JUDGMENT : ARINDAM SINHA, J. 1. Appellant was wife in the marriage dissolved by impugned judgment dated 29th November, 2021 made by the Family Court. The dissolution was on ground of cruelty and desertion. Controversy between the parties before us is quantum of permanent alimony. Mr. Rath, learned senior advocate appears on behalf of appellant and Mr. Das, learned advocate, for respondent. 2. On 30th April, 2024 Mr. Rath had drawn our attention to impugned judgment to submit, ruling on issue no.5 is to be adjudicated in the appeal as erroneous. Though the Family Court correctly appreciated that even where the husband had made out a case for divorce the wife is entitled to permanent alimony for her sustenance, as declared by the Supreme Court in K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa , reported in AIR 2013 SC 2176 and U. Shree v. U. Srinivas , reported in AIR 2013 SC 41, it is thereafter that said Court erred in saying there is no admitted evidence on record as to respondent-husband’s assets, besides his salary. Without prejudice he submits, the Supreme Court in Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v. Rita Dey Chowdhury , reported in (2017) 14 SCC 200 had approved permanent alimony calculated factoring in 25% of the salary. His client filed affidavit of assets in the interim maintenance proceeding, following direction of the Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha , reported in AIR 2021 SC 569 . She disclosed to the Court, respondent’s income is Rs.1.5 lakh per month. He drew attention to order dated 26th October, 2021 made in the interim maintenance proceeding to demonstrate so. Respondent-husband did not and has not filed his affidavit. 3. Mr. Rath commented on aforesaid authorities beginning with Rajnesh v. Neha (supra). He drew attention to paragraph-72 and several supplementary paragraphs thereunder to submit, there were directions given, to be mandatorily followed, not complied with by respondent-husband at trial, resulting in impugned judgment. He also relied on Aditi Alias Mithi v. Jitesh Sharma , available at 2023 SCC Online SC 1451 paragraphs-9 and 15. He then relied upon view taken by a learned single Judge in the Calcutta High Court on order dated 8th February, 2023 in CO 138 of 2022 ( Nripendra Chandra Mahanta v. Smt. Pramila Mahanta ). He submitted, evidence laid before the Family Court was not considered. It is a fit case for remand. He then relied upon view taken by a learned single Judge in the Calcutta High Court on order dated 8th February, 2023 in CO 138 of 2022 ( Nripendra Chandra Mahanta v. Smt. Pramila Mahanta ). He submitted, evidence laid before the Family Court was not considered. It is a fit case for remand. Impugned judgment be set aside in appeal with the direction. 4. Today Mr. Das submits, there should be no interference in appeal. Appellant did not stay with his client for any time longer than aggregate of four months, interrupted by her going away to her paternal house. The marriage was solemnized on 19th April, 2000. His client lost his youth. There was no issue from the marriage. Cruelty and desertion having had been proved, appellant should not be rewarded therefor. He submits further, aggregate sum in excess of Rs.6,50,000/- was paid by his client during pendency of the proceeding before the Family Court. Reasons given by the Family Court on issue no.5, to answer it by directing payment of Rs.12,00,000/- as permanent alimony, do not warrant interference in appeal. His client had deposited the amount by tender to this Court, on demand draft issued in favour of appellant. 5. Section 25 in HINDU MARRIAGE ACT , 1955 gives discretion to the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to, inter alia, at the time of passing any decree, order that either the wife or the husband shall pay for the other’s maintenance and support, such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding life of the payee spouse. This order is to be made having regard to the payee’s own income and other property if any, the income or other property of the payor spouse, conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case as may seem to the Court to be just. Thus we see there is a great deal of discretion given to the trial Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act. This is because before said Court the parties obtain adjudication on their rival contentions, at trial. The Court also has benefit of observing conduct of the parties appearing before it. 6. In this case appellant has not challenged findings as stated in impugned judgment, of cruelty nor desertion. The marriage was solemnized on 19th April, 2000. This is because before said Court the parties obtain adjudication on their rival contentions, at trial. The Court also has benefit of observing conduct of the parties appearing before it. 6. In this case appellant has not challenged findings as stated in impugned judgment, of cruelty nor desertion. The marriage was solemnized on 19th April, 2000. Case of desertion made out on facts, accepted by the trial Court is that appellant deserted respondent on 1st December, 2000. 7. Spouses in a marriage have reciprocal obligations towards each other. On dissolution of the marriage, a continuing obligation on a spouse is to pay the disadvantaged spouse, maintenance, either on a periodical sum or as a gross sum being permanent alimony. The trial Court found appellant had meted out cruelty to respondent and had deserted him. In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh , reported in (2007) 4 SCC 511 the Supreme Court gave several instances, which may amount to mental cruelty. In Malathi Ravi v. B.V. Ravi , reported in (2014) 7 SCC 640 the Supreme Court interpreted desertion as total repudiation of obligations of the marriage. The Supreme Court said, desertion for purpose of seeking divorce means intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent and without reasonable cause. In other words, the Court said, it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. 8. We see that in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), it was a criminal appeal arising out of claim for interim maintenance made under section 125 in Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that reached the Supreme Court. Guidelines were laid down in exercise of power of said Court under articles 136 and 142 in the Constitution of India, as said in paragraph 72 of the judgment. Article 136 is reproduced below. “Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court. – (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. The Supreme Court subsequently in Allahabad High Court Bar Association v. State of U.P., reported in (2024) 6 SCC 267 interpreted scope of article 142. The Court said, inter alia, the jurisdiction under article 142 can be invoked only to deal with extraordinary situations for doing complete justice between the parties before it. 9. The Family Court gave reasons for answering issue no.5 on permanent alimony. The reasons, as in paragraph-7 of impugned judgment, are reproduced below. “Issue No.v. Is the respondent entitled to get permanent alimony from the petitioner ? 07. No doubt, the petitioner has already made out a case of divorce by proving desertion and mental cruelty against the respondent-wife. In the case of K. Srinivas Rao vs. D.A. Deepa reported in AIR (2013) SC 2176 and U. Shree v. U. Srinivas reported in AIR (2013) SC 41, it has been held that despite the fact that the husband has made out a case for divorce proving mental cruelty, the wife is entitled to permanent alimony for her sustenance. It appears from the pleadings of the respondent that she has been staying at her father’s house since long. She has completed her post graduation in Anthropology. She has no independent income of her own. She depends upon her parents for her sustenance. As per her disclosure statements, she is now at the age of 45 years and her educational qualification is M.A. She is at her parental home. She has no child. She depends upon her parents for her medical treatment, if any. She has no employment or engagement. She has a vacant piece of land in her name since 1990. As per her written statements, petitioner is working as M.D. in Odisha State Seed Supply Corporation and getting Rs.1,50,000/- per month towards his salary. Pay particulars of the petitioner or his Income Tax Return has not been produced before the Court. No paper is furnished to know about his other liability and asset. There is no admitted evidence in record as to the respondent is getting good amount as rent from her building standing on her plot at Bhubaneswar. Pay particulars of the petitioner or his Income Tax Return has not been produced before the Court. No paper is furnished to know about his other liability and asset. There is no admitted evidence in record as to the respondent is getting good amount as rent from her building standing on her plot at Bhubaneswar. There is also no admitted evidence on record as to the petitioner has a four storeyed building at Bhubaneswar and has any other sources of income besides his salary. In I.A. No.141 of 2006 arising out of MAT Case No.81 of 2006, learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divin.), Bhubaneswar has passed order on 27.10.2008 directing the opposite party-husband who is the petitioner in the case at hand to pay Rs.3,500/- per month to the respondent-wife as interim maintenance and Rs.1,500/- towards cost of the litigation. As per the pleadings of the respondent, she claims Rs.75,000/- per month from the petitioner for her sustenance. Considering the economic status of both the parties, their needs, potentialities, social status, age and price index at present it would be just to fix the permanent alimony of the respondent at Rs.12,00,000/- (Rupees twelve lakhs only). This issue is decided accordingly.” (emphasis supplied) 10. On going through above reasons given by the Family Court we can take away from them the following:- (i) appellant had been staying in her father’s house since long; (ii) she completed her post graduation in Anthropology; (iii) she has no independent income of her own. She depends on her parents for her sustenance; (iv) she has a vacant piece of land in her name since year 1990; (v) according to her, respondent is working and getting Rs.1,50,000/- per month towards his salary; and (vi) there is no evidence regarding appellant getting good amount of rent from her property. There is also no evidence regarding particulars of respondent’s income tax return and therefore his assets and liabilities. As such, the Family Court exercising discretion, fixed permanent alimony payable to appellant at Rs.12,00,000/-. 11. In the reasons given by the Family Court there is also reference to order of interim maintenance and litigation cost earlier awarded. Interim maintenance was directed at Rs.3,500/- per month. There is nothing on record to show appellant was aggrieved thereby or had challenged the same. She had been found to desert him on and from 1st December, 2000. 11. In the reasons given by the Family Court there is also reference to order of interim maintenance and litigation cost earlier awarded. Interim maintenance was directed at Rs.3,500/- per month. There is nothing on record to show appellant was aggrieved thereby or had challenged the same. She had been found to desert him on and from 1st December, 2000. In the circumstances, she made do with the direction, to continue to stay away from respondent till date of impugned judgment and beyond. There is no material on record to form basis of lifestyle she enjoyed in the brief period or periods she stayed with respondent. Application of Rajnesh v. Neha (supra) necessarily relates to interim maintenance. In this case there was no dispute regarding said direction of interim maintenance earlier made or compliance therewith during pendency of the proceeding. It must be remembered, maintenance or permanent alimony is not compensation. 12. Kalyan Dey Chowdhury (supra) does not come to aid of appellant because in that case the Supreme Court approved enhancement of maintenance made by the High Court in context of the facts and circumstances. The High Court had made the enhancement on review of earlier order for maintenance made in revision. During pendency of the maintenance issue in the High Court, the civil proceeding before the lower Court resulted in dissolution of the marriage, pursuant to which the husband remarried. Thus, the direction made in revision by the High Court for maintenance, subsequently enhanced by it on review, had element of discretion exercised, not interfered with by the Supreme Court. However, as aforesaid, since the husband had remarried and there was a child from the subsequent marriage, the Supreme Court reduced enhanced monthly maintenance of Rs.23,000/- to Rs.20,000/-. 13. In view of aforesaid, we are hard pressed to find a reason to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Family Court. The exercise does not appear to be in a manner perverse or not judicial. The Court had before it the parties, who had adduced evidence, including they being crossexamined in the box. The discretion thus exercised cannot easily be interfered with in appeal. The Supreme Court in several decisions including Neon Laboratories Limited v. Medical Technologies Limited reported in (2016) 2 SCC 672 interpreted the law regarding exercise of discretion and interference therewith by the appellate Court. We reproduce below paragraph-5 from the judgment. “5. The discretion thus exercised cannot easily be interfered with in appeal. The Supreme Court in several decisions including Neon Laboratories Limited v. Medical Technologies Limited reported in (2016) 2 SCC 672 interpreted the law regarding exercise of discretion and interference therewith by the appellate Court. We reproduce below paragraph-5 from the judgment. “5. This Court does not normally entertain appeals against interlocutory orders. In the case of trade marks, however, keeping in perspective the endemic delay in concluding cases/suits in India because of the exponentially increasing docket explosion, temporary ad interim injunctions are of far reaching consequences, oftentimes effectively deciding the lis and the disputes themselves. Possibly for this reason “leave” has already been granted in the present appeal. However, it is now well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that the appellate court should not flimsily, whimsically or lightly interfere in the exercise of discretion by a subordinate court unless such exercise is palpably perverse. Perversity can pertain to the understanding of law or the appreciation of pleadings or evidence. We shall restrict ourselves to reference in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. ( 1990 Supp SCC 727 ), wherein it has been adumbrated that the appellate court ought not to “reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion”. We shall be careful not to transgress these frontiers.” (emphasis supplied) 14. Aditi Alias Mithi (supra) is interpretation by a subsequent Bench of the Supreme Court of its earlier judgment in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra). It is not necessary for us to say anything in addition regarding the decision except that it is inapplicable to the case. The ingredients considered in paragraph-9 of the judgment are not present here, in this case. As aforesaid, parties were together for a very brief period. There was no issue from the marriage. 15. It is not necessary for us to say anything in addition regarding the decision except that it is inapplicable to the case. The ingredients considered in paragraph-9 of the judgment are not present here, in this case. As aforesaid, parties were together for a very brief period. There was no issue from the marriage. 15. On behalf of appellant there was reliance placed on view taken by a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Nripendra Chandra Mahanta (supra). We reproduce below a paragraph from the order made in the case. “… … Although learned counsel for the petitioner is justified in arguing that the proposition laid down in Rajnesh vs. Neha has not been observed at all in the present case, on humanitarian consideration and considering that the marriage between the petitioner and the opposite party is still subsisting, it cannot be gainsaid that the petitioner is entitled to get at least some amount of ad hoc alimony from the petitioner-husband. … …” (emphasis supplied) Clearly, the reliance is misplaced. 16. We are not moved to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Family Court in directing permanent alimony at Rs.12,00,000/-. 17. Impugned judgment is confirmed. Demand draft no.000005 dated 1 st March, 2024 issued by Bank of India in favour of appellant for Rs.12,00,000/- is detached from the file and handed over to Mr. Das. Respondent is at liberty to produce website copy of our judgment and request the bank to revalidate the draft since, the value received was and still is with it. The draft could not be presented for payment by reason of pendency of the appeal. On getting the revalidated draft, respondent will forthwith, within a week of revalidation, deposit same in the Family Court for obtaining execution, discharge and satisfaction of impugned judgment, hereby confirmed. 18. The appeal is dismissed.