IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH **** 126 RSA-2936-2023 (O&M) Date of Decision.:13.08.2026 Narender Kumar …..Appellant Vs. Vijay Pal and Another .….Respondents CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Present:- Ms. Vini Mahajan, Advocate for Mr. Nipun Vashisht, Advocate for the appellant. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) CM-10408-C-2023: Allowed. Delay of 11 days in filing the appeal is hereby condoned on account of the reasons men%oned in the applica%on supported by affidavit of appellant Narender Kumar. Main case.: The appellant-plain%ff is in second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 12.05.2023 passed by the learned Addi%onal District Judge, Rewari, whereby his appeal against the judgment and decree dated 31.10.2018 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Rewari, dismissing his suit for permanent and mandatory injunc%on, has also been dismissed. 2. The case set up by the appellant before the Courts below was that the respondents are running a bakery in the premises adjacent to his residen%al house and that the opera%on of heavy machinery, generator NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.08.14 16:39 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-2936-2023 (O&M) and wooden furnace causes excessive noise, vibra%ons, smoke and foul smell, resul%ng in nuisance and discomfort to the appellant and his family. It was further alleged that vibra%ons had caused cracks in the walls of the appellant's house and that the bakery was being run in viola%on of pollu%on norms. On these asser%ons, the appellant sought direc%ons for shi9ing the bakery and generator or, alterna%vely, for stopping the manufacturing ac%vi%es. 3. The defendants contested the suit. They pleaded, inter alia, that the bakery was being run under a valid licence and denied causing any nuisance or pollu%on. 4. The Courts below, upon apprecia%on of the evidence, have concurrently found against the appellant. 5. The learned first appellate Court has no%ced that the respondents had produced evidence showing that the premises were commercial property and that the bakery had been licensed from %me to %me. More importantly, it has considered the oral evidence of the par%es and their witnesses and found that no cogent and convincing evidence had been produced by the appellant to establish that the running of the bakery resulted in ac%onable nuisance or viola%on of pollu%on norms. The evidence of the neighbouring witnesses examined by the respondents was also taken into considera%on. The first appellate Court further found that there was no definite evidence establishing that any cracks in the appellant's house had been caused by vibra%ons from the machinery or generator. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has a=empted to persuade this Court that the evidence led by him, par%cularly with regard to noise, smoke, vibra%ons and the func%oning of heavy machinery, has not been correctly appreciated. It is also contended that the fact that the respondents possessed a licence could not authorise them to cause Page No. 2 of 4 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.08.14 16:39 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-2936-2023 (O&M) nuisance to the neighbouring residents. 7. There can be no quarrel with the general proposi%on that a licence to carry on a business does not confer an absolute right upon the licensee to cause ac%onable nuisance to his neighbours. The right to use one's property is necessarily subject to the corresponding right of the neighbouring owner to the ordinary comfort and peaceful enjoyment of his property. Noise or other ac%vity becomes ac%onable when it materially interferes with the ordinary comfort of life, regard being had to the nature of the locality and all the surrounding circumstances. The Supreme Court has recognised this principle while dealing with claims based upon noise and other forms of nuisance. 8. However, the aforesaid proposi%on does not advance the case of the appellant in the present second appeal. The ques%on whether the par%cular ac%vi%es carried on by the respondents cons%tuted ac%onable nuisance is essen%ally a ques%on dependent upon the evidence on record. The first appellate Court, which is the final Court of fact, has examined the evidence in detail and has concurred with the trial Court that the appellant failed to establish the alleged nuisance. It has specifically no%ced the absence of cogent evidence regarding pollu%on, the alleged cracks in the walls and viola%on of statutory norms. 9. The jurisdic%on of this Court under Sec%on 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is circumscribed by the existence of a substan%al ques%on of law. A substan%al ques%on of law must be a debatable ques%on of law having a material bearing upon the rights of the par%es. A mere plea that the evidence has been wrongly appreciated, or that another view of the evidence is possible, does not furnish a substan%al ques%on of law. The High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal unless such findings are shown to be vi%ated by a substan%al ques%on of law, perversity, or some patent legal infirmity. Page No. 3 of 4 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.08.14 16:39 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-2936-2023 (O&M) 10. In the present case, no such infirmity has been demonstrated. The findings recorded by the Courts below are based upon apprecia%on of the oral as well as documentary evidence. The first appellate Court has independently considered the material on record and has given reasons for affirming the judgment of the trial Court. The conclusion that the appellant failed to prove ac%onable nuisance cannot, in the facts of the case, be characterised as perverse merely because the appellant seeks a different apprecia%on of the evidence. 11. It is also significant that the appellant's case regarding viola%on of pollu%on norms has not been substan%ated by any cogent material. The first appellate Court no%ced that although a complaint had been made before various authori%es, the appellant's own evidence did not establish the outcome of those proceedings so as to demonstrate any finding by a competent authority that the respondents were indulging in an unlawful ac%vity. 12. Consequently, the ques%ons sought to be raised by the appellant are essen%ally ques%ons of fact and do not cons%tute substan%al ques%ons of law within the meaning of Sec%on 100 CPC. 13. No other substan%al ques%on of law arises for considera%on. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. 14. Pending miscellaneous applica%on(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. ( DEEPAK GUPTA ) JUDGE August 13, 2026 Nee%ka Tuteja Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether Reportable Yes/No Page No. 4 of 4 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.08.14 16:39 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document