OD-16 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ORIGINAL SIDE APO/97/2024 With EC/190/2023 IA No. GA/2/2024 RAJESH SANEI AND OTHERS -VS- RAVI SANEI BEFORE: The Hon’ble JUSTICE DEBANGSU BASAK -AND- The Hon’ble JUSTICE MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI For the Appellants : Mr. Sourojit Dasgupta, Adv. Mr. Vishwarup Acharyya, Adv. For the Respondent : Mr. Rupak Ghosh, Adv. Ms. Antalina Guha, Adv. Ms. Harshita Purohit, Adv. For the UCO Bank : Mr. Aniruddha Saha Ray, Adv. HEARD ON : 14.07.2026 DELIVERED ON : 14.07.2026 DEBANGSU BASAK, J.:- 1. Appeal is directed against judgment and order dated February 23, 2024 passed in GA/1/2023 in EC/190/2023. 2. By the impugned judgment and order, learned Executing Court dismissed the application of the appellant being GA/1/2023 seeking dismissal of the execution petition. 3. Learned advocate appearing for the appellant submits that, the parties to the execution proceeding entered into an agreement 2 dated March 15, 2017. Such agreement dated March 15, 2017 contains an arbitration clause. He submits that, in the suit filed by the respondent herein, a compromise decree was passed on April 5, 2017 on the basis of the agreement dated March 15, 2017. 4. Relying upon 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3446 (Atul Chopra & Ors. Vs. Technotree Corporation & Ors.), learned advocate appearing for the appellants submits that, since the compromise decree refers to the agreement dated March 15, 2017 and since the agreement dated March 15, 2017 contains an arbitration clause, the execution petition was not maintainable. It was for the plaintiff in the suit to refer the disputes arising out of the compromise decree to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause contained in the agreement dated March 15, 2017. The plaintiff i.e. the respondent herein not doing so, the execution petition itself was not maintainable. Therefore, the appellants were entitled to the relief of dismissal of the execution proceeding and vacating of all orders passed in such execution petition. 5. Learned advocate appearing for the appellants submits without prejudice to the earlier contentions, as noted above, that the compromise decree was incapable of execution. Compromise decree refers to an effort being made by the appellants to obtain release of the personal guarantees of the respondent from the bank. The appellants are in contact with the relevant banks. Such portion of the compromise decree cannot be put into execution. 3 6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submits that, the respondent stood as guarantor in respect of credit facilities obtained by the appellants from various banks. The respondent was constrained to file a suit where a compromise decree was entered into. He refers to the compromise decree dated April 5, 2017. He submits that, the compromise decree records that, a fresh terms of settlement was entered into between the parties. The terms of settlement formed part of the compromise decree. Such terms of settlement, however, also refer to the agreement dated March 15, 2017. 7. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submits that, the compromise decree is on the basis of a fresh terms of settlement. The events culminating into such terms of settlement and the passing of the compromise decree, notes the agreement dated March 15, 2017. He submits that, disputes and differences between the parties to the suit stood settled in terms of the terms of settlement on the basis of which, compromise decree was passed. Question therefore, not applying for execution of the compromise decree does not arise. 8. We find from the records that, the appellants and the respondent obtained credit facilities from various banks and financial institutions. Respondent stood as personal guarantor for such credit facilities. 9. Disputes and differences arose between the appellants and the respondent. Respondent filed a suit being Civil Suit no. 330 of 4 2014 in relation to such disputes and differences. Such disputes and differences ultimately culminated into agreement dated March 15, 2017. Such agreement contained an arbitration clause. 10. Disputes and differences persist amongst the parties subsequent to the agreement dated March 15, 2017. A fresh term of settlement was entered into by the parties to the suit. This fresh terms of settlement resulted in the compromise decree dated April 5, 2017 being passed. Compromise decree dated April 5, 2017 states that, parties settled their disputes covered in Civil Suit No. 330 of 2014 on the basis of the terms and conditions mentioned in the terms of settlement. 11. The agreement dated March 15, 2017 is referred to in the compromise decree as an event which occurred between the parties. The body of the compromise decree states that, the suit is decreed on the basis of the terms of settlement entered into between the parties. 12. The terms of settlement which is a schedule to the compromise decree, as noted above, refers to the agreement dated March 15, 2017 as an event which occurred between the parties. It does not in our view purport to say that, in the event any dispute and difference cropping up with regard to the execution of the compromise decree, the same is required to be referred to arbitration. 13. In Atul Chopra & Ors. (Supra), the compromise decree itself provided for a dispute resolution being clause no. 20 of the 5 settlement agreement. It stated that any dispute arising out of or in connection with such agreement including the question regarding its existence, validity and termination shall be referred to arbitration. 14. In our view, disputes and differences which were required to be referred to arbitration in terms of the agreement dated March 15, 2017 stood settled by the fresh terms of settlement which formed part of the compromise decree. 15. Respondent herein put the decree into execution. In such execution proceeding, as noted above, appellants applied by way of GA/1/2023 for dismissal of such execution proceeding. Learned Trial Judge did not accept the contention of the appellants. 16. We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the Learned Executing Court. 17. The execution petition, per se, cannot be said to be not maintainable or the compromise decree cannot be termed to be not executable. 18. In view of the above discussions, APO/97/2024 along with connected application is dismissed, without any order as to costs. (DEBANGSU BASAK, J.) 19. I agree. (MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.) sp3