JUDGMENT : RAVI KRISHAN KAPUR, J. 1. The appellant challenges an order dated 19 December 2022 passed by the Additional District Judge Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Port Blair determining compensation under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. 2. Briefly, the respondent, Andaman Timber Industries Ltd had sought for compensation in respect of 3.64 hectares of land, situated at Survey No. 22/3 & 23 at Shore Point Village, Ferrargunj, Tehsil Andaman and Nicobar Islands. 3. Originally, one Shri Sheoram had been granted an area of 56 acres, 1 kanal and 3 marlas situated at Shore Point under section 4(1) of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Land Tenure) Regulations, 1926, for a period of 30 years commencing from 1 January 1934 inter-alia for carrying on business of coconut plantations. The grant was subsequently transferred to Subhas Dweep Co-operative. Multipurpose Society and thereafter to Krishi Gopalan Silpa Sikshalaya. Ultimately, Krishi Gopalan Silpa Sikshalaya executed a lease deed in favour of the respondent. 4. In 1966, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Land Tenure) Regulations, 1926 was repealed by introducing the Andaman and Nicobar Land Revenue and Land Reforms Regulations 1966, whereby in view of Regulation 38, all land in the Union Territory of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands vested absolutely in the Government. For convenience, Regulation 38 reads as follows: "38. (1) All land in the Union territory of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, is vested absolutely in the Government, and, save as provided by or under this Regulation, no person shall be deemed to have acquired any property therein or any right to or over the same by occupation, prescription or conveyance or in any other manner what so ever except by a conveyance executed by, or under the authority of, the Government." 5. In 1990, a portion of the above land, bearing Survey No 22/3 & 23 measuring about 8.86 hects., at Shore Point Village was allotted to the respondent by issuance of a license meant for commercial purposes with retrospective effect from April 1964 for a sum of Rs.2,16,690/- (inclusive of interest). Pursuant to the above, the respondent set up a wood based industry which was ultimately directed to be closed in the year 2000 following the decision of the Supreme Court in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad vs. Union of India & Ors. 1997 (2) SCC 267 . 6. Pursuant to the above, the respondent set up a wood based industry which was ultimately directed to be closed in the year 2000 following the decision of the Supreme Court in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad vs. Union of India & Ors. 1997 (2) SCC 267 . 6. Upon being approached by the Port Management Board (PMB), for acquisition of 12.37 hectares of land at Shore Point village, Bambooflat for relocating the Port facilities and creating Foreshore Port facilities, the Collector notified the respondent about the acquisition of the above land of 8.86 hectares (Survey No. 22/3 and 3) and 3.51 hectares (Survey No.37) meant for public purposes under the Act. The land was proposed to be acquired in two phases. In Phase I, an area of 6.63 hectares was to be acquired at an estimated cost Rs.14,20,97,426. Thereafter, an area of 3.64 hectares is the subject matter of this proceeding and was to be acquired under Phase II. The remaining area of 2.23 hectares has been in the occupation of the employees of the respondent and does not form the subject matter of these proceedings. 7. Though an award was passed based on the proposal made by PMB for acquisition of the remaining portion of land of 3.64 hectares for an amount of Rs.3.03 crores, the same was deferred due to paucity of funds. Subsequently, pursuant to a challenge made against the said award by the claimant, an order was passed in W.P. No 197 of 2004, wherein this proceeding was directed to be completed within a prescribed time period. 8. In view of the above acquisition proceedings, three separate awards have been passed dated 26 September 2022, 15 March 2017 and 5 May 2018 respectively of which the award dated 15 March 2017 had been unconditionally accepted by the respondent and the respondent has also been paid the entire compensation. 9. Pursuant to the above, the respondent filed an application under section 18 of the Act being Land Acquisition Case No.07 of 2023.The appellant filed its pleadings and both the parties adduced their respective evidence. The respondent examined five witnesses and exhibited several documents. On the other hand, the appellant also examined three witnesses and exhibited their documents. 10. By the impugned order, the Learned Judge has inter-alia directed as follows: That the respondent is entitled to get: (i) The market value of the land @ Rs.20229/- per sq.mtr. The respondent examined five witnesses and exhibited several documents. On the other hand, the appellant also examined three witnesses and exhibited their documents. 10. By the impugned order, the Learned Judge has inter-alia directed as follows: That the respondent is entitled to get: (i) The market value of the land @ Rs.20229/- per sq.mtr. (ii) Simple interest @ 9% per annum for the first year and 15% per annum for the subsequent year till realization. (iii) Solatium @ 30% of the market value of the subject land in consideration of the compulsory nature of acquisition. (iv) Interest on solatium @ 9% per annum for the first year and 15% per annum for the subsequent year till realization. 11. It is alleged by the appellant that the compensation awarded in terms of the impugned order aggregating to Rs.27,65,66,945.20/- as on 26 November 2023 is excessive, arbitrary and unreasonable. The primary challenge is directed against the reliance in the impugned order placed on Exhibit 25 i.e. a sale deed of a property measuring an area of 135 sq.mtrs., pertaining to landed property situated at Shore Point village which included the value of a house and land assessed at Rs.2,50,000/-. It is contended that the subject matter of acquisition being situated in a rural region of the Island could not possess a valuation higher than that of land situated in the Municipal region. Moreover, in passing the impugned order, the Learned Judge placed no reliance on the Report furnished by the Sub-Registrar, South Andaman District which indicated that the market value of land over a period of 3 years and had been accepted by various Courts. The Learned Judge also failed to adjudicate upon any of the preliminary objections raised by the appellant. It was alleged that the entire claim for compensation was misconceived and inherently flawed since the land sought to have been acquired, belonged to the Government and could not have been the subject matter of any acquisition. Additionally, since the purpose of the grant had already been extinguished, the respondent ought to have surrendered the land upon closure of its business in the year 2000. The machineries had also been shifted from the above premises, the respondent had also floated a Voluntary Retirement Scheme for employees as a final settlement for the suspension period and the respondent had no further plans of carrying on business. The machineries had also been shifted from the above premises, the respondent had also floated a Voluntary Retirement Scheme for employees as a final settlement for the suspension period and the respondent had no further plans of carrying on business. There was also no evidence of any financial loss alleged by the respondent. Clause 6 of the license dated 2 January 1990 provided that no compensation shall be paid to the licensee in the event of cancellation or resumption of the license. It is also alleged that no license could be issued retrospectively in terms of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Land Tenure) Regulations, 1926 or Andaman and Nicobar Land Revenue and Land Reforms Regulations, 1966. A preliminary objection had also been raised by the appellant as to the original license being unavailable in the records and the same has not been adverted to in the impugned order. It is further contended that, notwithstanding having received compensation of Rs.3,03,03,567/- (under protest), the respondent had unreasonably approached the Court for further compensation. 12. On behalf of the respondent, it is contended that the license for the licensed land is not a grant in terms of Regulation 146(i) of Andaman and Nicobar Land Revenue and Land Reforms Regulations, 1966 rather the same is a license issued under the provisions of Regulations 146(ii) of the said Andaman and Nicobar Land Revenue and Land Reforms Regulations, 1966 read with Rule 46(ii) of Andaman and Nicobar Land Revenue and Land Reforms Regulations, 1968. It is also contended that the Learned Judge while determining compensation lawfully considered Exhibit 25 to be the most reliable and suitable exemplar in determining the actual value of the land sought to be acquired. In support of such contentions, the respondent relies on the decisions in Major General Kapil Mehra v. Union of India, (2015) 2 SCC 262 and Major Pakhar Singh Atwal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 2185 . In support of such contentions, the respondent relies on the decisions in Major General Kapil Mehra v. Union of India, (2015) 2 SCC 262 and Major Pakhar Singh Atwal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 2185 . Significantly, in a prior round of litigation between the parties being Collector of Land Acquisition & Others vs. Andaman Timber Industries & Others, (2016) 4 SCC 406 and Collector of Land Acquisition and Others vs. Andaman Timber Industries, (2014) 16 SCC 780 the Hon’ble Supreme Court had inter alia held that the licensed land is not a grant rather the respondent had acquired an interest in the license land in terms of Regulations 146(ii) of 1966 Regulations and that there was no stipulated time frame for operation of such license. As a result, the respondent possessed a perpetual license of the above land and the interest of the respondent could only be extinguished as per clause 162 of 1966 Regulations. Accordingly, there is no merit in the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the appellant which warrant any interference with the impugned order. 13. The core question to be decided in this appeal is what would be a fair and just compensation to be awarded in terms of the Act so as to do justice between the parties. For convenience, the relevant provisions of the Act are set out hereinbelow: 18. Reference to Court: (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. 23. 23. Matters to be considered on determining compensation: (1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration: first, the market-value of the land at the date of the publication of the [notification under section 4, sub-section (1)]; secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof; thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of serving such land from his other land; fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings; fifthly, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change, and sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under section 6 and the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land. (1A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub- section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Explanation - In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded. (2) In addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of [thirty per centum] on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. 24. (2) In addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of [thirty per centum] on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. 24. Matters to be neglected in determining compensation - But the Court shall not take into consideration - first, the degree of urgency which has led to the acquisition; secondly, any disinclination of the person interested to part with the land acquired; thirdly, any damage sustained by him which, if caused by a private person, would not render such person liable to a suit; fourthly, any damage which is likely to be caused to the land acquired, after the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6, by or in consequence of the use to which it will be put; fifthly, any increase to the value of the land acquired likely to accrue from the use to which it will be put when acquired; sixthly, any increase to the value of the other land of the person interested likely to accrue from the use to which the land acquired will be put; seventhly, any outlay or improvements on, or disposal of the land acquired, commenced, made or effected without the sanction of the Collector after the date of the publication of the [notification under section 4, sub-section (1); eighthly, any increase to the value of the land on account of its being put to any use, which is forbidden by law or opposed to public policy. 14. In Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 3 SCC 751 it has been held as follows: (1) A reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award and the court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his award unless the same material is produced and proved before the court. (2) So also the award of the Land Acquisition Officer is not to be treated as a judgment of the trial court open or exposed to challenge before the court hearing the reference. It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the court unless produced and proved before it. It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the court to sit in appeal against the award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer, as if it were an appellate court. (3) The court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. (4) The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the court. Of course the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose. (5) The market value of land under acquisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (dates of notifications under Sections 6 and 9 are irrelevant). (6) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price. (7) In doing so by the instances method, the court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value. (8) Only genuine instances have to be taken into account. (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of acquisition of land.) (9) Even post-notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects. (10) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations: (i) proximity from time angle. (ii) proximity from situation angle. (10) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations: (i) proximity from time angle. (ii) proximity from situation angle. (11) Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis-à-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. (12) A balance-sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors may be evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do. (13) The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deduced by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors. (14) The exercise indicated in clauses (11) to (13) has to be undertaken in a common sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do. We may illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors: Plus Factors Minus Factors 1. smallness of size 1. largeness of area 2. proximity to a road 2. situation in the interior at a distance from the road 3. frontage on a road 3. narrow strip of land with very small frontage compared to depth 4. nearness to developed area 4. lower level requiring the depressed portion to be filled up 5. regular shape 5. remoteness from developed locality 6. level vis-a-vis land under acquisition 6. some special disadvantageous factor which would deter a purchaser 7. special value for an owner of an adjoining property to whom it may have some very special advantage (15) The evaluation of these factors of course depends on the facts of each case. There cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor regarding the size. A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq. yds. cannot be compared with a large tract or block of land of say 10,000 sq. yds. or more. There cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor regarding the size. A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq. yds. cannot be compared with a large tract or block of land of say 10,000 sq. yds. or more. Firstly while a smaller plot is within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a lay out, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur. The factor can be discounted by making a deduction by way of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approximately between 20 per cent to 50 per cent to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots. The discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area, whether building activity is picking up, and whether waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur would be locked up, will be longer or shorter and the attendant hazards. (16) Every case must be dealt with on its own fact pattern bearing in mind all these factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the judge must place himself. (17) These are general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense. 15. In General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel, (2008) 14 SCC 745 it has been observed as follows: “15. Normally, recourse is taken to the mode of determining the market value by providing appropriate escalation over the proved market value of nearby lands in previous years (as evidenced by sale transactions or acquisitions), where there is no evidence of any contemporaneous sale transactions or acquisitions of comparable lands in the neighbourhood. The said method is reasonably safe where the relied-on sale transactions/acquisitions precede the subject acquisition by only a few years, that is, up to four to five years. Beyond that it may be unsafe, even if it relates to a neighbouring land. What may be a reliable standard if the gap is of only a few years, may become unsafe and unreliable standard where the gap is larger. Beyond that it may be unsafe, even if it relates to a neighbouring land. What may be a reliable standard if the gap is of only a few years, may become unsafe and unreliable standard where the gap is larger. For example, for determining the market value of a land acquired in 1992, adopting the annual increase method with reference to a sale or acquisition in 1970 or 1980 may have many pitfalls. This is because, over the course of years, the “rate” of annual increase may itself undergo drastic change apart from the likelihood of occurrence of varying periods of stagnation in prices or sudden spurts in prices affecting the very standard of increase.” 16. In BSNL v. Nemichand Damodardas, (2022) 14 SCC 60 , it has been held as follows: “16. Thus, there may be various factors, which are required to be considered for determining the market value of the land. The market value of the land depends upon the location of the land; area of the land; whether the land is in a developed area or not; whether the acquisition is of a small plot of land or a big chunk of land and number of other advantageous and disadvantageous factors are required to be considered. Therefore, there cannot be the same market value for the different lands while determining the compensation for the lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the rates mentioned in the Ready Reckoner, which are basically for the purpose of collection of stamp duty and as observed hereinabove, which are the uniform rates for all the lands in the area, cannot be the basis for determination of the compensation for the lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the High Court has committed a serious error in enhancing the amount of compensation by 800% from Rs 21 per square foot to Rs 174 per square foot relying upon and/or considering the rates mentioned in the Ready Reckoner.” 17. Ordinarily, there is an element of guesswork in most cases involving determination of the market value of the acquired land. This is inherent in the very nature of the adjudication which is contemplated under the Act. The burden of proof lies on the claimant to prove by placing acceptable evidence that the acquired land deserves higher compensation. Ordinarily, there is an element of guesswork in most cases involving determination of the market value of the acquired land. This is inherent in the very nature of the adjudication which is contemplated under the Act. The burden of proof lies on the claimant to prove by placing acceptable evidence that the acquired land deserves higher compensation. The market value is the value which a normal and prudent buyer would pay after evaluating the value prevailing in the surrounding area and which a normal and prudent seller is willing to accept. Compensation as contemplated under the Act is not to be equated with bounty or lottery earnings. It is not the role of any Authority exercising jurisdiction under the Act to be charitable at the expense of the State. 18. The selective reliance in the impugned order on a single document being Exhibit 25 in determining compensation is arbitrary, capricious and whimsical. Exhibit 25 deals with a property where the market value of the land including a house was assessed at Rs.2,50,000/-. The valuation assessed in the sale deed was inclusive of building and land. A perusal of the sale deed dated 3 June 2002 reveals that the same was in respect of a house standing on the site being survey no. 242 measuring 135 sq.mtrs, for a consideration of Rs.2,50,000/-. The schedule to the said sale deed specifies that the subject matter of the same was a house standing on site survey measuring 342 sq.mtrs and further added 37% in the final market value. In such circumstances, the suo-moto deduction of Rs.50,000/- on account of the house without any reason or justification is grossly arbitrary and bereft of any reason. Resultantly, the land has been assessed at Rs.2,00,000/135 sq.mtrs = Rs.1481/- per sq.mtrs. There were no specifications nor details nor justification pertaining to the valuation of the building and the consequential value of the land. The assessment by the Learned Judge in valuing the building at Rs.50,000/- and the land at Rs.2,00,000/- is arbitrary, unreasonable and without any reason. 19. Accordingly, the exemplar sale deed Exhibit 25 could not be basis of any rational assessment in respect of the fair and the true market value of the above land. There are also no reasons in the impugned order in disregarding the evidence relied on by the appellant. 19. Accordingly, the exemplar sale deed Exhibit 25 could not be basis of any rational assessment in respect of the fair and the true market value of the above land. There are also no reasons in the impugned order in disregarding the evidence relied on by the appellant. Significantly, the appellant had relied on evidence of comparative valuations of land similarly located. Assuming that the comparative sale method was the preferred method in calculating compensation, the distorted interpretation of Exhibit 25 is an inherent flaw in the ascertainment of compensation and this is fatal to the impugned order. Ordinarily, for the purposes of fixation of fair and reasonable market value of land, abnormally high value or abnormally low value of land are to be disregarded. 20. The Report of the Sub-Registrar in calculating the average period of three years of the market value of land at Shore Point Village i.e. Rs.437.94 for house site and Rs.28.09 for agriculture based on the available records has also been notably disregarded in determining compensation. The valuation of expert bodies adduced as evidence by the appellant has also been omitted and unreasonably ignored. In particular, Exhibit 14 wherein the Tehisildar had furnished a valuation assessing commercial land situated at Shore Point at Rs.600 per sq.mtrs. has not even been dealt with. Similarly, whether the fact that “no new construction being permitted 500 meters of the High Tide Line” under the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) norms notified by the Ministry of Environment & Forests dated 19 February 1991 was relevant or not, has not even been taken into consideration in determining valuation. 21. In view of the above, the impugned order is neither warranted nor justifiable on the evidence on record. In passing the impugned order, the Learned Judge solely relied on Exhibit 25 and ignored all other available pieces of evidence without assigning any reasons whatsoever. There is no rational nor logical basis in arriving at the compensation awarded and the same cannot be treated to be fair, just or reasonable compensation. The Learned Judge has not only ignored the mandate of the Act but has taken into account extraneous and irrelevant factors which are particularly advantageous to the respondent. 22. The preliminary objection of compulsory acquisition of land which belonged to and vested in the Administration is also an issue which ought to have been dealt with in the impugned order. The Learned Judge has not only ignored the mandate of the Act but has taken into account extraneous and irrelevant factors which are particularly advantageous to the respondent. 22. The preliminary objection of compulsory acquisition of land which belonged to and vested in the Administration is also an issue which ought to have been dealt with in the impugned order. This is a peculiar situation where an owner is being made to acquire its own land from a private party at a grossly exorbitant price. Similarly, the challenge raised by the appellant insofar as the genuineness and veracity of the license agreement is concerned has also not been adjudicated upon. The question of jurisdiction to issue a license retrospectively though raised by the appellant has also not been considered. Clause 6 of the license issued to the respondent no.1 categorically provided for the right of resumption. As such, when the remedy of resumption was available and after the industry had been closed, the need to acquire its own premises, though raised as a preliminary objection has not even been dealt with in the impugned order. Similarly, the allegation of fraud in the entire acquisition proceedings raised by the appellant has also not even been adverted to in the impugned order. Notwithstanding, the earlier round of proceedings, the previous orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the limited jurisdiction at this stage of the acquisition proceedings under the Act, the above preliminary objections raised by the appellant at least required to be considered before passing of the impugned order. 23. For the above reasons, the impugned order is unsustainable and contrary to the principles laid down under sections 23 and 24 of the Act. The entire basis of the impugned order is unfair, unjust and unreasonable. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds. The impugned order dated 19 December 2022 is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Additional District Judge, Port Blair for expeditious adjudication of compensation in LA Case No.07/2023 arising out of the reference bearing No.5-39/LA/ADM/2002 in accordance with law and without being influenced on the merits. The above exercise is to be completed within eight weeks from the date of communication of this order and after granting a right of hearing to both the parties. Any pending application also stands disposed of as infructuous. I agree - Prasenjit Biswas, J.