IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present: The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) CRR 4678 of 2024 Ajay Kumar Bardia & Ors. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr. For the Petitioners : Mr. Moyukh Mukherjee, Mr. Keshav Daruka, Mr. Koustav Lal Mukherjee, Ms. Sagnika Banerjee, Ms. Sarmistha Basak. For the Opposite Party No. 2 : Mr. Soumya Nag, Mr. Aditya Tiwari, Ms. Debanjana De, Mr. Arijit Basu Mullick. For the State : Mr. Sagar Saha. Judgment reserved on : 30.06.2026 Judgment delivered on : 14.07.2026 SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. : 1. The revisional application has been preferred praying for setting aside of the order dated 27.08.2024 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bidhannagar in connection with Bidhannagar Electronics Complex Police Station Case No. 299 of 2021 dated 15.12.2021 under Sections 420/406/464/467/468/469/471/120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 now pending before the Additional Page 2 Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bidhannagar, North 24 Parganas (Corresponding to GR Case No. 1515 of 2021; CIS:120 of 2023). 2. Vide the impugned order, the learned Magistrate while considering an application dated 02.05.2024 filed by the accused persons under Section 239 Cr.P.C. praying for discharge from the case, considered an application submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and relying upon a judgment of the High Court, allowed the application filed by the Additional Public Prosecutor and thereby directed re- investigation in the said case. 3. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the revisional application, praying for quashing of the said order, and other reliefs. 4. Heard learned counsels for the parties including the learned public prosecutor. 5. Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. provide as follows:- “173…………………………………………………………… …. (8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, wherein upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such Page 3 report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2).” 6. In Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya Vs The State of Gujarat on 16.10.2019 in Original Appeal 478-479 of 2017, a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held:- “9. The question of law that therefore arises in this case is whether, after a charge-sheet is filed by the police, the Magistrate has the power to order further investigation, and if so, up to what stage of a criminal proceeding. 38. However, having given our considered thought to the principles stated in these judgments, we are of the view that the Magistrate before whom a report under Section 173(2) of the Code is filed, is empowered in law to direct “further investigation” and require the police to submit a further or a supplementary report. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Bhagwant Singh [Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] has, in no uncertain terms, stated that principle, as aforenoticed. 40. Having analysed the provisions of the Code and the various judgments as aforeindicated, we would state the following conclusions in regard to the powers of a Magistrate in terms of Section 173(2) read with Section 173(8) and Section 156(3) of the Code: 40.1. The Magistrate has no power to direct “reinvestigation” or “fresh investigation” (de novo) in the case initiated on the basis of a police report. 40.2. A Magistrate has the power to direct “further investigation” after filing of a police report in terms of Section 173(6) of the Code. 40.3. The view expressed in Sub-para 40.2 above is in conformity with the principle of law stated in Page 4 Bhagwant Singh case [Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] by a three- Judge Bench and thus in conformity with the doctrine of precedent. 40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific provision therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of the provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power would have to be read into the language of Section 173(8). 40.5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it must receive a construction which would advance the cause of justice and legislative object sought to be achieved. It does not stand to reason that the legislature provided power of further investigation to the police even after filing a report, but intended to curtail the power of the court to the extent that even where the facts of the case and the ends of justice demand, the court can still not direct the investigating agency to conduct further investigation which it could do on its own. 40.6. It has been a procedure of propriety that the police has to seek permission of the court to continue “further investigation” and file supplementary charge- sheet. This approach has been approved by this Court in a number of judgments. This as such would support the view that we are taking in the present case.” xxx xxx xxx 48. What ultimately is the aim or significance of the expression “fair and proper investigation” in criminal jurisprudence? It has a twin purpose: Firstly, the investigation must be unbiased, honest, just and in accordance with law; secondly, the entire emphasis on a fair investigation has to be to bring out the truth of the case before the court of competent jurisdiction. Once these twin paradigms of fair investigation are satisfied, there will be the least requirement for the court of law to interfere with the investigation, much Page 5 less quash the same, or transfer it to another agency. Bringing out the truth by fair and investigative means in accordance with law would essentially repel the very basis of an unfair, tainted investigation or cases of false implication. Thus, it is inevitable for a court of law to pass a specific order as to the fate of the investigation, which in its opinion is unfair, tainted and in violation of the settled principles of investigative canons. 49. Now, we may examine another significant aspect which is how the provisions of Section 173(8) have been understood and applied by the courts and investigating agencies. It is true that though there is no specific requirement in the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code to conduct “further investigation” or file supplementary report with the leave of the court, the investigating agencies have not only understood but also adopted it as a legal practice to seek permission of the courts to conduct “further investigation” and file “supplementary report” with the leave of the court. The courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken a similar view. The requirement of seeking prior leave of the court to conduct “further investigation” and/or to file a “supplementary report” will have to be read into, and is a necessary implication of the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The doctrine of contemporanea expositio will fully come to the aid of such interpretation as the matters which are understood and implemented for a long time, and such practice that is supported by law should be accepted as part of the interpretative process. 50. Such a view can be supported from two different points of view: firstly, through the doctrine of precedent, as aforenoticed, since quite often the courts have taken such a view, and, secondly, the investigating agencies which have also so understood and applied the principle. The matters which are understood and implemented as a legal practice and are not opposed to the basic rule of law would be good practice and such interpretation would be permissible with the aid of doctrine of contemporanea expositio. Even otherwise, to seek such leave of the Page 6 court would meet the ends of justice and also provide adequate safeguard against a suspect/accused. 51. We have already noticed that there is no specific embargo upon the power of the learned Magistrate to direct “further investigation” on presentation of a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. Any other approach or interpretation would be in contradiction to the very language of Section 173(8) and the scheme of the Code for giving precedence to proper administration of criminal justice. The settled principles of criminal jurisprudence would support such approach, particularly when in terms of Section 190 of the Code, the Magistrate is the competent authority to take cognizance of an offence. It is the Magistrate who has to decide whether on the basis of the record and documents produced, an offence is made out or not, and if made out, what course of law should be adopted in relation to committal of the case to the court of competent jurisdiction or to proceed with the trial himself. In other words, it is the judicial conscience of the Magistrate which has to be satisfied with reference to the record and the documents placed before him by the investigating agency, in coming to the appropriate conclusion in consonance with the principles of law. It will be a travesty of justice, if the court cannot be permitted to direct “further investigation” to clear its doubt and to order the investigating agency to further substantiate its charge-sheet. The satisfaction of the learned Magistrate is a condition precedent to commencement of further proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction. Whether the Magistrate should direct “further investigation” or not is again a matter which will depend upon the facts of a given case. The learned Magistrate or the higher court of competent jurisdiction would direct “further investigation” or “reinvestigation” as the case may be, on the facts of a given case. Where the Magistrate can only direct further investigation, the courts of higher jurisdiction can direct further, reinvestigation or even investigation de novo depending on the facts of a given case. It will be the specific order of the court that would determine the nature of investigation. In this regard, we may Page 7 refer to the observations made by this Court in Sivanmoorthy v. State [(2010) 12 SCC 29: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 295].” 34. ……………………….. “10. However, considering the observations made by the learned Magistrate and the deficiency in the investigation pointed out by the learned Magistrate and the ultimate goal is to book and/or punish the real culprit, it will be open for the investigating officer to submit a proper application before the learned Magistrate for further investigation and conduct fresh investigation and submit the further report in exercise of powers under Section 173(8) CrPC and thereafter the learned Magistrate to consider the same in accordance with law and on its own merits.” 38. There is no good reason given by the Court in these decisions as to why a Magistrate‟s powers to order further investigation would suddenly cease upon process being issued, and an accused appearing before the Magistrate, while concomitantly, the power of the police to further investigate the offence continues right till the stage the trial commences. Such a view would not accord with the earlier judgments of this Court, in particular, Sakiri (supra), Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (supra), Vinay Tyagi (supra), and Hardeep Singh (supra); Hardeep Singh (supra) having clearly held that a criminal trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only after charges are framed. What is not given any importance at all in the recent judgments of this Court is Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that the Article demands no less than a fair and just investigation. To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate‟s nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases mid- way through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out Page 8 for further investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h), and Section 173(8) of the CrPC, as has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually commences. It would also be in the interest of justice that this power be exercised suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether further investigation should or should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such discretion on the facts of each case and in accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts come to light which would lead to inculpating or exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and doing substantial justice in a criminal case are more important than avoiding further delay being caused in concluding the criminal proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi (supra). Therefore, to the extent that the judgments in Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Ranjan Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they stand overruled. Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration) (1997) 1 SCC 361 and Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand overruled.” 7. By a Judgment dated 12.10.2022 the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1768 of 2022 (Devendra Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar & Ors.) relying upon several precedents including Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya Vs The State of Gujarat (Supra) held:- “12.5. The case of Divine Retreat Centre (supra) has had the peculiarity of its own. Therein, the Criminal Case bearing No. 381 of 2005 had been Page 9 registered at Koratty Police Station on the allegations made by a female remand prisoner that while taking shelter in the appellant-Centre, she was subjected to molestation and exploitation and she became pregnant; and thereafter, when she came out of the Centre to attend her sister‟s marriage, she was implicated in a false theft case and lodged in jail. Parallel to these proceedings, an anonymous petition as also other petitions were received in the High Court, which were registered as a suo motu criminal case. In that case, the High Court, while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, directed that the said Criminal Case No. 381 of 2005 be taken away from the investigating officer and be entrusted to the Special Investigating Team („SIT‟). The High Court also directed the said SIT to investigate/inquire into other allegations levelled in the anonymous petition filed against the appellant-Centre. However, this Court did not approve the order so passed by the High Court and in that context, while observing that no unlimited and arbitrary jurisdiction was conferred on the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, explained the circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised as also the responsibilities of the investigating officers, inter alia, in the following words: - “27. In our view, there is nothing like unlimited arbitrary jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The power has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution only where such exercise is justified by the tests laid down in the section itself. It is well settled that Section 482 does not confer any new power on the High Court but only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. There are three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order 29 under the Code, ( ii ) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and ( iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.” 8. Thus as the impugned order dated 27.08.2024 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bidhannagar, Page 10 directs re-investigation and not further investigation, the same being not in accordance with the direction of the High Court in CRR 245 of 2020 dated 24.02.2022, is quashed and set aside. 9. The learned 2nd Additional Judicial Magistrate, Basirhat shall hear the application under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. afresh, by following the guidelines in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (Supra), and decide the application by passing a reasoned order in accordance with law within 30 days from the date of communication of this order. 10. CRR 4678 of 2024 is disposed of. 11. All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of. 12. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 13. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary compliance. 14. Urgent certified website copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities. [Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.]