IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.6974 of 2023 In the matter of an application under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950. &&&&&& Pradeep Mohan Khora &. Petitioner -versus- State of Odisha & Others &. Opp. Parties For Petitioner : Mr. M.K. Mohanty, Advocate For Opp. Parties : Mr. S. Das, Addl. Standing Counsel PRESENT: THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY Date of Hearing: 10.03.2026 and Date of Judgment: 10.03.2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J. 1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Arrangement (Virtual/Physical) Mode. 2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties. 3. The present Writ Petition has been filed inter alia challenging the initiation of the proceeding vide p. 2 p. 2 Memorandum dtd.16.01.2023 under Annexure-12 of Opposite Party No.2. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner at the outset contended that such a proceeding is not maintainable as the same has been initiated by an in- competent authority. 4.1. It is contended that since Petitioner was appointed vide the order issued by the Superintendent of Excise, Koraput under Annexure-1, in view of the provisions contained under Rule-7(a) of the Orissa Lower Excise Service (Method of Recruitment & Conditions of Service), Rules, 2011, Superintendent of Excise being the appointing authority, as per the provisions contained under the OCS (CCA) Rules, 1962, Opposite Party No.3 is competent to initiate the proceeding. Since the proceeding has been initiated by Opposite Party No.2 who is not the appointing authority, the proceeding as such is not maintainable. 4.2. It is also contended that this Court while directing the State Counsel to obtain instruction in the matter vide order dtd.26.09.2023, passed an interim order staying the further proceeding of the proceeding so initiated under Annexure-2. 4.3. It is further contended that the proceeding in question has been initiated on the ground that the Petitioner got the benefit of appointment by producing a forged transfer certificate. p. 3 p. 3 4.4. It is however contended that for such alleged fraud committed by the Petitioner, a criminal proceeding though was initiated against him for the offence under Section- 420 / 468 of the I.P.C in G.R. Case No.820 of 1993, but Petitioner was acquitted from the charges in the said criminal proceeding, vide judgment dtd.09.09.1998 under Annexure-13. 4.5. It is further contended that challenging such order of acquittal though State moved this Court by filing Criminal Misc. Case No.3731 of 1999, the same was also dismissed vide order dtd.29.01.2002. 4.6. It is contended that since the factum of the fraud as alleged against the Petitioner, has been disbelieved by the competent Criminal Court and Petitioner has been acquitted from the charges, initiation of the proceeding on self-same charges is also not permissible in view of the decision of the Hon9ble Apex Court in the case Ram Lal Vrs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (Civil Appeal No.7935 of 2023) so followed in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh Vs. The State of Bihar and Others (Civil Appeal No.5497 of 2025). 4.7. Hon9ble Apex Court in Para-13, 25 and 30 of the decision in the case of Ramlal has held as follows:- <13. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. If the court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding p. 4 p. 4 was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. [See G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446, State Bank of Hyderabad vs. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 and S. Samuthiram (supra)] xxx xxx xxx 25. Expressions like <benefit of doubt= and <honorably acquitted=, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. xxx xxx xxx 30. In view of the above, we declare that the order of termination dated 31.03.2004; the order of the Appellate Authority dated 08.10.2004; the orders dated 29.03.2008 and 25.06.2008 refusing to reconsider and review the penalty respectively, are all illegal and untenable.= 4.8. Hon9ble Apex Court in Para-47 & 50 of the decision in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh has held as follows:- <47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan31. p. 5 p. 5 xxx xxx xxx 50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that the prosecution "miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt" as both the informant and PW-2 refused to identify the appellant in court. This discussion confirms that the appellant's acquittal was based not on mere technicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this Court held that terms like "benefit of doubt" or "honourably acquitted" should not be treated as formalities. The Court's duty is to focus on the substance of the judgment, rather than the terminology used.= 4.9. It is also contended that Petitioner in the meantime has already retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 30.11.2025 and he is not getting his retiral benefits because of the initiation of the proceeding. 5. Mr. S. Das, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the State on the other hand placing reliance on the order passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No.323 of 2005 under Annexure-10, contended that in terms of the said order since the proceeding has been initiated by the Collector under Annexure-12, it cannot be held that Opposite Party No.2 is not competent to initiate the proceeding. 5.1. It is accordingly contended that since such a proceeding has been initiated in terms of the order passed by this Court on 22.07.2022 in W.P.(C) No.323 of 2005, no illegality or irregularity can be passed with the same 6. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties and considering the submissions made, this Court finds that Petitioner was appointed as an Excise Constable vide order of appointment issued on 01.08.1989 under Annexure-1 by Opposite Party No.3. While so continuing, p. 6 p. 6 Petitioner when was dismissed from his services w.e.f. 30.04.1993 vide order dtd.29.04.1993 under Annexure-2, so issued by Opposite Party No.3, Petitioner filed an appeal before the Collector who at that point of time was the appellate authority. Vide order dtd.24.09.1993 under Annexure-3, Opposite Party No.2 though directed for reinstatement of the Petitioner, pending initiation of a proceeding, but Petitioner was never allowed to join in terms of the said order. Petitioner accordingly when approached the Tribunal by filing O.A. No.2260(C) of 1999 with a prayer to allow him to join and the said O.A was dismissed vide order dtd.10.05.2004, challenging the same Petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.323 of 2005. 6.1. It is found from order dtd.22.07.2022 so passed in W.P.(C) No.323 of 2025 under Annexure-10, this Court while quashing the order passed by the Tribunal, issued the following directions so contained in Para-8 & 9: <8. Having heard learned Counsel for the Parties and after going through the records, this Court finds that admittedly as per the direction given by the Collector, no Departmental Proceeding has been initiated. The Opposite Parties, as is asserted, are contemplating to initiate disciplinary proceeding against the Petitioner. Therefore, the observation made by the Tribunal that the Collector is not Appellate Authority, cannot sustain and consequentially the Order impugned has to be quashed. But since the Collector has passed order to initiate a Departmental Proceeding against the Petitioner, let the Petitioner be reinstated in service and the Departmental Proceeding be initiated against him, as directed by the Collector, but he may be placed under suspension, in view of the reliance placed by learned Counsel for the Petitioner in the case of P.S.E.B. & Ors. V. Leela Singh, 2007 AIR SCW 2023, Paragraph-8 whereof, reads thus:- p. 7 p. 7 <8. For the reasons aforementioned, while setting aside the order of termination passed as against the respondent, we also set aside the order dated 15.06.2001 passed by the Administrative Member of the appellant-Board upon giving liberty to the appellant-Board to initiate a full-fledged departmental proceedings against the respondent. The respondent may be reinstated in service but he may be placed under suspension. Appellant shall refund the amount which has been deducted from respondent9s salary pursuant to the aforementioned order passed by the Administrative Member of the appellant-Board in the meanwhile. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned direction.= 9. Having regard to the facts and circumstance, as well as the law laid down by the apex Court, as discussed above, the Order dated 10.05.2014 passed by the Tribunal in O.A. No. 2260 of 1999 is hereby quashed. The Departmental Proceeding, as per the direction of the Collector, shall be initiated against the Petitioner by placing him under suspension. Needless to mention, for the selfsame charges, since the Petitioner has already been acquitted from criminal case and such order of acquittal has been confirmed in revision, the Disciplinary Authority shall take into consideration such aspect, while considering the case of the Petitioner with regard to initiation of the Departmental Proceeding.= 6.2. Pursuant to the said order, Petitioner though was allowed to join, but the proceeding in terms of the order dtd.24.09.1993 have been initiated by Opposite Party No.2 vide the impugned office Memorandum dtd.16.03.2023 under Annexure-12. 6.3. It is also found that the proceeding in question has been initiated inter alia with the charge that Petitioner got the benefit of appointment by producing a forged transfer certificate. However, since it is not disputed that on self- same issue, Petitioner was also proceeded with in a criminal proceeding in G.R. Case No.820 of 1993 for the p. 8 p. 8 offence under Sections 420/468 of IPC and Petitioner was acquitted by the learned Trial Court vide judgment dtd.09.09.1988 under Annexure-13 and challenge made to the said judgment by the State by filing Criminal Misc. Case No.3731 of 1999 was dismissed vide order dtd.29.01.2002, this Court taking into account the aforesaid factual position is of the view that since Petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal proceeding, there was no occasion to initiate the proceeding, basing of an order passed way back on 24.09.1993 under Annexure-3. 6.4. It is also the view of this Court that this Court in its order dtd.22.07.2022 under Annexure-10, never permitted Opposite Party No.2 to initiate the proceeding. Instead this Court observes that such a proceeding can be initiated by the appropriate authority. Since Petitioner was appointed vide order issued under Annexure-1 by Opposite Party No.3 and order of dismissal so issued by Opposite Party No.3, was set aside by the Collector being the appellate authority, it is also the view of this Court that Opposite Party No.2 is not competent to initiate the proceeding. 6.5. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court is inclined to quash the proceeding so initiated against the Petitioner vide Memorandum dtd.16.01.2023 under Annexure-12. While quashing the proceeding so initiated under Annexure-12, this Court allows the Writ Petition. p. 9 p. 9 7. Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands disposed of. (Biraja Prasanna Satapathy) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated the 10th March, 2026/Subrat