- 1 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K WRIT PETITION NO. 4728 OF 2023 (S-KSAT) C/W WRIT PETITION NO. 13003 OF 2023 (S-KSAT) IN WP No. 4728/2023 BETWEEN: SRI. MALLIKARJUN LATE. CHINNASWAMAPPPA, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, RETIRED SECOND DIVISION ASSISTANT, OFFICE OF THE COMMERCIAL TAX, RESIDING AT NO.795/A, 1A CROSS, B.S.K. I STAGE, II BLOCK, BENGALURU - 560 050 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. NAIK VENKATRAMAN NAGAPPA.,ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE REPRESENTED BY ITS ADDITIONAL SECRETARY, FINANCE DEPARTMENT (COMMERCIAL TAX-2 AND CO ORDINATION) VIDHANASOUDHA, DR. B.R. AMBEDKARVEEDHI BANGALORE – 01 Digitally signed by NANJUNDACHARI Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 2. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, M.S.BUILDING, BANGALORE - 560 001 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. HARISHA A.S. AGA FOR R1; SRI. K.PRASANNA SHETTY ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIROARI OR ANY OTHER WRIT OR ORDER OR DIRECTION SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 17.01.2023 IN A.No-3598-99/2021 PASSED BY THE KSAT AT BENGALURU WHICH IS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-A CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE ANo-3598-99/2021 (ANNEXURE- B) FILED BY THE PETITIONER, BEFORE THE HONBLE TRIBUNAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND ETC., IN WP NO. 13003/2023 BETWEEN: SHRI. BYRAPPA S/O LATE GAVISIDDIAH, AGED 68 YEARS, RETIRED COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, R/ATN O. 982, 21ST CROSS, JNANA BHARATI LAYOUT, 2ND BLOCK, MARIYAPPANA PALYA, BENGALURU – 560 056. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI. NAIK VENKATRAMAN NAGAPPA.,ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE REPRESENTED BY ITS ADDITIONAL SECRETARY, FINANCE DEPARTMENT (COMMERCIAL TAX-2 AND CO ORDINATION) VIDHANA SOUDHA DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI BANGALORE - 560 001. - 3 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 2. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, M.S.BUILDING, BANGALORE – 560 001. ...RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. HARISHA A.S. AGA FOR R1; SRI. K.PRASANNA SHETTY ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER WRIT OR ORDER OR DIRECTION, SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 17.301.2023 IN APPLICATION No. 3598-99/2021, PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT BENGALURU, WHICH IS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-A, CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE APPLICATION No-3598-99/2021 (ANNEXURE-B), FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE HONBLE TRIBUNAL, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND ETC., THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDER ON 08.06.2026 COMING ON THIS DAY, S.G.PANDIT J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K CAV ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT) Since both the Writ Petitions are filed challenging a Common Order and since the facts involved in both the Writ Petitions are the same, both the Writ Petitions shall be disposed of by this Common Order. - 4 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 2. The petitioner in WP No. 4728/2023, a retired Second Division Assistant and the petitioner in WP No. 13003/2023, a retired Commercial Tax Officer are before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, aggrieved by the common Order dated 17.01.2023 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Tribunal’) in Application Nos. 3598 and 3599 of 2021, wherein the petitioner’s prayer to set aside the Order of penalty dated 08.01.2021, is rejected. 3. The brief facts of the case are that, the petitioners in WP No. 13003/2023 and WP No. 4728/2023 were working as Commercial Tax Officer(Hereinafter referred to as ‘DGO No.1’) and Second Division Assistant (Hereinafter referred to as ‘DGO No.2’), respectively, at Commercial Tax Office, Bengaluru. A complaint came to be lodged before the Lokayukta Police by one Sri K.K. Mohammad (hereinafter referred to as “the complainant”) on 21.01.2010, alleging that, on 18.01.2010, when broken granite pieces were being transported in lorry bearing No. - 5 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 KA-01-AA-4847 owned by the complainant, DGO No.1 and DGO No.2 had demanded and collected a bribe of Rs.11,000/- in addition to the fee levied to the tune of Rs.39,000/-.It was further alleged in the complaint that, on 20.01.2010, lorry bearing No. KL-45-B-3222, carrying broken granite pieces from Jigani to Thrissur, was stopped at the Attibele Check Post, where DGO No.1 and DGO No.2 threatened the complainant with the levy of a huge penalty and subsequently demanded a bribe of Rs.87,000/-. The said demand was thereafter reduced to Rs.37,000/-, and the complainant was asked to come to their office with the bribe amount on 21.01.2010.Consequently, the complainant lodged the aforesaid complaint before the Lokayukta Police, pursuant to which Crime No.2/2010 was registered and a trap was laid against both the DGOs. The investigation ultimately culminated in the filing of a charge sheet against five accused persons, which included DGO No.1 and 2. 4. Subsequently, the Lokayukta was entrusted with the departmental enquiry under Rule 14A of the - 6 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 Karnataka Civil Services(CCA) Rules, 1957 and articles of charge was issued on 09.05.2013, to which both the DGO No.1 and DGO No. 2 replied on 11.06.2013. During the pendency of the departmental enquiry, the DGOs were acquitted in the Criminal Trial in Spl. C.C. No. 129/2012 vide judgment dated 09.04.2014 by the Principal Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Bangalore Rural District. On 22.02.2017, the enquiry officer submitted the enquiry report holding that the charges against the DGO No. 1 and 2 are said to be proved. The said report was forwarded to the government along with recommendation of imposition of withholding 50% of monthly pension amount by the Upa-Lokayukta on 01.03.2017. On 21.03.2017, the Respondent No.1 issued the second show cause notice to the petitioner enclosing the enquiry report as well as the recommendation of the Upa-Lokayukta seeking explanation within 15 days. In response to the same, the DGO No.1 and 2 have replied on 18.05.2017. The Respondent No.1 vide impugned Order dated 08.01.2021 imposed the penalty of withholding 50% of monthly - 7 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 pension amount. Challenging the Order of penalty dated 08.01.2021, the DGOs No. 1 and 2 were before the Tribunal in Application Nos. 3598 and 3599 of 2021.The Tribunal vide common Order dated 17.01.2023, dismissed both the Applications and upheld the Order of penalty imposed by the Respondent No.1.Questioning the Order of penalty as well as the Order of the Tribunal, these writ petitions have been filed by DGOs No. 1 and 2. 5. Heard Sri.Naik Venkataraman Nagappa, learned counsel for petitioners in both the Writ Petitions, Sr. Harisha A S, learned AGA for Respondent No.1 in both the Writ Petitions and Sri. K Prasanna Shetty, learned counsel for the Lokayukta in both the Writ Petitions. Perused the entire writ petition papers. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in both the Writ Petitions, Sri. Naik Venkataraman Nagappa would submit that impugned Order of the Tribunal is arbitrary, perverse and is passed without appreciating the materials on record. Learned counsel for the petitioner, referring to - 8 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 judgment of acquittal in Spl. C.C. No. 129/2012 dated 09.04.2014, would submit that, on the same set of allegations and facts, both the DGOs have been acquitted in the criminal proceedings and hence, it is submitted that the departmental proceedings cannot be allowed to stand. It is further submitted that the allegations of demand and acceptance have not been proved in the enquiry proceedings and hence, the enquiry officer erred in holding that the charges against the DGOs are proved. It is submitted that the charges against the DGOs were not proved even on the standard of preponderance of probabilities applicable to departmental proceedings and that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were perverse and unsupported by any material on record. Thus, it is submitted that writ petitions be allowed and the orders of the Tribunal and the Order of penalty be set aside. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the Lokayukta, Sri. K Prasanna Shetty would submit that departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings operate in different fields. It is submitted that, while departmental proceedings - 9 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 are intended to examine misconduct under the service rules, criminal proceedings deal with offences that must be proved in accordance with strict rules of evidence. Therefore, findings recorded by a criminal court do not automatically govern disciplinary proceedings. It is further submitted that in cases involving demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, even if demand is not conclusively established, recovery of the amount from the delinquent official would be sufficient to prove the charges against the DGOs. It is submitted that the depositions of PW1, the complainant, PW2, the panch witness and PW3, the investigating officer would fully support the case against the DGOs. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the Lokayukta places reliance upon two decisions of the coordinate bench of this court in WP No. 19669/2022 (NAGESH VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANR.) dated 27.09.2024 and in WP No. 24208/2021 (T REVANNA VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANR.) dated 21.08.2025. Thus, it is submitted that both the writ petitions be dismissed. Learned AGA, Sri. Harisha AS - 10 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 would adopt the submissions made on behalf of Respondent No.2 and further submit that charges in departmental proceedings are required to be proved only on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and that, in exercise of judicial review, this Court cannot re-appreciate the sufficiency of evidence. Thus, learned AGA would pray for dismissal of the writ petitions. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the entire writ petition papers, the only point which falls for consideration is: Whether interference with Order of penalty dated 08.01.2021 as well as the impugned Order of the Tribunal is warranted? 9. Answer to the above point would be in the ‘Negative’ for the following reasons: This Court, in a challenge to the Order of penalty or disciplinary proceedings, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not sit as an appellate authority, rather, this Court would only interfere with the - 11 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 order of penalty for correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions has reiterated that interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitutions, with the Order of penalty or disciplinary proceedings is extremely limited. The Hon’ble Apex Court in SBI V. AJAI KUMAR SRIVASTAVA reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612 summarized the principles at paragraphs 22 to 28 as under: “22. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier examined by this Court in State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan [State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan, (1994) 6 SCC 302 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1385] and later in State of T.N. v. A. Rajapandian [State of T.N. v. A. Rajapandian, (1995) 1 SCC 216 : 1995 - 12 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 SCC (L&S) 292] and further examined by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] wherein it has been held as under : (B.C. Chaturvedi case [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , SCC pp. 759-60, para 13) “13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 23. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya [H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] and recently by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India [Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 103] . - 13 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; - 14 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry. 27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or - 15 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings. 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.” 10. Keeping in mind the above principles summarized by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Writ Petition shall have to be adjudicated. The charges against DGO No. 1 and DGO No. 2 reads as under: “ANNEXURE-I CHARGE: That you DGO-1 Sri Bhyrappa, Commercial Tax Officer (retired), you DGO no.2 Mallikarjun, SDA and DGO no.3 (iii) Krishna, Group D' Employee (all of them working then in the Commercial Tax Checkpost, Attibele, Hosur - 16 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 Road, Bangalore) demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs. 37000/- and Rs. 5000/- on 21/1/2010 from complainant Sri.K.K. Mohammad Ali S/o K.K. Kunhi Koya of Marva Granites, P.O-Koori Kuzhikaipamangalam in Trichur District for allowing transportation of broken granite pieces from Charbuja Granites at Jigani to Trissur that is for doing an official act, and thereby you have failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and committed an act which is unbecoming of a Government Servant and thus you both are guilty of misconduct under Rule 3(1)(i) to (iii) of KCS (Conduct)Rules 1966” 11. In sum and substance, the charges against the DGOs is of demand and acceptance of bribe of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 37,000/- from the complainant for the transportation of broken pieces of granite from Jigani to Thrissur. A perusal of the evidence adduced against the DGOs in the enquiry proceedings would disclose that PW1, the complainant, deposed that DGO No.1 had, on 19.01.2010, demanded a bribe of Rs.11,000/- in addition to the fee of Rs.39,000/- that had been levied. Subsequently, on the very next day, both the DGOs - 17 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 demanded a bribe of Rs.87,000/-, which was later reduced to Rs.37,000/-, and the complainant was asked to pay the same on the following day at 8.00 p.m. at the office of the DGOs. Thereafter, the complainant lodged a complaint before the Lokayukta Police, who made arrangements for conducting trap proceedings. When the complainant reached the office of the DGOs with the currency notes smeared with phenolphthalein powder, DGO No.2 asked the complainant if the cash was arranged and was asked to speak to DGO No.1. The DGO No.1, thereafter, demanded a sum of Rs.42,000/- instead of Rs.37,000/-. The complainant was then instructed to hand over the cash to one Sri Ravi, who counted the currency and thereafter handed it over to DGO No.3, Sri Krishna. Subsequently, when the police arrived at the office of the DGOs, the hands of the said Ravi and DGO No.3, Krishna, turned pink. Nothing contrary to, or fatal to, the case of the disciplinary authority emerged from the cross- examination of PW1. Similar depositions were made by PW2, the panch witness who accompanied the complainant - 18 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 during the trap proceedings, and PW3, the Investigating Officer. 12. It has been argued on behalf of the petitioners that, the petitioners have been acquitted in the criminal trial in Spl. C.C. No. 129/2012 vide judgment dated 09.04.2014 and hence, it is submitted that on the same set of facts and witnesses, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be allowed to stand. We have perused the judgment of the trial Court in Spl. C.C. No. 129/2012. A perusal at paras 29 and 30 of the said judgment would disclose that the acquittal of the DGOs and 3 other accused persons in the said trial was on account of doubts raised in the mind of the court as well as insufficient evidence against the accused persons. The said acquittal was not an honorable one. It has been held time and again by this Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court that criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings stand on different footings. The standard of proof required in a criminal trial is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas, in enquiry proceedings, the standard of proof - 19 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 required is that of preponderance of probabilities. In RAM LAL VS STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS reported in (2024) 1 SCC 175, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that if the prosecution fails to prove the charge miserably, i.e. in other words, it is an honorable acquittal, then the same shall be taken note of by this Court in judicial review. A Co-ordinate bench of this Court in P.V. RUDRAPPA VS STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. reported in 2024 SCC ONLINE KAR 10628 has explained ‘honorable acquittal’ and in paragraph 3 has held as under: “3. AS TO PLEA OF HONOURABLE ACQUITTAL & ITS EFFECT ON DISCIPLINARY ACTION: (a)…... (b) The concept of ‘honourable acquittal’ is easy to say, but difficult to employ, there being no statutory definition thereof, more particularly in the IPC, Cr. P.C. & Indian Evidence Act. Lord Williams, J. in ROBERT STUART WAUCHOPE v. EMPEROR, ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168 observed:“The expression ‘honourably acquitted’ is one which is unknown to court of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extra judicial tribunals…”. The Apex Court in COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHER SINGH, (2013) 7 SCC 685 at para 25 explained the same: - 20 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 “…the expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame” and “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. … when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges leveled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.” (c) The idea of ‘honourable acquittal’ is not easy to define although it can be illustrated. If an accused is discharged at pre-trial stage or the criminal proceeding launched against him is quashed, there is no difficulty in treating the same as the cases of ‘honourable acquittal’ for the limited purpose of disciplinary enquiry. (We are mindful that the question of acquittal comes post trial). A case of ‘honourable acquittal’ may arise when, after trial the Criminal Court orders acquittal with any of nearly the following illustrives: (i) the accused is falsely prosecuted to seek vengeance or for some ulterior motive. (ii) that there is absolutely no evidence to implicate the accused in the proceedings; (iii) there is very little evidence which is insufficient to connect the accused with the commission of crime; (iv) the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges against the accused; - 21 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 (v) the prosecution witnesses are unworthy of any credit and their version does not generate any confidence. We again say that the above are only illustrative and not exhaustive. We would also add a caveat that in considering as to whether the case of delinquent is of ‘honourable acquittal’, the entire judgment in Criminal Case should be perused. It is also desirable to secure a copy of record of the proceedings for examination, unless the said exercise poses practical difficulty. At least, it should be open to the delinquent employee to produce such copies.” 13. In the facts of the present case, as stated above, the circumstances under which the DGOs were acquitted cannot be considered as honorable acquittal or it cannot be said to be falling under any of the circumstances stated in P.V. RUDRAPPA (supra). Thus, the argument that enquiry proceedings cannot be allowed to stand for the reason of acquittal in criminal proceedings, deserves to be rejected. 14. Further, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court would only interfere with the decision of - 22 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 the fact-finding authority in disciplinary proceedings if the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry officer is perverse or if it is a case of no evidence. It has been argued for the petitioners that the charge of demand and acceptance against the DGOs have not been proved. It is an admitted and undisputed fact that, during the trap proceedings, the hands of one Sri. Ravi and one Sri. Krishna turned pink and not that of DGO No. 1 and DGO No.2. It is also an admitted fact that the tainted currency has been recovered from the office premises of DGO No. 1 and 2. The perusal of the evidence on record would clearly establish that it was at the behest of DGO No. 1 and 2 that the said Sri. Ravi and Sri. Krishna counted and received the tainted currency. There is sufficient material on record to prove the charges against the DGOs on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. No perversity in the enquiry proceedings as such has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Thus, the argument that charge of demand and acceptance against the DGOs is not proved, is liable to be rejected. - 23 - WP No. 4728 of 2023 C/W WP No. 13003 of 2023 15. For the reasons recorded above, there is no merit in the contentions raised on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner in both the writ petitions. Thus, both the writ petitions stand rejected. SD/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE SD/- (RAJESH RAI K) JUDGE NC. CT: RK