JUDGMENT : B.P.ROUTRAY, J. 1. The Petitioner has prayed to release him on bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. He was arrested and remanded to custody on 4 th September 2021 in connection with S.T.F. P.S. Case No.31 dated 3 rd September 2021 for alleged commission of offences under Sections 21 (c)/29 of the N.D.P.S. Act for transporting and possessing 1 kg 34 grams of brown sugar (heroin). Since then, the Petitioner is inside custody in connection with the aforesaid Police Case corresponding to T.R. Case No.126 of 2021 in the court of learned 1 st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Khordha. 2. The prayer for his release on default bail in terms of the provisions contained in Section 167 (2) of the Cr.P.C. read with Section 36 -A(4) of the N.D.P.S. Act was earlier rejected by this Court in CRLMC No.625 of 2022. This Court in its order dated 25.04.2022 have held as follows: “xxx xxx xxx 2. Law is no more res integra on this issue. Recently in the case of M. Ravindran vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence , (2021) 2 SCC 485 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the law that the date on which the accused was remanded to judicial custody has to be excluded from calculation of statutory period of 180 days. It was observed at paragraph 8 of the said decision that:- “This Court in a catena of judgments including Ravi Prakash Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2015) 8 SCC 340 , has ruled that while computing the period under Section 167 (2), the day on which accused was remanded to judicial custody has to be excluded and the day on which challan / charge-sheet is filed in the court to be included.” xxx xxx xxx 7. As stated above, the day of initial remand is excluded from the statutory period as held in several case laws. By excluding 4 th September, 2021 from counting, 180 days completes on 3 rd March, 2022 when the prayer for extension was allowed by the learned Special Judge, It goes without saying that unless statutory period of 180 days is completed, no right of default bail accrues in favour of the accused. As such in the given facts of the case, no merit is seen in the prayer of the Petitioner to release him on default bail.” 3. Mr. As such in the given facts of the case, no merit is seen in the prayer of the Petitioner to release him on default bail.” 3. Mr. D. Panda, learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that recently a Three Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court taking note of the case of M. Ravindran vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence , (2021) 2 SCC 485 and several other case laws have held in Enforcement Directorate, Government of India vs. Kapil Wadhawan and another , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 972 while answering the reference that whether the period of remand under the first proviso to Section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is inclusive of the day on which the Magistrate orders remand, have clarified and declared that the stipulated 60/90 day remand period under Section 167 Cr.P.C. ought to be computed from the day when the Magistrate authorizes remand. The relevant observations are reproduced below. “xxx xxx xxx Simply put, the Court needs to answer whether the period of remand under the first provision to Sec.167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter ‘CrPC’) is inclusive of the day on which the Magistrate orders remand. xxx xxx xxx 7. The prosecution relies, on the line of reasoning in State of M.P. Vs. Rustam & Ors., 1995 (Supp) 3 SCC 221 which was later followed in Ravi Prakash Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (2015) 8 SCC 340 and M. Ravindran Vs. Intelligence Officer, Director of Revenue Intelligence, (2021) 2 SCC 485 where it was held that the date of remand is to be excluded for computing the stipulated 60/90 days period for the right of default bail to arise. 8. On the other hand, the Accused rely, inter alia, on Chaganti Satyanarayan Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1986) 3 SCC 141 , CBI Vs. Anupam J Kulkarni, (1992) 3 SCC 141, State Vs. Mohd. Ashraf Bhat, (1996) 1 SCC 432 and State of Maharashtra Vs. Bharati Chandmal Varma, (2002) 2 SCC 121 to contend that the first date of remand must be included for computing the remand period for determining an accused’s entitlement to default bail. 9. Due to the aforementioned conflict in law, a judicial conundrum has arisen which is required to be resolved in this reference. xxx xxx xxx 50. xxx xxx xxx. Bharati Chandmal Varma, (2002) 2 SCC 121 to contend that the first date of remand must be included for computing the remand period for determining an accused’s entitlement to default bail. 9. Due to the aforementioned conflict in law, a judicial conundrum has arisen which is required to be resolved in this reference. xxx xxx xxx 50. xxx xxx xxx. We therefore declare that the stipulated 60/90 day remand period under Section 167 CrPC ought to be computed from the date when a Magistrate authorizes remand. If the first day of remand is excluded, the remand period, as we notice will extend beyond the permitted 60/90 days’ period resulting in unauthorized detention beyond the period envisaged under Section 167 CrPC. In cases where the chargesheet / final report is filed on or after the 61 st /91 st day, the accused in our considered opinion would be entitled to default bail. In other words, the very moment the stipulated 60/90 day remand period expires, an indefeasible right to default bail accrues to the accused.” 4. It is thus submitted by the Petitioner that, on the principles decided in Kapil Wadhawan and another (supra), the Petitioner is entitled to be released on bail since the charge-sheet was not submitted within the period of 180 days and the prayer for extension of investigation period was prayed and granted on 3 rd March 2022 by the learned Special Judge. 5. Further, the contention of the Petitioner is that despite he is inside custody for more than 2 years, the trial is yet to commence and unlikely to be concluded in the near future. So keeping his period of custody in view and the delay in commencement of trial, he should be released on bail, and he being a resident under Khordha Town P.S., any apprehension for his abscondence from the course of law is not there. 6. The Petitioner is taken to custody on remand on 4.9.2021 and the charge-sheet was submitted on 10.3.2022. On 3 rd March 2022, a further period of three months was granted by the learned Special Judge to complete the investigation on the ground of spread of COVID-19 infection and consequent lock-down situation. These facts remain undisputed. 6. The Petitioner is taken to custody on remand on 4.9.2021 and the charge-sheet was submitted on 10.3.2022. On 3 rd March 2022, a further period of three months was granted by the learned Special Judge to complete the investigation on the ground of spread of COVID-19 infection and consequent lock-down situation. These facts remain undisputed. So if 4 th September 2021, i.e. the date of remand of the Petitioner is included in the period of counting, 180 days completed on 2 nd March 2022 and as such, 3 rd March 2022 is counted as 181 st day when the prayer for extension was made by the prosecution and allowed by learned Special Judge. Therefore, based on the principles propounded in Kapil Wadhawan and another (supra), the Petitioner would be entitled to default bail. 7. Further, the custodial period of the Petitioner for more than two years without commencement of trial remains undisputed at the Bar. In Satender Kumar Antil vs. Central Bureau of Investigation , (2022) 10 SCC 51 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of prolonged incarceration of an accused pending trial have observed that, “We do not wish to deal with individual enactments as each special Act has got an objective behind it, followed by the rigour imposed. The general principle governing delay would apply to these categories also. To make it clear, the provision contained in Section 436 -A of the Code would apply to the Special Acts also in the absence of any specific provision. For example, the rigour as provided under Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not come in the way in such a case as we are dealing with the liberty of a person. We do feel that more the rigour, the quicker the adjudication ought to be. After all, in these types of cases number of witnesses would be very less and there may not be any justification for prolonging the trial. Perhaps there is a need to comply with the directions of this Court to expedite the process and also a stricter compliance of Sectin 309 of the Code.” 8. In Mohd. After all, in these types of cases number of witnesses would be very less and there may not be any justification for prolonging the trial. Perhaps there is a need to comply with the directions of this Court to expedite the process and also a stricter compliance of Sectin 309 of the Code.” 8. In Mohd. Muslim alias Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that grant of bail on the ground of undue delay in trial cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, given the imperative of Section 436 -A of the Cr.P.C. which is applicable to offences under the NDPS Act too. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “ 19 . The conditions which courts have to be cognizant of are that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty of such offence” and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. What is meant by “not guilty” when all the evidence is not before the court? It can only be a prima facie determination. That places the court’s discretion within a very narrow margin. Given the mandate of the general law on bails ( Sections 436 , 437 and 439, CrPC) which classify offences based on their gravity, and instruct that certain serious crimes have to be dealt with differently while considering bail applications, the additional condition that the court should be satisfied that the accused (who is in law presumed to be innocent) is not guilty, has to be interpreted reasonably. Further the classification of offences under Special Acts (NDPS Act, etc.), which apply over and above the ordinary bail conditions required to be assessed by courts, require that the court records its satisfaction that the accused might not be guilty of the offence and that upon release, they are not likely to commit any offence. These two conditions have the effect of overshadowing other conditions. In cases where bail is sought, the court assesses the material on record such as the nature of the offence, likelihood of the accused co-operating with the investigation, not fleeing from justice: even in serious offences like murder, kidnapping, rape, etc. These two conditions have the effect of overshadowing other conditions. In cases where bail is sought, the court assesses the material on record such as the nature of the offence, likelihood of the accused co-operating with the investigation, not fleeing from justice: even in serious offences like murder, kidnapping, rape, etc. On the other hand, the court in these cases under such special Acts, have to address itself principally on two facts: likely guilt of the accused and the likelihood of them not committing any offence upon release. This court has generally upheld such conditions on the ground that liberty of such citizens have to – in cases when accused of offences enacted under special laws – be balanced against the public interest. 20. A plain and literal interpretation of the conditions under Section 37 (i.e., that Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty and would not commit any offence) would effectively exclude grant of bail altogether, resulting in punitive detention and unsanctioned preventive detention as well. Therefore, the only manner in which such special conditions as enacted under can be considered within constitutional parameters is where the court is reasonably satisfied on a prima facie look at the material on record (whenever the bail application is made) that the accused is not guilty. Any other interpretation, would result in complete denial of the bail to a person accused of offences such as those enacted under of the NDPS Act. 21. The standard to be considered therefore, is one, where the court would look at the material in a broad manner, and reasonably see whether the accused’s guilt may be proved. The judgments of this court have, therefore, emphasized that the satisfaction which courts are expected to record, i.e., that the accused may not be guilty, is only prima facie, based on a reasonable reading, which does not call for meticulous examination of the materials collected during investigation (as held in Union of India v. Rattam Malik). Grant of bail on ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the Act, given the imperative of Section 436A which is applicable to offences under the NDPS Act too (ref.Satender Kumar Antil supra). Having regard to these factors the court is of the opinion that in the facts of this case, the appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail. 22. Having regard to these factors the court is of the opinion that in the facts of this case, the appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail. 22. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for grant of bail, may be necessary in public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wreeked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded and their living conditions, more often than not, appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry’s response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31 st December, 2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against total capacity of 4,25,069 lakhs in the country. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest 4,27,165 were undertrials. 23. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner. “loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity any autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.” 24. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” (also see Donald Clemmer’s ‘The Prison Community’ published in 1940). Incarceration has further deleterious effects – where the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata : immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials – especially in cases, where special laws enact stringent provisions, are taken up and concluded speedily.” 9. Further, the Supreme Court in another recent case in SLP (Crl.) No.6690 of 2022 ( Dheeraj Kumar Shukla vrs. Further, the Supreme Court in another recent case in SLP (Crl.) No.6690 of 2022 ( Dheeraj Kumar Shukla vrs. The State of Uttar Pradesh ), involving seizure of 92 Kg and 65 Kg of Ganja from two vehicles and the accused was in custody since 24 th June 2020, have held that in absence of criminal antecedents and the fact that the Petitioner was in custody for 2 ½ years, the conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be dispensed with. The relevant observations are reproduced below: “3. It appears that some of the occupants of the ‘Honda City’ Car including Praveen Maurya @ Puneet Maurya have since been released on regular bail. It is true that the quantity recovered from the petitioner is commercial in nature and the provisions of Section 37 of the Act may ordinarily be attracted. However, in the absence of criminal antecedents and the fact that the petitioner is in custody for the last two and a half years, we are satisfied that the conditions of of the Act can be dispensed with at this stage, more so when the trial is yet to commence though the charges have been framed. 4. For the reasons stated above but without expressing any views on the merits of the case, the petitioner is directed to be released on bail subject to his furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.” 10 . In the case at hand as stated above, the Petitioner is incarcerated inside custody for more than 2 years without commencement of trial and as such, this Court is inclined to observe that the embargo contained in Section 37 (1)(b) of the NDPS Act can be dispensed with at this stage in respect of the Petitioner. 11 . In view of the discussions made above, it is directed to release the Petitioner on bail in connection with S.T.F. P.S. Case No.31 of 2021 corresponding to T.R. Case No.126/2021 on such terms and conditions to be fixed by the learned 1 st Addl. Sessions Judge-cum- Special Judge, N.D.P.S. Act, Khordha as he deems just and proper including the condition that, he shall not be involved in any other offence while on bail. 12. The BLAPL is disposed of.