IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD Criminal Appeal No. 686 of 2024 Bhaskar S/o Sarjerao Shirsath Versus 1. State of Maharashtra 2. Sitaram S/o Shripati Karanje Mr. A. L. Kanade, Advocate for the Appellant (original complaint) Mr. S. B. Narwade, APP for the Respondent/State Mr. N. B. Patekar, Advocate for Respondent No. 2 (original Accused) CORAM : R. M. JOSHI, J. DATED : 21th AUGUST, 2026 PER COURT :- 1. This appeal filed under Section 14A of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 takes exception to the order dated 14/03/2024 passed in Special Case No. 733 of 2020 by Additional Session Judge, Ahmednagar whereby present Respondent No. 2 came to be discharged for the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r)(s) of Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocity) Act. 2. In short, it is the case of the prosecution that the present applicant/original informant-Bhaskar Sarjerao Shirsath, belonging to the 'Hindu Mang' community 1 of 8 2026:BHC-AUG:38465 which is categorised as Scheduled Caste. He earns his livelihood through masonry work and daily wage labor. The accused persons i.e. Respondent No.2 is the Original accused-Sitaram Shreepat Karanje who is the owner of fair price shop and Kadubal Dada Bhumkar works as a grain distributor in Respondent No.2’s shop belong to the Maratha community. On 27/09/2020 at about 07:30 AM, the Applicant/informant accompanied along with his mother came to the fair price shop to collect their monthly ration. When the present Applicant/informant requested Kadubal to distribute grain expeditiously so he could leave for work, accused Kadubal insulted him and hurled caste-based slurs, addressing him as "Mangtya". After the informant and his mother provided their thumb impressions, the accused handed over 30 kg of rice and directed them to return later for the remaining 50 kg quota of grain. Thereafter, when the Applicant/informant sent his son, Ashish, to fetch the balance grain, the accused insisted that the Applicant/informant daughter be brought to give a thumb impression. After some time the present Applicant/informant accompanied his son back to the shop of Respondent No.2 to inquire about the alleged comment on his daughter. Upon questioning, Respondent No.2/Original accused grabbed the Applicant/informant by his collar and intentionally insulted him in the presence of witnesses who are residents of the same village by uttering casteist slurs, saying "Mangtya, what can you possibly do?". Frightened and humiliated by the physical assault and public insult, the informant left without taking the remaining grain. Subsequently, crime was lodged by the present Applicant/Informant, and 2 of 8 chargesheet was filed, supplementary statements of witnesses came to be recorded, so also their statements under section 164. 3. Learned Counsel for the Applicant/Original Informant submits that this is a case wherein offences are made on prima facie perusal of Record, so also version narrated in the FIR and Chargesheet corroborates with the statement of independent witnesses recorded. To support the above contention, he drew the attention of the court to statements of witnesses recorded under section 161 as well as under section 164 of CRPC to show that casteist abuses/slurs were hurled and he was humiliated in public View. It's further argued that the Learned Special Court has committed an error in appreciating statement of present Applicant/informant discharging the Respondent No. 2 on erroneous/incorrect observations that offence is not made out when there are specific overt allegations attributed to the Respondent No. 2 of he hurling casteist slurs and humiliating the Present Applicant/informant publically. It's further contended that an FIR was belatedly registered by the wife of the Respondent No.2 by way of counterblast to pressurize the present Applicants. To support the above submission, reliance is placed upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of HITESH VERMA vs STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANOTHER reported in (2020) 10 SCC 710. 4. The Learned APP supports the case of Appellant. 3 of 8 5. Learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 opposed the grant of any relief to the present Applicant. He contends that from the bare perusal of the investigation papers it's evident that offence is not made out, so also the statement of the witnesses recorded cannot be relied upon as they are not independent witnesses and they are acquainted with present Applicant. To substantiate the above submissions, the attention of the court is drawn to order impugned dated 14/03/2023 to show that an FIR was belatedly registered by wife of Respondent No.2, so also it is rightly observed by the Special Judge about offence being not made out which indicates that statement of witnesses are unreliable, omnibus and Vague. 6. At the outset, it needs to be recorded that the Learned Special Court passed Order impugned discharging present Respondent No.2/Original Accused on the premise that in the statement recorded under section 164 of CrPC, there are no allegations with regards to abuses over caste. This finding however is contrary to the said Statement. A bare perusal of it shows presence of statement indicating cast abuse. 7. There is no dispute about the fact that the investigation into the crime is concluded with the filing of the chargesheet. Perusal of prima facie evidence on record shows that the present Applicant/informant along with his mother went to 4 of 8 collect grains from the ration shop of Respondent No.2., where he was abused on his caste and was directed to collect remains grains later that day. Thereafter, when the present Applicant along with his son came to inquire about offensive comment made on his daughter, it is specifically alleged that Respondent No.2. assaulted the Applicant/informant in front of villagers by grabbing his collar/scruff and subsequently hurling casteist abuses by calling him “Mangtya, what can you possibly do?” which shows the complicity of the Respondent No.2. in the present crime about he assaulting and hurling casteist slurs in “Public View”. 8. At this stage, in order to appreciate above observations, reference can be made to the Judgement relied on by the Applicant of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of HITESH VERMA (Supra) wherein elements to constitute an offence under section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is interpreted and elucidated as under: “ 14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane 5 of 8 outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic)". The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) "28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a 6 of 8 private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies." ” (emphasis in original) 9. With regards to the statement of Witnesses, the perusal of same indicates that the Applicant/informant was assaulted by the present Respondent No.2 and casteist slurs were being hurled at present Applicant in their presence. This corroborates the version of Victim/Informant and his statement recorded under 164 of CrPC. At this stage genuinity of statement of these witnesses cannot be considered as it will be subject matter to be substantiated in the course of trial. 10. In so far as the impugned order of discharge dated 14/03/2023 passed by Special Court discharging the accused for want of allegations with regards to abuses over caste is concerned, the record clearly indicates assault caused and casteist abuse being hurled by Respondent No.2 on the present Applicant. The learned Special Judge has, prima facie, committed error in not considering the alleged utterances made by respondent No.2 against the Applicant/informant to be abused over the caste in the order impugned. 7 of 8 11. In view of the above discussion and on Perusal of the charge-sheet, so also the evidence collected during the course of investigation, prima facie offence alleged is made out against Respondent No.2. As such, the order impugned cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. 12. The Appeal is allowed in terms of prayer clause “B”. 13. The above observations are prima facie in nature and shall not prejudice the parties during the course of trial. ( R. M. JOSHI, J.) Malani 8 of 8