CRM-M-70311- In the High Court for the States of Punjab and Haryana 135 Baljinder Singh @ Billa State of Punjab and another CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE Present:- Mr. Inderjit Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner. SUBHAS MEHLA 1. Present petition has been filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 seeking quashing of FIR bearing No.0028 dated 24.02.2003 registered under Sections 302, 336, 201, 120 read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 18 59 of arms Act, 1959, at Police Station Phagwara, District Kapurthala and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including the impugned order dated 21.07.2003 (Annexure P proclaimed offender. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, with considerable vehemence, contended that FIR No.0028 dated 24.02.2003, registered at Police Station Phagwara, District Kapurthala, under Sections 302, 336, 201, 120 of the IPC and Section -2025 (O&M) ( 1 ) In the High Court for the States of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh Singh @ Billa Versus State of Punjab and another HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBHAS MEHLA Mr. Inderjit Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner. ***** SUBHAS MEHLA, J. (Oral) Present petition has been filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 seeking quashing of FIR bearing No.0028 dated 24.02.2003 registered under Sections 302, 336, 201, 120 read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 18 59 of arms Act, 1959, at Police Station Phagwara, District Kapurthala and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including the impugned order dated 21.07.2003 (Annexure P-4) vide which petitioner was delcared laimed offender. Learned counsel for the petitioner, with considerable vehemence, contended that FIR No.0028 dated 24.02.2003, registered at Police Station Phagwara, District Kapurthala, under Sections 302, 336, 201, 120 of the IPC and Sections 25, 27, 54 and 59 of the Arms Act, came to be In the High Court for the States of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311-2025 (O&M) Date of Decision:- 11.05.2026 … Petitioner ... Respondents SUBHAS MEHLA Mr. Inderjit Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner. Present petition has been filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 seeking quashing of FIR bearing No.0028 dated 24.02.2003 registered under Sections 302, 336, 201, 120-B, read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 25, 27, 54 and 59 of arms Act, 1959, at Police Station Phagwara, District Kapurthala and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including the impugned order 4) vide which petitioner was delcared Learned counsel for the petitioner, with considerable vehemence, contended that FIR No.0028 dated 24.02.2003, registered at Police Station Phagwara, District Kapurthala, under Sections 302, 336, 201, 120-B and 34 s 25, 27, 54 and 59 of the Arms Act, came to be Present petition has been filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 seeking quashing of FIR bearing B, 60 and Sections 25, 27, 54 and 59 of arms Act, 1959, at Police Station Phagwara, District Kapurthala and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including the impugned order 4) vide which petitioner was delcared Learned counsel for the petitioner, with considerable vehemence, contended that FIR No.0028 dated 24.02.2003, registered at Police Station B and 34 s 25, 27, 54 and 59 of the Arms Act, came to be GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311- instituted on allegations that certain persons were seen exchanging firearms and indulging in celebratory firing during the marriage ceremony of Jaswinder Singh and that, subsequently in the evening after the the Barat, one Mohan Singh was shot dead. It was urged that the petitioner had no semblance of connection, direct or indirect, with the alleged occurrence and that his implication is wholly misconceived and bereft of factual foundation. 2.1 It was further submitted that the petitioner had been permanently residing in the United Kingdom much prior to the registration of the FIR and was gainfully employed there. He had come to India only on 12.02.2003 to attend the marriage of his real brother 23.02.2003 at Windsor Palace, Phagwara, and thereafter returned to the United Kingdom. Learned counsel emphasized that during the entire course of investigation, no incriminating material whatsoever surfaced against the petitioner; nevertheless, a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala, arraying the petitioner as an accused. 2.2 It was strenuously argued that since the petitioner had already departed for the United Ki remained completely oblivious to the pendency of the criminal proceedings arising out of the aforesaid FIR and that his non Court was neither wilful nor deliberate but occasioned b knowledge. Despite this factual backdrop, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kapurthala, vide order dated 08.07.2003, proceeded to issue proclamation warrants against the petitioner and, thereafter, vide order dated -2025 (O&M) ( 2 ) instituted on allegations that certain persons were seen exchanging firearms and indulging in celebratory firing during the marriage ceremony of Jaswinder Singh and that, subsequently in the evening after the the Barat, one Mohan Singh was shot dead. It was urged that the petitioner had no semblance of connection, direct or indirect, with the alleged occurrence and that his implication is wholly misconceived and bereft of factual foundation. It was further submitted that the petitioner had been permanently residing in the United Kingdom much prior to the registration of the FIR and was gainfully employed there. He had come to India only on 12.02.2003 to attend the marriage of his real brother Jaswinder Singh, solemnized on 23.02.2003 at Windsor Palace, Phagwara, and thereafter returned to the United Kingdom. Learned counsel emphasized that during the entire course of investigation, no incriminating material whatsoever surfaced against the ioner; nevertheless, a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala, arraying the petitioner as It was strenuously argued that since the petitioner had already departed for the United Kingdom after attending the marriage ceremony, he remained completely oblivious to the pendency of the criminal proceedings arising out of the aforesaid FIR and that his non Court was neither wilful nor deliberate but occasioned b knowledge. Despite this factual backdrop, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kapurthala, vide order dated 08.07.2003, proceeded to issue proclamation warrants against the petitioner and, thereafter, vide order dated instituted on allegations that certain persons were seen exchanging firearms and indulging in celebratory firing during the marriage ceremony of Jaswinder Singh and that, subsequently in the evening after the departure of the Barat, one Mohan Singh was shot dead. It was urged that the petitioner had no semblance of connection, direct or indirect, with the alleged occurrence and that his implication is wholly misconceived and bereft of It was further submitted that the petitioner had been permanently residing in the United Kingdom much prior to the registration of the FIR and was gainfully employed there. He had come to India only on 12.02.2003 to Jaswinder Singh, solemnized on 23.02.2003 at Windsor Palace, Phagwara, and thereafter returned to the United Kingdom. Learned counsel emphasized that during the entire course of investigation, no incriminating material whatsoever surfaced against the ioner; nevertheless, a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala, arraying the petitioner as It was strenuously argued that since the petitioner had already ngdom after attending the marriage ceremony, he remained completely oblivious to the pendency of the criminal proceedings arising out of the aforesaid FIR and that his non-appearance before the trial Court was neither wilful nor deliberate but occasioned by sheer lack of knowledge. Despite this factual backdrop, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kapurthala, vide order dated 08.07.2003, proceeded to issue proclamation warrants against the petitioner and, thereafter, vide order dated instituted on allegations that certain persons were seen exchanging firearms and indulging in celebratory firing during the marriage ceremony of departure of the Barat, one Mohan Singh was shot dead. It was urged that the petitioner had no semblance of connection, direct or indirect, with the alleged occurrence and that his implication is wholly misconceived and bereft of It was further submitted that the petitioner had been permanently residing in the United Kingdom much prior to the registration of the FIR and was gainfully employed there. He had come to India only on 12.02.2003 to Jaswinder Singh, solemnized on 23.02.2003 at Windsor Palace, Phagwara, and thereafter returned to the United Kingdom. Learned counsel emphasized that during the entire course of investigation, no incriminating material whatsoever surfaced against the ioner; nevertheless, a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala, arraying the petitioner as It was strenuously argued that since the petitioner had already ngdom after attending the marriage ceremony, he remained completely oblivious to the pendency of the criminal proceedings appearance before the trial y sheer lack of knowledge. Despite this factual backdrop, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kapurthala, vide order dated 08.07.2003, proceeded to issue proclamation warrants against the petitioner and, thereafter, vide order dated GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311- 21.07.2003, de of the mandatory safeguards enshrined in Sections 82 Cr.P.C. It was contended that neither due and proper service was effected nor was the statutory period prescribed under law afforded to the the proclamation order, thereby vitiating the entire exercise and rendering the impugned order ex facie illegal and unsustainable. 2.3 Learned counsel further submitted that during the course of trial, the prosecution examined a 05.03.2005. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the evidence so adduced, the learned Sessions Judge, Kapurthala, vide judgment dated 18.10.2005, acquitted all the accused who had faced trial, except Bikram extending them the benefit of doubt. It was further submitted that even the conviction of the said co scrutiny and was subsequently set aside by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. CRA-D-823-DB dated 08.08.2025, culminating in his acquittal as well. Thus, prayed for quashing of impugned FIR and proclamation order on the ground of acquittal of co-accused. Supreme Court in No.2861-2025, decided on 14.08.2025, Sudo Mandal @ Diwarak Mandal Vs. State of Punjab, (2011) 2 RCR (Criminal) 453 decided on 17.03.2011, and another, CRM Vs. State of Punjab and another, CRM 03.02.2012, Gurpreet Singh @ Khinder Vs. State of Punjab CRM -2025 (O&M) ( 3 ) 21.07.2003, declared the petitioner a proclaimed offender in patent disregard of the mandatory safeguards enshrined in Sections 82 Cr.P.C. It was contended that neither due and proper service was effected nor was the statutory period prescribed under law afforded to the the proclamation order, thereby vitiating the entire exercise and rendering the impugned order ex facie illegal and unsustainable. Learned counsel further submitted that during the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as 23 witnesses and closed its evidence on 05.03.2005. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the evidence so adduced, the learned Sessions Judge, Kapurthala, vide judgment dated 18.10.2005, acquitted all the accused who had faced trial, except Bikram extending them the benefit of doubt. It was further submitted that even the conviction of the said co-accused Bikram Singh did not withstand judicial scrutiny and was subsequently set aside by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. DB-2005 titled Bikram Singh vs. State of Punjab dated 08.08.2025, culminating in his acquittal as well. Thus, prayed for quashing of impugned FIR and proclamation order on the ground of acquittal accused. Learned counsel placed reliance upon ju Supreme Court in Shanti Devi Vs. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal 2025, decided on 14.08.2025, judgments of this Court passed in Sudo Mandal @ Diwarak Mandal Vs. State of Punjab, (2011) 2 RCR (Criminal) 453 decided on 17.03.2011, Pardeep Kaur Vs. State of Punjab and another, CRM-M-33746-2018, decided on 09.07.2019, Jasvinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another, CRM 03.02.2012, Gurpreet Singh @ Khinder Vs. State of Punjab CRM clared the petitioner a proclaimed offender in patent disregard of the mandatory safeguards enshrined in Sections 82 Cr.P.C. It was contended that neither due and proper service was effected nor was the statutory period prescribed under law afforded to the petitioner before passing the proclamation order, thereby vitiating the entire exercise and rendering the impugned order ex facie illegal and unsustainable. Learned counsel further submitted that during the course of trial, s many as 23 witnesses and closed its evidence on 05.03.2005. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the evidence so adduced, the learned Sessions Judge, Kapurthala, vide judgment dated 18.10.2005, acquitted all the accused who had faced trial, except Bikram Singh, by extending them the benefit of doubt. It was further submitted that even the accused Bikram Singh did not withstand judicial scrutiny and was subsequently set aside by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. Bikram Singh vs. State of Punjab vide judgment dated 08.08.2025, culminating in his acquittal as well. Thus, prayed for quashing of impugned FIR and proclamation order on the ground of acquittal Learned counsel placed reliance upon judgment of Hon’ble Shanti Devi Vs. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal dgments of this Court passed in Sudo Mandal @ Diwarak Mandal Vs. State of Punjab, (2011) 2 RCR Pardeep Kaur Vs. State of Punjab 2018, decided on 09.07.2019, Jasvinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another, CRM-M-15621-2011, decided on 03.02.2012, Gurpreet Singh @ Khinder Vs. State of Punjab CRM-M- clared the petitioner a proclaimed offender in patent disregard of the mandatory safeguards enshrined in Sections 82 Cr.P.C. It was contended that neither due and proper service was effected nor was the petitioner before passing the proclamation order, thereby vitiating the entire exercise and rendering the Learned counsel further submitted that during the course of trial, s many as 23 witnesses and closed its evidence on 05.03.2005. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the evidence so adduced, the learned Sessions Judge, Kapurthala, vide judgment dated 18.10.2005, Singh, by extending them the benefit of doubt. It was further submitted that even the accused Bikram Singh did not withstand judicial scrutiny and was subsequently set aside by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. vide judgment dated 08.08.2025, culminating in his acquittal as well. Thus, prayed for quashing of impugned FIR and proclamation order on the ground of acquittal dgment of Hon’ble Shanti Devi Vs. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal dgments of this Court passed in Sudo Mandal @ Diwarak Mandal Vs. State of Punjab, (2011) 2 RCR Pardeep Kaur Vs. State of Punjab 2018, decided on 09.07.2019, Jasvinder Singh 2011, decided on - GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311- 18301-M of 1994 decided on Court passed in 06.08.1999, and Urmila Devi Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) Criminal Revision P.507 of 2006, decided on 18.09.2006. 3. Notice of motion. 4. Mr. Anup Sin of the respondent petitioner had been declared a proclaimed offender as far back as the year 2003 and had, with calculated intent, kept himself beyond process of law for an inordinately prolonged duration. It was contended that such conscious evasion of the judicial process constitutes a conduct disentitling the petitioner from invoking the equitable and discretionary jurisdiction of th 4.1 It was further contended that the mere factum of acquittal of certain co-accused, who had duly subjected themselves to trial and faced the rigours of the judicial process, cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning, ipso facto enure to the emphasized that the petitioner, having chosen to remain at large and having never submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial Court, cannot seek parity with those who stood trial and earned acquittal on mer 5. Heard. 6. After affording due hearing to learned counsel for the parties and upon a circumspect appraisal of the record, this Court finds that the petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender as far back as in the year 2003. It is not in dispute that soon after the occurrence, the petitioner left the country and -2025 (O&M) ( 4 ) M of 1994 decided on 24.01.10995 Court passed in Sunil Kumar Vs. State, CRM 06.08.1999, and Urmila Devi Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) Criminal Revision P.507 of 2006, decided on 18.09.2006. Notice of motion. Mr. Anup Singh, learned AAG, Punjab, accepted notice on behalf of the respondent–State and resisted the petition by submitting that the petitioner had been declared a proclaimed offender as far back as the year 2003 and had, with calculated intent, kept himself beyond process of law for an inordinately prolonged duration. It was contended that such conscious evasion of the judicial process constitutes a conduct disentitling the petitioner from invoking the equitable and discretionary jurisdiction of this Court. It was further contended that the mere factum of acquittal of accused, who had duly subjected themselves to trial and faced the rigours of the judicial process, cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning, ipso facto enure to the benefit of the present petitioner. Learned counsel emphasized that the petitioner, having chosen to remain at large and having never submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial Court, cannot seek parity with those who stood trial and earned acquittal on mer Heard. After affording due hearing to learned counsel for the parties and upon a circumspect appraisal of the record, this Court finds that the petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender as far back as in the year 2003. It is not in te that soon after the occurrence, the petitioner left the country and 24.01.10995 and judgments of Delhi High Sunil Kumar Vs. State, CRM-M-4465-1998, decided on 06.08.1999, and Urmila Devi Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) Criminal Revision gh, learned AAG, Punjab, accepted notice on behalf State and resisted the petition by submitting that the petitioner had been declared a proclaimed offender as far back as the year 2003 and had, with calculated intent, kept himself beyond the reach of the process of law for an inordinately prolonged duration. It was contended that such conscious evasion of the judicial process constitutes a conduct disentitling the petitioner from invoking the equitable and discretionary It was further contended that the mere factum of acquittal of accused, who had duly subjected themselves to trial and faced the rigours of the judicial process, cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning, ipso benefit of the present petitioner. Learned counsel emphasized that the petitioner, having chosen to remain at large and having never submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial Court, cannot seek parity with those who stood trial and earned acquittal on merits. After affording due hearing to learned counsel for the parties and upon a circumspect appraisal of the record, this Court finds that the petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender as far back as in the year 2003. It is not in te that soon after the occurrence, the petitioner left the country and and judgments of Delhi High 1998, decided on 06.08.1999, and Urmila Devi Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) Criminal Revision gh, learned AAG, Punjab, accepted notice on behalf State and resisted the petition by submitting that the petitioner had been declared a proclaimed offender as far back as the year the reach of the process of law for an inordinately prolonged duration. It was contended that such conscious evasion of the judicial process constitutes a conduct disentitling the petitioner from invoking the equitable and discretionary It was further contended that the mere factum of acquittal of accused, who had duly subjected themselves to trial and faced the rigours of the judicial process, cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning, ipso benefit of the present petitioner. Learned counsel emphasized that the petitioner, having chosen to remain at large and having never submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial Court, cannot seek parity with After affording due hearing to learned counsel for the parties and upon a circumspect appraisal of the record, this Court finds that the petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender as far back as in the year 2003. It is not in te that soon after the occurrence, the petitioner left the country and GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311- proceeded abroad. Rather than remaining within the jurisdiction to facilitate investigation and submit to the process of law, the petitioner chose to depart from India and thereafter ne the trial Court. He thus succeeded in keeping himself beyond the reach of the law for an inordinately long span of nearly twenty 6.1 The plea now sought to be projected that the petitioner w residing abroad and remained oblivious to the pendency of the criminal proceedings does not merit acceptance at this highly belated stage, particularly when the proclamation order passed against him has remained unchallenged for decades together. The co unmistakably demonstrates a conscious and deliberate evasion of the process of law from the very inception of the criminal proceedings. 6.2 This Court further finds that the mere acquittal of the co who had duly subjected judicial process, cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning, automatically enure to the benefit of the present petitioner. The validity and legality of the proclamation proceedings are required to be examin basis of the material available on record and cannot be eclipsed by the outcome of the trial qua other accused. The contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, seeking parity on the basis of acquittal of the co accused, is thus wholly misconceived and legally untenable. Reliance placed by him on “Sudo Mandal @ Diwarak Mandal v. State of Punjab” 2011(2) RCR (Criminal) 453 distinguished factual matrix. -2025 (O&M) ( 5 ) proceeded abroad. Rather than remaining within the jurisdiction to facilitate investigation and submit to the process of law, the petitioner chose to depart from India and thereafter neither joined the investigation nor appeared before the trial Court. He thus succeeded in keeping himself beyond the reach of the law for an inordinately long span of nearly twenty The plea now sought to be projected that the petitioner w residing abroad and remained oblivious to the pendency of the criminal proceedings does not merit acceptance at this highly belated stage, particularly when the proclamation order passed against him has remained unchallenged for decades together. The co unmistakably demonstrates a conscious and deliberate evasion of the process of law from the very inception of the criminal proceedings. This Court further finds that the mere acquittal of the co who had duly subjected themselves to the rigours of trial and faced the judicial process, cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning, automatically enure to the benefit of the present petitioner. The validity and legality of the proclamation proceedings are required to be examin basis of the material available on record and cannot be eclipsed by the outcome of the trial qua other accused. The contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, seeking parity on the basis of acquittal of the co is thus wholly misconceived and legally untenable. Reliance placed Sudo Mandal @ Diwarak Mandal v. State of Punjab” 2011(2) RCR (Criminal) 453 and other cases would lend no help to his case owing to distinguished factual matrix. proceeded abroad. Rather than remaining within the jurisdiction to facilitate investigation and submit to the process of law, the petitioner chose to depart ither joined the investigation nor appeared before the trial Court. He thus succeeded in keeping himself beyond the reach of the law for an inordinately long span of nearly twenty-three years. The plea now sought to be projected that the petitioner was residing abroad and remained oblivious to the pendency of the criminal proceedings does not merit acceptance at this highly belated stage, particularly when the proclamation order passed against him has remained unchallenged for decades together. The conduct of the petitioner unmistakably demonstrates a conscious and deliberate evasion of the process of law from the very inception of the criminal proceedings. This Court further finds that the mere acquittal of the co-accused, themselves to the rigours of trial and faced the judicial process, cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning, automatically enure to the benefit of the present petitioner. The validity and legality of the proclamation proceedings are required to be examined independently on the basis of the material available on record and cannot be eclipsed by the outcome of the trial qua other accused. The contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, seeking parity on the basis of acquittal of the co- is thus wholly misconceived and legally untenable. Reliance placed Sudo Mandal @ Diwarak Mandal v. State of Punjab” 2011(2) and other cases would lend no help to his case owing to proceeded abroad. Rather than remaining within the jurisdiction to facilitate investigation and submit to the process of law, the petitioner chose to depart ither joined the investigation nor appeared before the trial Court. He thus succeeded in keeping himself beyond the reach of the as residing abroad and remained oblivious to the pendency of the criminal proceedings does not merit acceptance at this highly belated stage, particularly when the proclamation order passed against him has remained nduct of the petitioner unmistakably demonstrates a conscious and deliberate evasion of the process accused, themselves to the rigours of trial and faced the judicial process, cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning, automatically enure to the benefit of the present petitioner. The validity and legality of the ed independently on the basis of the material available on record and cannot be eclipsed by the outcome of the trial qua other accused. The contention raised by learned - is thus wholly misconceived and legally untenable. Reliance placed Sudo Mandal @ Diwarak Mandal v. State of Punjab” 2011(2) and other cases would lend no help to his case owing to GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311- 6.3 The Ho “Balmukund Singh Gautam versus State of Madhya Pradesh and anr. 2026 INSC 157” accused who was claiming such relief on ground of acquittal of co accuse The relevant extract of the said judgment is as under: “ 47. Furthermore, on account of subsequent developments, the ground raised by the Accused that other co trial Court relief of anticipatory bail on the ground of parity, particularly when the Accused himself failed to cooperate with the Court and delayed the trial of the other co accused by absconding. Moreover, the accus been tried yet and are required to be independently examined and decided in the course of a separate trial. 48. In this regard, the full Bench of the Kerala High Court, in the case of Sub Inspector of Police, r discuss the question of whether an absconding accused can seek quashing of the criminal proceedings pending against him, when the co acquitted by the trial Court. The full Bench grounds that in a trial against the co nor expected to adduce evidence against the absconding accused, thus, the acquittal, or conviction for that matter, of the co on the absconding accused. The relevant portion of hereinbelow: "53. [....] In the light of the above discussions, we may summarise the legal position as follows: xxxx (v) is it expected to adduce evidence against the absconding co such trial the prosecution cannot be held to have the opportunity or obligation to adduce all evidence against the absconding co fact that the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in the trial against the co incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be accepted in such later trial xxxx (viii) inherent jurisdiction to serve the ends of justice, it is perfectly permissible -2025 (O&M) ( 6 ) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent case titled as “Balmukund Singh Gautam versus State of Madhya Pradesh and anr. 2026 INSC 157”, refused even to grant relief of anticipatory bail to an accused who was claiming such relief on ground of acquittal of co accuse The relevant extract of the said judgment is as under: 47. Furthermore, on account of subsequent developments, the ground raised by the Accused that other co-accused in the Subject FIR have been acquitted by the trial Court vide judgment dated 24.06.2023 does not ipso facto entitle him to the relief of anticipatory bail on the ground of parity, particularly when the Accused himself failed to cooperate with the Court and delayed the trial of the other co accused by absconding. Moreover, the accus been tried yet and are required to be independently examined and decided in the course of a separate trial. 48. In this regard, the full Bench of the Kerala High Court, in the case of Sub Inspector of Police, reported in 2005 SCC Online Ker 605 discuss the question of whether an absconding accused can seek quashing of the criminal proceedings pending against him, when the co acquitted by the trial Court. The full Bench grounds that in a trial against the co-accused, the prosecution is neither called upon nor expected to adduce evidence against the absconding accused, thus, the acquittal, or conviction for that matter, of the co on the absconding accused. The relevant portion of hereinbelow: "53. [....] In the light of the above discussions, we may summarise the legal position as follows: xxxx (v) In a trial against the co-accused the prosecution is not called upon, nor is it expected to adduce evidence against the absconding co such trial the prosecution cannot be held to have the opportunity or obligation to adduce all evidence against the absconding co fact that the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in the trial against the co-accused is no reason to assume that he shall not lender incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be accepted in such later trial. xxxx (viii) While considering the prayer for invocation of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction to serve the ends of justice, it is perfectly permissible n’ble Supreme Court in a recent case titled as “Balmukund Singh Gautam versus State of Madhya Pradesh and anr. , refused even to grant relief of anticipatory bail to an accused who was claiming such relief on ground of acquittal of co accused. The relevant extract of the said judgment is as under:- 47. Furthermore, on account of subsequent developments, the ground raised accused in the Subject FIR have been acquitted by the 24.06.2023 does not ipso facto entitle him to the relief of anticipatory bail on the ground of parity, particularly when the Accused himself failed to cooperate with the Court and delayed the trial of the other co accused by absconding. Moreover, the accusations against the Accused have not been tried yet and are required to be independently examined and decided in the 48. In this regard, the full Bench of the Kerala High Court, in the case of Moosa v. eported in 2005 SCC Online Ker 605, had occasion to discuss the question of whether an absconding accused can seek quashing of the criminal proceedings pending against him, when the co-accused have been finally acquitted by the trial Court. The full Bench held this as impermissible on the accused, the prosecution is neither called upon nor expected to adduce evidence against the absconding accused, thus, the acquittal, or conviction for that matter, of the co-accused cannot have any bearing on the absconding accused. The relevant portion of Moosa (supra) is reproduced "53. [....] In the light of the above discussions, we may summarise the legal sed the prosecution is not called upon, nor is it expected to adduce evidence against the absconding co-accused. In such trial the prosecution cannot be held to have the opportunity or obligation to adduce all evidence against the absconding co-accused. The fact that the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in the accused is no reason to assume that he shall not lender incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be accepted in such While considering the prayer for invocation of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction to serve the ends of justice, it is perfectly permissible n’ble Supreme Court in a recent case titled as “Balmukund Singh Gautam versus State of Madhya Pradesh and anr. , refused even to grant relief of anticipatory bail to an d. 47. Furthermore, on account of subsequent developments, the ground raised accused in the Subject FIR have been acquitted by the 24.06.2023 does not ipso facto entitle him to the relief of anticipatory bail on the ground of parity, particularly when the Accused - ations against the Accused have not been tried yet and are required to be independently examined and decided in the Moosa v. , had occasion to discuss the question of whether an absconding accused can seek quashing of the accused have been finally held this as impermissible on the accused, the prosecution is neither called upon nor expected to adduce evidence against the absconding accused, thus, the annot have any bearing (supra) is reproduced "53. [....] In the light of the above discussions, we may summarise the legal sed the prosecution is not called upon, nor accused. In such trial the prosecution cannot be held to have the opportunity or e fact that the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in the accused is no reason to assume that he shall not lender incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be accepted in such While considering the prayer for invocation of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction to serve the ends of justice, it is perfectly permissible GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311- for the court to consider the bona fides the cleanliness of the hands of the seeker. If he is a fugitive from j without sufficient reason or having waited for manipulation of hostility of witnesses, such improper conduct would certainly be a justifiable reason for the court to refuse to invoke its powers under S. Criminal Procedure. (ix) The fact that the co them in the absence of absconding co as a relevant under S. 49. Although the aforesaid case dealt with quashing of the proceedings rationale applied therein can be instrumental in the present case, for the reason that the High Court, by way of the Impugned Order, granted anticipatory bail to the Accused solely based on the fact that the prosecution failed to produce any evidence proving the involvement of the accused persons named in the Subject FIR, in the alleged offence. The High Court also took note of certain findings recorded in favour of the Accused by the trial Court in its judgment dated 24.06.2023 acquit completely erroneous and perverse in an anticipatory bail application, especially when the Accused had been absconding for about 6 years and made a mockery of the judicial process. In view of such cir permitted to en Court failed to consider that any finding recorded by the trial Court either against or in favour of the absconding Accused is wholly irrel deciding the bail application as the prosecution was not required to produce any evidence against the absconding Accused during the trial of the co persons, in view of the judgment in 50. It is apposite to m absconding accused person sets a bad precedent and sends a message that the law abiding co process of trial and further, incenti impunity. xxxx” 6.4 In ‘ Vadakara Police Station, Ernakulam and etc. 2006(3) RCR (Criminal) 221’, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court held that an accused cannot claim the benefit of acquittal of his co Section 482 Cr.P.C. The relevant extract of the said judgment is as under: -2025 (O&M) ( 7 ) for the court to consider the bona fides the cleanliness of the hands of the seeker. If he is a fugitive from justice having absconded or jumped bail without sufficient reason or having waited for manipulation of hostility of witnesses, such improper conduct would certainly be a justifiable reason for the court to refuse to invoke its powers under S. Criminal Procedure. (ix) The fact that the co-accused have secured acquittal in the trial against them in the absence of absconding co as a relevant circumstance while considering invocation of the powers under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [...]" 49. Although the aforesaid case dealt with quashing of the proceedings rationale applied therein can be instrumental in the present case, for the reason that the High Court, by way of the Impugned Order, granted anticipatory bail to the Accused solely based on the fact that the prosecution failed to produce any evidence proving the involvement of the accused persons named in the Subject FIR, in the alleged offence. The High Court also took note of certain findings recorded in favour of the Accused by the trial Court in its judgment dated 24.06.2023 acquitting the co-accused. However, the said consideration is completely erroneous and perverse in an anticipatory bail application, especially when the Accused had been absconding for about 6 years and made a mockery of the judicial process. In view of such circumstances, the Accused cannot be permitted to en-cash on the acquittal of the co Court failed to consider that any finding recorded by the trial Court either against or in favour of the absconding Accused is wholly irrel deciding the bail application as the prosecution was not required to produce any evidence against the absconding Accused during the trial of the co persons, in view of the judgment in Moosa (supra). 50. It is apposite to mention that granting the relief of anticipatory bail to an absconding accused person sets a bad precedent and sends a message that the law abiding co-accused persons who stood trial, were wrong to diligently attend the process of trial and further, incentivises people to evade the process of law with impunity. In ‘T. Moosa and etc. etc. versus Sub Inspector of Police, Vadakara Police Station, Ernakulam and etc. 2006(3) RCR (Criminal) , the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court held that an accused cannot claim the benefit of acquittal of his co Section 482 Cr.P.C. The relevant extract of the said judgment is as under: for the court to consider the bona fides the cleanliness of the hands of the ustice having absconded or jumped bail without sufficient reason or having waited for manipulation of hostility of witnesses, such improper conduct would certainly be a justifiable reason for the court to refuse to invoke its powers under S. 482 of the Code of accused have secured acquittal in the trial against them in the absence of absconding co-accused cannot by itself be reckoned circumstance while considering invocation of the powers of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [...]" (Emphasis supplied) 49. [...]" (Emphasis supplied) 49. Although the aforesaid case dealt with quashing of the proceedings entirely, the rationale applied therein can be instrumental in the present case, for the reason that the High Court, by way of the Impugned Order, granted anticipatory bail to the Accused solely based on the fact that the prosecution failed to produce any cogent evidence proving the involvement of the accused persons named in the Subject FIR, in the alleged offence. The High Court also took note of certain findings recorded in favour of the Accused by the trial Court in its judgment dated accused. However, the said consideration is completely erroneous and perverse in an anticipatory bail application, especially when the Accused had been absconding for about 6 years and made a mockery of cumstances, the Accused cannot be cash on the acquittal of the co-accused persons. Further, the High Court failed to consider that any finding recorded by the trial Court either against or in favour of the absconding Accused is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the bail application as the prosecution was not required to produce any evidence against the absconding Accused during the trial of the co-accused (supra). ention that granting the relief of anticipatory bail to an absconding accused person sets a bad precedent and sends a message that the law accused persons who stood trial, were wrong to diligently attend the vises people to evade the process of law with T. Moosa and etc. etc. versus Sub Inspector of Police, Vadakara Police Station, Ernakulam and etc. 2006(3) RCR (Criminal) , the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court held that an absconding accused cannot claim the benefit of acquittal of his co-accused by invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C. The relevant extract of the said judgment is as under:- for the court to consider the bona fides the cleanliness of the hands of the ustice having absconded or jumped bail without sufficient reason or having waited for manipulation of hostility of witnesses, such improper conduct would certainly be a justifiable reason for of the Code of accused have secured acquittal in the trial against accused cannot by itself be reckoned circumstance while considering invocation of the powers entirely, the rationale applied therein can be instrumental in the present case, for the reason that the High Court, by way of the Impugned Order, granted anticipatory bail to the cogent evidence proving the involvement of the accused persons named in the Subject FIR, in the alleged offence. The High Court also took note of certain findings recorded in favour of the Accused by the trial Court in its judgment dated accused. However, the said consideration is completely erroneous and perverse in an anticipatory bail application, especially when the Accused had been absconding for about 6 years and made a mockery of cumstances, the Accused cannot be accused persons. Further, the High Court failed to consider that any finding recorded by the trial Court either against evant for the purpose of deciding the bail application as the prosecution was not required to produce any accused ention that granting the relief of anticipatory bail to an - accused persons who stood trial, were wrong to diligently attend the vises people to evade the process of law with T. Moosa and etc. etc. versus Sub Inspector of Police, Vadakara Police Station, Ernakulam and etc. 2006(3) RCR (Criminal) absconding accused by invoking GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311- “52. To quash the proceeding after referring to the overt act of the petitioner with refere of a co the accused cannot be done as the judgment in the earlier case is not judgment relevant within the meaning of Sections Act. To do so will be in the realm of appreciation of the evidence which has to be done by the trial Judge. In the above view, with great respect we cannot agree with the proposition of law thus stated in Arunkumar's case. The acq in their case is no ground to bar a criminal trial as the appreciation by the concerned Judge in a criminal trial is not binding when the latter case is tried in the case of the other co to appreciate the evidence adduced in the latter case. In that regard possibly a particular witness may or may not be believed and his reliability may also be tested in the light of what he has stated in the earl are all matters for the trial Judge to do. All that we want to say is that it will not preclude the trial of the case for the mere reason that the co were acquitted. This is the principle that is stated by the Apex Court in Megh Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004 SCC Crl 58 : 2003 CriLJ 4329); Gorle S. Naidu v. State of A.P., (AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1169 : 2004 CriLJ 924) etc. Further, as held by the Apex Court in Rajan Rai's case (2005(7) Supreme 459 : 2006 CriLJ 163) the judgm accused is not at all a judgment relevant within the meaning of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. The rule of estoppel as held by the Apex Court is a rule of admissibility of evidence and which does not bar the trial as such. Hence, it has to be held that the power under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code cannot be invoked to prevent the trial of the petitioners/accused solely by referring to the overt act played by the accused as spoken to by the witnesses in the case of th Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code quash the proceedings and prevent the trial. Hence, the dictum laid down in Arunkumar's case to the extent it has taken a contrary view of what i 53. In the light of the above discussions, we may summarise the legal position as follows: -2025 (O&M) ( 8 ) “52. To quash the proceeding after referring to the overt act of the petitioner with reference to the evidence tendered in the judgment rendered in a case of a co-accused who faced the trial and based on evidence therein case of the accused cannot be done as the judgment in the earlier case is not judgment relevant within the meaning of Sections Act. To do so will be in the realm of appreciation of the evidence which has to be done by the trial Judge. In the above view, with great respect we cannot agree with the proposition of law thus stated in Arunkumar's case. The acquittal of some of the co-accused based on appreciation of evidence in their case is no ground to bar a criminal trial as the appreciation by the concerned Judge in a criminal trial is not binding when the latter case is tried in the case of the other co-accused and it is for the learned trial Judge to appreciate the evidence adduced in the latter case. In that regard possibly a particular witness may or may not be believed and his reliability may also be tested in the light of what he has stated in the earl are all matters for the trial Judge to do. All that we want to say is that it will not preclude the trial of the case for the mere reason that the co were acquitted. This is the principle that is stated by the Apex Court in Megh Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004 SCC Crl 58 : 2003 CriLJ 4329); Gorle S. Naidu v. State of A.P., (AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1169 : 2004 CriLJ 924) etc. Further, as held by the Apex Court in Rajan Rai's case (2005(7) Supreme 459 : 2006 CriLJ 163) the judgm accused is not at all a judgment relevant within the meaning of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. The rule of estoppel as held by the Apex Court is a rule of admissibility of evidence and which does not bar the trial as such. Hence, it has to be held that the power under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code cannot be invoked to prevent the trial of the petitioners/accused solely by referring to the overt act played by the accused as spoken to by the witnesses in the case of th Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code quash the proceedings and prevent the trial. Hence, the dictum laid down in Arunkumar's case to the extent it has taken a contrary view of what is stated above, is not a correct law and the same is overruled. 53. In the light of the above discussions, we may summarise the legal position as follows: (i) The inherent powers of the High Court reserved and recognised under Section 482 of the Code of Procedure are sweeping and awesome; but such powers can be invoked only - (a) to give effect to any order passed under the Code of Criminal Procedure or (b) to prevent abuse of “52. To quash the proceeding after referring to the overt act of the petitioner nce to the evidence tendered in the judgment rendered in a case accused who faced the trial and based on evidence therein case of the accused cannot be done as the judgment in the earlier case is not judgment relevant within the meaning of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. To do so will be in the realm of appreciation of the evidence which has to be done by the trial Judge. In the above view, with great respect we cannot agree with the proposition of law thus stated in Arunkumar's case. accused based on appreciation of evidence in their case is no ground to bar a criminal trial as the appreciation by the concerned Judge in a criminal trial is not binding when the latter case is cused and it is for the learned trial Judge to appreciate the evidence adduced in the latter case. In that regard possibly a particular witness may or may not be believed and his reliability may also be tested in the light of what he has stated in the earlier case etc. But those are all matters for the trial Judge to do. All that we want to say is that it will not preclude the trial of the case for the mere reason that the co-accused were acquitted. This is the principle that is stated by the Apex Court in Megh Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004 SCC Crl 58 : 2003 CriLJ 4329); Gorle S. Naidu v. State of A.P., (AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1169 : 2004 CriLJ 924) etc. Further, as held by the Apex Court in Rajan Rai's case (2005(7) Supreme 459 : 2006 CriLJ 163) the judgment in the case of the co accused is not at all a judgment relevant within the meaning of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. The rule of estoppel as held by the Apex Court is a rule of admissibility of evidence and which does not bar the trial as such. Hence, it has to be held that the power under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code cannot be invoked to prevent the trial of the petitioners/accused solely by referring to the overt act played by the accused as spoken to by the witnesses in the case of the co-accused and this Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code quash the proceedings and prevent the trial. Hence, the dictum laid down in Arunkumar's case to the extent it has taken a contrary s stated above, is not a correct law and the same is overruled. 53. In the light of the above discussions, we may summarise the legal (i) The inherent powers of the High Court reserved and recognised under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are sweeping and awesome; but such powers can (a) to give effect to any order passed under the Code of Criminal Procedure or (b) to prevent abuse of “52. To quash the proceeding after referring to the overt act of the petitioner nce to the evidence tendered in the judgment rendered in a case accused who faced the trial and based on evidence therein case of the accused cannot be done as the judgment in the earlier case is not 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. To do so will be in the realm of appreciation of the evidence which has to be done by the trial Judge. In the above view, with great respect we cannot agree with the proposition of law thus stated in Arunkumar's case. accused based on appreciation of evidence in their case is no ground to bar a criminal trial as the appreciation by the concerned Judge in a criminal trial is not binding when the latter case is cused and it is for the learned trial Judge to appreciate the evidence adduced in the latter case. In that regard possibly a particular witness may or may not be believed and his reliability may also ier case etc. But those are all matters for the trial Judge to do. All that we want to say is that it will accused were acquitted. This is the principle that is stated by the Apex Court in Megh Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004 SCC Crl 58 : 2003 CriLJ 4329); Gorle S. Naidu v. State of A.P., (AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1169 : 2004 CriLJ 924) etc. Further, as held by the Apex Court in Rajan Rai's case - accused is not at all a judgment relevant within the meaning of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. The rule of estoppel as held by the Apex Court is a rule of admissibility of evidence and which does not bar the trial as such. Hence, it has to be held that the power under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code cannot be invoked to prevent the trial of the petitioners/accused solely by referring to the overt act played by the accused and this Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code quash the proceedings and prevent the trial. Hence, the dictum laid down in Arunkumar's case to the extent it has taken a contrary s stated above, is not a correct law and the same is overruled. 53. In the light of the above discussions, we may summarise the legal (i) The inherent powers of the High Court reserved and Criminal Procedure are sweeping and awesome; but such powers can (a) to give effect to any order passed under the Code of Criminal Procedure or (b) to prevent abuse of GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311- -2025 (O&M) ( 9 ) process of any Court or (c) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Such powers may have to be exercised in an appropriate case to render justice even beyond the law. (ii) Considering the nature, width and amplitude of the powers, it would be unnecessary, inexpedient and imprudent to prescribe or stipulate any straight j identify cases where such powers can or need not be invoked. (iii) But such powers can be invoked only in exceptional and rare cases and cannot be invoked as a matter of course. Where the Code provides methods and procedures to deal with the given situation, in the absence of exceptional and compelling reasons, invocation of the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not necessary or permissible. (iv) The fact that an accused can seek discharge/dropping of proceedings/acquittal under the relevant provisions of the Code in the normal course would certainly be a justifiable reason, in the absence of exceptional and compelling reasons, for the High Court not invoking its extraordinary powers under Section 482, Crimina (v) In a trial against the co called upon, nor is it expected to adduce evidence against the absconding co-accused. In such trial the prosecution cannot be held to have the opportunity or obligation to addu evidence against the absconding co testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in the trial against the co-accused is no reason to assume that he shall not tender incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be accepted in such later trial. (vi) On the basis of materials placed before the High Court in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which materials can be placed before the Court in appropriate proceedings before the subo extraordinary inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot normally be invoked, unless such materials are of an unimpeachable nature which can be translated into legal evidence in the course of trial. (vii) The judgment of acquittal of co trial is not admissible under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act to bar the subsequent trial of the absconding co-accused and cannot, hence, be reckoned as a relevant document while considering t proceedings under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code Such judgments will be admissible only to show as to who were the parties in the earlier proceedings or the factum of acquittal. (viii) While considering the prayer for invocat extraordinary inherent jurisdiction to serve the ends of justice, it is perfectly process of any Court or (c) otherwise to secure the ends of Such powers may have to be exercised in an appropriate case to render justice even beyond the law. (ii) Considering the nature, width and amplitude of the powers, it would be unnecessary, inexpedient and imprudent to prescribe or stipulate any straight jacket formula to identify cases where such powers can or need not be invoked. (iii) But such powers can be invoked only in exceptional and rare cases and cannot be invoked as a matter of course. Where the Code provides methods and procedures to deal the given situation, in the absence of exceptional and compelling reasons, invocation of the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not necessary or (iv) The fact that an accused can seek discharge/dropping of ings/acquittal under the relevant provisions of the Code in the normal course would certainly be a justifiable reason, in the absence of exceptional and compelling reasons, for the High Court not invoking its extraordinary powers under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. (v) In a trial against the co-accused the prosecution is not called upon, nor is it expected to adduce evidence against the accused. In such trial the prosecution cannot be held to have the opportunity or obligation to adduce all evidence against the absconding co-accused. The fact that the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in the accused is no reason to assume that he shall not tender incriminating evidence or that his evidence not be accepted in such later trial. (vi) On the basis of materials placed before the High Court in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which materials can be placed before the Court in appropriate proceedings before the subordinate Courts) such extraordinary inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot normally be invoked, unless such materials are of an unimpeachable nature which can be translated into legal evidence in the course of trial. ii) The judgment of acquittal of co-accused in a criminal trial is not admissible under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act to bar the subsequent trial of the absconding accused and cannot, hence, be reckoned as a relevant document while considering the prayer to quash the proceedings under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code Such judgments will be admissible only to show as to who were the parties in the earlier proceedings or the factum of (viii) While considering the prayer for invocation of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction to serve the ends of perfectly permissible for the Court to consider process of any Court or (c) otherwise to secure the ends of Such powers may have to be exercised in an (ii) Considering the nature, width and amplitude of the powers, it would be unnecessary, inexpedient and imprudent acket formula to identify cases where such powers can or need not be invoked. (iii) But such powers can be invoked only in exceptional and rare cases and cannot be invoked as a matter of course. Where the Code provides methods and procedures to deal the given situation, in the absence of exceptional and compelling reasons, invocation of the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not necessary or (iv) The fact that an accused can seek discharge/dropping of ings/acquittal under the relevant provisions of the Code in the normal course would certainly be a justifiable reason, in the absence of exceptional and compelling reasons, for the High Court not invoking its extraordinary powers accused the prosecution is not called upon, nor is it expected to adduce evidence against the accused. In such trial the prosecution cannot ce all accused. The fact that the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in the accused is no reason to assume that he shall not tender incriminating evidence or that his evidence (vi) On the basis of materials placed before the High Court in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which materials can be placed before the Court in rdinate Courts) such extraordinary inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot normally be invoked, unless such materials are of an unimpeachable nature which can be accused in a criminal trial is not admissible under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act to bar the subsequent trial of the absconding accused and cannot, hence, be reckoned as a relevant he prayer to quash the proceedings under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code Such judgments will be admissible only to show as to who were the parties in the earlier proceedings or the factum of ion of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction to serve the ends of for the Court to consider GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311- 6.5 The Hon’ble Orissa High Court in of Orissa, 2024 CriLJ 1313’ on the grounds that the co opportunity or obligation to adduce all evidence against the absconding co accused. The fact that upon in that trial against the co accused is no reason to assume that such witness shall not tender incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be accepted in such later trial. It may be possibl have come to the witness box or having come, may not have deposed against the accused persons in the trial for a variety of reasons including false implication, threats from absconding accused or failure to recollect the incident. accused in the subsequent trial. Similarly a witness who has not come to the witness box in the first trial, may appear and depose against an accused who has not faced the previous trial. XXX 20. While considering the prayer of an accused for quashing of proceedings in exercise of power under Section -2025 (O&M) ( 10 ) the bonafides - the cleanliness of the hands of the seeker. If he is a fugitive from justice having absconded or jumped bail without sufficient reason or having waited for manipulation of hostility of witnesses, such improper conduct would certainly be a justifiable reason for the Court to refuse to invoke its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (ix) The fact that the co the trial against them in the absence of absconding coaccused cannot by itself be reckoned as a relevant circumstance while considering invocation of the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (x) A judgment not inter parties cannot justify the invocation of the doctrine of issue estoppel under the Indian law at present. (xi) Conscious of the above general principles, the High Court has to consider in each case whether the powers Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deserve to be invoked. Judicial wisdom, sagacity, sobriety and circumspection have to be pressed into service to identify that rare and exceptional case where invocation of the extraordinary inherent juri about premature termination of proceedings subject of course to the general principles narrated above. ” The Hon’ble Orissa High Court in of Orissa, 2024 CriLJ 1313’, in a case wherein discharg on the grounds that the co-accused had been acquitted, held as under: “18. In the trial of the co accused, the prosecution does not have the opportunity or obligation to adduce all evidence against the absconding co accused. The fact that the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in that trial against the co accused is no reason to assume that such witness shall not tender incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be accepted in such later trial. It may be possibl have come to the witness box or having come, may not have deposed against the accused persons in the trial for a variety of reasons including false implication, threats from absconding accused or failure to recollect the incident. But this does not mean that such a witness will never implicate the accused in the subsequent trial. Similarly a witness who has not come to the witness box in the first trial, may appear and depose against an accused who has not faced the previous trial. XXX 20. While considering the prayer of an accused for quashing of proceedings in exercise of power under Section the cleanliness of the hands of the seeker. If he is a fugitive from justice having absconded or jumped bail without sufficient reason or having waited for manipulation of hostility of witnesses, such improper conduct would certainly be a justifiable reason for the Court to refuse to invoke its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal e fact that the co-accused have secured acquittal in the trial against them in the absence of absconding coaccused cannot by itself be reckoned as a relevant circumstance while considering invocation of the powers under Section 482 of Procedure. (x) A judgment not inter parties cannot justify the invocation of the doctrine of issue estoppel under the Indian law at (xi) Conscious of the above general principles, the High Court has to consider in each case whether the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deserve to be invoked. Judicial wisdom, sagacity, sobriety and circumspection have to be pressed into service to identify that rare and exceptional case where invocation of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction is warranted to bring about premature termination of proceedings subject of course to the general principles narrated above. ” The Hon’ble Orissa High Court in ‘Deepak Oram versus State , in a case wherein discharge was sought accused had been acquitted, held as under:- “18. In the trial of the co accused, the prosecution does not have the opportunity or obligation to adduce all evidence against the absconding co the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in that trial against the co accused is no reason to assume that such witness shall not tender incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be accepted in such later trial. It may be possible that a witness may not have come to the witness box or having come, may not have deposed against the accused persons in the trial for a variety of reasons including false implication, threats from absconding accused or failure to recollect the But this does not mean that such a witness will never implicate the accused in the subsequent trial. Similarly a witness who has not come to the witness box in the first trial, may appear and depose against an accused who 20. While considering the prayer of an accused for quashing of proceedings in exercise of power under Section - 482 Cr.P.C., where the chances of the cleanliness of the hands of the seeker. If he is a fugitive from justice having absconded or jumped bail without sufficient reason or having waited for manipulation of hostility of witnesses, such improper conduct would certainly be a justifiable reason for the Court to refuse to invoke its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal accused have secured acquittal in the trial against them in the absence of absconding coaccused cannot by itself be reckoned as a relevant circumstance while considering invocation of the powers under Section 482 of (x) A judgment not inter parties cannot justify the invocation of the doctrine of issue estoppel under the Indian law at (xi) Conscious of the above general principles, the High under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deserve to be invoked. Judicial wisdom, sagacity, sobriety and circumspection have to be pressed into service to identify that rare and exceptional case where invocation of the sdiction is warranted to bring about premature termination of proceedings subject of course ‘Deepak Oram versus State e was sought “18. In the trial of the co accused, the prosecution does not have the - the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in that trial against the co accused is no reason to assume that such witness shall not tender incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not e that a witness may not have come to the witness box or having come, may not have deposed against the accused persons in the trial for a variety of reasons including false implication, threats from absconding accused or failure to recollect the But this does not mean that such a witness will never implicate the accused in the subsequent trial. Similarly a witness who has not come to the witness box in the first trial, may appear and depose against an accused who 20. While considering the prayer of an accused for quashing of proceedings 482 Cr.P.C., where the chances of GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311- conviction of the accused is bleak, delay in approaching the Court may not be a ground for rejectin allowing the proceedings to continue will be an exercise in futility and result in wastage of time and resources of the Court. But at the same time, it is open to the High Court to take into account, th of the accused who invokes exercise of the extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Whether such accused absconded or jumped bail, the reasons for doing so and whether he has waited "for manipulation of hostility of wit for the court to refuse to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 22. The petitioner had been arrested and released on bail during investigation of the case. As h date i.e. 05.04.2006 NBW of arrest was issued against him. He remained at large for almost ten years. Five co accused persons who faced trial were acquitted by judgment dated 30.04.2012.This CRLMC was filed on 2 was in respect of the petitioner and one Ganga Sahu in the Court below was committed to the Court of Sessions, application filed by them for discharge was dismissed and charge has been summons issued to the prosecution witnesses. 23. In view of the facts of the case and developments which have taken place during pendency of the CRLMC and the settled position of law as discussed above, I do not cons under Section No.2058(A) of 2004.” 6.6 The instant case is one of quashing of the FIR on the grounds that the co-accused has been acquitted which the law laid down in Balmukund Singh Gautam (supra), T. Moosa and etc. etc. (supra) and Deepak Oram (supra). It is legally impermissible for a person, once declared a proclaimed offender, to remain at large from the very inception of the criminal proceedings, to bide his time awaiting the outcome of the trial qua the co Court for quashing of the FIR as well as the proclamation order solely on the basis of their acquittal at the very root of the administration of criminal justice and would lay down -2025 (O&M) ( 11 ) conviction of the accused is bleak, delay in approaching the Court may not be a ground for rejecting the application if the High Court is satisfied that allowing the proceedings to continue will be an exercise in futility and result in wastage of time and resources of the Court. But at the same time, it is open to the High Court to take into account, th of the accused who invokes exercise of the extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Whether such accused absconded or jumped bail, the reasons for doing so and whether he has waited "for manipulation of hostility of witnesses"? Conduct of an accused can be a justifiable reason for the court to refuse to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 22. The petitioner had been arrested and released on bail during investigation of the case. As he did not appear in the case on a subsequent date i.e. 05.04.2006 NBW of arrest was issued against him. He remained at large for almost ten years. Five co accused persons who faced trial were acquitted by judgment dated 30.04.2012.This CRLMC was filed on 27.10.2016. But while the CRLMC remained pending in this Court, the case was in respect of the petitioner and one Ganga Sahu in the Court below was committed to the Court of Sessions, application filed by them for discharge was dismissed and charge has been framed against them on 20.03.2021 and summons issued to the prosecution witnesses. 23. In view of the facts of the case and developments which have taken place during pendency of the CRLMC and the settled position of law as discussed above, I do not consider this to be a fit case to exercise power under Section - 482 of the Crl.P.C. and quash the proceedings in C.T. Case No.2058(A) of 2004.” The instant case is one of quashing of the FIR on the grounds accused has been acquitted which the law laid down in Balmukund Singh Gautam (supra), T. Moosa and etc. etc. (supra) and Deepak Oram (supra). It is legally impermissible for a person, once declared a proclaimed offender, to remain at large from the very ion of the criminal proceedings, to bide his time awaiting the outcome of the trial qua the co-accused, and thereafter to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for quashing of the FIR as well as the proclamation order solely on the basis of their acquittal. Any such course, if judicially sanctioned, would strike at the very root of the administration of criminal justice and would lay down conviction of the accused is bleak, delay in approaching the Court may not g the application if the High Court is satisfied that allowing the proceedings to continue will be an exercise in futility and result in wastage of time and resources of the Court. But at the same time, it is open to the High Court to take into account, the bona fides and conduct of the accused who invokes exercise of the extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Whether such accused absconded or jumped bail, the reasons for doing so and whether he has waited "for manipulation of nesses"? Conduct of an accused can be a justifiable reason for the court to refuse to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code 22. The petitioner had been arrested and released on bail during e did not appear in the case on a subsequent date i.e. 05.04.2006 NBW of arrest was issued against him. He remained at large for almost ten years. Five co accused persons who faced trial were acquitted by judgment dated 30.04.2012.This CRLMC was filed on 7.10.2016. But while the CRLMC remained pending in this Court, the case was in respect of the petitioner and one Ganga Sahu in the Court below was committed to the Court of Sessions, application filed by them for discharge framed against them on 20.03.2021 and summons issued to the prosecution witnesses. 23. In view of the facts of the case and developments which have taken place during pendency of the CRLMC and the settled position of law as ider this to be a fit case to exercise power 482 of the Crl.P.C. and quash the proceedings in C.T. Case The instant case is one of quashing of the FIR on the grounds accused has been acquitted which cannot be allowed in view of the law laid down in Balmukund Singh Gautam (supra), T. Moosa and etc. etc. (supra) and Deepak Oram (supra). etc. (supra) and Deepak Oram (supra). It is legally impermissible for a person, once declared a proclaimed offender, to remain at large from the very ion of the criminal proceedings, to bide his time awaiting the outcome accused, and thereafter to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for quashing of the FIR as well as the proclamation order solely on the . Any such course, if judicially sanctioned, would strike at the very root of the administration of criminal justice and would lay down conviction of the accused is bleak, delay in approaching the Court may not g the application if the High Court is satisfied that allowing the proceedings to continue will be an exercise in futility and result in wastage of time and resources of the Court. But at the same time, it e bona fides and conduct of the accused who invokes exercise of the extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Whether such accused absconded or jumped bail, the reasons for doing so and whether he has waited "for manipulation of nesses"? Conduct of an accused can be a justifiable reason for the court to refuse to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code 22. The petitioner had been arrested and released on bail during e did not appear in the case on a subsequent date i.e. 05.04.2006 NBW of arrest was issued against him. He remained at large for almost ten years. Five co accused persons who faced trial were acquitted by judgment dated 30.04.2012.This CRLMC was filed on 7.10.2016. But while the CRLMC remained pending in this Court, the case was in respect of the petitioner and one Ganga Sahu in the Court below was committed to the Court of Sessions, application filed by them for discharge framed against them on 20.03.2021 and 23. In view of the facts of the case and developments which have taken place during pendency of the CRLMC and the settled position of law as ider this to be a fit case to exercise power 482 of the Crl.P.C. and quash the proceedings in C.T. Case The instant case is one of quashing of the FIR on the grounds cannot be allowed in view of the law laid down in Balmukund Singh Gautam (supra), T. Moosa and etc. etc. (supra) and Deepak Oram (supra). etc. (supra) and Deepak Oram (supra). It is legally impermissible for a person, once declared a proclaimed offender, to remain at large from the very ion of the criminal proceedings, to bide his time awaiting the outcome accused, and thereafter to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for quashing of the FIR as well as the proclamation order solely on the . Any such course, if judicially sanctioned, would strike at the very root of the administration of criminal justice and would lay down GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh CRM-M-70311- a deleterious precedent, virtually incentivising calculated non before Courts and speculative litigation by a 6.7 It stands consistently enunciated in a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS is of an extraordinary character and is to be exercised with great circumspection, restrain designed to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; it is not intended to extend indulgence to those who have themselves abused, evaded or frustrated the process of la such power is warranted only in rare and exceptional situations where refusal to intervene would result in palpable miscarriage of justice. 6.8 In the factual conspectus of the present case, the petitioner has remained beyond the reach process. He did not join investigation, nor did he ever submit to the jurisdiction of the trial Court. In these circumstances, the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS cannot be person who has consciously chosen to remain an absconder. This Court cannot be persuaded to grant any protective indulgence or to provide a convenient legal passage to such a litigant to re time and in a 7. Keeping in view the above discussion, the present petitioner is dismissed. 11.05.2026 Geeta Whether speaking /reasoned Whether Reportable -2025 (O&M) ( 12 ) a deleterious precedent, virtually incentivising calculated non before Courts and speculative litigation by absconding accused. It stands consistently enunciated in a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS is of an extraordinary character and is to be exercised with great circumspection, restraint and judicial sobriety. The said inherent power is designed to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; it is not intended to extend indulgence to those who have themselves abused, evaded or frustrated the process of la such power is warranted only in rare and exceptional situations where refusal to intervene would result in palpable miscarriage of justice. In the factual conspectus of the present case, the petitioner has remained beyond the reach of law since the very initiation of the criminal process. He did not join investigation, nor did he ever submit to the jurisdiction of the trial Court. In these circumstances, the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS cannot be person who has consciously chosen to remain an absconder. This Court cannot be persuaded to grant any protective indulgence or to provide a convenient legal passage to such a litigant to re manner of his own choosing. Keeping in view the above discussion, the present petitioner is Whether speaking /reasoned Whether Reportable a deleterious precedent, virtually incentivising calculated non-appearance bsconding accused. It stands consistently enunciated in a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS is of an extraordinary character and is to be exercised with great t and judicial sobriety. The said inherent power is designed to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; it is not intended to extend indulgence to those who have themselves abused, evaded or frustrated the process of law. The exercise of such power is warranted only in rare and exceptional situations where refusal to intervene would result in palpable miscarriage of justice. In the factual conspectus of the present case, the petitioner has of law since the very initiation of the criminal process. He did not join investigation, nor did he ever submit to the jurisdiction of the trial Court. In these circumstances, the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS cannot be invoked in aid of a person who has consciously chosen to remain an absconder. This Court cannot be persuaded to grant any protective indulgence or to provide a convenient legal passage to such a litigant to re-enter the judicial process at a Keeping in view the above discussion, the present petitioner is ( SUBHAS MEHLA ) JUDGE Yes / No Yes / No appearance It stands consistently enunciated in a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS is of an extraordinary character and is to be exercised with great t and judicial sobriety. The said inherent power is designed to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; it is not intended to extend indulgence to those who have w. The exercise of such power is warranted only in rare and exceptional situations where refusal In the factual conspectus of the present case, the petitioner has of law since the very initiation of the criminal process. He did not join investigation, nor did he ever submit to the jurisdiction of the trial Court. In these circumstances, the inherent jurisdiction invoked in aid of a person who has consciously chosen to remain an absconder. This Court cannot be persuaded to grant any protective indulgence or to provide a enter the judicial process at a Keeping in view the above discussion, the present petitioner is GEETA RANI 2026.05.28 16:17 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh