Judgment : Arindam Mukherjee, J. 1. The appeal arises out of an order dated 9th August, 2024 passed in WPA/68/2024 where the appellant, an employee under Jawaharlal Nehru Rajkeeya Mahavidyala, (in short ‘JNRM’ as the writ petitioner, has sought for relief in respect of his service related benefits. 2. Admittedly, an employee of JNRM is a person holding a civil Port under the Union. 3. The learned Single Judge had disposed of the writ petition in view of the provision of Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 and relying upon the Judgment of L.Chandrakumar vs. Union of India reported in 1997(3) SCC 261 held that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to receive, by and determine the writ petition and thereafter granting leave to the petitioner to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal. 4. The appellant has challenged the said order on the ground that alternative remedy being not an absolute bar for entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ petition ought to have been decided on merits. 5. The appellant has also submitted that, if a writ petition has been entertained and directions for affidavits have been given, the Court should, instead of relegating the petitioner to the alternative forum, decide the writ petition on merits. 6. The appellant has cited two judgments – one delivered by the Allahabad High Court in WRIT-C.No.26239 of 2020 on 15th September, 2023 and a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1331 (State of U.P. Vs. Ehsan and another) in support of his contentions as aforesaid. Although, these two judgments should be present presumed to have not been cited before the learned Single Judge as they do not find place in impugned order, yet for the ends of justice and as they relate to a point of law we do consider the same. 7. After hearing the parties and considering the judgments cited at the bar, we are unable to accept the contention of the appellant and also do not find any scope to interfere with the judgment and order impugned for the following reasons. 7. After hearing the parties and considering the judgments cited at the bar, we are unable to accept the contention of the appellant and also do not find any scope to interfere with the judgment and order impugned for the following reasons. (i) The ordinary forum in case of the disputes relating to service related issues of a person holding a civil post under the Union or State in view of the provisions of Section 14 and 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 read with the provision of Section 28 and 3(q) of the said Act is the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the said Act. This position has been clarified in L.Chandrakumar (supra) by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. (ii) In the instant case, the petitioner is admittedly holding a civil post under the Union. The ordinary forum is, therefor, the Central Administrative Tribunal for the petitioner to ventilate his grievance in respect of his service related claims. (iii) The jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal again fell for consideration in All India Institute of Medical Sciences vs. Sanjiv Chaturvedi reported in 2020(17) SCC 602 : AIR 2019 SC 2971 where the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after considering L.Chandrakumar (Supra) has held that an Administrative Tribunal is even competent to here the issues relating to constitutional validity of any statute except the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 uner which it has been constituted. (iv) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Roger Methew vs. SouthIndian Bank Limited reported in 202(6) SCC 1 and 2023 (4) SCR 18 M/s South Indian Bank Ltd & Ors. vs. Naveen Mathew Philip and another has again clarified that the jurisdictional High Court can entertain a writ petition when the Tribunal is in operative or has not been constituted. At the present the Central Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench is functional. So writ petition in such a case cannot be entertained by this Court. (v) There is no dispute as to the proposition that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition. However, a writ petition can be entertained where the same is (a) for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (b) where there has been a violation of principles of natural justice; (c) where the order under challenge is wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of the statute is under challenge. However, a writ petition can be entertained where the same is (a) for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (b) where there has been a violation of principles of natural justice; (c) where the order under challenge is wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of the statute is under challenge. This proposition as held in AIR 1969 SC 556 (Baburam Praksh Chandra Maheshwari vs. Antarim Zilla Parishad). The same view has been reiterated in State of U.P. vs. Eshan (supra) with an additional ground that the parties should not be relegated to avail the alternative remedy when the writ petition has been admitted and directions for affidavit has been given. (vi) The issue of alternative statutory remedy whether is a bar in entertaining a writ petition fell for consideration in 2011 (14) SCC 337 (Nivedita Sharama vs. Cellular Operators Association of India & Others), the Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering Baburam Prakash Chandra (supra) and Thansingh Nathmal Vs. A.Mazid Superintendent of Taxes reported in AIR 1964 SC 1419 has held that “the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contain a mechanism for redressal of grievances still holds the field.” (vii) The view expressed in Thansingh Nathmal (supra) Baburam Prakash Chandra (supra) and Nivedita Sharma (supra) has been approved in 2020 (19) SCC 681 (Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinda and others Vs. M/s Glaxo Smith Kline Consume Health Care Limited ). In paragraph 14 of the said judgment, it has been held -“As regards the power of the High Court to issue directions, orders or writs in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the same is no more res integra. Even though the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order or direction passed/action taken by the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, it ought not to do so as a matter of course when the aggrieved person could have availed of an effective alternative remedy in the manner prescribed by law (see Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari vs. Antarim Zila Parishad , and also Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of India & Ors. In Thansingh Nathmal & Ors. vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri & Ors. In Thansingh Nathmal & Ors. vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri & Ors. the Constitution Bench of this Court made it amply clear that although the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is very wide, the Court must exercise self-- imposed restraint and not entertain the writ petition, if an alternative effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person. In paragraph 7, the Court observed thus (Thansingh nathma, case, AIRp.1423): “7. Against the order of the Commissioner an order for reference could have been claimed if the appellants satisfied the Commissioner or the High Court that a question of law arose out of the order. But the procedure provided by the Act to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court was bypassed, the appellants moved the High Court challenging the competence of the Provincial Legislature to extend the concept of sale, and invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and sought to reopen the decision of the Taxing Authorities on question of fact. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self imposed limitations. Resort that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.” (viii) In the instant case the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1955 provides for an effective alternative remedy as the appellate holds a civil post under the Union. The claims made in the petition by the appellant as the petitioner therein does not come within any of the exceptions curved at in Baburam Prakash Chandra (supra) as reiterated in State of U.P. vs. Ehsan(supr). In view of the ratio laid down in Nivedita Sharma (supra) w are unable to accept argument of the appellant that the writ petition had been entertained and directions for affidavit were given as State of U.P. vs. Ehsan (supra) has been delivered not in the context of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 but in a general perspective. Moreover, the Administrative Tribunal has the authority to go into the disputed questions of fact which has been arisen in the instant case in view of appellant’s assertion as to the claim and denial thereof by the respondents while the scope of the writ court in going in the factual issues is very limited. 8. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, however, without any order as to costs. 9. The leave granted by the learned Single Judge to the petitioner to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Act, 1985, is retained and the time period spent from date of filing of the writ petition till today (30.08.2024) shall be construed as the time spent in prosecuting a litigation bonafide before a court without jurisdiction. 10. Urgent certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of usual formalities. I agree. Biswaroop Chowdhury, J.