves, providing sufficiently for the machinery and procedure of assessment and recovery. 33. Insofar as the basis of the rates of assessment and/or the factors which lead to such fixation of rates are concerned, the same falls squarely within the revenue domain of the legislature. It is well-settled that the policy decisions of the legislature in statues and delegated pieces of legislation are not readily scrutinized by Courts, since such policy decisions may be prompted by several considerations which fall within the legislative competence of the Legislature. 34. It is well-settled that the policy decisions of the legislature in statues and delegated pieces of legislation are not readily scrutinized by Courts, since such policy decisions may be prompted by several considerations which fall within the legislative competence of the Legislature. 34. In deference to the cardinal principle of Separation of Powers inbuilt in the Constitutional scheme of the country, Courts of law normally do not enter into a scrutiny of the exact factors or bases and/or other inputs which go into the fixation of the rates of taxes and duties. 35. What is evident from the impugned Notification dated April 26, 2022 is that the same provides a scientific basis for levy of excise duty. The Schedule given in the Notification provides clear and separate slabs unambiguously for different categories of liquor. For IMFL, for example, different and distinct price slabs have been fixed for assessing the excise duty on the basis of the last selling price. For wine, beer and RTD on the other hand, general percentages have been fixed. 36. It is well within the domain of the Legislature to have a play in the joints as to policy decisions regarding taxation. Thus, since proper mechanism and procedure as well as machinery have been provided for assessment of excise duty in the Notification read with the 2012 Regulation, the first ground on which Section 31A of the 1876 regulation (as amended in 1984) goes. 37. Insofar as the second ground is concerned, there was no Notification at all issued under Section 31A, which prompted the Division Bench to hold that Section 31A could not be implemented at all and was unworkable. 38. However, in view of the specific slabs and rates being provided for excise duty in the Notification dated April 26, 2022 and the previous Notifications of 2014 and 2015 published under Section 28 of the 2012 Regulation, such lacuna has been taken care of completely. 39. As regards the argument of the petitioners that the previous Rules cannot work as a basis of levy of excise duty under the new Regulation, the said argument cannot be accepted as well. 39. As regards the argument of the petitioners that the previous Rules cannot work as a basis of levy of excise duty under the new Regulation, the said argument cannot be accepted as well. A scrutiny of the provisions of Section 28 of the 2012 Regulation, read in conjunction with the impugned Notification of 2022, clearly shows that the Rules can very well operate within the current framework and ecosystem brought about by the 2012 Regulation and the Notifications issued thereunder from time to time. There is no contradiction in such working. Hence, it cannot be said that the previous Rules are unworkable in the present scenario. 40. The argument that since Section 31A was declared ultra vires, the Rules framed thereunder should automatically go, cannot also be accepted for the simple reason that the grounds on which Section 31A was struck down have now been cured and as such, the validity of the premise of the Rules framed thereunder is no longer in issue. 41. The next question which comes up is whether the previous Rules framed under the 1876 Regulation (as amended in 1984) can continue to be valid till new Rules are framed under the 2012 Regulation. 42. Section 2 (47) of the 2012 Regulations defines “prescribed” to mean prescribed by Rules made by the Administration under the 2012 Regulation. 43. Section 96 of the 2012 Regulation provides that notwithstanding the repeal of Section 31A of the 1876 Regulation, all Rules, Notifications and Orders made or issued thereunder shall continue to be in force and operate till new Rules, Orders and Notifications are made or issued under the present Regulation. 44. If we juxtapose the language of Section 2 (47), which envisages Rules being prescribed “under this Regulation”, with the language of Section 96 which provides that the previous Rules, Notifications etc. “shall continue to be in force and operate till new Rules, etc. are made or issued under this Regulation”, it is found that the expression “under this Regulation” in Section 2 (47) could be read as equivalent to the previous Rules which have been continued in force and prescribed to operate till the new Rules are framed. “shall continue to be in force and operate till new Rules, etc. are made or issued under this Regulation”, it is found that the expression “under this Regulation” in Section 2 (47) could be read as equivalent to the previous Rules which have been continued in force and prescribed to operate till the new Rules are framed. Hence, till the new Rules are framed, the old Rules have been given the transitory status of Rules framed under the current Regulation, which is quite a valid legal fiction designed to ensure that there is no unnecessary vacuum in the field of collection of excise duty under the new Regulation. 45. Hence, it cannot be said that in the absence of new Rules framed under the 2012 Regulation, the provisions of the 2012 Regulation cannot be given effect to, particularly in view of the Notification of 2012 and the previous Notifications under the 2012 Regulation having clearly provided the rates for assessment of excise duty. 46. It is beyond the judicial domain to direct the Legislature, by issuing a Rule of Mandamus, to frame a Rules where there is no such mandate provided in the law itself. The law as embodied in Section 91 of 2012 Regulation merely confers power on the Administration, by notification, to make Rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Regulation for carrying out the purposes of the Regulation. 47. The clauses under sub-Section (2) of section 91 provide the broad contours of exercise of such rule-making power and the specific fields in which such Rules shall be framed. Sub-Section (k) contemplates collection of duties of excise. The expression “manner of assessment” used in the said sub-Section, however, pertains not to excise duty but to import, export and transport duties, which are not the subject-matters of the present challenge. Thus, the over-reliance of the petitioners on the said expression does not have a germane bearing in the context of excise duty. 48. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that in view of the issuance of the impugned Notification of 2022 as well as the previous Notifications under the 2012 Regulation, the Schedule under Section 28 has been fleshed out by providing body to the same, introducing specific slabs and rates of excise duty for different liquor products within the ceiling limits outlined in the Schedule of the 2012 Regulation. 49. 49. The only other ground on which Section 31A of the 1876 Regulation (as amended in 1984) was held to be ultra vires by the Division Bench was that there was no provision for appeal. 50. Such flaw has been taken care of elaborately under chapter VII of the 2012 Regulation, which provides for appeal and revision. Sections 76 to 83 under the said Chapter provide a full plethora of mechanisms as well as designate the particular authorities regarding appeal and revision by any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under the Regulation by an Excise Officer or a Deputy Commissioner. Hence, sufficient care has been taken to provide a full-fledged ecology of challenge for aggrieved persons, including forums and the modalities of preferring of such appeal and/or revision, apart from the source of the right to prefer such appeal or revision itself, in the aforesaid provisions of the 2012 Regulation. Hence, the second ground on which Section 31A of the previous Regulation was struck down has been fully removed by the new piece of legislation and the Notifications brought thereunder from time to time. 51. In such view of the matter, we do not find any reason to hold that the impugned provision, that is, Section 28 of the 2012 Regulation and/or the impugned Notification dated April 26, 2022 issued thereunder suffer from any drawback. As such, both Section 28 and the impugned Notification are declared to be intra vires the Constitution and the law. 52. In such view of the matter, the present writ petitions fail. Accordingly, WPA(P)/3/2024 and WPA(P)/4/2024 are hereby dismissed on contest, without, however, no order as to costs. 53. Urgent certified server copies, if applied for, be issued to the parties upon compliance of due formalities. I agree. - Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee , J.