Page 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLA No.805 of 2023 (In the matter of an appeal under Section 415 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).) Vishal Som …. Appellant (s) -versus- State of Odisha …. Respondent (s) Advocates appeared in this case through Hybrid Arrangement Mode: For Appellant(s) : Ms. Ananya Mishra, Adv. Ms. Diptirekha Nanda, Adv. For Opp. Party(s) : Mr. Sonak Mishra, ASC CORAM: DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI DATE OF HEARING: -21.05.2026 DATE OF JUDGMENT: -25.06.2026 Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J. 1. The appellant is challenging the Judgment of Conviction and Order of Sentence dated 22.03.2023 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Special Court under the POCSO Act, Jharsuguda, in C.T. (Special) Case No. 62 of 2020, arising out of Jharsuguda P.S. Case No. 485 dated 07.07.2020. I. FACTUAL MATRIX: 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that in the year 2017, while the victim was visiting the house of her maternal uncle at Jharsuguda, the appellant gave her his mobile phone number, whereafter they started talking to each other over the phone. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 2 3. It is alleged that in March, 2019, the appellant came to the victim's house at Sundargarh in the absence of her parents and established physical relations with her. It is further alleged that the appellant videographed the act without the victim's knowledge and thereafter started threatening her that he would circulate the videos and photographs unless she met him. 4. The victim is stated to have disclosed the aforesaid facts to her mother on 06.07.2020, whereafter her mother lodged the F.I.R. on 07.07.2020 against the appellant. 5. Upon completion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet, charges were framed, and the prosecution examined 12 witnesses in support of its case. P.Ws.1, 2, 5, 11 and 12 are seizure witnesses; P.W.3 is the informant; the victim has been examined as P.W.4; and P.Ws.6 and 7 are the medical officers who examined the victim and the appellant. 6. The defence pleaded denial and false implication and, in support thereof, examined two witnesses. 7. Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 376(1) IPC, Section 4(1) of the POCSO Act, and Section 506 IPC, and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of Rs.25,000/-, and in default, further rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 376(1) IPC and Section 4(1) of the POCSO Act, and rigorous imprisonment for 3 years with fine of Rs.3,000/-, and in default, further rigorous Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 3 imprisonment for 6 months under Section 506 IPC, directing all sentences to run concurrently. 8. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.03.2023 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Special Court under the POCSO Act, Jharsuguda in C.T. (Special) Case No.62 of 2020. II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT: 9. Learned counsel for the Appellant made the following submissions in support of his contentions: i. The appellant submitted that the F.I.R. was lodged after due deliberation and confabulation after a delay of one year and four months, which raises a significant possibility of exaggeration, embellishment and colourful version and is as such fatal to the prosecution case. ii. The appellant submitted that the informant P.W.3 (mother of the victim) has stated that the victim P.W.4 was in a frustrated mind and, on her enquiry, disclosed the facts to her on 06.06.2020. It is highly suspicious as to how P.W.4 never appeared frustrated and never disclosed the facts to her mother or anyone else prior to this date for a period of one year and four months, even though the victim and her mother reside jointly in the same house. iii. The appellant submitted that instead of any original documentary evidence as provided under Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015, the Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 4 learned Trial Court has erroneously relied upon inadmissible evidence such as the Aadhaar card of the victim and a photocopy of a document purporting to be the date of birth certificate granted in the year 2008, i.e., 6 years after the date of birth recorded therein, in order to determine her age as 16 years and 7 months on the date of occurrence. iv. The appellant submitted that the I.O.s (P.W.s 10 and 11) have not taken any pains to visit the victim’s school and no date of birth certificate/matriculation certificate has been seized by the I.O.s or called for from the concerned examination board by the learned Trial Court at any stage during trial in order to determine the age of the victim in accordance with Section 94(2)(i) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, and that the concerned school authorities have also not been examined in the case. v. The appellant submitted that as necessitated under Section 94(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, the original birth certificate issued by the Municipality was never seized by the I.O. nor called for by the learned Trial Court from the concerned Municipality that granted it, and consequently the original date of birth certificate has neither been brought in evidence nor marked as exhibit or duly proved in Court by the prosecution, and instead the learned Trial Court has relied upon a photocopy of the date of birth certificate. vi. The appellant submitted that as per Section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the primary evidence of a document is the document itself Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 5 produced for the inspection of the Court, and that a photocopy of a document is not admissible in evidence unless it is proved that the original is destroyed or lost or under circumstances delineated under Section 65 of the Evidence Act, which further provides that even in case of a public document, only a certified copy and no other kind of secondary evidence is admissible, and hence the learned Trial Court has grossly erred in relying upon a photocopy of the date of birth certificate, which is inadmissible in evidence and is additionally not free from the suspicion of having been manufactured or manipulated. vii. The appellant submitted that the Aadhaar card is not proof of age as per Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 and is not admissible in evidence for the purpose of determination of age, and the learned Trial Court has erred in relying upon the same. viii. The appellant submitted that Section 94(2)(iii) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 lays down that in the absence of a date of birth certificate from the school or a matriculation certificate obtained from the Board of Examination or a date of birth certificate granted by a Corporation, Municipal Authority or a Panchayat, the age shall be determined by ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test, and in the present case P.W.6, the medical officer who examined the victim, had duly conducted the necessary bone ossification test, and according to the medical report as well as the deposition of P.W.6, the X-ray plates show that the age of the victim is 18–19 years, which as per the statutory provision is conclusive proof of her age, and this Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 6 indicates that the victim was not a minor below 18 years of age and therefore the provisions of the POCSO Act are not attracted in the present case. ix. The appellant submitted that the medical evidence in the present case shows that the victim is a major girl and that there is no other injury on her except an old healed hymenal tear, and there is no evidence to correlate the age of the injury to the date of the alleged occurrence, nor is there any other medical or serological evidence to connect the appellant to the alleged offences. x. It is further submitted that as per her own deposition and statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the victim was not just acquainted with the appellant but was also in contact with certain other men during the same period, with whom she used to make TikTok videos, and there was also a marriage proposal which did not materialize. xi. The appellant further submitted that it is the prosecution’s version that the appellant and the victim were regularly in touch and talking to each other over phone since 2017 and that in March, 2019 the appellant came to the victim’s house at Sundargarh and established physical relations with her against her wish, and it is inconceivable as to how the appellant became aware of the victim’s address at Sundargarh and the fact that her parents would be absent on that day unless he was invited by the victim herself, and it is further submitted that it is even more unbelievable that he was able to set up the paraphernalia to videograph the incident in the victim’s house Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 7 without her knowledge, and the fact that the victim did not struggle or raise hue and cry and did not inform anybody including her parents about the incident indicates that if at all any such incident took place, it was voluntary and consensual. xii. The appellant submitted that in the light of the conclusive medical evidence proving that the victim was an adult of 18–19 years and the conduct of the victim suggesting a consensual relationship rather than forcible rape, the conviction of the appellant under Section 4(1) of the POCSO Act as well as under Section 376(1) IPC must fail. xiii. The appellant submitted that the alleged objectionable videos and photographs were never found anywhere nor has anyone deposed to have seen them, and the forensic examination also did not disclose the existence of any such objectionable material, and on this basis the learned Trial Court rightly acquitted the appellant of the charges under Section 354C IPC and Section 66E of the IT Act, 2000. Although the learned Trial Court held that the allegations of videography of intimate acts without consent were not proved, yet the appellant has been wrongly convicted under Section 506 IPC for allegedly threatening the victim of circulating such videos/photographs, and it further submitted that since the learned Trial Court itself has held that the entire allegation of videography is doubtful, the allegation of threats based on such videos/photographs ought also to have been held not proved and therefore the conviction of the appellant under Section 506 IPC is liable to be set aside. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 8 xiv. The appellant submitted that the learned Trial Court should not have based the conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and should not have considered her a sterling witness in the light of glaring inconsistencies and discrepancies in her evidence. xv. It was submitted that the appellant is an innocent and law-abiding man with no complicity in the alleged incident. He was a young man of 24 years at the time of judgment and has been in custody for about 5 years and 10 months till date, which has robbed him of a normal life and livelihood. Hence, it is prayed on behalf of the appellant that the appeal be allowed and the judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside by this Court. III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT: 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent made the following submissions in support of his contentions: i. The present appeal is liable to be rejected, as the learned Trial Court has passed a well-reasoned judgment dated 22.03.2023 after proper appreciation of the oral, documentary, and medical evidence available on record, and the same does not call for any interference by this Court. ii. The victim/prosecutrix (P.W. 4), has clearly deposed that in the year 2017, the Appellant came in contact with her at Jharsuguda, gave his mobile number, and thereafter remained in contact with her over phone. She has further deposed that the Appellant came in contact with her in 2017, remained in touch over phone, and in March, 2019 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 9 came to her rented house at Sundargarh in absence of her mother and committed rape upon her. She has further stated that the Appellant videographed/took photographs without her knowledge and thereafter threatened to circulate the same in social media if she did not meet him. Her evidence on the core allegation of rape/penetrative sexual assault remained intact in cross-examination. iii. The evidence of P.W.4 also receives support from Dr. Rita Maxima Barla, P.W.6, who examined the victim on 08.07.2020 and found an old healed hymenal tear suggesting sexual intercourse. Further, Dr. Prafulla Chandra Dalai, P.W.7, opined that the Appellant was capable of committing sexual intercourse. Thus, the evidence of P.W.4, supported by P.W.3, P.W.6 and P.W.7, proves penetration and satisfies the ingredients of Section 375 IPC, Section 376(1) IPC and Section 4(1) of the POCSO Act. iv. There is no case of the defence that the victim was the wife of the Appellant. Therefore, the exception relating to marital relationship under Section 375 IPC has no application to the present case. The victim was a minor girl aged about 16 years and 7 months at the time of occurrence, and the Appellant was not her husband. v. The Appellant submits that the conviction cannot be sustained because it rests primarily on the solitary oral testimony of the prosecutrix (P.W.4) and that the medical evidence does not show active signs of recent physical violence. This argument misinterprets the law relating to sexual offences, as a prosecutrix is not an Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 10 accomplice, she is a victim of a sexual offence, and her testimony stands on a higher pedestal than that of an ordinary witness. If her statement is clear, cogent, natural, and inspires judicial confidence, it is sufficient to sustain a conviction without independent corroboration. In the present case, the testimony of the victim has remained unshaken through cross-examination. Further, her evidence is corroborated by (i) the testimony of her mother (P.W.3), (ii) her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and (iii) the medical evidence of Dr. Rita Maxima Barla (P.W.6), who noticed an old healed hymenal tear at the 5 o’clock position, indicating sexual intercourse consistent with the prosecution case. vi. Reliance was placed on Ganesan v. State1, State of Punjab v. Raghubir Singh2 and State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh3 to assert that conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, provided it is found to be reliable, trustworthy, and inspires confidence, and that no independent corroboration is necessary in such cases. It was submitted that the aforesaid judgments are applicable to the present case, as the evidence of the victim/prosecutrix (P.W.4) inspires confidence and clearly proves the core allegation against the appellant. Her testimony is further supported by the evidence of her mother (P.W.3) and the medical evidence of Dr. Rita Maxima Barla (P.W.6). Therefore, seeking further 1 (2020) 10 SCC 573. 2 (1991) 2 SCC 622. 3 (1996) 2 SCC 384. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 11 corroboration as a condition for sustaining conviction would be contrary to the settled law. vii. The Appellant has taken a ground that the victim was a grown-up girl, did not raise alarm, did not struggle and did not attempt to escape, and therefore the prosecution case is improbable. The said contention is wholly misconceived, as the victim was below 18 years of age at the time of occurrence. Since she was a minor, her alleged conduct, maturity, absence of resistance or consent cannot dilute the offence under the POCSO Act or Section 375 IPC. viii. The victim/P.W.4 has clearly stated that the appellant committed rape upon her in March, 2019 and thereafter threatened to circulate her video/photos on social media. Her evidence is supported by P.W.3 and the medical evidence of P.W.6. Therefore, the defence plea of improbability/consent is legally unsustainable, and the learned Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 376(1) IPC and Section 4(1) of the POCSO Act. ix. The Appellant has taken a ground that although the occurrence is of March, 2019, the victim disclosed the incident to her mother only on 06.07.2020 and the FIR was lodged on 07.07.2020. The said ground is liable to be rejected, as P.W.4 has clearly stated that after committing rape, the appellant threatened to circulate her video/photos on social media if she did not meet him. P.W.3 has also stated that the victim was in frustration and, upon inquiry, disclosed the incident to her on 06.07.2020, whereafter the FIR was lodged as Ext.4. Thus, the delay is Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 12 satisfactorily explained by threat, fear, trauma and mental pressure. The same evidence also proves the offence under Section 506 IPC. The threat to circulate the victim’s video/photos was not a casual or empty statement, but a real threat to her dignity and reputation, which caused fear and alarm in her mind. Even though the learned Trial Court has acquitted the appellant under Section 354(C) IPC and Section 66-E of the I.T. Act, the evidence regarding video/photos and threat remains relevant for appreciating the conduct of the appellant, explaining the delay, and sustaining the conviction under Section 506 IPC. Therefore, even in the absence of admissible cyber evidence, the conviction under Section 506 IPC is legally sustainable, and the delay in lodging the FIR does not weaken the prosecution case. x. The age of the victim below 18 years is proved through the municipal birth record and supporting evidence and once the foundational facts are established, the statutory presumptions under sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act operate against the appellant. The victim (P.W.4) has stated that her date of birth is 31.07.2002. Her mother, namely P.W.3, has also stated the same. Further, the birth certificate of the victim was issued by the Registrar, Births and Deaths, Jharsuguda Municipality. The learned Trial Court has also considered the Birth Register maintained in the office of the Registrar, Births and Deaths, Jharsuguda Municipality, wherein the date of birth of the victim has been recorded as 31.07.2002. On the date of occurrence in March, 2019, Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 13 the victim was about 16 years and 7 months old and therefore a child within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. xi. The Appellant has relied upon the medical age opinion of Dr. Rita Maxima Barla (P.W.6), who assessed the victim’s age as 18 to 19 years on the basis of X-ray examination. However, medical opinion is only approximate and cannot override reliable public record of birth. The defence has not produced any cogent material to dislodge the authenticity of the municipal birth record. xii. Reliance was placed on the observations in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana4, where it was observed that the highest priority must be given to matriculation or equivalent certificate, and in its absence, to the birth certificate issued by a municipal authority, and only in the absence of such records should medical opinion be relied upon. xiii. Once the foundational facts of penetrative sexual assault and minority are proved, the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act operate against the Appellant. xiv. The Appellant has contended that electronic evidence such as call detail records and cyber evidence have not been proved. The said ground does not affect the conviction under Section 376(1) IPC, Section 4(1) POCSO Act and Section 506 IPC, which stand proved through oral and medical evidence along with age proof. 4 (2013) 7 SCC 263. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 14 IV. FINDINGS OF THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE-CUM- SPECIAL COURT UNDER THE POCSO ACT, JHARSUGUDA: 11. The accused was tried for offences under Sections 376(1), 506 IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act, and Sections 354(C) IPC and 66(E) of the IT Act. 12. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses, including the victim (PW4), her mother (PW3), medical officers (PW6 & PW7), and investigating officers. The defence examined two witnesses and denied the allegations. 13. On the issue of age, the Court relied upon the birth certificate issued by the Registrar of Births and Deaths, Jharsuguda Municipality, supported by school records, Aadhaar card and testimonies of PW3 & PW4 and held that the victim was born on 31.07.2002. Accordingly, she was found to be about 16 years and 7 months old at the time of occurrence, thus a minor under the POCSO Act. 14. On merits, the learned trial Court held that the testimony of the victim was consistent, natural and trustworthy, and, therefore, did not require any independent corroboration. It was further held that her version stood duly corroborated by the testimony of her mother as well as the medical evidence on record. The medical examination revealed an old healed hymenal tear at the 5 o’clock position, which, according to the doctor, was consistent with sexual intercourse. The learned trial Court, therefore, concluded that the medical evidence corroborated the ocular testimony of the victim. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 15 15. Accordingly, the Court found the charge under Section 376(1) IPC proved, holding that the victim’s evidence clearly established penetrative sexual assault committed by the accused. 16. With regard to Section 4(1) of the POCSO Act, the Court held that the victim was a minor at the time of occurrence and that the evidence of PW3 and PW4, supported by medical opinion, established penetrative sexual assault. The presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act was invoked against the accused. 17. On the charge under Section 506 IPC, the Court accepted the prosecution case that the accused repeatedly threatened the victim with circulation of obscene material, thereby causing fear and mental harassment, which led to delayed disclosure of the incident. The Court held that the ingredients of criminal intimidation were made out. 18. However, the Court acquitted the accused under Section 354(C) IPC and Section 66(E) of the IT Act, holding that the electronic evidence relied upon was not proved in accordance with Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, and therefore could not be legally relied upon to establish voyeurism or unlawful transmission of private images. 19. Accordingly, the accused was convicted under Sections 376(1) IPC, 506 IPC, and Section 4(1) of the POCSO Act, and acquitted of the remaining charges. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 16 20. On sentence, the Court imposed rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of Rs.25,000/-, and in default, further rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 376(1) IPC and Section 4(1) of the POCSO Act, and rigorous imprisonment for 3 years with fine of Rs.3,000/-, and in default, further rigorous imprisonment for 6 months under Section 506 IPC, directing all sentences to run concurrently. 21. The Court further directed victim compensation of Rs. 75,000/- under Section 357-A CrPC, and ordered destruction/release of seized articles as per law. V. COURT’S ANALYSIS AND REASONING 24. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. 25. The appellant has assailed the impugned judgment on several grounds, inter alia, questioning the determination of the age of the victim, the appreciation of the evidence of the prosecutrix, the delay in lodging the F.I.R., and the sustainability of the conviction under Sections 376(1) and 506 IPC as well as Section 4 of the POCSO Act. The respondent, on the other hand, has supported the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court and contended that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the charges beyond reasonable doubt. 26. Since the applicability of the provisions of the POCSO Act and the plea of consent sought to be advanced on behalf of the appellant are fundamentally dependent upon the age of the victim, it becomes Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 17 necessary to first examine whether the prosecution has been able to establish the age of the victim in accordance with law. 27. The learned Trial Court has recorded a finding that the victim was born on 31.07.2002 and was, therefore, about 16 years and 7 months of age at the time of the occurrence alleged to have taken place in March, 2019. The appellant has challenged the said finding by contending that the prosecution failed to prove the age of the victim in the manner contemplated under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and that the medical opinion assessing her age to be between 18 and 19 years ought to have been accepted. 28. In support of the prosecution case regarding age, the victim (P.W.4) and her mother (P.W.3) have consistently stated that the date of birth of the victim is 31.07.2002. The learned Trial Court has also taken into consideration the birth certificate issued by the Registrar of Births and Deaths, Jharsuguda Municipality as well as the corresponding entry in the Birth Register maintained by the competent authority. 29. In this context, it is apposite to refer to Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The provision contemplates determination of age primarily on the basis of documentary evidence and envisages recourse to medical age determination only in the absence of such material. The provision reads as follows: Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 18 “94. Presumption and determination of age.—(1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under Section 14 or Section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age. (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining— (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order. (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.” 30. The principal submission of the appellant is that the learned Trial Court ought not to have relied upon the documentary evidence relating to the age of the victim and should instead have accepted the Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 19 medical opinion of P.W.6, who assessed her age to be between eighteen and nineteen years. The appellant has further contended that the birth certificate relied upon by the prosecution was not proved in accordance with law and that the Aadhaar card could not have been treated as proof of age. Upon consideration of the materials on record, this Court finds no merit in the aforesaid contention. The evidence of P.W.3 and P.W.4 consistently indicates that the date of birth of the victim is 31.07.2002. The learned Trial Court has also taken into consideration the birth record maintained by the office of the Registrar of Births and Deaths, Jharsuguda Municipality, wherein the date of birth of the victim has been recorded as 31.07.2002. The defence has not been able to demonstrate any material discrepancy in the said record nor has any evidence been adduced to show that the entry was fabricated, manipulated or otherwise unreliable. In the absence of any such material, the mere assertion that the documentary evidence ought not to be relied upon cannot be accepted. 31. In Jarnail Singh (supra), the Supreme Court observed that where documentary evidence relating to age is available in the form of school records or birth certificates issued by municipal authorities, such evidence must receive precedence and medical opinion can be resorted to only in the absence of such material. The relevant observations are replicated hereinunder: 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 20 the basis for determining age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3) envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion.” Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 21 32. In the present case, P.W.6 assessed the age of the victim to be between eighteen and nineteen years on the basis of radiological examination. However, it is well settled that an ossification test provides only an approximate estimate of age and not an exact determination. Such medical opinion necessarily carries a margin of error and cannot ordinarily override reliable documentary evidence indicating a specific date of birth. Having regard to the birth record relied upon by the prosecution and accepted by the learned Trial Court, this Court is of the considered view that the medical estimate furnished by P.W.6 is insufficient to dislodge the documentary evidence regarding age. Accordingly, this Court finds no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the learned Trial Court that the victim was below eighteen years of age at the relevant point of time and was consequently a child within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. 33. Having affirmed the finding regarding the age of the victim, this Court now proceeds to examine the evidence relating to the occurrence. 34. The victim has been examined as P.W.4. She has stated that she came into contact with the appellant in the year 2017 while visiting her maternal uncle's house at Jharsuguda and thereafter remained in contact with him over phone. According to her, in March, 2019, the appellant came to her house at Sundargarh in the absence of her parents and established physical relations with her. She has further Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 22 stated that the appellant videographed the act without her knowledge and subsequently threatened to circulate the videos and photographs. 35. On a careful scrutiny of her evidence, this Court finds that the testimony of P.W.4 remains consistent on the core aspects of the prosecution case. The fact that she knew the appellant, was in contact with him over phone and that he came to her residence and established physical relations with her has remained substantially unchanged throughout her examination. Though certain omissions and discrepancies were sought to be highlighted in cross-examination, this Court finds that they pertain to peripheral aspects of the matter and do not detract from the essential substratum of the prosecution case. 36. The law is equally well settled that the testimony of a prosecutrix, if found to be credible and trustworthy, can by itself form the basis of conviction. The Court is not required to seek corroboration as a matter of course. What is required is a careful evaluation of the intrinsic worth of her testimony. In this regard, in Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police5, the Supreme Court observed that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on her sole testimony. Similarly, in Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana6 it was observed that to hold an accused guilty for 5 (2020) 10 SCC 573. 6 (2011) 7 SCC 130. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 23 commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient provided that the same inspires confidence and appears to be trustworthy, unblemished and is of sterling quality. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court finds no reason to discard the evidence of P.W.4. 37. The testimony of the victim also receives support from the evidence of her mother (P.W.3). P.W.3 has deposed that she noticed her daughter to be under mental distress and upon enquiry the victim disclosed the incident to her. The F.I.R. was lodged thereafter. Though P.W.3 is not an eyewitness to the occurrence, her evidence assumes significance insofar as it explains the circumstances in which the incident came to light and lends support to the version of the victim regarding the subsequent events. 38. It is also noted that the appellant has placed emphasis upon the delay of approximately one year and four months in lodging the F.I.R. It has been contended that such delay creates a serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of the prosecution case. In this regard, it is relevant to examine the evidence of P.W.4 which reveals that after the occurrence the appellant threatened to circulate her photographs and videos. P.W.3 has also stated that she found the victim to be mentally disturbed and that the disclosure came only after repeated enquiry. While evaluating the effect of such delay, the Court must remain conscious of the realities attendant upon allegations of sexual assault, particularly where the victim is a young girl. Feelings of fear, shame, Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 24 social stigma and emotional vulnerability often operate as significant deterrents against immediate disclosure. The conduct of a victim in such circumstances cannot be tested on the basis of rigid assumptions as to how a person ought to behave. Viewed in this context, the delay in the present case does not appear so unnatural as to discredit the prosecution version altogether. Rather, the explanation offered by the prosecution appears to be reasonably consistent with the circumstances brought on record. The delay, therefore, cannot be treated as fatal to the prosecution case. 39. Further, once it has been found that the victim was below eighteen years of age at the time of the occurrence, any apparent consent on her part becomes legally immaterial. The statutory scheme of the POCSO Act proceeds on the premise that a child is incapable of giving legally valid consent to such acts. Likewise, for the purpose of Section 375 IPC, consent of a girl below the age prescribed by law cannot furnish a defence. Consequently, the plea sought to be advanced on behalf of the appellant that the relationship was consensual does not assist his case. 40. The testimony of the victim also finds support from the medical evidence. P.W.6, who examined the victim, noticed an old healed hymenal tear at the 5 o'clock position. While it is true that no recent external injury was detected, the examination admittedly took place long after the alleged occurrence. In such circumstances, the absence Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 25 of fresh injuries cannot be viewed as a circumstance adverse to the prosecution case. 41. It is equally well settled that the absence of injuries does not, by itself, negate an allegation of sexual assault. Medical evidence is essentially corroborative in nature and its significance lies in whether it is consistent with the prosecution version. In the present case, the medical findings do not contradict the evidence of the prosecutrix and are broadly compatible with her allegation of prior sexual intercourse. In this regard, in B.C. Deva v. State of Karnataka7, it was observed that the plea that no injuries were found on the person of the accused or prosecutrix, does not lead to any inference that the accused has not committed forcible sexual intercourse on the prosecutrix. It was observed that even in the absence of any corroboration of medical evidence, the oral testimony of the prosecutrix, which is found to be cogent, reliable, convincing and trustworthy has to be accepted. In the present case, the medical findings do not contradict the evidence of the prosecutrix and are broadly compatible with her allegation of prior sexual intercourse. 42. The appellant has also challenged the conviction under Section 506 IPC on the ground that the learned Trial Court acquitted him of the offences under Section 354(C) IPC and Section 66(E) of the Information Technology Act owing to the failure of the prosecution to prove the electronic evidence in accordance with Section 65B of the 7 (2007) 12 SCC 122 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 26 Evidence Act. However, the said contention overlooks the distinction between the two sets of offences. The acquittal under Section 354(C) IPC and Section 66(E) of the Information Technology Act was founded upon the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged electronic material in the manner required by law. The charge of criminal intimidation, however, rests upon a different footing. The substance of the allegation is not the actual existence of the photographs or videos but the threat allegedly held out by the appellant that such material would be circulated. 43. P.W.4 has consistently stated that the appellant threatened her with circulation of photographs and videos. Her evidence on this aspect has remained substantially intact. The delayed disclosure of the incident and the mental distress spoken to by P.W.3 also lend assurance to this part of the prosecution case. Therefore, merely because the electronic evidence itself was not proved, it does not necessarily follow that the allegation of criminal intimidation must also fail. 44. Upon an independent re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has approached the matter with due caution and has correctly appreciated the oral, documentary and medical evidence available before it. This Court finds no perversity, misappreciation of evidence, manifest illegality or omission of any material circumstance in the approach adopted by the Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 08-Jul-2026 17:14:15 Signature Not Verified Page 27 learned Trial Court so as to warrant interference in appellate jurisdiction. 45. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the prosecution has been able to establish the guilt of the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 376(1) IPC, Section 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 506 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. No ground has been made out warranting interference with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court. VI. CONCLUSION: 46. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in the present appeal. The prosecution has succeeded in establishing the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court do not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference. Accordingly, the Judgment of Conviction and Order of Sentence dated 22.03.2023 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Special Court under the POCSO Act, Jharsuguda in C.T. (Special) Case No. 62 of 2020 are hereby affirmed. 47. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. 48. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated. (Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 25th June, 2026 / CUTTACK