CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:101917 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) Ram Parkash …Pe++oner Versus Rakesh (deceased) through Lrs and another …Respondents Reserved on: July 21, 2026 Pronounced on: July 23, 2026 Pronounced fully/opera+ve part : Fully * * * * CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued By:- Mr. Navmohit Singh, Advocate for the peoner. Mr. Sanchit Punia, Advocate for the Respondent DEEPAK GUPTA, J. The peoner-plainff has invoked the supervisory jurisdicon of this Court under Arcle 227 of the Constuon of India assailing the order dated 19.12.2022 (Annexure P-3) passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hisar, whereby his applicaon under Order VI Rule 17 read with Secon 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking amendment of the plaint in Civil Suit bearing CIS No. CS/437/2016 tled ‘Ram Parkash vs Rakesh & Another’, has been dismissed. 2. The peoner instuted a suit seeking declaraon and permanent injuncon in respect of Plot No.409 measuring 162 square yards situated in South City, Hisar, asserng that the said plot had been purchased by him from defendant No.1 and that the membership of the Cooperave House Building Society stood duly transferred in his favour. In the wri;en statement, defendant No.1 pleaded that although the plot had inially been transferred in favour of the Page No. 1 of Total 7 Pages SARITA RANI 2026.07.23 16:41 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:101917 plainff, the plainff had, on the very same day i.e. 11.01.2013, executed an agreement in favour of defendant No.1 in respect of one-half share of the plot measuring 81 square yards, pursuant where to possession had also been delivered. 3. A>er issues were framed, the plainff led his evidence. Two witnesses were examined and the plainff's oral evidence was closed. Therea>er, despite availing opportunies, the plainff failed to produce documentary evidence and consequently, his evidence stood closed by order dated 15.09.2017. 4. It was only therea>er that the present applicaon under Order VI Rule 17 CPC came to be filed seeking amendment of the plaint by introducing averments that the agreement dated 11.01.2013 relied upon by defendant No.1 was illegal, void, without consideraon, the result of fraud and misrepresentaon and liable to be set aside, besides seeking corresponding amendment in the prayer clause. The explanaon furnished by the peoner was that a>er engaging a new counsel and while preparing the case, it came to his noce that the previous counsel had inadvertently omi;ed to challenge the aforesaid agreement and, therefore, the amendment had become necessary for effecve adjudicaon of the controversy. 5. The learned Trial Court declined the prayer holding that the trial had already commenced and, in fact, the plainff had concluded his evidence; that the agreement sought to be challenged was admi;edly within the plainff's knowledge from the incepon of the ligaon; and permiBng the amendment at such belated stage would prejudice the defendants and reopen the trial. 6. Assailing the aforesaid order, learned counsel for the peoner contends that the learned Trial Court has adopted an unduly technical approach. It is argued that the proposed amendment is necessary for determining the real controversy between the pares and that mere delay cannot constute a ground to reject an amendment. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporaon of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1128, to contend that amendments ought Page No. 2 of Total 7 Pages SARITA RANI 2026.07.23 16:41 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:101917 ordinarily to be permi;ed, if they facilitate complete adjudicaon of the dispute and avoid mulplicity of proceedings and that delay in itself cannot be ground to decline the amendment. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the pares and having perused the record with their assistance, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdiconal error warranng interference under Arcle 227 of the Constuon. 8. The controversy lies within a narrow compass. The queson is not whether the amendment proposed by the plainff may ulmately facilitate a complete adjudicaon of the dispute. The real queson is whether, a>er commencement of trial and a>er conclusion of the plainff's evidence, the statutory condions contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC stood sasfied so as to enable the Trial Court to exercise its discreon in favour of the plainff. 9. The answer, in the opinion of this Court, has necessarily to be in the negave. The agreement dated 11.01.2013, which the plainff now seeks to challenge by incorporang an addional declaratory relief, is admi;edly not a document discovered subsequently. It is a document allegedly executed by the plainff himself. More importantly, defendant No.1 had specifically founded his defence upon the said agreement in the wri;en statement filed immediately a>er instuon of the suit. The plainff was, therefore, fully conscious not merely of the existence of the agreement but also of the fact that the defendants intended to rely upon it in resisng the suit. 10. Despite such knowledge, the plainff chose to proceed with the suit on the original pleadings. He neither sought amendment before se;lement of issues nor at any stage before commencement of evidence. He examined his witnesses, concluded his oral evidence and therea>er also availed opportunies for producing documentary evidence. It is only a>er his evidence stood concluded that the present applicaon under Order VI Rule 17 CPC came to be instuted. Page No. 3 of Total 7 Pages SARITA RANI 2026.07.23 16:41 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:101917 11. It is also important to take note of the pleadings contained in the amendment applicaon itself. A careful reading thereof shows that the plainff has nowhere pleaded discovery of any new fact or subsequent event. There is no averment indicang when the alleged omission in the plaint came to his knowledge. The applicaon is conspicuously silent regarding the steps taken by him a>er filing of the wri;en statement or the circumstances which prevented him from seeking amendment before commencement of trial. The enre explanaon is confined to a bald asseron that a>er engaging another counsel, it was noced that the previous counsel had inadvertently failed to challenge the agreement dated 11.01.2013. 12. In the considered opinion of this Court, such pleadings do not sasfy the statutory requirement of due diligence. The proviso appended to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, marks a conscious departure from the unqualified discreon, which earlier existed in the ma;er of amendment of pleadings. The object behind the amendment was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Associaon, Tamil Nadu (II) v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344, wherein it was observed that the proviso was introduced to discourage belated amendments a>er commencement of trial and to ensure expedious disposal of civil proceedings. 13. The mandatory character of the proviso was therea>er authoritavely recognised in Vidyabai and others v. Padmalatha and another, (2009) 2 SCC 409, wherein it was held that once the trial has commenced, the Court cannot exercise jurisdicon under Order VI Rule 17 CPC unless it first records sasfacon that despite exercise of due diligence, the applicant could not have raised the ma;er before commencement of trial. The requirement of due diligence is, therefore, not procedural but jurisdiconal. 14. The expression "due diligence" has itself been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117, wherein it was held that due diligence means the diligence reasonably expected from a prudent person acng in the conduct of his own affairs. The same principle was reiterated in J. Samuel and others v. Ga6u Mahesh and Page No. 4 of Total 7 Pages SARITA RANI 2026.07.23 16:41 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:101917 others, (2012) 2 SCC 300, wherein it was held that negligence, inadvertence or omission cannot be equated with due diligence. Where the material facts were always within the knowledge of the party, subsequent realisaon that the pleadings were inadequate does not sasfy the statutory requirement. 15. Judged on the aforesaid touchstone, the explanaon furnished by the peoner does not inspire acceptance. The omission a;ributed to the previous counsel cannot, by itself, constute due diligence within the meaning of the proviso. A ligant is undoubtedly entled to engage counsel of his choice and may in appropriate cases seek relief against the consequences of bona fide mistakes commi;ed by counsel. However, the statutory requirement under the proviso is of a different character. The Court is required to ascertain whether the party itself acted with reasonable diligence before the commencement of trial. If every omission on the part of an advocate were to be accepted as sufficient compliance with the proviso, the legislave restricon enacted by Parliament would become wholly ineffecve, for every delayed amendment could therea>er be jusfied by a;ribung blame to the previous counsel. 16. Another circumstance, which cannot be ignored is the stage at which the amendment has been sought. The proposed amendment is not confined to amplificaon of exisng pleadings. By the amendment, the plainff seeks to introduce allegaons of fraud, want of consideraon and invalidity of the agreement dated 11.01.2013 and simultaneously seeks an addional declaraon that the said agreement is illegal, void and liable to be set aside. Such pleadings necessarily require evidence. If the amendment were permi;ed a>er the plainff had already concluded his evidence, the inevitable consequence would be reopening of the enre evidenary exercise, recall or re-examinaon of witnesses and corresponding opportunity to the defendants to amend their defence and lead further evidence. The prejudice, therefore, is not merely one of delay. It strikes at the orderly progress of the trial a>er the plainff had already exhausted the opportunity available to him under law. 17. The reliance placed upon Life Insurance Corporaon of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited (supra) is equally misplaced. The said judgment Page No. 5 of Total 7 Pages SARITA RANI 2026.07.23 16:41 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:101917 undoubtedly reiterates that amendments necessary for determining the real controversy should ordinarily be allowed and that delay by itself ought not to defeat substanal jusce. At the same me, the Supreme Court did not dilute the statutory embargo created by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. On the contrary, while summarising the governing principles, the Court reaffirmed that amendments sought a>er commencement of trial remain subject to the requirement of due diligence and the Court must also examine the prejudice likely to be caused to the opposite party. 18. The present case does not turn upon delay alone. The applicaon has failed because the peoner has not laid even the basic factual foundaon necessary for recording sasfacon regarding due diligence. The disncon between delay and absence of due diligence is fundamental. While delay may in an appropriate case be compensated by costs, absence of due diligence strikes at the very jurisdicon of the Court to exercise discreon a>er commencement of trial. 19. Before parng with the merits of the controversy, it is considered appropriate to clarify that this Court has not examined the legality, validity or enforceability of the agreement dated 11.01.2013. Those quesons do not arise for consideraon in the present proceedings. The observaons recorded herein are confined exclusively to examining the correctness of the order refusing amendment and shall not prejudice adjudicaon of the suit on its own merits. 20. The scope of interference under Arcle 227 of the Constuon is also well se;led. Supervisory jurisdicon is intended to ensure that subordinate Courts act within the bounds of their authority. It is neither an appellate nor a revisional jurisdicon enabling the High Court to substute its own discreon merely because another view may also be possible. Unless the order impugned is shown to be patently perverse, contrary to se;led principles of law or suffering from jurisdiconal infirmity, interference would be unwarranted. 21. The impugned order, viewed in the light of the principles noced above, reflects a proper exercise of judicial discreon. The learned Trial Court has Page No. 6 of Total 7 Pages SARITA RANI 2026.07.23 16:41 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:101917 correctly appreciated the scope of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, has recorded cogent reasons for holding that the peoner failed to establish due diligence and has declined the amendment keeping in view the stage of the proceedings and the prejudice likely to be caused to the defendants. No perversity, arbitrariness or jurisdiconal error is discernible so as to warrant interference by this Court. 22. Accordingly, the present revision peon, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applicaon(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. July 23, 2026 Sarita (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned? : Yes/No Whether reportable? : Yes/No Uploaded on: July 23, 2026 Page No. 7 of Total 7 Pages SARITA RANI 2026.07.23 16:41 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order