In the High Court at Calcutta Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present :- The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and The Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya Case No. FA 46 of 2024 In the matter of : BRATATI GHOSH (DUTTA) …Appellant VS. SANTANU DUTTA …Respondent For the Appellant/Wife : Mr. Chittapriya Ghosh Mr. Goutam Acharya ….Advocates For the Respondent/Husband : Mr. BalaramPandit Mr. Krishna Deo Das ….Advocates Heard on : 15.07.2026 Judgment on : July 15, 2026. Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. :- 1. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/wife against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, whereby the appellant‟s suit for divorce was dismissed. Page 2 2. Learned counsel for appellant contends that as per the findings of the learned Trial Judge, the marriage was only a “pomp show”, which was evident when the wife stated in her cross-examination that the marriage was solemnized on a Thursday, she went to her matrimonial house on Friday, and on Sunday next, she returned to her paternal house. It was even stated on oath by the wife that she took three days‟ casual leave in August, 2015 and resided at her matrimonial house but did not think it necessary to stay a little further in her matrimonial home or take some more leaves, she being a government employee and not a new recruit. It was also recorded by the learned Trial Judge that the Court could not find anything from the evidence which goes to show that the respondent/husband had ever persuaded the petitioner/wife to remain in his house for a longer period or about his not being comfortable with the condition or his interest in trying to spend time together with the petitioner. 3. The Trial Court went on to find that there was no warmth in the matrimonial relationship and it was cold from the very initiation. 4. However, since the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not contained within the four corners of the statute, i.e., the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the learned Trial Judge refused to grant a decree of divorce. Page 3 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/wife places reliance on a judgment passed on the self-same day as the divorce suit; whereby a suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the respondent/husband was dismissed. 6. While dismissing the said suit, the learned Trial Judge came to the conclusion that the petitioner therein, i.e., the present respondent (husband), lacked interest in the marriage and from his conduct it was very clear that he had no intention in resuming his conjugal right with the respondent (wife) after being separated. 7. Learned counsel argues that in view of the restitution suit having been dismissed on such findings, no useful purpose would be subserved in keeping the marriage alive. 8. In such context, learned counsel places reliance on a judgment passed by this Court in the matter of Dr. Soma Mandal Debnath Vs. TanmoyDebnath, reported at 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 165, where, by placing reliance on the judgment of Rakesh Raman Vs. Kavita, reported at (2023) 17 SCC 433, this Court held that although irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for dissolution of marriage, but cruelty has been incorporated via the route of irretrievable breakdown of marriage into the definition of „cruelty‟ as contemplated in the matrimonial laws of India. Page 4 9. Learned counsel also places reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Rakesh Raman (supra) for the self-same proposition that where a marital relationship has become bitter and acrimonious over the years, it does nothing but inflict cruelty on both sides. To keep the facade of this broken marriage alive would be doing injustice to both the parties. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court went on to observe that a marriage which has broken down irretrievably spells cruelty to both the parties, as in such a relationship each party is treating the other with cruelty. More crucially, it was observed that it is, therefore, a ground for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 10. In view of the findings of the learned Trial Judge as to the marriage between the parties having broken down irretrievably, it is argued that the same should be dissolved by granting a decree of divorce. 11. Learned counsel reiterates that factually, the marriage took place on July 23, 2015 and the parties separated in the year 2016 and, since then, they are living separately. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/husband, after conclusion of arguments of the appellant, suggests to the Court that the matter may be sent for mediation. Page 5 13. However, learned counsel for the appellant/wife denies such suggestion, primarily on the ground that a previous effort of mediation by the Mediation Committee of this Court had failed. 14. That apart, we find that the suggestion being made in the midst of hearing of the appeal, particularly, in view of the appellant having disagreed to the same, is apparently for the sole purpose of showing that the husband is still agreeable to continue the marriage; otherwise, such suggestion ought to have come much earlier. 15. Be that as it may, on merits, learned counsel for the respondent argues that the factual matrix of Rakesh Raman (supra)was different from the present case. 16. Learned counsel submits that in the said case, the parties had been living separately for over 25 years and as such, since the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had observed that there were multiple litigations between the parties, the relationship was embittered and the marriage had broken down irretrievably. 17. As opposed thereto, in the present case, from the evidence it would be clear that the respondent/husband all along tried to reconcile. Page 6 18. Efforts at resolution of the issue by intervention of other well- wishers were also taken by the respondent/husband but failed due to the resistance of the appellant/wife. Thus, it is submitted that the respondent was never willing to part with the appellant/wife. Hence, it cannot be said that merely due to the adamant attitude of the wife, the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably. 19. Upon hearing learned counsel, the primary question which arises is whether the learned Trial Judge was justified in refusing to grant a decree of divorce, despite virtually having held that the marriage between the parties has broken down beyond repair, only on the ground that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not spelt out as a ground in terms in the Hindu Marriage Act or, for that matter,in any other matrimonial law in India. 20. Such conundrum has been resolved by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in its judgment, Rakesh Raman (supra). 21. Paragraph nos.20, 22 and 23 of the said judgment would be germane in the context and are reproduced below:- “...20. Matrimonial cases before the courts pose a different challenge, quite unlike any other, as we are dealing with human relationships with its bundle of emotions, with all its faults and frailties. It is not possible in every case to pinpoint to an act of Page 7 “cruelty” or blameworthy conduct of the spouse. The nature of relationship, the general behaviour of the parties towards each other, or long separation between the two are relevant factors which a court must take into consideration. In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh [Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511] a three-Judge Bench of this Court had dealt in detail as to what would constitute cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act. An important guideline in the above decision is on the approach of a court in determining cruelty. What has to be examined here is the entire matrimonial relationship, as cruelty may not be in a violent act or acts but in a given case has to be gathered from injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations, taunts, etc. The Court relied on the definition of cruelty in matrimonial relationships in Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. 13, 4th Edn., Para 1269, p. 602) which must be reproduced here: “The general rule in all cases of cruelty is that the entire matrimonial relationship must be considered, and that rule is of special value when the cruelty consists not of violent acts but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations or taunts. In cases where no violence is averred, it is undesirable to consider judicial pronouncements with a view to creating certain categories of acts or conduct as having or lacking the nature or quality which renders them capable or incapable in all Page 8 circumstances of amounting to cruelty; for it is the effect of the conduct rather than its nature which is of paramount importance in assessing a complaint of cruelty. Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact and previously decided cases have little, if any, value. The court should bear in mind the physical and mental condition of the parties as well as their social status, and should consider the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other, weighing all incidents and quarrels between the spouses from that point of view; further, the conduct alleged must be examined in the light of the complainant's capacity for endurance and the extent to which that capacity is known to the other spouse. Malevolent intention is not essential to cruelty but it is an important element where it exists.” ... 22. Irretrievable breakdown of a marriage may not be a ground for dissolution of marriage, under the Hindu Marriage Act, but cruelty is. A marriage can be dissolved by a decree of divorce, inter alia, on the ground when the other party “has, after the solemnisation of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty” [ Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955] . 23. In our considered opinion, a marital relationship which has only become more bitter and Page 9 acrimonious over the years, does nothing but inflict cruelty on both the sides. To keep the façade of this broken marriage alive would be doing injustice to both the parties. A marriage which has broken down irretrievably, in our opinion spells cruelty to both the parties, as in such a relationship each party is treating the other with cruelty. It is therefore a ground for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act” 22. From the above discussions, it is crystal clear that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that a marital relationship, which has only become bitter and acrimonious over the years, does nothing but inflict cruelty on both the sides. To keep the facade of the broken marriage alive would be doing injustice to both the parties. Thus, irretrievable breakdown of marriage, in the opinion of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, spells cruelty to both the parties, and, as such, amounts to cruelty by the parties to each other. On such premise, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court brought the irretrievable breakdown concept within the ambit of cruelty as envisaged in Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 23. From a meaningful reading of the said judgment, it is evident that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in the said case, did not merely invoke Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice between the parties but laid down the law on the subject Page 10 upon taking into consideration several previous judgments holding the field and the provisions in question. Hence, the ratio laid down in Rakesh Raman (supra) tantamounts to a precedent within the contemplation of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and has the same force as statute law. 24. It is precisely such proposition which was recognized in Dr. Soma Mandal Debnath (supra) by this Court. 25. In such view of the matter, in the teeth of the multiple observations of the learned Trial Judge to the effect that the marriage between the parties has in fact been a non-starter from the very beginning and never fructified in a conjugal relationship between the parties worth the name and since the relationship between the parties, even if any, is long past its twilight, the parties being separate for more than ten years, there is no reason as to why the proposition laid down in Rakesh Raman (supra) should not be applied to the present case as well. 26. The respondent/husband argues that the appellant/wife cannot take advantage of her own wrong in not coming back to the matrimonial home and residing with the husband despite the respondent/husband seeking a reunion of the parties. Page 11 27. However, since no challenge has been preferred by the respondent/husband to the dismissal of the respondent‟s suit for restitution of conjugal rights, it is evident that the conduct of the husband is entirely devoid of animus revertendi. 28. In the absence of any desire to resume their conjugal rights on the part of the husband as well, as was explicitly found by the learned Trial Judge in the judgment dismissing the husband‟s suit for restitution of conjugal rights, it is clear that both parties participated in the severance of the conjugal bond between themselves. 29. The learned Trial Judge, conspicuously, observed in the impugned judgment that there was nothing from the evidence to show that the husband had ever persuaded the appellant/wife to remain in his house for a longer period and that the parties were comfortable with the condition that the wife would only occasionally visit the matrimonial home. Hence, it cannot be said that it was one-sided stonewalling by the appellant/wife which resulted in the breakdown of the marriage between the parties. Such breakdown, to say the least, has been participatory on the part of both parties. 30. In such view of the matter, we find no useful purpose to be subserved in keeping the dead marriage between the parties alive Page 12 merely due to legal technicalities. Even otherwise, in view of the proposition laid down in Rakesh Raman(supra), it has been recognized by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that irretrievable breakdown of marriage between the parties for a considerable period without any chance of restitution itself tantamounts to cruelty by the parties to each other, coming within the ambit of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, thus entitling the parties to a divorce decree against each other. 31. Before parting with the matter, we also take note of the fact that by not preferring any appeal against the dismissal of his own suit for restitution of conjugal rights, the respondent/husband had acceded to the parties parting ways with each other. 32. Thus, in view of the above observations, FA No.46 of 2024 is allowed on contest by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree dated August 24, 2023 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Second Court at Contai, District – PurbaMedinipur in Matrimonial Suit No.93 of 2017; thereby decreeing the said suit by granting a divorce to the appellant/wife against the respondent/husband. 33. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 34. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. Page 13 35. A formal decree be drawn up accordingly. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) I agree. (Supratim Bhattacharya, J.) 15.07.2026 Item no. DL 7 Court No. 16 Asraf, A.R.(Ct.)