29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (1) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO.624 OF 2023 1. Gaurav s/o Prabhat Gupta, Aged about 30 Years, Occupation : Business, R/o. 48, Sahakar Nagar, Bhandara, Tahsil and District Bhandara. 2. Ashish s/o Dhananjay Dalal, Aged about 26 years, Occupation : Business, R/o: Krishna Mandir Ward, Bhandara, Tahsil and District Bhandara. .... APPLICANTS // VERSUS // 1. State of Maharashtra, Through Police Station Officer, Police Station, Bhandara, Tahsil and District Bhandara. 2. Chandrashekhar Harichandra Khobragade, Aged about 40 years, Occupation : Business, R/o. Lal Bahadur Shastri Ward, Bhandara. ....NON-APPLICANTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Mr. S. P. Bhandarkar, Advocate along with Mr. Atharva Khadse, Advocate for applicants. Mr. N. B. Jawade, APP for non-applicant No.1/State. Mr. Anirudh Ananthakrishnan, Advocate (appointed) for non-applicant No.2. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J. DATED : 02/02/2026 ORAL JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. 2026:BHC-NAG:2799-DB 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (2) 2. Admit. 3. Heard finally with the consent of the learned Counsel for the applicants, learned counsel for the non-applicant No.2 and learned APP for the State. 4. By this application, the applicants are seeking quashing of the First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as ‘FIR’) in connection with Crime No.56/2023 registered with Police Station Bhandara, District Bhandara for the offence punishable under Sections 143, 294, 506, 427 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) and under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(g), 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1989). 5. The crime is registered against the present applicants on the basis of a report lodged by Chandrashekhar Harichandra Khobragade on an allegation that he is running a Tea Stall near the Lal Bahadur Shastri Vidyalaya from last 20 years. On 28.12.2022, when he was present in his Tea Stall at about 8.30 a.m. at time the present applicants came in his shop and disclosed that they got a contract to construct the shops and therefore, he has to remove the said shop, otherwise they will remove his shop by JCB and thereafter, they have agitated the act of the present applicants and the other co-accused. On 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (3) 14.01.2023 at about 8.00 p.m., the present applicants along with 8 to 12 persons came in his shop and abused him in a filthy language as well as on his caste. At the relevant time, other villagers were also present there and also caused damage to his shop. On the basis of the said report, police have registered the crime against the present applicants. 6. As per the allegations, the alleged incident has taken place on 14.01.2023 at about 8.00 p.m., whereas the FIR came to be lodged on 30.01.2023 at about 9.26 p.m. 7. After registration of the crime, the Investigating Officer has recorded the statements of various witnesses and after completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer come to the conclusion that as far as the applicant No.2 Ashish Dhananjay Dalal is concerned, whose involvement is not revealed as he was at Koradi, Nagpur at the relevant time, and therefore, the charge sheet was not filed against the applicant No.2. 8. Heard learned counsel for the applicants, who submitted that the FIR came to be lodged after 15 days of the incident and no explanation is rendered for the said delay. Thereafter, he invited my attention towards the various statements of the witnesses and submitted that none of the statements discloses the exact words used by the present 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (4) applicants even if accepting the allegation at its face value that present applicants have abused the informant in a filthy language or on his caste. He read out the statements of various witnesses and submitted that there is no consistent statement regarding the exact words used by the present applicants. Thus, it is apparent that after thought after 15 days of the incident, the alleged FIR came to be lodged after due deliberations. In view of that, no prima facie case is made out against the present applicants. A mere omnibus, general statement is not sufficient to attract the offence. As far as the offence under Section 143 of IPC is concerned, which is not attracted as the statements of the witnesses itself shows that after obtaining the permission, the applicants allegedly had been to the said place to take the possession of the said place and therefore, only to give the counterblast to the action taken against the informant, this false FIR came to be lodged. In view of that, the application deserves to be allowed. 9. Per contra, learned APP and learned counsel for the non-applicant No.2 strongly opposed for the same and submitted that considering the allegations levelled that the present applicant No.1 has abused the informant in a filthy language as well as on his caste with an intention to humiliate and insult him. In view of that, the application deserves to be rejected. 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (5) 10. Learned counsel for the applicants placed reliance on various decisions in support of his contentions including N. S. Madhanagopal and another vs K. Lalitha reported (2022) LiveLaw SC 844, Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto vs State of Bihar and another in Special Leave Petition No.12144/2025 and Mahmood Ali and others Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 2023 LiveLaw SC 613. 11. Before entering into the merits of the present application, it is necessary to see the parameters which are laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure. As far as the quashing of the FIR is concerned, in case of State of Haryana and others Vs Bhajan Lal and others reported in AIR 1992 SC 604, the parameters laid down are: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (6) (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (7) 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mahmood Ali and others Vs. State of U.P. and others reiterated the said parameters and it is further observed that before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (8) circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged. 13. In the light of the above parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, if the facts of the present case are taken into consideration, it is relevant that the alleged incident has occurred as the present applicants, who obtained the contract of establishing or constructing the shops. He had been there to take the possession of the said premises, wherein the non-applicant No.2 and others various hawkers were running their business. On perusal of the report lodged by the informant, it reveals that as far as his allegation, initially the incident occurred on 28.12.2022 on which day allegedly he was threatened by the present applicants however, no such complaint is filed or any reporting to the Police Station regarding the 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (9) incident dated 28.12.2022. As per the allegation of the informant in the said FIR that on 14.01.2023 present applicant No.1 along with the applicant No.2 also came there and abused him in a filthy language as well as on his caste. As far as the involvement of the applicant No.2 in the incident dated 14.01.2023 appears to be false reveals during the investigation and therefore, the Investigating Officer has already exonerated the applicant No.2 by not filing the charge sheet against him. 14. Now, coming to the allegations levelled against the present applicant No.1 and the allegation is that the present applicant No.1 has abused him in words like ‘lkys egkjs /ksMs vPNqr rq nqdku gVkys ugh rks cgqr iprk;sxk’. This allegation is to be looked into in the light of the statements of the other witnesses. On perusal of the statements of the other witnesses, if perused there is no consistent statement as to the exact words used by the present applicant No.1. Every witness has stated differently as far as the abuses are concerned. Some of the witnesses have not uttered a single word as to the abuses by the present applicant on his caste and some witnesses have stated that the applicant has used the words on his caste, but the statement is also not consistent as far as the abuses on the caste are concerned. 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (10) 15. It is now well settled that mere abuses are not sufficient to attract the offence punishable under Section 294 of IPC. In the case of N. S. Madhanagopal and another referred supra relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the Section 294(b) of IPC which talks about the obscene act and songs. Section 294 reads as obscene acts and songs which is reproduced as under: “294. Obscene acts and songs.—Whoever, to the annoyance of others – (a) does any obscene act in any public place, or (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.” 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court has noted the test of obscenity under Section 294(b) of IPC and observed that it is to be noted that the test of obscenity under Section 294 (b) of the IPC is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprive and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. By referring the decision of P.T. Chacko v. Nainan (1967 KLT 799) which explains as follows: “The only point argued was that the 1st accused has not committed an offence punishable under Section 294(b) IPC., by uttering the words above-mentioned. The courts below have held that the words uttered 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (11) were obscene and the utterance caused annoyance to the public. I am not inclined to take this view. In the Queen v. Hicklin, [L.R.] 3 Q.B. 360 at 371 Cockburn C.J. Laid down the test of ‘obscenity’ in these words: “……. the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences” This test has been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme Court has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881. In Samuel Roth v. U.S.A., 354 US 476 (1957), Chief Justice Warren said that the test of ‘obscenity’ is the “substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires”. Mr. Justice Harlan observed that in order to be ‘obscene’ the matter must “tend to sexually impure thoughts”. I do not think that the words uttered in this case have such a tendency. It may be that the words are defamatory of the complainant, but I do not think that the words are ‘obscene’ and the utterance would constitute an offence punishable under Section 294(b) IPC”. 17. It is observed by the Apex Court that the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b). None of the records disclose the alleged words used by the accused. It may not be the requirement of law to reproduce in all cases the entire obscene words if it is lengthy, but in the instant case, there is hardly anything on record. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) IPC. To prove the offence under 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (12) Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case. No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellants accused annoyed others, it can not be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294(b) of IPC is made out. Similarly in the present case, except the abuses there is nothing on record to show that there was any lascivious elements which reflects the sexual thoughts and feelings by the words and therefore, the Section 294 is not attracted. 18. Coming to the offence punishable under Section 3(1) (r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of the Act of 1989 as already observed that the statements are not consistent as far as the words used by the present applicants are concerned. This aspect in catena of decisions is considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shajan Skaria Vs. The State of Kerala and another in Criminal Appeal No.2622/2024 decided on 23.08.2024, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has occasioned to consider all the aspects as far as the attraction of Section 3(1)(r) is concerned and it is observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are: 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (13) a. Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; b. Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; c. Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and d. Accused must do so at any place within public view. 19. 19. It is further observed that all insults or intimidations to a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe will not amount to an offence under the Act, 1989 unless such insult or intimidation is on the ground that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. In other words, considering the object of the provision of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is that not every act of intentional insult or intimidation meted by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because it is committed against a person who happens to be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. On the contrary, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation is that the person who is subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (14) targeted towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the reason of their caste status. 20. While explaining the meaning of the expression “intent to humiliate” the Hon’ble Apex Court observes the words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear in the text of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to the caste identity of the person who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation. Not every intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation. It is only in those cases where the intentional insult or intimidation takes place either due to the prevailing practice of untouchability or to reinforce the historically entrenched ideas like the superiority of the “upper castes” over the “lower castes/untouchables”, the notions of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or intimidation of the type envisaged by the Act, 1989. Similar observation is made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto referred supra, wherein by referring the earlier judgment of Shajan Skaria Vs. The State of Kerala and another the Apex Court observed that Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation by the accused is that the person who is subjected to is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (15) other words, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community. 21. In the light of the above observations, if the allegations in the present case are taken into consideration as observed earlier that the statements of the witnesses is not consistent as far as the words uttered by the present applicant No.1 is concerned. In addition to that, the alleged incident has taken place 14.01.2023, whereas the FIR came to be lodged on 30.01.2023 for which no explanation is put forth, therefore the submission of the learned counsel for the applicants that the possibility of false implication after concoction cannot be ruled out. In view of that, and in the light of the above observations, the present application deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, I proceed to pass following order: ORDER (i) The application is allowed. (ii) The FIR in connection with Crime No.56/2023 registered with Police Station Bhandara, District Bhandara for the offence punishable under Sections 143, 294, 506, 427 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(g), 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and the consequent proceeding arising out of the same 29.apl.624.2023.Judgment.odt (16) bearing charge sheet No.195/2025, is hereby quashed and set aside to the extent of the present applicant applicants. The application is disposed of. (URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J) Sarkate.