1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA LPA No.97 of 2022 Reserved on : 20.06.2026 Decided on : 25.06.2 026 Uploaded on : 25.06.2026 The State of Himachal Pradesh and another …… Appellants Versus Rangila Ram …… Respondent Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellants : Ms. Priyanka Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General. For the respondent : Mr. Surender Saklani, Advocate. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge By way of the present appeal, challenge has been laid to the impugned judgment dated 07.07.2021, passed by learned Single Judge, in CWPOA No.2063 of 2020, titled Rangila Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., whereby, a direction has been issued to the appellants to promote the writ petitioner (respondent), as a Junior Engineer from amongst the category of Work Inspector (Diploma Holder in Civil Engineering) from the date, on which the writ petitioner (respondent), had completed three years of service in the feeder category, by convening a 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 review Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) w.e.f. 01.01.2001, with all consequential benefits. 2. The writ petitioner (respondent) is a Diploma holder in Civil Engineering. The writ petitioner (respondent) was appointed as a Work Inspector on daily wage basis w.e.f. 01.06.1990. The services of the writ petitioner (respondent) were regularized w.e.f. 21.03.2003. However, subsequently, vide corrigendum dated 28.04.2012 (Annexure A-1 appended along-with the writ petition), the writ petitioner (respondent) came to be regularized against the post of Work Inspector w.e.f. 01.01.2001. 3. In the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances of the case, the writ petitioner (respondent) became eligible to be considered for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) against the 3.5% quota meant for Diploma Holders (Technical) under Clause 11(iv) of the R & P Rules for the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) (Annexure A-2 filed with the writ petition) after putting in three years of service in the feeder category. 4. The writ petitioner (respondent) was promoted to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) against the 3.5% quota meant for Diploma Holders as provided in the Service Rules detailed (supra) w.e.f. 31.12.2005. The writ petitioner (respondent) had joined in pursuance to the promotion orders on 04.01.2006 without any protest. 5. In the aforesaid backdrop, the writ petitioner (respondent) preferred a representation dated 20.07.2017 (Annexure A-6 filed along- with the writ petition). The sum and substance of the representation so 3 filed being that once the writ petitioner (respondent) had been regularized as a Work Inspector w.e.f. 01.01.2001 (Annexure A-1 filed with the writ petition), in terms of the R & P Rules, on completion of three years therefrom, i.e., from 01.01.2004, the writ petitioner (respondent) should have been given promotion as a Junior Engineer, hence, the promotion given to the writ petitioner (respondent) w.e.f. 31.12.2005 was required to be ante-dated. 6. Subsequent to the aforesaid representation, Original Application bearing No.2992 of 2017 was filed before the erstwhile Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal, wherein, the aforesaid grievance was raised. The said Original Application was transferred to this Court. The same was re-registered as CWPOA No.2063 of 2020. 7. In the Original Application, the contention raised was that since the writ petitioner (respondent) had been regularized as a Work Inspector w.e.f. 01.01.2001, hence, now promotion which had been given to the petitioner w.e.f. 31.12.2005, was required to be given effect from 01.01.2004, as in terms of R&P Rules, on 01.01.2004, the writ petitioner had completed three years of service in the feeder category. It was contended in the Original Application that in the year, 2004, promotional posts of Junior Engineers were lying vacant. 8. In the reply filed, the stand taken was that promotion is not automatic, but subject to availability of vacancies against quota prescribed for various feeder categories and is also subject to the seniority position of the incumbents in their respective category. 4 9. Other than the aforesaid, in the reply filed, a plea of limitation/delay and laches in filing the petition has also been raised. 10. In the rejoinder filed, the writ petitioner (respondent) has raised a plea that one Shri Jagdeep Bhag Chandani had been promoted w.e.f. 15.03.2003 and that there were posts which was lying vacant. Detail of posts lying vacant in other than tribal/difficult areas, was also filed with the rejoinder. 11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings. 12. Admittedly, in the case at hand, the writ petitioner (respondent) had been promoted w.e.f. 31.12.2005 in pursuance whereto the writ petitioner (respondent) had joined on 04.06.2006 without any protest. Initially, the date of promotion of the writ petitioner (respondent) to the post of Work Inspector had been notified on 21.03.2003. However, subsequently vide corrigendum dated 28.04.2012 (Annexure A-1 appended along with the writ petition), the writ petitioner (respondent) came to be regularized w.e.f. 01.01.2001. 13. In the aforesaid backdrop, a grievance qua being promoted w.e.f. 01.01.2004, on completion of three years, in the feeder category from the date of regularization as a Work Inspector from 01.01.2001, was for the first time raised vide representation dated 20.02.2017 (Annexure A-6 filed along-with the writ petition). In pursuance thereto, Original Application bearing No.2292 of 2017 was filed on 14.05.2017. Thus, the instant petition is clearly barred under the provisions of Section 21 of the 5 Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal Act. The same reads as follow:- “21. Limitation.—(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,— (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1), where— (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal become exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub- section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may 6 be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1), or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.” 14. A reading of the aforesaid reproduced Section makes it clear that the Tribunal cannot admit an application unless the same is made within the time specified in Clause (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) or Section 21(2) or an order is passed in terms of Sub Section (3) for entertaining the application after the prescribed period, since Section 21(1) is couched in negative form, it is the duty of the Tribunal to first consider whether the application is within limitation. 15. An application can be admitted only if the same is found to have been made within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is shown under Section 21(3) of the Act for belated filing. Reference in this respect can be made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, in D.C.S. Negi v. Union of India, (2018) 16 SCC 721. 16. Other than the aforesaid, insofar as the promotion is concerned, it is settled position of law that dispute with respect to promotion should be raised at the earliest, i.e. within six months or at the most a year of the promotion. In the case at hand, once rectification with respect to the regularization of the petitioner had been made on 28.04.2012 (Annexure A-1 appended along-with the writ petition), even then ante dating of the promotion made to the post of Junior Engineer 7 against 3.5% quota meant for Diploma Holders Junior Technician (Work Inspector), in terms of R & P Rules should have been made within six months or at the most a year therefrom. In this respect, reference can gainfully be made to P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152, relevant extract whereof reads as follow: “A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner’s petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work.” (See also State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das, (2023) 15 SCC 273). 17. The writ petition is based on the premise that once the writ petitioner (respondent) had completed the requisite number of years in the feeder category, he had a right to be promoted immediately against the 8 vacancy available. There is an inherent fallacy in the aforesaid contention as suffice it to state the writ petitioner (respondent) has no right to get promotion. He has only a right to be considered for promotion. In this respect, reference can be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Hardev Singh vs. Union of India and another, (2011) 10 SCC 121. Relevant extract is being reproduced here-in-below:- “17. It cannot be disputed that no employee has a right to get promotion; so the appellant had no right to get promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-General but he had a right to be considered for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-General and if as per the prevailing policy, he was eligible to be promoted to the said rank, he ought to have been considered. In the instant case, there is no dispute to the fact that the appellant’s case was duly considered by the SSB for his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant- General.” 18. Reference can also be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Bihar State Electricity Board and others vs. Dharamdeo Das, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1768. Relevant extract is being reproduced here-in-below:- “18. It is no longer res integra that a promotion is effective from the date it is granted and not from the date when a vacancy occurs on the subject post or when the post itself is created. No doubt, a right to be considered for promotion has been treated by courts not just as a statutory right but as a fundamental right, at the same time, there is no fundamental right to promotion itself. In this context, we may profitably cite a recent decision in Ajay 9 Kumar Shukla vs. Arvind Rai9 where, citing earlier precedents in Director, Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. vs. Pravat Kiran Mohanty and Others10 and Ajit Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others11, a three Judge Bench observed thus: 41. This Court, time and again, has laid emphasis on right to be considered for promotion to be a fundamental right, as was held by K. Ramaswamy, J., in Director, Lift Irrigation Corpn. Ltd. v. Pravat Kiran Mohanty and Others9 in para 4 of the report which is reproduced below: “4………..There is no fundamental right to promotion, but an employee has only right to be considered for promotion, when it arises, in accordance with relevant rules. From this perspective in our view the conclusion of the High Court that the gradation list prepared by the corporation is in violation of the right of respondent- writ petitioner to equality enshrined under Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution, and the respondent-writ petitioner was unjustly denied of the same is obviously unjustified.” 42. A Constitution Bench in Ajit Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others10, laying emphasis on Article 14 and Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India held that if a person who satisfies the eligibility and the criteria for promotion but still is not considered for promotion, then there will be clear violation of his/her’s fundamental right. Jagannadha Rao, J. speaking for himself and 10 Anand, C.J., Venkataswami, Pattanaik, Kurdukar, JJ., observed the same as follows in paras 22 and 27 : “Articles 14 and 16(1) : is right to be considered for promotion a fundamental right 22. Article 14 and Article 16(1) are closely connected. They deal with individual rights of the person. Article 14 demands that the ‘State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws’. Article 16(1) issues a positive command that: ‘there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State’. It has been held repeatedly by this Court that clause (1) of Article 16 is a facet of Article 14 and that it takes its roots from Article 14. The said clause particularises the generality in Article 14 and identifies, in a constitutional sense “equality of opportunity” in matters of employment and appointment to any office under the State. The word “employment” being wider, there is no dispute that it takes within its fold, the aspect of promotions to posts above the stage of initial level of recruitment. Article 16(1) provides to every employee otherwise eligible for promotion or who comes within the zone of consideration, a fundamental right to be “considered” for promotion. Equal opportunity here means the right to be “considered” for promotion. If a person satisfies the eligibility and zone criteria but is not considered for promotion, then there will be a clear infraction of his fundamental right to be “considered” for promotion, which is his personal right.“Promotion” based on equal opportunity and seniority attached to such promotion are facets of fundamental right under Article 16(1) * * * 11 27. In our opinion, the above view expressed in Ashok Kumar Gupta [Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. , and followed in Jagdish Lal [Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana13, and other cases, if it is intended to lay down that the right guaranteed to employees for being “considered” for promotion according to relevant rules of recruitment by promotion (i.e. whether on the basis of seniority or merit) is only a statutory right and not a fundamental right, we cannot accept the proposition. We have already stated earlier that the right to equal opportunity in the matter of promotion  in the sense of a right to be “considered” for promotion is indeed a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16(1) and this has never been doubted in any other case before Ashok Kumar Gupta [Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P.11], right from 1950.” 22. The spirit behind elevating the right for being considered for promotion to a fundamental right is enshrined in the principle of “equality of opportunity” in relation to matters of employment and appointment to a position under the State. Once employed, the employees are entitled for being considered for promotion to the next higher post subject to their satisfying the eligibility criteria, as per the applicable rules. Failure to consider an employee for promotion even after satisfying the eligibility criteria would violate her fundamental right. However, a clear distinction has been drawn between the stage of considering an employee for being promoted to taking the next step of recognizing the said right as a vested right for promotion. That is where the line has to be drawn. Stated differently, a right to be considered for promotion being a facet of the right to equal opportunity in employment and appointment, would have to be treated as a fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India but such a right cannot translate into a vested right of the employee for 12 being necessarily promoted to the promotional post, unless the rules expressly provide for such a situation.” 19. The plea taken in the rejoinder that one Shri Jagdeep Bhagchandani had been promoted w.e.f. 15.03.2003, needs to be rejected on account of the fact that said Shri Jagdeep Bhagchandani was regularized/appointed as Work Inspector on 28.03.1998. The writ petitioner/respondent, on the other hand, was regularized w.e.f. 01.01.2001 as a Work Inspector. Meaning thereby that Jagdeep Bhagchandani was senior to the writ petitioner (respondent). 20. Other than the aforesaid, the detail of vacancies qua posts of Junior Engineers in areas other than tribal/difficult areas filed along with the rejoinder, do not depict the number of vacancies which were to fall to the share/quota, to which the writ petitioner (respondent) belonged, i.e., 3.5% quota meant for Diploma Holders Junior Technician (Work Inspector), in terms of Clause 11(iv) of the R & P Rules for promotion to the Junior Engineer (Civil) (Annexure A-2 filed with the writ petition). Even otherwise, in the petition filed it is not the case of the writ petitioner that juniors to the writ petitioner had been promoted. The only bald contention raised therein was that there existed vacancies on 1-1-2004. It has been correctly pointed out by the appellant that promotion is not automatic (no right to be promoted only a right to be considered), but subject to availability of vacancies against quota prescribed for various feeder categories and is also subject to the seniority position of the incumbents in their respective category. The writ petitioner/respondent had been 13 considered and promoted w.e.f 31.12.2005 which had been accepted without any protest by joining on 04.01.2006. 21. In view of the aforesaid, the present appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment passed by learned Single Judge, in CWPOA No.2063 of 2020, titled Rangila Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others dated 07.07.2021, is quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the appeal stands disposed of, so also, the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (G.S. Sandhawalia) (Bipin Chander Negi) Chief Justice Judge June 25, 2026 (KS)