GURTEJ SINGH @ GURTEJ SINGH GILL AND ANR. v. CHARANJIT KAUR AND ORS.
RSA/2427/2023 · 2026-04-09
Deepak Gupta
body2023
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2023 DAILYLAW 4069 (PNJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2023 DAILYLAW 4069 (PNJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH **** 120 RSA-2427-2023 (O&M) Date of Decision.: 09.04.2026 Gurtej Singh @ Gurtej Singh Gill and Another
…..Appellants Vs. Charanjit Kaur and Others
.….Respondents
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Present:- Mr. Sandeep Khunger, Advocate for the appellants. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) The plainffs, having failed before the learned first appellate Court, are in Regular Second Appeal challenging the judgment & decree dated 31.03.2023 passed by the learned Addional District Judge, Moga, whereby the appeal preferred by the defendants was allowed; the
judgment & decree dated 03.11.2016 passed by the learned trial Court decreeing the suit for specific performance was set aside, and the suit of the plainffs stood dismissed.
2. The factual matrix giving rise to the present lis is that the plainffs instuted a suit for possession by way of specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 21.02.2004 in respect of land measuring 93 kanal, asserng that defendant No.1 had executed the agreement on her own behalf and as an alleged a6orney of the remaining defendants No. 2 to 6, and had received a sum of ₹50,000/- as earnest money. It was pleaded that the plainffs were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and had even marked their presence before the Sub Registrar on the spulated dates, but the defendants failed to execute the sale deed.
NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.04.10 14:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-2427-2023 (O&M)
3. The defendants, contesng the suit, denied the execuon of any agreement to sell and disputed the authority of defendant No.1 to act on behalf of the co-sharers, alleging the agreement to be forged and fabricated.
4. The learned trial Court, upon appreciaon of evidence,
decreed the suit for specific performance. However, the first appellate Court, being the final Court of facts, re-appreciated the enre evidence on record and reversed the findings of the trial Court, holding that the execuon of the agreement to sell had not been proved in accordance with law and that the document was surrounded by serious suspicious circumstances. 5. Assailing the said judgment, learned counsel for the appellants-plainffs has contended that the first appellate Court has misread the evidence on record and has erred in discarding the tesmony of the a6esng witnesses, which clearly established due execuon of the agreement. It is further argued that once the agreement stood proved and readiness and willingness of the plainffs was established, the trial Court had rightly decreed the suit and the reversal thereof is unsustainable in law. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and have gone through the file. 7. At the outset, it needs to be noced that the jurisdicon of this Court under Secon 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is confined to substanal quesons of law. The first appellate Court is the final Court of fact, and its findings are not to be interfered with unless it is shown that the same are perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or suffer from patent illegality. 8. In the present case, the enre claim of the plainffs hinges upon the agreement to sell dated 21.02.2004. The first appellate Court, Page No. 2 of 6 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.04.10 14:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-2427-2023 (O&M) upon a detailed scruny of the evidence, has recorded a categorical finding that the execuon of the agreement has not been duly proved. An important aspect, which weighed with the first appellate Court is the unreliable nature of the tesmony of the a6esng witnesses. While one of the witnesses supported the case of the plainffs in examinaon-in-chief, he made material admissions in cross-examinaon to the effect that the executant had not signed the document in his presence and that the contents of the agreement were not read over to him. Such inconsistencies go to the root of the ma6er and render the proof of execuon doub@ul. 9.
Further, the first appellate Court has taken note of several suspicious circumstances surrounding the alleged agreement. The agreement was executed at a place different from where the pares reside and where the property is situated, without any plausible explanaon. No independent scribe or deed writer was examined to substanate its execuon. There are discrepancies in the descripon of the property, including mismatch of khewat numbers, and even the stamp paper was purchased by one of the plainffs. These circumstances cumulavely create a serious cloud over the genuineness of the document. 10. Another crucial factor, rightly taken note by the first appellate Court, is the absence of proof regarding the authority of defendant No.1 to execute the agreement on behalf of other co-owners. There is no reliable evidence on record to establish the existence of a valid power of a6orney authorizing her to bind the other defendants. In the absence of such authority, no enforceable contract can be said to exist qua the enre suit property, parcularly when the property is admi6edly jointly owned. 11. It is a se6led principle of law that the plainff must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence. The first appellate Court has correctly applied this principle while holding that even if the defence raised by the defendants is assumed to be weak, the Page No. 3 of 6 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.04.10 14:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-2427-2023 (O&M) plainffs cannot be granted a decree for specific performance unless they independently establish a valid and enforceable agreement. 12.
It has been argued on behalf of the appellants-plainffs that since out of the five co-owners, two had executed powers of a6orney in favour of defendant No.1 prior to the agreement to sell dated 21.02.2004, a decree for specific performance ought to have been granted at least to the extent of the share of those co-owners. 13. At first blush, the submission appears a6racve, however, upon closer scruny, it is found to be legally untenable. 14. In the present case, the very foundaon of the plainffs’ claim, namely the agreement to sell, has been held to be not duly proved. The first appellate Court has recorded a categorical finding that the execuon of the agreement is shrouded in suspicious circumstances and has not been established in accordance with law. Once the agreement itself is not proved, the queson of enforcing the same, whether in whole or in part, does not arise. A decree for specific performance, even parally, presupposes the existence of a valid and enforceable contract. In the absence thereof, no relief can be granted. 15. Even otherwise, the contenon cannot be accepted on the touchstone of se6led principles governing specific performance of part of a contract. It is well se6led that a contract for sale of joint property is ordinarily to be enforced as a whole, and not in fragments, unless the contract is severable and the part sought to be enforced is clearly idenfiable and independent. In the present case, the agreement, as set up by the plainffs, is a composite one for the enre suit land. There is no spulaon in the agreement suggesng that it was divisible or that the shares of individual co-owners were separately agreed to be sold. 16.
Further, the plainffs have not laid any foundaonal pleadings seeking specific performance to the extent of the shares of parcular co- Page No. 4 of 6 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.04.10 14:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-2427-2023 (O&M) sharers. In absence of such pleadings, no such relief can be granted at the appellate stage. It is trite law that a case not pleaded cannot be made out during arguments. 17. Moreover, even qua the alleged two co-owners, the authority of defendant No.1 to act on their behalf has not been sasfactorily proved. The first appellate Court has already noced that there is no clear and cogent evidence establishing the existence, scope, and subsistence of any valid power of a6orney authorizing execuon of the agreement to sell on behalf of other co-sharers. In such circumstances, the Court cannot presume authority so as to enforce the contract even parally. 18. It is also pernent to note that a decree for paral specific performance is discreonary and is governed by equitable consideraons. Granng such a decree in the present case would result in mulplicity of proceedings and praccal difficules in paron and enforcement, parcularly when the remaining co-sharers are not bound by the contract. 19. Thus, in view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the agreement to sell having not been proved, no decree can be granted even in part. The contract is not shown to be severable. There are no pleadings or proof to jusfy paral enforcement; and the authority of the alleged executant itself is doub@ul. 20. Accordingly, the contenon raised on behalf of the appellants- plainffs seeking specific performance to the extent of the shares of two co-owners is rejected. 21. This Court finds that the conclusions arrived at by the first appellate Court are based on a proper appreciaon of the evidence on record.
No material evidence has been ignored, nor has any inadmissible evidence been relied upon. The view taken is a plausible and reasonable one. Merely because the trial Court had taken a different view would not jusfy interference in the exercise of jurisdicon under Secon 100 CPC. Page No. 5 of 6 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.04.10 14:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-2427-2023 (O&M)
22. No substanal queson of law arises for consideraon in the present appeal. The findings recorded by the first appellate Court are pure findings of fact, which do not suffer from perversity or illegality. 23. Resultantly, the present Regular Second Appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 31.03.2023 passed by the learned Addional District Judge, Moga are affirmed. No
order as to costs. All the miscellaneous applicaon(s), if any, stand disposed of.
(DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE April 09, 2026 Neeka Tuteja Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether Reportable Yes/No Page No. 6 of 6 Pages NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.04.10 14:59 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document