1 Mewa Singh & another vs. Parkasho Devi & others CMP No. 5122 of 2023 in RSA No. 273 of 2000 20.08.2026 Present: M/s H.S. Rana and Kamlesh Kumari, Advocates, for the appellants. Ms Devyani Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Mr Anirudh Sharma, Advocates, for respondents No.1(a), 5(a) to 5(c), 7(a) and 7(b). LR No.1(c)(iii) and 1(b) (ii) (a) were proceeded against ex parte, vide order dated 20.03.2026. The appellant Mewa Ram (since deceased) filed RSA No. 273 of 2000. The Court noticed on 10.05.2010 that the original counsel representing the appellant was appointed as Additional District Judge. Hence, the Court ordered the issuance of a notice to the appellant, returnable on 30.06.2010. The Court noticed on 09.07.2010 that notice was sent to the appellant in terms of the order dated 10.05.2010. The appellant had not engaged any counsel, nor had he appeared before the Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed in default. 2. Subsequently, an application, CMP No.749 of 2012, was filed for restoration of the appeal, and the notices were issued to the respondents on 25.07.2012. The matter came up before this Court on 23.03.2015, when the Court was informed that the appellant had died; hence, the matter was adjourned for bringing on record the legal representatives. The Court noticed on 29.06.2015 that the sole appellant had died and no 2 steps had been taken to bring on record the legal representative. Hence, the application was dismissed for non- prosecution. 3. Subsequently, CMP(M) No. 1407 of 2016 was filed, which was dismissed on 19.09.2016 as there was no representation on behalf of the applicant. 4. Another application, CMP (M) No. 1512 of 2017, was filed, which was dismissed on 24.04.2018, because no one had appeared on behalf of the applicant. 5. Another application, CMP No. 9639 of 2018, was filed, which was dismissed on 06.04.2022, because learned counsel for the appellant stated that the appellant was not coming forward to impart instructions; as such, he was unable to do anything in the matter. 6. The applicant filed the present application for restoration of the regular second appeal to its original position. It has been asserted that the applicant’s father was unable to reside at Village Nagalahar Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. because of his ill health. He was residing in the State of Punjab and occasionally used to visit the village where the disputed land is situated. The learned counsel for the applicant was elevated as Additional District & Sessions Judge, which fact was not in the knowledge of the applicant’s father. 3 He came to know about this fact when the appeal was dismissed in default. He engaged another counsel for recalling the order of dismissal in default, but it was also dismissed on 29.06.2015. The applicant’s father had died on 05.03.2012, and the applicant was not aware of the case. She filed an application, CMP No. 1407 of 2016, which was dismissed on 19.09.2016. The applicant filed another application for restoration, but it was dismissed on 24.04.2018. She again filed an application, which was dismissed on 06.04.2022. There was miscommunication between the learned counsel and the applicant, and the applicant did not receive any communication. She was not residing at the address furnished in the regular second appeal. She came to know about the dismissal and handed over the case file to the new counsel. No harm or prejudice would be caused to the other side by the restoration of the appeal. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the orders dated 29.06.2015, 19.09.2016, 24.04.2018 and 06.04.2022 be set aside. The RSA be restored to its original position. 7. The application was opposed by filing a reply, taking a preliminary objection regarding lack of maintainability. It was asserted that not only the appeal, but subsequent applications for restoration of the appeal were dismissed. The appeal stood abated, and valuable rights have been conferred in favour of 4 the respondents. Respondent No. 1 died 14 years ago. Respondent No. 4 died 25 years ago, Respondent No. 5 died 22 years ago, Respondent No. 7 died 10 years ago, and Respondent No. 9 died 13 years ago. Their legal representatives were not brought on record. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for setting aside the abatement. The applicant and her father have repeatedly given the address mentioned in the application and the affidavit in support of the application, which falsifies the plea taken by the applicant that the applicant and her father were not residing at the address furnished in the regular second appeal. A notice was issued to the appellant after the elevation of his counsel. The applicant was grossly negligent. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed. 8. I have heard M/S H.S. Rana and Kamlesh Kumari, learned counsel for the applicant and Ms Devyani Sharma, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel for respondents No.1(a), 5(a) to 5(c), 7(a) and 7(b). 9. Mr H.S. Rana, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that the applicant was not aware of the pendency of the regular second appeal. She had engaged a counsel, but there was miscommunication between her and her counsel due to which the counsel could not appear before the Court. There was no negligence on the part of the applicant. Hence, 5 he prayed that the present application be allowed and the appeal be restored. 10 Ms Devyani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents, submitted that the applicant was grossly negligent in pursuing the appeal. The regular second appeal was dismissed in default, and the applications for restoration filed by the applicant were also dismissed for non- prosecution or in default. The applicant was supposed to contact the learned counsel, and she cannot throw the blame upon the learned counsel. There is no cause, much less sufficient cause, for the restoration of the appeal. Moreover, the appeal had abated because of the failure to bring the legal representatives on record. Hence, she prayed that the present application be dismissed. She relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions:  H. Guruswamy & other vs. A. Krishnaiah since deceased by LRs,2025 INSC 53; and  Kaushalya & Others vs. Rameshwar & Others 2024: HHC6954. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 19. The history of the case narrated above shows that first the regular second appeal was dismissed and thereafter various applications filed for the restoration of the regular second appeal were dismissed. It was asserted that the 6 applicant was not available at the address and there was miscommunication between the learned counsel and the applicant. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380 that a litigant is supposed to be present before the Court, and he cannot throw the blame upon the counsel to escape from the liability of his absence. It was observed: “10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers for negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay, as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief. 11. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185, wherein this Court observed as under: — “8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal, i.e. the party who engages him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant, but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq [(1981) 2 SCC 788: AIR 1981 SC 1400] must not be 7 understood as an absolute proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was an ongoing suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years from its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic, ignorant villager but a private limited company with its head office at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not disposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing, they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. Maybe it was part of their delaying tactics, as alleged by the plaintiff. Maybe not. But one thing is clear: they chose not to cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. Thus, it is impermissible for the applicant to throw the blame upon the learned counsel and claim that the appeal should be restored. 21. A similar situation arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H. Guruswamy (supra); the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed the progress of the suit as under: 12. We take notice of the following glaring features of the matter: (i) The original suit is of the year 1977. The said suit came to be re-numbered as Original Suit No. 1833 of 1980. It has been 48 years since the suit has been pending for recording of evidence. (ii) The Original Suit No. 1833 of 1980 came to be dismissed for default in the year 1983. The same was restored in 1984. (iii) The defendant No. 4 in Original Suit No. 1833 of 1980, namely, Nagaraja, passed away on 4.12.1999. 8 (iv) The respondents herein were granted opportunities on 6.03.2000, 18.7.2000 and 22.8.2000 respectively to bring the legal heirs of the defendant No. 4 on record. Having failed to do so, the suit ultimately came to be dismissed as having stood abated. (v) The rights of the deceased respondent No. 1 had already been decided in the suit filed for specific performance, i.e. the Original Suit No. 33 of 1971. (vi) The respondents, having obtained the certified copies on 26.8.2005, preferred the Misc. Case No. 223 of 2006 on 06.03.2006. (vii) Indisputably, there is a delay of 6 years (about 2200 days) in filing the application for recall itself. 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the delay in filing the application for recall was not explained and could not have been condoned by applying concepts such as liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or substantial justice. It was observed: - 13. We are at our wits' end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well as the High Courts that the concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation. 14. We are constrained to observe that the High Court has exhibited complete absence of judicial conscience and restraint, which a judge is expected to maintain while adjudicating a lis between the parties. 15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. 16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. 9 From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and, in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time. 23. In the present case, the regular second appeal was dismissed in default on 09.07.2010, when the notice was served upon the appellant, and nobody had appeared on behalf of the appellant. Thereafter, repeated applications were filed, and those were dismissed in default. There is no sufficient cause to explain as to why the present application was filed after the lapse of nearly 13 years from the date of dismissal of the regular second appeal. 24. It was pointed out in the reply that respondents no. 1, 4, 5, 7 and 9 have expired. A composite application bearing CMP No. 1585 of 2023 was filed for bringing on record the legal 10 representatives of respondent no. 1, 2, 4, 5 6, 7, 9 and 12 has been filed for bringing their legal representatives on record. It was asserted that the application for bringing on record the legal representatives is being filed immediately after coming to know of the factum of the death. The respondent filed a reply asserting that a composite application is not maintainable and earlier applications for bringing on record the legal representatives were dismissed by the Court on 06.04.2022. The applicant was aware of the death, and there is no reason for the condonation of delay. This is duly supported by the affidavit. Therefore, the present application cannot be allowed as the appeal has automatically abated and there is no reasonable cause for setting aside the abatement. 25. Consequently, the present application fails and is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 26. Records of the learned Courts below be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 20th August, 2026. (Ravinder)