CRM-M-37112-2023 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-M-37112-2023 Ved Parkash Joshi ... Petitioner Vs. State of Haryana ... Respondent 1. The date when the judgment is reserved 23.07.2026 2. The date when the judgment is pronounced 30.07.2026 3. The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 30.07.2026 4. Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced or whether the full judgment is pronounced Full 5. The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full judgment, and reasons thereof Not applicable CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MANISHA BATRA Present: Mr. Saurav Saini, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Ashok Kumar Khubbar, Addl. Advocate General, Haryana. ... Manisha Batra, J. (Oral). 1. The instant petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking quashing of FIR No.91, dated 12.03.2018, registered under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC, at Police Station Hodal, District Palwal and all the proceedings having emanated therefrom. 2. Brief facts of the case relevant for the disposal of this petition HARJEET KAUR 2026.07.30 17:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-37112-2023 -2- are that the aforementioned FIR was registered on the basis of statement recorded by complainant – Sheru Mohammad, alleging therein that on 10.03.2018, he along with his wife was going on his motorbike from Hodal to Kesi and while on NH2, one car bearing registration No.DL- 9CAN-7413 coming from behind, driving at a high speed in a rash and negligent manner hit the vehicle from the back due to which he had fallen down and became unconscious after sometime. He had noted down the registration number of the offending car. His wife had also sustained injuries. His motorbike was damaged. 3. After registration of the FIR, investigation proceedings were initiated . The petitioner was joined into investigation on 22.07.2023 and was formally arrested. On interrogation, he suffered disclosure statement admitting his involvement in the crime. Offences under Sections 192 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act were added. After completion of investigation, challan was presented in the Court of learned jurisdictional Magistrate as on 16.12.2023. 4. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the FIR of this case is liable to be quashed in view of the fact that the cognizance of the offences allegedly committed by him on 10.03.2018 had been taken by the Court only in the year 2023. The offences for which he has been booked and challaned are punishable to the extent of period of six months only and in view of provisions of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code'), the period of limitation to take cognizance was one year from the date of commission of offence. It is further argued that the petitioner was not the driver of the offending HARJEET KAUR 2026.07.30 17:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-37112-2023 -3- vehicle on the date of occurrence. The complainant himself was driving his motorbike in a negligent manner. He was not even wearing helmet. It was the motorbike of the complainant that had hit car in which the petitioner was travelling from the backside. The complainant had been taken by the petitioner to the hospital on humanitarian grounds as he himself had apologized for his carelessness. The FIR was lodged after a gap of 02 days only to extract money. The ingredients for commission of subject offences are not attracted qua him. Proceeding, however, with the trial is amount only to abuse the process of law. There are no chances of conviction of the petitioner in this case. With these broad submissions, it is urged that the petition deserves to be allowed. 5. Per contra, learned State counsel has argued that the registration number of the offending vehicle as owned by the petitioner had been disclosed in the FIR itself. However, since the registered owner of the offending vehicle i.e. the present petitioner could not be located till the date of his arrest, hence, challan could not be presented before the learned trial Court and it was filed on completion of investigation. It is further argued that the allegations make out a prima facie case as against the petitioner and hence it is urged that the petition does not deserve to be allowed. 6. This Court has heard the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 7. At the outset, it will be profitable to look into the scope and ambit of the Court’s power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (which is pari materia with Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) as HARJEET KAUR 2026.07.30 17:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-37112-2023 -4- spelt out in several judicial pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as different High Courts. The well settled proposition of law is that in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court is not expected to analyze all the facts, which are to be placed before the High Court. The power conferred under this section is very specific. To secure the ends of justice, to prevent the abuse of process of Court or to make any such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, such power can be exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has drawn up some guidelines in some categories of cases by way of illustration to circumscribe the exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process of any Court or to secure the ends of the justice or to give effect to an order of the Court. It is also well settled that inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice, yet, the High Court must not hesitate in quashing of criminal proceedings, where the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the case would put him into great oppression and prejudice and injustice would be caused to him by not quashing criminal case. 8. Since the main thrust of the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is with regard to competency of the jurisdictional Court to take cognizance of the offence under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC, therefore, it will be proper to firstly refer to he relevant provision of law in this context. Reference can firstly made to Section 468 HARJEET KAUR 2026.07.30 17:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-37112-2023 -5- Cr.P.C., which reads as under: “468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. (1)Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2)The period of limitation shall be - (a)six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b)one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c)three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3)[ For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.] [Inserted by Act of 1978, Section 33 (w.e.f. 18-12-1978).] ” 9. Reference can further be made to Section 469 of the Code, which reads as under: “469. Commencement of the period of limitation. (1)The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence, - (a)on the date of the offence; or (b)where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or HARJEET KAUR 2026.07.30 17:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-37112-2023 -6- to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or (c)where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. (2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded. ” 10. It is discernible from the record that at the time of lodging of FIR by the complainant on 12.03.2018, the registration number of the offending vehicle had been mentioned therein. The petitioner was joined into investigation of this case and was arrested only on 22.03.2023 i.e. after a gap of 05 years and 10 days from the date of registration of FIR. Once the registration number of the offending vehicle had come into knowledge of the Investigating Agency, it can reasonably be assumed that the name of registered owner, who was the petitioner in this case, had also come to the knowledge of Investigating Officer. However, there is no reasonable explanation to show as to why the petitioner was not joined into investigation for such a long period of time only on account of his arrest after a gap of 05 years. It cannot be assumed that the Investigating Agency or the complainant were not knowing as to by whom the offences were committed and the identity of the petitioner as the driver of the offending vehicle had come to be known only on 22.07.2023. Rather, it is to be assumed to the contrary. As such, apparently and evidently, the HARJEET KAUR 2026.07.30 17:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-37112-2023 -7- learned Judicial Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance of the offences on presentation of challan on 16.12.2023 as the same had been hit by the law of limitation. 11. At this juncture, it may be mentioned that undoubtedly as per Section 473 of the Code, the Court can take cognizance of offence even after expiry of period of limitation i.e. only on a satisfaction being arrived on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. The object of the provisions of the Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecution was clearly with an intent to prevent the parties from filing case after a long time and to prevent abuse of process of Code by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of offence. Since the delay in joining the petitioner into investigation and filing the challan has not been satisfactorily explained, therefore, this Court has no hesitation to held that the prosecution against the petitioner is being barred by law of limitation. Hence, the subsequent proceedings are nonest and not sustainable in the eyes of law. 12. In view of the above discussed facts, the present petition is allowed and FIR No.91, dated 12.03.2018, registered under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC, at Police Station Hodal, District Palwal and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed qua the petitioner. (MANISHA BATRA) 30.07.2026 JUDGE harjeet Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No HARJEET KAUR 2026.07.30 17:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document