Research › Search › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

2024 DAILYLAW 2275 (CAL)

Kausik Majumdar v. State of West Bengal

2024-12-23

Harish Tandon, Prasenjit Biswas

body2024
JUDGMENT : HARISH TANDON, J. 1. The instant appeal arises from a judgment dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Single Bench in WPA 16573 of 2019 by which the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed as not maintainable. 2. Admittedly, the appellant was employed as an office assistant in W.W.A, Cossipore English School, the Respondent no. 2 herein, in the year 1992. Subsequently, the appellant was brought in a teaching faculty as a computer teacher and the service was terminated on October 29, 2018. The reason for termination was founded upon an allegation of committing a sexual harassment. The writ petition was filed challenging the said order of termination on the premise of violation of a principle of natural justice with the consequential relief of reinstatement in service and release of the arrear salary and all financial benefits attached to the said post. 3. On the conspectus of the aforesaid facts, a preliminary objection was raised by the Respondent no. 2 that the same is not maintainable as the Respondent no. 2 being an unaided private school is not amenable to writ jurisdiction as the action was taken under the realm of a private law and there is a complete lack of public law element involved in it. In other words, it is sought to be contended that the employment of the appellant with the respondent no. 2 is governed by the contract between them and being an unaided private school, they do not come within the folds of “authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 4. The Single Bench after considering the various judgments including St. Mary’s Education Society & Anr. Vs. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors. (2023) 4 SCC 498 held that the Respondent no. 2 cannot be regarded as an authority nor a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, proceeded to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of maintainability. 5. The Counsel for the appellant assailed the said order and sought to contend that the Respondent no. 2 was discharging a public duties in imparting education to the children and, therefore, has an element of an authority within the four corners of the Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 5. The Counsel for the appellant assailed the said order and sought to contend that the Respondent no. 2 was discharging a public duties in imparting education to the children and, therefore, has an element of an authority within the four corners of the Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is vociferously submitted that it is not necessary that the writ is maintainable only against the State or its instrumentality but can also be maintained against the other authorities if they are discharging the public duties. It is further submitted that the Respondent no. 2 are governed by a statute and once they have violated the statutory provisions and discharging the public duties in imparting education to the children, the writ petition is maintainable. It is sought to be contended that the West Bengal Administrative (Adjudication of School Disputes) Commission Act, 2008 was promulgated by the State Government for better protection of the right of teacher and non-teaching staffs of the school in the State which defines the “school” under Section 2(i) to mean a “school” as recognised by the State but does not include the Government school and further included the unaided school within its meaning. It is thus contended that the definition of a “school dispute” in Section 2(k) have taken within its folds all disputes including the service matters of a person in a school. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant the moment the “school disputes” imbibed within itself the service matters of a person in school, the act of termination comes within the school dispute and therefore, the writ petition is maintainable. Taking a clue from Section 12 of the Act of 2008 providing the Constitution of a Commission, it is submitted that so long the Commission is not constituted under the said Act, the remedy by way of a writ petition is maintainable and, therefore, the judgment of the Single Bench needs interference. 6. To buttress the aforesaid contention the learned Advocate for the appellant audaciously submits that the teacher in an unaided private school are not a workman as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as held by the Apex Court in Miss A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa. Daman & Diu and Ors. (1988) 4 SCC 42 . 6. To buttress the aforesaid contention the learned Advocate for the appellant audaciously submits that the teacher in an unaided private school are not a workman as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as held by the Apex Court in Miss A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa. Daman & Diu and Ors. (1988) 4 SCC 42 . According to him, the Apex Court in the above noted decision showed his concern over the illegal and unjust termination of the services of the teacher and to activate the social justice issued mandamus upon the Government to take steps in bringing the appropriate legislation providing the adjudication of the dispute between the teachers and the management of the educational institution’s legislation which, in fact, was promulgated by the State Government by enacting the West Bengal Administrative (Adjudication and School Disputes) Commission Act, 2008. The learned Advocate for the appellant further relies upon a Single Bench judgment of this Court in Bineeta Patnaik Padhi vs. Union of India and Ors. (2021) 1 CLT 21 for the proposition that once the private unaided educational institution are discharging the public duties in imparting education to the children, any action of the said school is susceptible to be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as such educational institution would be regarded as a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is thus submitted that the writ petition raising a dispute on termination of service by the Respondent no. 1 is maintainable and, therefore, the order of the Single Bench in this regard is liable to be set aside. 7. On the other hand, the school authorities supported the judgment of the Single Bench that they being the private unaided educational institution are neither the State nor the authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the writ petition has been rightly dismissed as not maintainable. The Counsel for the School authorities relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in St. Mary’s Education Society (supra) in support of their contention that discharge of the public duty being one of the relevant factors in bringing the educational institution within the folds of the State or the authority but the services of a teacher qua the School Authorities are under the realm of a private law and, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. 8. 8. The Counsel for the School Authorities submits that a distinction has to be drawn on the dispute involved in the writ petition between the action of the authorities in discharge of the public duties and the service conditions of the teachers which is purely contractual in nature as in later case, it does not involve the public element and, therefore, the writ in this regard is not maintainable. In support of the aforesaid contention several judgments of the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts are cited making a distinction between an action perceived to be in discharge of the public duties and within the realm of a private law and according to the Counsel, those judgments are affirming the concept that the relation between school and its teacher are not within the purview of public duty. It is thus submitted that the judgment of the Single Bench so relied upon by the appellant is contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court more particularly, St. Mary’s Education Society (supra) and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a good law. 9. The Counsel appearing for the State submits that the cause of action pleaded in the writ petition is relatable to a dispute between the school authorities and its teacher and in the event the Court passes any direction, the State will comply the same. However, the Counsel for the State could not apprise the Court on the enforceability of the Act of 2008 though it was notified in the Kolkata Gazette, Extraordinary on December 29, 2011. On the backdrop of the aforesaid facts and the submissions so advanced, the limited question involved in the instant appeal is whether the writ petition is maintainable against the unaided private educational institution in relation to a dispute concerning the termination of the service on the touchstone of the public duty or in the realm of a private law. The plea of Act of 2008 was taken before the Single Bench and taking into account the various provisions contained therein and the law laid down in St. Mary’s Education Society (supra) it is held that the writ petition concerning the disputes relating to the condition of service of a teacher in private unaided educational institution is not amenable to a writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. Mary’s Education Society (supra) it is held that the writ petition concerning the disputes relating to the condition of service of a teacher in private unaided educational institution is not amenable to a writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. As indicated above, the argument of the appellant is basically founded upon the Act of 2008 more particularly, the definition of a “school” and “school dispute” appearing in Section 2(i) and (k) thereof. Though the said Act of 2008 was duly published in the Official Gazette but, Section 1(2) of the said Act postulates that it shall come into force on such date as the State Government by notification appoint. None of the Counsels appearing before us could apprise as to whether any notification bringing in force of the said act was subsequently issued and/or published by the State Government. Be that as it may since the Single Bench has taken into consideration several provisions of the said Act and held that the said Act does not lead to a point that the dispute between the teacher and the school management would come under the purview of a public duty, we, therefore, proceeded to decide the said point in order to arrive at a decision whether it has got any bearing on the core issue indicated hereinabove. 11. The definition of a school given under Section 2(i) clearly indicates that the Government school and school recognised under the State Act would not come within such definition. However, the inclusive definition expanded its horizon to imbibe within itself its folds unaided school by virtue of an explanation appended thereto defining the “Government School” to mean school maintained and managed by the State Government or the Government of India or the Railway Board under the Ministry of Railways, Government of India. Indubitably, the Respondent no. 2 is an unaided private educational institution having no support from the Government by way of a grant and is solely controlled and managed by its managing committees. “School disputes” have included the service matter of a person in a school which is further defined and explanation appended thereto of service of a person in a school and any matter relating to the disciplinary action taken. “School disputes” have included the service matter of a person in a school which is further defined and explanation appended thereto of service of a person in a school and any matter relating to the disciplinary action taken. The “Specified State Act” is further defined in Section 2(n) of the Act to mean the State Act specified in the said schedule to the said Act which does not include any special Act relatable to aided private educational institution. The scheme of the Act as it appears from its bare look contained the provision providing a forum i.e. a Commission to be constituted for adjudication and trial of any school disputes and the matter connected and/or related incidental thereto and exclude the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. Section 12 and 13 of the said Act is quoted as under: “12. (1) This Act shall apply to every specified State Act with effect from such date as the State Government may, by notification, appoint, and the Commission, save as otherwise expressly provided under such specified State Act and subject to other provisions of this Act, shall exercise jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation to all matters of adjudication or trial of any school disputes and the matters connected therewith or incidental thereto; and no civil court shall, with effect from such date, exercise any jurisdiction, powers of authority in the matter or adjudication or trial of any school disputes. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act, all proceedings triable by any court or courts in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall continue to be tried by such court, and the Commission shall have no jurisdiction to try such proceedings. 13. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Commission shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate a school dispute and make order to a person directing redressal of the school dispute. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the provision of sub-section (1), the Commission shall, in adjudicating the school dispute, have jurisdiction to declare that - (i) a law or an instrument, statutory or otherwise, or an act has or shall have such effect or no such effect. (ii) a party has or shall have such right or duty or no such right or duty. (ii) a party has or shall have such right or duty or no such right or duty. (iii) an act has or shall have such effect or no such effect, Subject to such conditions and restrictions, if any, as may be mentioned in the judgment: Provided that where the matter relates to disposal of question of constitutional validity of any provision of any specified State Act, the matter shall be decided by a Bench constituted of at least three Members of which the Chairman shall be one. (3) The Commission shall, in making order for redressal of the school dispute, have jurisdiction to make order to the person directing him to pay such cost, compensation and interest, if any, as may be mentioned in the order.” 12. It is manifest from the aforesaid Section that it has an applicability in relation to a Specified State Acts and the Commission shall assume powers and/or jurisdiction after a notification is issued by the State Government. The intention of the legislation is laudable that any dispute concerning the Specified State Act as included in the Schedule appended thereto is amenable to be decided and/or decided under the Act of 2008. An argument is advanced that so long the Commission is not constituted by the State Government in exercise of power conferred therein, the remedy by way of a writ before the High Court cannot be said to be curtailed does not appear to hold water. The dispute between the teacher and the school management does not emanate from the Specified State Acts and is purely a contractual in nature. The spirit of the provisions of law is to be culled out from the language used therein and the moment the Court found that the State Act applies to every specified Act, unless such specified Act provides and/or protects the service condition of the unaided private school institution, the Commission cannot assume the jurisdiction; as a corollary, the writ is not maintainable. The contention of the appellant that since the Commission has not been constituted the writ is not acceptable, as we find that the Commission can assume jurisdiction only in relation to a matter arising from a Specified State Act and not otherwise. 13. The contention of the appellant that since the Commission has not been constituted the writ is not acceptable, as we find that the Commission can assume jurisdiction only in relation to a matter arising from a Specified State Act and not otherwise. 13. It leads to a core issue as to whether the writ petition is maintainable against the unaided private school institution in relation to a dispute between a teacher and the school management and in support of a maintainability, the reliance is placed by the appellant upon a judgment of the Apex Court in case of Miss A. Sundarambal (supra). The question involved therein was whether the educational institution would be regarded as an industry and the teachers of the said institution would come within the definition of a “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Apex Court ultimately held that the teachers employed in the educational institution imparting primary, secondary, graduate or post-graduate education cannot be called as a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The definition of a ‘workman’ as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act involved the primary three conditions - firstly, the person must be employed in industry for higher reward; secondly, person must be engaged in a skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work and lastly, the person should not fall under the other four Clauses i.e. Clauses (i) to (iv) indicated in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 14. The role of a teacher in an educational institution is not only to educate children in a particular subject but have more onerous duty of moulding their character, building up the personalities and above all to make them a responsible citizen of the country. The suggestions, the voice and/or personality of the teacher is often imitated by the children to inculcate the values in life to make them a responsible citizen contributing in the growth and development of the country. It would be preposterous to suggest that such teacher would be regarded as a workman under Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act which, in fact, is held by the Apex Court in the said judgment. However, the Apex Court was considering the social and economic suppression of the teachers in the hands of an unscrupulous managing committee of the educational institution which has a social impact. However, the Apex Court was considering the social and economic suppression of the teachers in the hands of an unscrupulous managing committee of the educational institution which has a social impact. The direction was passed to bring an appropriate legislation and, therefore, we do not find that such judgment has any bearing in the instant matter. 15. The judgment rendered by the Single Bench in B. Patanaik Padhi (supra) though decided on the identical facts but the same is to be tested on the subsequent judgment rendered by the Apex Court in St. Mary’s Education Institution (supra). The judgment of the High Court if runs counter to the decision of the Apex Court declaring the law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the judgment of the Supreme Court would prevail and any judgment of the High Court runs counter to the same would not be regarded as a good law. 16. In St. Mary’s Education Society (supra) the principal respondent therein was an employee of a private unaided educational institution and was served with the show cause notice cum suspension order alleging various misconduct in service. Ultimately, the service of the principal respondent therein was terminated and the said principal respondent challenged the order of termination on several grounds by filing a writ petition before the High Court. The writ petition was rejected by the Single Bench on the ground of non-maintainability thereof which was set aside by the Division Bench and ultimately the matter came up before the Supreme Court. The pivotal issue involved before the Supreme Court was whether a writ petition is maintainable against the private unaided educational institution in relation to a termination of a service of its teachers. The status of the educational institution in the above report as well as in the instant case stands on a same parity i.e the private unaided educational institution having no Government control over the functioning and administration of the school although they are affiliated with the State or the Central Board of education and governed by the Rules and the bye-laws thereof. The point was taken for consideration as to whether such private unaided educational institution having no aid or control of the Government or its instrumentality would be regarded as a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The point was taken for consideration as to whether such private unaided educational institution having no aid or control of the Government or its instrumentality would be regarded as a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court after taking into consideration the various judgments including an issue relating to public duties or involvement of a public element held that a distinction is to be drawn between an institution discharging the public duties and/or public functions and the steps/actions taken against its employee under the realm of a private law. It is held that the scope of a mandamus is basically limited to the enforcement of a public duty and, therefore, any matter brought before the Court in this regard is to be tested whether the cause of action so pleaded comes within the ambit of the nature of duties encompassing the public duty or in other words there is an involvement of a public law element in such action. In pursuit of deciding the said issue, the Apex Court also considers the relevant fact that such unaided private educational institution is affiliated to a statutory Board constituted by the Government to regulate its educational activities which is answered in the following: “68. In the aforesaid context, we may only say that merely because the State Government has the regulatory power, the same, by itself, would not confer any such status upon the institution (school) nor put any such obligations upon it which may be enforced through issue of a Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this regard, we may refer to and rely upon the decision of this Court in the case of Federal Bank (supra). While deciding whether a private bank that is regulated by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 discharges any public function, this Court held thus:- “33. … in our view, a private company carrying on banking business as a scheduled bank, cannot be termed as an institution or a company carrying on any statutory or public duty. A private body or a person may be amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. A private body or a person may be amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. We don’t find such conditions are fulfilled in respect of a private company carrying on a commercial activity of banking. Merely regulatory provisions to ensure such activity carried on by private bodies work within a discipline, do not confer any such status upon the company nor put any such obligation upon it which may be enforced through issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Present is a case of disciplinary action being taken against its employee by the appellant Bank. The respondent’s service with the Bank stands terminated. The action of the Bank was challenged by the respondent by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The respondent is not trying to enforce any statutory duty on the part of the bank.” 34. Thus, contracts of a purely private nature would not be subject to writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the fact that they are structured by statutory provisions. The only exception to this principle arises in a situation where the contract of service is governed or regulated by a statutory provision. Hence. for instance, in K.K. Saksena [K.K. Saxena v. International Commission on Irrigation & Drainage, (2015) 4 SCC 670 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 654 : (2015) 2 SCC (L &S) 119] this Court held that when an employee is a workman governed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it constitutes an exception to the general principle that a contract of personal service is not capable of being specifically enforced or performed. 35. It is of relevance to note that the Act was enacted to provide for the regulation and registration of clinical establishments with a view to prescribe minimum standards of facilities and services. The Act, inter alia, stipulates conditions to be satisfied by clinical establishments for registration. However, the Act does not govern contracts of service entered into by the hospital with respect to its employees. These fall within the ambit of purely private contracts, against which writ jurisdiction cannot lie. The sanctity of this distinction must be preserved. (Emphasis supplied)” 17. The Act, inter alia, stipulates conditions to be satisfied by clinical establishments for registration. However, the Act does not govern contracts of service entered into by the hospital with respect to its employees. These fall within the ambit of purely private contracts, against which writ jurisdiction cannot lie. The sanctity of this distinction must be preserved. (Emphasis supplied)” 17. Ultimately, the Apex Court held that though the writ petition against an institution or person or a body of person is maintainable if they discharge a public duty or the public functions either statutory or otherwise, but while ascertaining the same, the Court must take into account whether the person seeking the relief would achieve the collective benefit of the public or a section of it. It is further held that so far as the service related disputes are concerned between a private unaided educational institution and its teachers or employees does not involve a public duty or public element and, therefore, is outside the purview of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the following: “69. We may sum up our final conclusions as under:- (a) An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public. (b) Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element. (c) It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a “public function” or “public duty” be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service. (d) Even if it be perceived that imparting education by private unaided the school is a public duty within the expanded expression of the term, an employee of a non-teaching staff engaged by the school for the purpose of its administration or internal management is only an agency created by it. It is immaterial whether “A” or “B” is employed by school to discharge that duty. In any case, the terms of employment of contract between a school and non-teaching staff cannot and should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a particular employee. In any case, the terms of employment of contract between a school and non-teaching staff cannot and should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a particular employee. It is only where the removal of an employee of non-teaching staff is regulated by some statutory provisions, its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be interfered by the court. But such interference will be on the ground of breach of law and not on the basis of interference in discharge of public duty. (e) From the pleadings in the original writ petition, it is apparent that no element of any public law is agitated or otherwise made out. In other words, the action challenged has no public element and writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the action was essentially of a private character. 70. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the learned single Judge of the High Court was justified in taking the view that the original writ application filed by the respondent no. 1 herein under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. The Appeal Court could be said to have committed an error in taking a contrary view.” 18. The Co-ordinate Bench comprising one of us, (Harish Tandon, J.) in Narayana School, Barasat and Anr. Vs. Anisur Rahman and Ors. (2022) 2 CLT 466 held that the writ petition is not maintainable against the private unaided educational institution in relation to its employee in the following: “25. The law enunciated in the above reports leaves no ambiguity that the writ petition is maintainable against the private institution provided it discharges the public duties and most important public functions. Merely because a writ petition can be maintained against the private individuals discharging the public duties and/or public functions yet the writ petition is not maintainable if the enforcement is sought to be secured under the realm of private law. It would not be safe to say that the moment the private institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction yet every dispute concerning the said private institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction. It largely depends upon the nature of the dispute and the enforcement of the right by an individual against such institution. It would not be safe to say that the moment the private institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction yet every dispute concerning the said private institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction. It largely depends upon the nature of the dispute and the enforcement of the right by an individual against such institution. The right which purely originates from a private law cannot be enforced taking aid of the writ jurisdiction irrespective of the fact that such institution is discharging the public duties and/or public functions. The scope of the mandamus is basically limited to an enforcement of the public duty and, therefore, it is an ardent duty of the court to find out whether the nature of the duty comes within the peripheral of the public duty. There must be a public law element in any action. 27. The plea of the Respondent no. 1 that the appellant is affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary Education and guided and regulated by the bye-laws framed by it does not appear to be correct. The Central Board of Secondary Education though a statutory authority amenable under the writ jurisdiction but, his horizon is restricted to regulating, guiding and conducting the examinations and issuing certificates to the students. The said statutory authority does not have any direct or pervasive control over the private affairs of the institution except to the extent of affiliation nor the appointment of the teachers are required to be approved by it. The said Board has no control over the financial affairs of the institution nor over the functioning of the said institution except to the extent of imparting education in terms of the bye-laws. Even though one of the conditions of the bye-laws appears to have some remotest nexus to the cause of action pleaded in the writ but the same is within the circumference of the affiliation and does not impinge upon the private contracts. 28. We, therefore, do not find that the decision of the Single Bench in this regard can be sustained wherein it has been held that the appellant discharging the public duties and/or functions are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Writ Court and writ petition in this regard is maintainable. We have already held that the Respondent no. 28. We, therefore, do not find that the decision of the Single Bench in this regard can be sustained wherein it has been held that the appellant discharging the public duties and/or functions are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Writ Court and writ petition in this regard is maintainable. We have already held that the Respondent no. 1 has sought to enforce the rights emanating from the private law, even if the appellant being the private unaided educational institution is discharging the public duties/functions but the writ petition is not maintainable in relation to a cause of action pleaded in the writ petition. 19. In view of the discussion made hereinabove we do not find any infirmity and/or illegality in the impugned order. 20. The appeal is thus dismissed. 21. The connected application, if there by any, is also dismissed. 22. No order as to costs. 23. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be made available to the parties subject to compliance with the requisites formalities. I agree - Prasenjit Biswas, J.