1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4030 of 2023 1 - Smt. Vidya Dekate W/o Shri P.P. Dekate, Aged About 61 Years Occupation Retired As Administrative Officer Lic, R/o J-10, Rajiv Nagar, Shankar Nagar, Extension, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Life Insurance Corporation Of India Through Its Chairman, Jeevan Bima Marg, Nariman Point, Mumbai, Maharashtra, 400021. 2 - Executive Director (Personnel) -Cum-Disciplinary Authority, Life Insurance Corporation Of India, Central Office, Yogakshema, Jeevan Bima Marg, Mumbai, Maharashtra, 400021. 3 - Manager, Personnel And Industrial Relations, Life Insurance Corporation Of India, Divisional Office, Jeevan Prakash Jeevan Bima Marg, Post Box No. 10, Pandari, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Manager (Os/dm), Life Insurance Corporation Of India, Divisional Office, Jeevan Prakash Jeevan Bima Marg, Post Box No. 10, Pandari, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Divy Jha, Advocate on behalf of Mr. R.S. Marhas, Advocate. For Respondent(s) No. 1 : Ms. Swati Agrawal, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, Advocate. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 11/03/2026 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- “10.1 Call for the entire records from the possession of respondents, for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. 10.2 This Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash the impugned notice Annexure P-1 and the impugned letter Annexure P-2 by issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari. 10.3 This Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct the respondents to pay the pension, gratuity and other post retiral benefits to the petitioner along with adequate interest thereon. 10.4 This Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass such other orders as it may deem fit under the facts and circumstances of the case, in favour of the petitioner against the respondents including the cost of litigation.” 2. Brief facts of the case, is that, the petitioner belongs to the aboriginal tribe “Halba” community, which is recognized as a Scheduled Tribe under the Presidential Order, 1950 issued 3 pursuant to Article 342 of the Constitution of India, and a caste certificate to this effect was issued on 20.03.1977 by the Office of the Collector, Raipur. The petitioner was born and brought up in the Halba community, her ancestors being residents of Pawani Tehsil, District Bhandara, which, as on 06.09.1950, fell within the State of Madhya Pradesh, and it is pertinent that Raipur, now in the State of Chhattisgarh, also formed part of Madhya Pradesh on the said date. The petitioner’s father was employed with the Khadi and Village Industries Commission and was posted at Raipur, and during his service tenure the petitioner completed her primary education from Nasik, Maharashtra. Thereafter, she obtained her B.A. degree in 1982 from Ravi Shankar University, Raipur, and subsequently secured employment with the Life Insurance Corporation of India as an Assistant on 10.11.1989 after successful completion of training, later completing her LL.B. in 1994 with due permission from her employer, and, owing to her sincere and diligent service, she was promoted to the post of Administrative Officer and posted at Mahasamund, while serving in the said capacity, the High-Level Caste Scrutiny Committee, Chhattisgarh, passed an erroneous and perverse order dated 23.08.2019 cancelling her caste certificate without following due procedure of law, which was challenged by the petitioner before this Hon’ble Court in WPC No. 4154 of 2019, wherein the operation of the said order was stayed vide order dated 20.11.2019 and the petition remains pending, with interim relief 4 continued vide order dated 04.10.2021. Despite the subsistence of the stay order, the petitioner was served with a charge sheet- cum-show cause notice dated 31.12.2019 alleging that she had misled LIC and wrongfully obtained employment, proposing disciplinary action including dismissal and withholding of gratuity and pensionary benefits, to which the petitioner submitted a detailed reply dated 15.01.2020 pointing out the subsisting stay and requesting that no coercive action be taken, and also forwarded the same to respondent No. 3 vide letter dated 17.01.2020. Thereafter, the petitioner retired from service on 31.10.2022, however, to her utter shock, she received the impugned notice dated 02.11.2022 whereby her gratuity and leave encashment were withheld on the ground of pendency of the writ petition, prompting her to send emails dated 13.12.2022 and 20.12.2022 requesting release of pensionary benefits, and upon receiving no response, she filed an RTI application dated 11.01.2023, in response to which the impugned letter was issued informing her that her pension had also been withheld. Subsequently, the petitioner made representations dated 04.02.2023 and 16.03.2023 invoking Rules 46 and 47 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995, seeking grant of provisional pension, but no relief was granted, and thus the impugned actions, being contrary to the applicable Rules, are illegal, arbitrary and perverse. Hence, this petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the present case 5 does not call for any fresh adjudication on the caste status of the petitioner. The issue sought to be raised by the respondent authorities has already attained finality up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The petitioner’s service stands expressly protected by binding judicial orders passed by this Hon’ble Court, affirmed by the Hon’ble Division Bench, and thereafter upheld by dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The impugned termination order, therefore, amounts to a clear violation of binding directions issued inter partes. Learned counsel submits that earlier, in the States of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, Halba and Koshti/Halba-Koshti were treated as Halba due to a prevailing misconception. It was only after the Constitution Bench judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Milind [(2001) 1 SCC 4] that it was clarified that Koshti or Halba-Koshti are not Halba. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressly protected admissions and appointments that had attained finality prior to 28.11.2000. Pursuant thereto, the Central Government issued a circular dated 10.08.2010 granting service protection to affected employees, and similarly, the State of Chhattisgarh also extended service protection to such employees appointed prior to 28.11.2000. He further submits that the impugned notice and the impugned letter are wholly erroneous, arbitrary and illegal, being in clear violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and are therefore liable to be quashed. It is further contended that the respondents 6 are fully aware of the pendency of proceedings before this Hon’ble Court wherein the order cancelling the petitioner’s caste status certificate has been challenged, and that this Hon’ble Court has already stayed the operation and effect of the said order, rendering it ineffective in law. Consequently, no action could have been taken by the respondents in furtherance thereof. Despite such knowledge, the respondents have proceeded to issue the impugned notice and letter, which are unsustainable in law. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner is duly entitled to all post-retiral benefits in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of 1995, and that she has rendered her entire service with utmost sincerity and dedication, having not been dismissed from service at any point of time, thereby entitling her to all consequential benefits accrued during her service tenure. It is emphatically argued that gratuity and pension are not matters of bounty but constitute hard-earned benefits and a form of property, which cannot be deprived without due process of law as mandated under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The impugned action of the respondents is thus contrary to the settled principles of service jurisprudence and deserves to be deprecated. The petitioner, moreover, reserves her right to add, alter, or amend the grounds at the time of hearing and to file an amended writ petition, if necessary, upon discovery of new facts. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 vehemently opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the 7 petitioner and contests the reliefs sought in the present petition, contending that the arguments raised are devoid of merit and do not warrant any interference by this Hon’ble Court. The writ petition is misconceived, devoid of merit, and is liable to be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. The Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Milind (2001) 1 SCC 4, decided on 28.11.2000, clarified that “Halba Koshti” is not included within the Scheduled Tribe “Halba”. However, while rendering the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically protected appointments that had already been made prior to 28.11.2000, even where the candidates had availed Scheduled Tribe benefits as Halba Koshti. In furtherance of the said judgment, the Government of India issued an Office Memorandum extending service protection to employees appointed prior to 28.11.2000 whose caste was recorded as Halba, though they in fact belonged to Koshti/Halba Koshti. Pursuant thereto, the State of Chhattisgarh also issued a circular granting identical protection to similarly situated employees affected by the Milind (Supra) decision. The State circular explicitly protected the services of persons appointed prior to 28.11.2000 on the strength of caste certificates describing them as Halba or Halba Koshti. Since the petitioner was appointed prior to the cut-off date of 28.11.2000, he 8 squarely falls within the protected category. Therefore, the benefit of service protection flows in his favour by virtue of the Supreme Court judgment, the Government of India Office Memorandum dated 10.08.2010, and the State Government circular. Consequently, a complaint raised after a prolonged lapse of time in the year 2015 and the subsequent circular dated 11.01.2016 withdrawing earlier protection cannot override the binding protection granted by the Supreme Court. When the petitioner and other similarly situated employees challenged the withdrawal circular in WPS No. 616/2016, this Court quashed the circular dated 11.01.2016 and directed the respondents to extend service protection. The writ appeal preferred against the said order was dismissed by the Division Bench vide order dated 01.07.2016, affirming that the petitioners were entitled to continue in service, though to be treated as General Category employees from 28.11.2000 onwards. 7. In the matter of Milind (supra), the Hon’ble Suprme Court ruled that “Halba-Koshti” is not a Scheduled Tribe, invalidating claims made under that category. However, it protected past appointments and educational admissions already finalized to prevent undue hardship. The decision has since guided policies on caste and tribe verification and is often cited in cases concerning the limits of judicial review in matters of constitutional lists. 8. Also, in the matter of Gajanan Marotrao Nimje and others vs. 9 Reserve Bank of India and others reported in (2019) 12 SCC 639 wherein despite being given service protection to employees affected with the dispute of Halba and Halba/Koshti, their services were terminated, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:- "8. We are afraid, in the peculiar background of the appellants and the history of the previous litigation of the same issue, the High Court is not justified in passing such an omnibus order. There is no case for anybody, leave alone the writ petitioners that at the time of entry in service, the appellants played any fraud. There was no case that the petitioners therein had played any fraud in obtaining the certificate or employment. In any case the appellants, it is pointed out that, even assuming that they do not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, fall either under the Most Backward or under the Backward Category, who were also entitled to some reservation at the time of recruitment. In order to avoid any litigation on this aspect only, the High Court in its wisdom passed the judgment dated 1-11-2012, that all the petitioners therein will be put in the general category. 9. It will be relevant to note that the common judgment dated 1-11-2012 was challenged before this Court and the special leave petition(s) and the review petition(s) were also dismissed. 10. Having regard to the background, as above, we are of the view that the appellants are 10 entitled to the protection granted by the same High Court in the judgment dated 1-11- 2012. ....." 9. Further, an identical situation has arisen in the matter of R. Unnikrishnan vs,. V.K. Mahanudevan reported in 2014 4 SCC 434, wherein once the employee was granted service protection, his caste status was reopened, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:- “12. Two distinct questions fall for determination in these appeals. The first is whether the appellants could have reopened for examination the caste status of the respondent V.K. Mahanudevan no matter that judgment of the High Court in OP No. 9216 of 1986 had declared him to be a "Thandan" belonging to a Scheduled Caste community. The High Court has, as seen above, taken the view that its judgment and order in OP No. 9216 of 1986 effectively settled the question regarding the caste status of the respondent which could not be reopened as the said judgment had attained finality. The second and the only other question that would arise for determination is whether the respondent V.K. Mahanudevan can claim protection against ouster from service and, if so, what is the effect of the change in law relevant to the caste status of the respondent. We propose to deal with the two questions ad seriatim.19. It is trite that law favours finality to binding judicial decisions pronounced by courts that are 11 competent to deal with the subject matter. Public interest is against individuals being vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. The binding character of the judgments pronounced by the courts of competent jurisdiction has always been treated as an essential part of the rule of law which is the basis of the administration of justice in this country. We may gainfully refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Daryao v. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 SC 1457] where the Court succinctly summed up the law in the following words: (AIR p. 1462, paras 9 & 11) "9.... It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. *** 11. The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis." 26. It is only because the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court held that anthropological 12 study conducted by KIRTADS may not provide a sound basis for holding Thandans, like the respondent, as those belonging to the Scheduled Caste category that the issue regarding the correctness of the certificate and a fresh investigation into the matter surfaced for consideration. Even if one were to assume that the conclusion drawn by KIRTADS was not for any reason completely accurate and reliable, the same would not have in the absence of any other material to show that such conclusion and enquiry was a complete farce based on wholly irrelevant or inadmissible material and motivated by extraneous considerations by itself provided a basis for unsettling what stood settled by the order passed by the High Court. Suffice it to say that the contention urged on behalf of the appellants that the order passed by the High Court in OP No. 9216 of 1986 was a nullity on the ground of fraud has not impressed us in the facts and circumstances of the case. 27. The upshot of the above discussion, therefore, is that the order passed by the High Court in OP No. 9216 of 1986 which had attained finality did not permit a fresh enquiry into the caste status of the writ petitioner. Inasmuch as the High Court quashed the said proceedings and the order passed by the State Government pursuant thereto, it committed no error to warrant interference." 10. From the above legal position and the law laid down by the 13 Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Milind, along with the memorandum issued by the Government of India and the State circular dated 01.10.2011, it is clear that employees appointed prior to 28.11.2000 on the basis of Halba/Halba Koshti caste certificates are entitled to protection of their services. This protection is based on binding judicial directions and cannot be taken away by later administrative action. Therefore, even though the Caste Scrutiny Committee later held that the petitioner belongs to Halba Koshti and invalidated the caste certificate, such a finding cannot affect the petitioner’s service. At most, it can affect future benefits under the reserved category, but it cannot cancel the protection already granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and implemented by the Government. The petitioner’s service is therefore legally protected. 11. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, and further taking into account that the denial of retiral dues solely on the basis of cancellation of the petitioner’s caste certificate (Halba) is legally untenable, such action is unsustainable in the eyes of law. In the landmark judgment rendered in State of Maharashtra vs. Milind & Others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has unequivocally granted protection of service to those individuals who were appointed prior to 28.11.2000, thereby safeguarding their accrued service benefits. In light of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement, the impugned notices, whereby the retiral dues of the petitioner have been withheld, are arbitrary, 14 contrary to settled legal principles, and thus liable to be set aside. The impugned notices goes against binding Court judgments and reopens an issue that has already been finally decided. Once the courts have granted protection and the matter has attained finality, the authorities cannot pass an order in violation of those directions. The impugned action is based on an incorrect understanding of the earlier Division Bench judgment and ignores the protection granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the impugned notice dated 31.10.2022 (Annexure P/1) and notice dated 18.1.2023 (Annexure P/2) are hereby quashed. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed, and the concerned respondent authorities are hereby directed to release and disburse to the petitioner all admissible retiral benefits, including pension, gratuity, and other post-retiral dues, along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, strictly in accordance with law preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat