JUDGMENT : ARINDAM MUKHERJEE, J. This judicial review arises out of an order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, at Port Blair (in short ‘CAT’) on 24 th July, 2024 in OA No.351/1214/2023 by which the said Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s said original application. I. FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE PETITIONER, IN BRIEF, IS AS FOLLOWS: a) The petitioner worked as a Daily Rated Mazdoor (in short “DRM”) in Andaman Public Works Department (in short “APWD”) between 1988 and 1997. There were several other DRMs working in the APWED during such period. b) On 23 rd November, 1994, the Chief Engineer, APWD, by a memo addressed to the Assistant Labour Commissioner (HQ), Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Port Blair accorded the approval for sanction of regular post of Work Charged Belder (in short “W.C.Belder) a temporary status to nine DRMs as indicated in the said letter. There were seven other DRMs who were not given such temporary status as they did not complete 240 days in a 12 calendar months. c) The petitioner says that the petitioner belongs to the second category of seven persons but his name was not included in the said memo dated 23 rd November, 1994 due to the reason unknown to the petitioner, although many of them included therein were juniors to the petitioner. d) By an Office Order dated 1st December, 1994 bearing No.1238, the terms and conditions of the DRMs on being given temporary status against approved post which included the said nine persons were stipulated. It will appear from the clauses contained therein (i) that their pay scale was fixed at Rs.750-12-870-EB-14-940 and would also draw the DA, HRA and CCA. The benefits of increment at the same rate to a Group ‘D’ employee was also to be taken into account for calculation of pro-rata rates of every one year service subject to performance of duties of at least 240 days (206 days in administrative office observing 5 days week, in the year from the conferment of temporary status. (ii) The leave entitled was to be at a pro-rate rate at the rate of one day of every 10 days of work. Casual or any account of leave except maternity leave will not be admissible. (iii) They were to also carry forward at their credit any leave on being regularized. (ii) The leave entitled was to be at a pro-rate rate at the rate of one day of every 10 days of work. Casual or any account of leave except maternity leave will not be admissible. (iii) They were to also carry forward at their credit any leave on being regularized. They were also not permitted to encash the leave on termination for any reasons or on quitting their service. (iv) It was also stated that 50% of the service rendered under temporary status would be counted for the purpose of retirement benefit after their regularisation. (v) The said DRMs with temporary status, after rendering three years of continuous service, on conferment of temporary status, will be treated at par with the temporary Group ‘D’ employees for the purpose of contribution to the General Provident Fund (in short ‘GPF’) and also further eligible for a grant of festival advance/flood advance on the same condition as applicable to the temporary Group –D employees. (vi) Until regularization, the DRMs with temporary status would be entitled to productivity bonus/adhoc bonus only at the rate applicable to DRM. (vii) Despite conferment of temporary status, the service of such DRMs shall be eligible to be dispensed with by giving a notice of one month in writing. The DRM with temporary status were also permitted to quit service by giving a written notice of one month. The wages for the notice period will be payable for the days for such DRMs are engaged. (viii) No benefits other than those specified in the said order will be admissible to a DRM with temporary status. e) In response to the representation made by General Secretary, Independent APWD Workers Union, the department forwarded the number of days worked in 12 calendar months by the 7 DRMs, who were not conferred with the temporary status the office memo dated 23 rd November, 1994. f) It was found that the said 7 DRMs completed 240 days in 12 calendar months and were given the temporary status with effect from 01.01.1994 by an office order dated 28 th April, 1995 being No.392. g) The petitioner says that this fact was not known to the petitioner although, he was service as a DRM in APWD. f) It was found that the said 7 DRMs completed 240 days in 12 calendar months and were given the temporary status with effect from 01.01.1994 by an office order dated 28 th April, 1995 being No.392. g) The petitioner says that this fact was not known to the petitioner although, he was service as a DRM in APWD. In 1998, the petitioner finding that he was not given the temporary status or his service was not regularized in APWD went to serve the Port Blair Municipal Council between 10th November 1998 and 20th July, 2014 as a DRM. h) Prior to the end of his tenure with the APWD as DRM in 1997, the General Secretary, Independent APWD Workers Union by two representations respectively dated 10 th January, 1995 and 13 th March, 1995 had ventilated the grievances of the DRMs who were not given the temporary status. i) The petitioner, on 15 th March, 2002 (which is, however, not available with the records) and 26 th March, 2002 requested the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, APWD, Andaman and Nicobar Administration, Port Blair to give him temporary status as a DRM. j) On the basis of the petitioner’s representation, the Chief Engineer, APWD, Andaman and Nicobar Administration by a memo dated 25 th September, 2002 directed the Executive Engineer, Port Blair South Division, APWD, Port Blair to furnish a detailed report to the extent whether the request of the petitioner is covered under the terms and conditions issued by the Government of India, vide Office Memorandum No.40011/4/2001-Estt(C) dated 12 th April, 2002. k) As the petitioner’s representation was not looked into, though there was request from the Member of Parliament in 2003 for looking into the petitioner’s case, the petitioner made a further representation on 1 st November, 2011 to the Labour Commissioner, Andaman and Nicobar Administration, Port Blair. Pursuant to such letter, the Assistant Labour Commissioner, decided to hold a conciliation meeting on 13th May, 2014. l) By a letter dated 5 th June, 2014, the Executive Engineer, Port Blair South Division, APWD, Port Blair requested the Chief Engineer, APWD, Port Blair, by forwarding the letter of the Assistant Labour Commissioner dated 30th June, 2014 along with the minutes of the conciliation meeting held on 13 th March, 2014 to take necessary action. l) By a letter dated 5 th June, 2014, the Executive Engineer, Port Blair South Division, APWD, Port Blair requested the Chief Engineer, APWD, Port Blair, by forwarding the letter of the Assistant Labour Commissioner dated 30th June, 2014 along with the minutes of the conciliation meeting held on 13 th March, 2014 to take necessary action. m) Subsequent thereto, an office order No.374 dated 21 st July, 2014 was passed to give appointment to the petitioner in the post of W.C.Belder for regular appointment with immediate effect in the scale of pay of Rs.5200-20200 under Sub-Division-II of PBSD,APWD, Port Blair. The terms and conditions of such appointment were also provided in the said letter one of which being clause 14 thereof clearly stated that the petitioner will not claim any financial or service benefit for the previous period. n) The petitioner ultimately joined the service in the regular post of W.C.Belder on 5 th September, 2014 and was put in to a probation period of two years. o) After completion of the probation period, the petitioner has been given permanent appointment. The petitioner now claims the benefits of his past service as DRM like the other sixteen DRMs mentioned in the memo dated 23rd November, 1994 by making representations dated 29 th August, 2016 and 14 th October, 2016. p) By an order dated 6 th March, 2017, the Executive Engineer refused to grant the petitioner the benefits of his past service. q) Challenging the said order dated 6th March, 2017, the petitioner filed an Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench at Port Blair. The said Original Application, being OA No.35/00455/2017 was disposed of by an order dated 21 st February, 2023 directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for grant of backlog financial and service benefits, as granted to other 16 DRMs , after regularization by taking to consideration his long service in the department, if permissible as per the extant rules within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order and to communicate the decision to the petitioner forthwith. r) Pursuant to the said order, the Executive Engineer, PBSD, APWD, by an order dated 16th August, 2023, turned down the petitioner’s request to grant of backlog financial and service benefits as granted to other 16 DRMs, after conferring them temporary status. r) Pursuant to the said order, the Executive Engineer, PBSD, APWD, by an order dated 16th August, 2023, turned down the petitioner’s request to grant of backlog financial and service benefits as granted to other 16 DRMs, after conferring them temporary status. s) Aggrieved by such order, the petitioner had filed another Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, Circuit Bench at Port Blair, being OA No.351/1214/2023. The said Original Application was dismissed by an order dated 14 th July, 2024, being the subject matter of such challenge in this writ petition. II. ARGUMENTS OF THE PETITIONER: a) On the basis of the facts as stated herein above, the petitioner says that the tribunal erred in rejecting his application on the ground of delay. The petitioner says that on 5th September, 2014, the petitioner was given the permanent appointment as W.C.Belder and was put into a probation period of two years. The probation period therefore ended in 2016 and immediately thereafter the petitioner made a representation for giving him the financial and service benefits for his past service. b) The petitioner’s prayer was rejected by the Executive Engineer on 6 th March, 2017. The petitioner, in 2017, approached the Central Administrative Tribunal by filing the original application being OA No.315/00455/2017. This application was disposed of by an order dated 21 st February, 2023 by directing the respondent to consider the petitioner’s case for grant of backlog financial and service benefits as granted to other 16 DRMs after regularisation by taking into consideration the long service in the department, if permissible as per the extant rules within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order and to communicate the decision to the petitioner forthwith. c) The Executive Engineer, thereafter, by an order dated 16.08.2023 turned down the petitioner’s request after considering the same in terms of the order of the Tribunal dated 21 st February 2023. The petitioner then challenged the said order by filing another original application being OA/351/1214/2023. The said O.A was dismissed by the CAT by an order dated 14.07.2024.which has been assailed in this writ petition. There is as such no delay or laches on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner cannot be held responsible for the original application filed in 2017 on being disposed of in 2023. The said O.A was dismissed by the CAT by an order dated 14.07.2024.which has been assailed in this writ petition. There is as such no delay or laches on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner cannot be held responsible for the original application filed in 2017 on being disposed of in 2023. d) The delay, if any, between 2014 and 2017 was taken into consideration by the Tribunal while passing the order dated 21.02.2023. The respondents did not assail the order dated 21.02.2023 but accepted the same and acted in terms thereof. Thus, there is no delay in the matter as has been held by the Tribunal in the order impugned. That being the sole ground for rejecting the petitioner’s subsequent original application, the order dated 14.07.2024 should be set aside. e) The petitioner also says that the 7 DRMs, who were considered in the memo dated 23.11.1994, and did not complete 240 days in 12 calendar months, were subsequently given temporary status and were later on absorbed as a regular employees. f) The petitioner was working as a DRM between 1988 and 1997 in APWD. The petitioner belonged to the same class of the 7 DRMs, who were later on given the temporary status and regularized. The petitioner being in the same category as subsequently admitted by the respondents as will appear from the correspondences exchanged should have been given the same financial and service benefits. The petitioner in support of such contention has relied upon following three judgments. (i) 2008 (14) SCC 403 (Purnendu Mukhopadhayay and others vs. V.K.Kapoor and another. (ii) 2015 (1) SCC 347 ( State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others. (iii) Judgment delivered by the Supreme Court on 22.07.2024 in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 25609/2018 (The State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Shyam Kumar Yadav and another. g) The petitioner further says that neither in the order dated 06.03.2017 nor in the order dated 16.08.2023, the respondents have urged that the claim of the petitioner is barred by limitation in view of delay and laches. The respondents have tried to shift their stand and harp on to the point of limitation contrary to the reasons, if any, assigned in the two orders dated 06.03.2017 and 16.10.2023. The respondents have tried to shift their stand and harp on to the point of limitation contrary to the reasons, if any, assigned in the two orders dated 06.03.2017 and 16.10.2023. The shifting of stand as sought to be made by the respondents is contrary to the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the off-quoted judgment in Mohinder Singh Gill vs Chief Election Commissioner reported in 1978 (1) SCC 405 ; AIR 1978 SC 851 . h) The petitioner therefore submit that the order impugned should be set aside and the matter should be remanded back to the Tribunal or in the alternative, this Court can decide the issue to bring to an end the controversy by granting the petitioner, the benefits of his past service. III. ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS: a) The respondents say that the petitioner had approached the Tribunal at a belated stage. The limitation period to approach the Tribunal is three years. The petitioner had served APWD till December, 1997 and thereafter voluntarily went to serve the PBMC which is altogether a different organization and as such is not entitled to any financial or service related benefits for having worked as a DRM between 1988 and 1997. The petitioner’s cause, if any to claim past service benefit is also not a continuous wrong as held in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh reported in 2008 (8) SCC 648 . The petitioner has claimed financial and service related benefits for the period of 1988 to 1997. In 2016, after having accepted the appointment letter dated 21.07.2014 issued specifically to the petitioner with the clear stipulation therein that the petitioner shall not be entitled to any financial or service benefits for his past service, the delay coupled with accepting the appointment letter with such clear stipulation have disentitled the petitioner from claiming financial and service benefits for his past service. b) The respondents have relied upon the judgment reported in (1973) 4 SCC 163 ( M.K.Krishnaswamy, Etc Vs. Union of India and another) and have submitted that it was open to the petitioner not to accept the recruitment when he was specifically declined of the financial and service benefits for his past service. After having accepted the appointment, there was really an end of the matter. The reopening of the issue was no more open to the petitioner. Union of India and another) and have submitted that it was open to the petitioner not to accept the recruitment when he was specifically declined of the financial and service benefits for his past service. After having accepted the appointment, there was really an end of the matter. The reopening of the issue was no more open to the petitioner. The respondents, honouring the order dated 21.02.2023, had considered the issue and have rejected the petitioner’s prayer on clear terms. The Tribunal, after considering all these aspects, have passed the order dated 14th July, 2024 which is being assailed in this writ petition. c) The respondents have, therefore, submitted that the writ petition should be dismissed. IV. ANALYSIS WITH REASONS: a) In the light of the aforesaid submissions, three issues fall for consideration. (1) Is the claim of the petitioner stale claim and did the petitioner approach the Tribunal after inordinate delay, thereby disentitling the petitioner from claiming the financial and service related benefits for his past service? (2) Whether the petitioner is similarly circumstanced as the 7 DRMs who were not given the temporary status by the memo dated 23.11.1994 but were subsequently given so and thereafter regularized with past service benefit. (3) Is the petitioner entitled to the financial and service related benefits for his past service? The second and the third issue will fall for consideration only when the first issue is held in favour of the petitioner. Answer to issue No.1 (i) The petitioner was given permanent appointment by the office order dated 21.07.2014 as per the government policy after taking into consideration his past service as DRM in APWD. The petitioner was given appointment with effect from 05.09.2014 and was placed in probation for two years. The petitioner raised the dispute as to his financial and service related benefits for the past service as DRM in APWD by his representation dated 29.08.2016 and 14.10.2016. The representations were made within a period of three years from his appointment. The claim, if any, therefore, was alive on the date of making the representation. As to whether the petitioner is entitled to such claim on merits is, however, a different aspect altogether. The order rejecting the petitioner’s claim dated 06.03.2017 was passed also within three years from the date of petitioner’s appointment. So, the claim, if any, as on the date of rejection was also alive. As to whether the petitioner is entitled to such claim on merits is, however, a different aspect altogether. The order rejecting the petitioner’s claim dated 06.03.2017 was passed also within three years from the date of petitioner’s appointment. So, the claim, if any, as on the date of rejection was also alive. (ii) The petitioner approached the Tribunal in 2017 by filing OA No.351/00455/2017 challenging the order of rejection dated 06.03.2017. Although the exact date of filing is not available from the records but it cannot be said that the petitioner approached the Tribunal to agitate his claim after an inordinate delay. Assuming without admitting that the original application was filed after three years from the date of his appointment, yet, the claim of the petitioner, if any, cannot be said to be barred by limitation. (iii) Even if the claim had accrued on 05.09.2014, when the petitioner accepted the appointment letter and joined the services of APWD, then also by virtue of the representations being made within three years from such date and rejection thereof on 06.03.2017 within three years from the date of appointment, it cannot be said that the claim, if any of the petitioner is barred by limitation without, however, going into the petitioner’s entitlement to claim and receive such benefits on merits. (iv) The cause of action, if any, to challenge the order of rejection dated 06.03.2017 arose for the first time on receipt of such order. The petitioner, therefore, had a three years period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to challenge the same before the Tribunal. The petitioner, having done so in 2017, that is, within a reasonable period from 06.03.2017, cannot be held liable for any delay or laches. Once the petitioner had approached the Tribunal, it was not within the hands of the petitioner for the disposal of the same. Thus, the time taken till 21.02.2023 cannot amount to any delay or laches on the part of the petitioner. (v) Assuming without admitting the respondents had taken the point of limitation before the Tribunal at the time of hearing of OA No.351/00455/2017 as the same has not been recorded or dealt with in the order dated 21.02.2023 then also the respondents accepted the order and acted in terms thereof without assailing the same. (v) Assuming without admitting the respondents had taken the point of limitation before the Tribunal at the time of hearing of OA No.351/00455/2017 as the same has not been recorded or dealt with in the order dated 21.02.2023 then also the respondents accepted the order and acted in terms thereof without assailing the same. Although, consideration of a representation even in terms of an order of court does not revive a claim which had become stale prior to the representation being directed to be considered as held in 2010 (2) SCC 59 (Union of India & Ors vs. M.K.Sarkar) but the respondents did not challenge the said order. (vi) It was open to the respondent to assail the order dated 21.02.2023, if they were aggrieved in the sense that the said order had revived as stale claim. Having not done so, it is too late in the day to contend that the claim of the petitioner is barred by limitation. That apart and, in any event, since neither of the two orders dated 06.03.2017 and 16.10.2023 passed by the Executive Engineer, PBSD, APWD takes in to fold the point of limitation, the arguments advanced by the petitioner, that the contention of the respondents is hit by the principles laid down in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) is of substance. (vii) We therefore hold that the claim of the petitioner is not hit by limitation, however, without going into the merits of the said claim at this juncture. (viii) On this sole ground of limitation, the Tribunal has rejected the petitioner’s original application by the order impugned. The Tribunal has not gone into the merits of the matter and has correctly done so as a petition on being rejected on the ground of limitation does not require consideration on merits as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2009) 3 SCC 525 Commissioner Nagar Parishad Bhilwara vs. Labor Court Bilwara and another. In the instant case, since the Tribunal was deciding the original claim and was satisfied that the same was barred by limitation it was not required to go into the merits of the case in same analogy as held in Commissioner Nagar Parishad Bhilwara (supra). In the instant case, since the Tribunal was deciding the original claim and was satisfied that the same was barred by limitation it was not required to go into the merits of the case in same analogy as held in Commissioner Nagar Parishad Bhilwara (supra). (ix) This takes us to the issue whether we should remand back the matter to the Tribunal on having held that the claim of the petitioner is not barred by limitation to decide the same on merits. The facts are explicit from the petition and the pleadings before the Tribunal which are annexed to this writ petition. Considering that the issue is pending since 2016 and that other two issues can be conveniently decided on the available records and keeping in mind that this writ petition is a product of two rounds of litigation before the Tribunal, we, instead of remanding the matter by applying the principles that the higher forum, if it finds that the matter can be decided on merits on the basis of the available materials on record is authorized to do so, we intend to dispose of the writ petition on merits deciding the claim of the petitioner to bring an end to the long controversy. (x) This takes us to the other two issues. Answer to issue No.2. a. On a perusal of the memorandum dated 23.11.1994, it is clear that the 7 DRMs in APWD with whom the petitioner claims to be similarly circumstanced till such time were not working against any approved post. By the said memo, approval was accorded to engage the 9 (nine) DRMs against sanctioned post of W.C.Belder by giving them temporary status on the basis of certain parameters. b. It is clear that the DRMs as per the said memo dated 23.11.1994, were divided into two classes. The first set of 9 DRMs had, by that time, completed 240 days continuous work in 12 calendar months and were given the temporary status. The second set of 7 DRMs who did not complete the said period of 240 days continuous work within 12 calendar months were declined from being given the temporary status. The terms and conditions of service of the 9 DRMs, who were given temporary status, were specified in the office order dated 01.12.1994. The second set of 7 DRMs who did not complete the said period of 240 days continuous work within 12 calendar months were declined from being given the temporary status. The terms and conditions of service of the 9 DRMs, who were given temporary status, were specified in the office order dated 01.12.1994. The second set of DRMs comprising of 7 persons were subsequently given the temporary status with effect from 01.01.1994 on having worked for 240 days within 12 calendar months in 1995. Their service conditions were governed by the office order dated 28.04.1995. c. The petitioner’s name did not figure in the office memo dated 23.11.1995 and in the subsequently in the office order dated 01.12.1994 and 28.04.1995. The 16 DRMs were subsequently regularized. Although the date on which they were regularized and/or absorbed in regular service as W.C.Belder is not available from the records but there is no dispute that they were initially given temporary status and were subsequently regularized leading into their absorption in regular service for which they got certain benefits for their past service. The petitioner, according to his own submission as will appears from the representation made by him as late as on 01.11.2011 which appears at page -83 to the writ petition as Annexure P-13 clearly shows that he did not complete 240 days in a calendar of 12 months till December, 1997 being the time upto which he worked as a DRM in APWD. d. The petitioner, having not completed 240 days continuous service in 12 calendar months, therefore did not become entitlement to be conferred with the temporary status like the 16 other DRMs, whose names appeared in the memorandum dated 23.11.1994 and the office orders dated 01.12.1994 and 28.04.1995. The claim of the petitioner to be similarly situated like the 7 DRMs who were not conferred with temporary status as per the memorandum dated 23.11.1994 on the strength of certain remarks in the subsequent documents which originate after 2014 that the said 7 DRMs did not complete 240 days work in 12 calendar months but the same cannot be accepted in view of specific documents giving the period between which the said 7 DRMs completed 240 days within 12 calendar months. These documents are as far back as of 19.01.1995 which appears at page -69 of the writ petition as Annexure P-6 thereto and that dated 24.04.1995 which appears at page -77 of the writ petition being Annexure P-10 thereto. The Office Order dated 28.04.1995 appearing at page 078 of the writ petition as part of Annexure P-10 also provides such petitioner. These documents read with the petitioner’s representation dated 01.11.2011 clearly shows that the petitioner did not fall in the same category as of the said 7 DRMs. The ratio laid down in Purnendu Mukhopadhayay (supra), Arvind Kumar Srivastava (supra) and Shyam Kumar Yadav (supra) as cited by the petitioner, has therefore no application in the facts of the case. The petitioner being not similarly circumstanced is not entitled to claim or receive the benefits conferred to the 7 DRMs for their past service before being regularized. e. The issue no.1 is, therefore, answered in the negative. Answer to issue no.3 (a) Apart from being not similarly circumstanced, the petitioner is also not entitled to the service benefits for the past service as DRMs in APWD for the simple reason that the petitioner accepted the appointment vide office order dated 21.07.2014 with effect from 05.09.2014 when such order was issued in the name of the petitioner clearly stipulated in clause 14 thereof that the petitioner is not entitled to claim any financial or service benefits for the previous period. (b) The petitioner was free to not accept such appointment but he did not do so on the contrary he changed his position by accepting the same. The respondents also altered their position by allowing the petitioner to work with such stipulation and had also altered their position. On having done so, petitioner has consciously waived his right to claim financial and service benefits for his past service period. This acceptance according to the Supreme Court as held in M.K.Krishnaswamy (supra) is the end of the matter. The petitioner was precluded from claiming his financial and service benefits for his past service on having accepted the appointment letter with the stipulation contained in clause 14 thereof. That apart and, in any event, between 1998 and 2014 till he took up the permanent employment in APWD, the petitioner worked as DRM in PBMC and not in APWD. The petitioner was precluded from claiming his financial and service benefits for his past service on having accepted the appointment letter with the stipulation contained in clause 14 thereof. That apart and, in any event, between 1998 and 2014 till he took up the permanent employment in APWD, the petitioner worked as DRM in PBMC and not in APWD. Even though the petitioner contends that his tenure under PBMC is under the A & N Administration we are, however, unable to accept the same as PBMC is an autonomous body governed by different set of service rules from that of APWD. (c) The break of service therein between 1998 – 2014 clearly disentitles the petitioner to claim past service financial and service related benefits. The claim of the petitioner has to be looked into from another angle. Assuming without admitting, that the petitioner is entitled to the financial and service benefits for his past service, then, also there exits an anomaly as to the date from which the petitioner shall be given such benefits and upto which date. Even if benefit is given to the petitioner for his past service, then also the same has to be given at the highest for the period between 1988-1997 which we have already held that the petitioner is not entitled to as he did not complete 240 days work on 12 calendar months like the others. As the petitioner did not work as DRM in APWD from 1998 to 2014. Even if we accept for the sake of argument that, the petitioner having served PBMC is entitled to notional benefit for the period between 1998 and 2014, the same cannot also be given for the simple reason that such service tenure did not fall for consideration while giving the petitioner permanent employment for his past service in APWD and not in PBMC. There is also yet another issue. The gradation list of W.C.Belder which was prepared on 05.09.2014 when the petitioner joined the service or immediately thereafter will have to be altered. There is also yet another issue. The gradation list of W.C.Belder which was prepared on 05.09.2014 when the petitioner joined the service or immediately thereafter will have to be altered. The Supreme Court has clearly held that it would not be sound and wise exercise of discretion for the court to exercise their extraordinary power under Article 226 to try to unsettle settled matter, as observed in the judgment reported in 1998 (2) SCC 523 (B.S.Bajwa & Other vs. State of Punjab & Ors) the ratio laid down therein has been followed in several subsequent judgments. (d) The gradation list in W.C.Belder cadre as it existed on 05.09.2014 has to be unsettled in 2024 after lapse of about 10 years to give the petitioner the financial and service related benefits for his past service. Many of the persons in W.C. Belder cadre, who may have been placed in the gradation list before the petitioner in 2014 will have to be placed below the petitioner if the benefits of past service is accorded in 2024. Many of such employees may have retired and it would lead to chaotic position inviting multiplicity of judicial proceeding. (e) There is also no question at this stage to remand the issue for reconsideration by the employer afresh as the respondents have already expressed their views which are under challenge. It will not only be an idle formality but will allow to re-open an issue for several rounds of unnecessary future litigation. (f) The issue no.3 is, therefore, also answered in the negative. (g) In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the writ petition is dismissed, However, without any order as to costs. (h) Urgent Xerox certified copy this judgment be supplied to the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties upon compliance of usual formalities. BISWAROOP CHOWDHURY, J. 1. I have perused the judgment of my learned brother and agreed to the grounds cited therein. I do not have much to add. However, on a particular issue I am of the view that the matter may be re- considered by the respondent authority sympathetically to some extent. 2. BISWAROOP CHOWDHURY, J. 1. I have perused the judgment of my learned brother and agreed to the grounds cited therein. I do not have much to add. However, on a particular issue I am of the view that the matter may be re- considered by the respondent authority sympathetically to some extent. 2. As much argument is advanced on the ground of discrimination between the petitioner and other 16 daily rated mazdoors who were earlier regularized and that it is contended that 7 daily rated mazdoors did not complete 240 days work at the very outset, this issue has to be addressed. 3. It is to be remembered that the case of the writ petitioner is not that his prayer for regularization is not considered although other daily rated mazdoors are regularized or that petitioner is suffering hardship as his application for regularization is not disposed of by the authorities. The representation made by the petitioner for regularization was considered and after necessary enquiries and discussion with Conciliation Officer, regular appointment order was issued. 4. It will appear from the order dated 21.07.2014 marked Annexure P-18 to the writ application that in pursuance of Labour Commissioner, Port Blair, Conciliation meeting communicated vide letter No.D2/CE-14(87)/2010-LC/PF-III/1764 dated 30.06.2014 and with the approval of Chief Engineer, APWD, Port Blair conveyed vide letter No.F.No.10-1(22)/CE/ES-III/2014/2745 dated 15.07.2014, the Executive engineer, Port Blair South Division, APWD, Port Blair is pleased to order the appointment of Shri A.Nagraj, Ex-DRM to the post of W.C.Beldar for regular appointment with immediate effect. Thus in the appointment letter itself it will appear that it is a new regular appointment from 21.07.2014 although in the said appointment order, it is mentioned that the writ petitioner was Ex-DRM. Thus the application for regularization was not kept pending but was disposed of by the authorities with a decision to issue regular appointment to the petitioner on 21.07.2014. The authorities did not take into consideration as to whether the petitioner was entitled to be regularized along with 16 other daily rated mazdoors who were already regularized neither it was discussed as to whether the petitioner stands in the same footing with that of 16 other Daily Rated Mazdoors who were already regularized. 5. The petitioner, being satisfied with the order of regular appointment dated 21.07.2014, joined duty and chose not to challenge the same before any forum. 5. The petitioner, being satisfied with the order of regular appointment dated 21.07.2014, joined duty and chose not to challenge the same before any forum. As the issue of entitlement of the petitioner for regularization along with other DRM was not considered and discussed by the authority in the order of the appointment, there is no scope for the Court to consider the said issue. Now the petitioner, at this stage, cannot be permitted to re-open the issue. Moreover, it is not the case of the petitioner that he is starving for being out of work as the respondent authorities have already provided him employment. However, one aspect that should be taken into consideration is that the petitioner had to go from pillar to post for regularization of his service and made representations from the year 2002 and have appeared before Conciliation Officer on different dates for conciliation. 6. Thus, the petitioner’s case may be treated sympathetically. Although the authorities had the discretion to issue new regular appointment instead of regularizing the past services but that could have been done at an early date. By appointment the writ petitioner after a period of twelve years from the date when the dispute arose and the petitioner stared making representation and appearing before different authorities, the petitioner will be able to render service for a short period and will not get a reasonable retirement benefit to support himself after retirement 7. As the scheme of regularization is a welfare scheme for the workers, endeavour should be made by the authorities that the eligible persons are not deprived of the benefit. Although there is a dispute in this case as to whether the petitioner was entitled to regularization and the authorities have issued appointment letter with effect from 21.07.2014 bur the said order could have been issued much before to enable the petitioner to render service for a long period and receive reasonable retirement benefit to support himself after retirement. 8. As India is a welfare state and it is the duty of the state to see that citizens have adequate meant of livelihood it is the duty of the respondent which is state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution that the employees do not suffer financial hardship during service or after retirement. 9. 8. As India is a welfare state and it is the duty of the state to see that citizens have adequate meant of livelihood it is the duty of the respondent which is state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution that the employees do not suffer financial hardship during service or after retirement. 9. Although, I do not intend to remit back the matter for re- consideration of the issue of granting the petitioner the benefits of past service or pass a direction upon the respondents to re-consider the issue and agree with the order of dismissal of the writ petition but I feel that the respondents may consider the petitioner’s case sympathetically in respect of granting benefits for the past service rendered by the petitioner since they have admitted in the appointment letter, the petitioner as Ex-DRM. In the facts and circumstances as aforesaid the writ petition is dismissed. However, dismissal of the writ petition will not stand in the way of the respondents from considering the petitioner’s case for past service benefits in a sympathetic manner. In the event the respondents do so, it will neither create a precedence nor will any equity be bestowed on the petitioner for the same. The petitioner is precluded from compelling the respondents to re-consider his case and shall not have the right to challenge the decision of the respondents if they do not consider the petitioner’s case or refuses to grant any benefit for his past service after sympathetically considering the same.